

**STATEMENT**  
**by the Delegation of the Russian Federation**  
**at the General Debate of the session**  
**of the United Nations Disarmament Commission,**

**(New York, 8 April 2025)**

Mr. Chairman,

I would like to congratulate you on your election to this responsible position and express our hope that under your leadership we shall keep the positive dynamics of the work of the UN Disarmament Commission (UNDC) and gain success in fulfilling the tasks it is entrusted with. The Russian delegation is ready to extend every support in this regard.

Mr. Chairman,

This year is marked by a number of important anniversaries directly related to the activities of the UNDC. This year we commemorate the 80<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the end of the Second World War, which, according to various estimates, claimed lives of between 50 and 80 million people worldwide, including over 27 million citizens of the Soviet Union. In accordance with the UNGA resolution «Eightieth anniversary of the end of the Second World War» adopted unanimously at the Russia's initiative, a special commemorative session of the General Assembly will be held in May to honour all victims of that devastating war.

The defeat of Nazism laid the foundation for a new architecture of international relations, with the UN at its core. To this day, the UN remains the unique universal platform for elaborating collective solutions in response to global challenges, primarily in the area of international security and stability. It was the UN that established the foundation for a system of multilateral agreements in the field of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation (ACDNP), where the key role belongs to the disarmament «triad», including the UNDC.

Unfortunately, after 80 years the lessons of the Second World War are being forgotten. Today we are witnessing a rapid degradation in the field of international security. The deeply self-serving and destructive course aimed at total geopolitical

dominance and overwhelming military-strategic superiority adopted by the group of Western States over a certain historical period has manifested itself in the blatant violation of the principle of equal and undiminished security, as well as in a refusal to seek mutually acceptable solutions based on genuine multilateralism and mutual consideration of concerns.

These actions have pushed other States, determined to firmly defend their sovereign rights and the external security perimeter, to take compensatory measures and increasingly tough steps to neutralize the escalating threats against them. The conflict potential in the relations between States with the greatest military capabilities has been particularly dangerous: targeted and shameless infringement by some of them upon fundamental security interests of others has provoked the most serious strategic risks, including the threat of direct armed confrontation between nuclear powers.

The sphere of ACDNP also experiences this negative impact at full extent. The system of relevant agreements and arrangements, which has served as the main pillar of international security architecture for decades, is being undermined and partially collapsed.

In the current circumstances, the consolidated efforts of the international community to de-escalate, reduce tensions and rectify the situation with a view to long-term and reliable stabilization seem to be the obvious priority. However, at present in the international arena there is insufficient political will for joint work based on the equality of parties, balance of interests and respect for each other's concerns to address the root causes of crises and fundamental contradictions between States in the field of security. On the contrary, individual States or their associations assertively promote their priorities and agendas without any regard to the opinions of others. It is precisely for this reason that disarmament initiatives often fail to gain universal support and sometimes even contribute to further divisions within the international community.

We emphasize that any initiatives in the field of ACDNP must be aligned with military-political and military-strategic realities, since their acceptability and feasibility are directly linked to the state of security environment, which determines the limits of what is possible.

For years we have considered and still believe these approaches to be axiomatics, the fundamental elements of which are agreed by consensus at the international level,

for example, in the final document of the UNGA First Special Session in 1978 and the Action Plan of the 2010 NPT Review Conference. However, recent discussions at specialized forums demonstrate that for some countries these understandings need to be proven again. All of this is far from encouraging.

Against the background of current international instability, preserving the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and ensuring its sustainability and effectiveness remain among our main priorities. Over the 55 years of its existence, the NPT has become a nearly universal international legal instrument that has proven its relevance to the entire international community. We look forward to constructive engagement with all State Parties intending to participate in the third session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2026 NPT Review Conference.

The establishment and operation of the Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones (NWFZ) in various regions of the world, as envisaged under Article VII of the NPT, contributes to strengthening the non-proliferation regime. We welcome efforts to expand the geographic scope of NWFZs. Russia has consistently advocated for the establishment of the Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction (WMDFZ). Such a zone would serve as an effective way to strengthen regional security and the non-proliferation regime in the interests of all states in the Middle East without exception. As an observer, our country contributes to the work of the annual UN Conference on the Establishment of a WMDFZ in the Middle East. It is essential to ensure participation of all invited States in the Conference.

The entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) primarily depends on the USA. We regret that the United States has taken no substantive steps to ratify the Treaty since 1999, repeatedly covering itself with various excuses. At the same time, Washington continues to maintain the readiness of its Nevada test site refusing to abandon the idea of conducting a full-scale nuclear test as a part of modernizing its arsenal. We are closely monitoring the situation in this area: the resumption of tests by the US would become a prelude to lifting the voluntary restrictions declared by other nuclear powers. It was the imbalance in commitments with Washington that forced us to withdraw ratification of the CTBT in order to achieve parity. At the same time, Russia remains a State Signatory to the Treaty with all rights

and obligations, and continues to participate fully in the CTBTO Preparatory Commission.

Mr. Chairman,

Scientific and technological progress and modern technologies, including advancements in space technology, artificial intelligence and biotechnology provide great opportunities for humankind and are becoming an integral part of our daily lives. At the same time, they pose certain risks and challenges to international security and stability.

Russia attaches particular importance to the examination of scientific and technological developments relevant to the ACDNP. We believe it is essential to identify and analyse the risks associated with various research areas in order to reduce such risks to an acceptable level without compromising scientific and technological progress. Simultaneously, there is a need to raise awareness and promote the sharing of knowledge and advances that can help to strengthen international security.

We would like to welcome the launching of a discussion in the framework of the UNDC on new technologies in the context of international security and are ready to contribute to the substantive discussion on this pressing issue. At the same time, we proceed from the assumption that the discussion in the UNDC should not duplicate the consideration of issues related to new technologies that is already taking place in parallel dialogue formats. In particular, we consider the relevant Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) of High Contracting Parties to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons to be the optimal format for discussing Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS). We believe that issues of preventing an arms race in outer space require further discussion within the framework of the relevant Open-ended Working Group (OEWG), as well as the biotechnologies and the establishment within the framework of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) of a mechanism for reviewing scientific and technological achievements in the biological sphere - in the Ad Hoc Working Group on Strengthening the BTWC.

Among promising topics we consider the issue of ensuring non-discriminatory access to new technologies and international co-operation in this field. Relevant

proposals were made by delegations during the UNDC session in 2024 and met no objections.

Mr. Chairman,

We are convinced that the UN Disarmament Commission is capable of making a significant contribution to multilateral efforts in the area of disarmament and arms control, in accordance with its mandate. We count on the preparation of recommendations within Working groups.

Thank you for your attention.