Statement by the delegations of the States Parties to the Treaty on the Establishment of the Union State of the Republic of Belarus and the Russian Federation at the Second Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2026 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

(Geneva, July 22, 2024)

Delivered by the delegation of the Republic of Belarus

Mr. Chair,

Allow me to congratulate you on your election to this high office and assure you of the full support of the delegations of the Republic of Belarus and the Russian Federation.

We, the States Parties to the Treaty on the Establishment of the Union State of the Republic of Belarus and the Russian Federation, reaffirm our commitment to preserving and strengthening the regime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

The Republic of Belarus and the Russian Federation recognize the critical importance of the NPT for enhancing global security. It is a central element of the arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation system. Preserving the fundamental values of the Treaty and promoting its effectiveness are not merely the duty of all States Parties, but a priority task for maintaining stability on a global scale.

We call for adhering to the NPT in its integrity, and remembering that all three of its pillars—nuclear non-proliferation, peaceful use of nuclear energy and disarmament—are equally important. The intentional selective promotion of certain elements of the rights and obligations that are envisaged by the Treaty and that a State Party finds
beneficial for itself, does not contribute to the effectiveness of the review process.

Nuclear disarmament cannot be considered in isolation without taking into account the existing political and military and strategic realities. The Treaty’s preamble and Article VI clearly place it within the context of general and complete disarmament. This task should be addressed in a comprehensive manner through collective efforts of both nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States based on a realistic step-by-step approach. All steps must be in full accordance with the provisions of the consensus documents of the NPT review process, according to which steps towards nuclear disarmament should promote the strengthening of international stability, peace and security. Furthermore, the principle of increased and undiminished security for all must be strictly observed. All members of the international community should engage in meticulous work to create a climate conducive to disarmament while taking into account the interests of all parties.

We have to recognize that the current international security and strategic stability situation is far from favourable for disarmament. There exists a series of closely interrelated factors that create an extremely negative atmosphere, hindering progress in this area, including in nuclear arms control and disarmament efforts.

These factors include NATO’s expansion to the detriment of the security of the States Parties to the Treaty on the Establishment of the Union State; NATO countries’ hostile actions that pose risks of a direct armed conflict between nuclear powers; the US efforts to achieve decisive military superiority to secure itself unchallenged global dominance; the US deployment of a global missile defense combined with the buildup of long-range high-precision non-nuclear weapons under the destabilizing “left-of-launch” and “global strike” concepts; the US advancement towards placing weapons in outer space and deploying ground-launched intermediate and shorter-range missiles in various regions of the world; the US and NATO’s attempts to increase
imbalances in the field of conventional weapons that are favourable for them; forward deployment of the US nuclear weapons capable of reaching the territory of the Union State, in the territory of five non-nuclear NATO countries; the buildup of NATO countries’ military capabilities and increased military activities in the vicinity of the borders of the States Parties to the Treaty on the Establishment of the Union State; illegitimate use of restrictive measures by the West bypassing the UN, which prejudices the security of other countries.

Any further progress on the disarmament track will primarily require abandoning the policy of deliberately undermining the security of sovereign States, which implies strict adherence to the principle of equal and indivisible security, as well as readiness to engage in comprehensive and equality-based work to strengthen international security and strategic stability taking into account all key factors in their interrelation. Furthermore, to ensure further practical results in nuclear arms reduction, it will be necessary to involve all states possessing military nuclear capabilities in this process, primarily all NATO countries possessing nuclear weapons.

We are convinced that the disarmament process is impossible without the effective implementation of the NPT provisions aimed at preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The IAEA comprehensive safeguards intended to ensure compliance with Articles I and II of the Treaty serve as a reliable barrier to the processes that are destructive for the planet and could lead to a major global crisis. Our countries are firmly committed to doing everything possible at both national and international levels to further assist this important work.

As far as the reform of the IAEA safeguards system is concerned, we would like to emphasize that despite any changes, the Agency’s control mechanism must remain objective, politically unbiased, technically sound, and based on agreements concluded between the IAEA and the States.
The review process should pay more attention to peaceful use of nuclear energy. Our States are a vivid example of how the creation of nuclear power generating capacities based on advanced technologies contributes to social and economic progress. It would also be important for the States Parties to consider various non-energy applications of peaceful nuclear technology.

It is our firm belief that international efforts in the field of nuclear non-proliferation, including those related to the improvement of export controls, should not lead to unjustified restrictions on peaceful scientific and technical cooperation and be used to create unilateral competitive advantages either in the nuclear field, or in other areas.

Unfortunately, the 2015 and 2022 Review Conferences failed to adopt final documents. That happened due to high expectations of certain States and, most importantly, due to NATO countries’ intention to use the NPT for political tasks not related to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and their unwillingness to work on genuinely consensual languages and to listen to their opponents. Such a course of action disrupts the review process.

Belarus and Russia are committed to constructive engagement with all delegations without exception during this Session of the Preparatory Committee, in a spirit of mutual respect without politicization, ultimatums, and taking into account each other's interests and concerns. We call on the other participants to follow suit.

Thank you.