



**United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
National Statement for Main Committee 2
of the 2026 Review Conference of the Parties to the
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons**

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As we have heard in the General Debate last week, the NPT's non-proliferation architecture remains critical to international peace and security. We should reaffirm and strengthen this architecture so that it remains resilient, credible, and fit for the future.

We hopefully can all agree that the International Atomic Energy Agency plays a key role - providing global assurance that States are meeting their non-proliferation obligations and thus providing the confidence for expanded nuclear trade and cooperation.

The United Kingdom reaffirms our support for the IAEA, its independent, impartial, and technical work, and the safeguards system it operates. Sustained political, technical and financial support from all States Parties is vital to enable the Agency to continue delivering its independent and impartial mandate at the heart of the NPT.

We welcome the recent entry into force of Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements for Guinea and Somalia, and hope universalisation will follow soon. This will mark a significant milestone.

The next step will be to ensure the strongest safeguards standards are in place everywhere.

The combination of a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and an Additional Protocol represents the current verification standard under Article III of the Treaty. A clear majority of States Parties now operate an Additional Protocol, reflecting widespread recognition of its value as an integral part of the safeguards system. We hope that our joint working paper with France and others on 'Strengthening IAEA safeguards' can contribute to a positive outcome at this Conference.

As global interest in nuclear energy grows, new technologies are widening opportunities for peaceful use – supporting clean, reliable power alongside important non-power applications. Safeguards that keep pace with these developments can be a key enabler, providing the assurance and confidence that underpin safe and secure access for interested States. The UK will host a side-event next week to explore the application of IAEA safeguards to new technologies, which we hope will helpfully

contribute to this debate. We also note the opportunities provided by the rapid evolution of artificial intelligence, both as a tool to enhance verification and as a driver of rising energy demand. The UK encourages continued dialogue on how to ensure the safeguards system remains robust and fit for the future.

It is regrettable that while the vast majority of States Parties implement their safeguards obligations fully, certain cases continue to pose serious risks to the non-proliferation regime.

We remain deeply concerned that the IAEA has been unable to verify the location of Iran's enriched uranium stockpile and that Iran is in non-compliance with its safeguards agreement. Iran has restricted access for the IAEA since June 2025, including at the sites of greatest proliferation concern. A negotiated outcome is the only long-term solution to the threat posed by Iran's nuclear programme.

The DPRK continues to develop its nuclear and ballistic missile programmes in violation of the NPT and UN Security Council resolutions. Its long-standing non-compliance does not diminish the need to address the issue.

This Conference should be deeply concerned by the ongoing risk to nuclear safety and security in Ukraine as a result of Russia's illegal war.

Naval Nuclear Propulsion was foreseen by the drafters of the NPT and is provided for in the IAEA safeguards regime. With Australia and the United States, we are engaging closely with the IAEA and are committed to an open and transparent approach – we welcome delegations' attendance at our joint side-event on AUKUS this Friday. The UK, Australia, and the United States remain fully committed to setting the highest non-proliferation standard for Australia's acquisition of conventionally-armed, nuclear-powered submarines under AUKUS.

Nuclear security is an essential component of an effective non-proliferation regime. We encourage all States that have not yet done so to become party to the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. It is important that all States Parties to maintain the highest standards of nuclear security, including physical protection, cyber resilience, mitigation of insider threats, and transport security.

Export controls are a critical enabling mechanism for the responsible exchange of civilian nuclear technology and to minimise the risks of proliferation. The United Kingdom remains an active participant in the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Zangger Committee, and we encourage all States to adhere to their guidelines.

Similarly, Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones make an important contribution to regional and international security. We reaffirm our commitment to the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East and remain ready to support constructive dialogue on a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems. We continue to engage ASEAN Member States on the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone, to establish a path for the UK to sign the Protocol to the Bangkok Treaty.

Preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons lies at the heart of the Treaty. The United Kingdom stands ready to work with States Parties to strengthen the non-proliferation regime.

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