



**Government Offices of Sweden
Ministry for Foreign Affairs**

STATEMENT

delivered by

Deputy Director General Johannes Oljelund

at the

**2026 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)**

Cluster 1

New York

- CHECK AGAINST DELIVERY -

Chair,

Sweden associates itself with the statement of the European Union. The following remarks are made in a national capacity.

The current security environment is deeply worrying. Tensions between countries with and without nuclear weapons have increased and rhetoric has hardened. The absence of an international arms control agreement and rapid expansion of nuclear arsenals without transparency are cause for concern.

We condemn in the strongest terms Russia's ongoing brutal war of aggression against Ukraine. Russia's recurring threats to use nuclear weapons is irresponsible and unacceptable. By suspending its participation in the New START and by withdrawing its ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty, Russia is undermining global security.

Sweden's accession to NATO was a direct consequence of Russia's actions. As an ally we fully support the nuclear sharing arrangements of NATO, acknowledging their compatibility with the NPT, support for the collective security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area, and contribution to non-proliferation.

Chair,

Sweden remains fully committed to the goal of a world free from nuclear weapons and the fundamental role of NPT as the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament architecture.

While the Nuclear Weapon States hold a special responsibility for implementing Article VI, all State Parties should actively strive towards the full implementation of NPT.

We urge the Nuclear Weapon States to engage constructively to achieve concrete measures related to nuclear disarmament and risk reduction. And we call on all NPT State Parties to refrain from actions that contradict or undermine the treaty's objectives.

Chair,

We regret the absence of an agreement on strategic arms control after the expiry of the New START. Engaging in arms control discussions without preconditions would be an important step in building trust. We welcome US efforts to initiate such a dialogue and urge Russia and China to participate.

Key steps towards nuclear disarmament are the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the establishment of a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices (FMCT).

We urge all States who have not yet done so, especially those in the annex II, to sign and ratify the CTBT without delay or preconditions. And we call on all States to abide by the moratorium on nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosion, and to refrain from any action contrary to the object and purpose of the Treaty.

Sweden also strongly advocates for greater involvement in nuclear disarmament verification. The IPNDV and Quad partnerships have provided valuable insights and results. Irreversibility remains a key topic that deserves our attention.

Chair,

In the spirit of contribution to a strong outcome of the Review Conference that reaffirms commitments to NPT, I would like to draw your attention to two transregional formats that Sweden participates in - the Stockholm Initiative for Nuclear Disarmament and the Initiative to Reduce the Risk for Nuclear Conflict - and the working papers they have presented during this review cycle. We hope that they can support the ambition to find consensus language and reinforce the NPT.

Chair,

In conclusion, let me also address the work on strengthening of the review Process, including the importance of inclusiveness and the effective participation of women and integration of gender perspectives in all

aspects of our work, and not least - on enhancing transparency and reporting. We welcome all steps taken in that direction.

Thank you!