

STATEMENT
by the Delegation of the Russian Federation at the 11th Review Conference
of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
(Cluster II, Non-Proliferation and IAEA Safeguards)

New York, 5 May 2026

Mr Chairman,

The nuclear non-proliferation regime established by the NPT plays a key role in maintaining international peace and security.

Nuclear non-proliferation regime has suffered a severe blow as a result of the unprovoked, unjustified and unlawful aggression by the United States and Israel against Iran, in which nuclear facilities of the Islamic Republic of Iran under IAEA safeguards and the country's civilian and military infrastructure were bombed, and numerous civilians died. What is particularly cynical is the fact that these strikes have been carried out under the pretext of nuclear non-proliferation by Israel, which flagrantly disregards the Treaty, and by the United States, a depositary of the NPT. This stands as a flagrant example of the Treaty being used as a pretext for the unauthorised use of military force against sovereign states. We call upon the NPT community to give an objective and impartial assessment of the aggression against the Islamic Republic of Iran at this Conference.

An essential element in ensuring the sustainability of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime is the IAEA safeguards system. The Agency's verification mechanism serves as a reliable tool for verifying States' compliance with their NPT obligations.

We are convinced that, in any reforms, the IAEA safeguards system must remain objective, depoliticised, technically sound, and consistent with the safeguards agreements concluded between States and the Agency. In drawing its conclusions, the IAEA may rely only on the information whose credibility the Secretariat is prepared to

defend in an open debate at the sessions of the Agency's policy-making bodies. The politicisation of safeguards and any departures from the principles of impartiality, the presumption of innocence, and respect for the sovereignty of States will inevitably undermine confidence in the IAEA verification mechanism and lead to the erosion of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime.

This approach should be followed with regard to the State-level concept (SLC) for safeguards being implemented by the Agency's Secretariat. The Agency's leadership must submit a comprehensive report on this matter to the Board of Governors for its consideration and decision. Until such a report is submitted, the application of State-level approaches (SLAs) to safeguards implementation remains merely an experiment conducted by the Secretariat and interested States.

Russia recognises the importance of additional protocols to safeguards agreements with the IAEA. At the same time, signing an Additional Protocol must remain entirely voluntary. We also call upon all countries with small quantities protocols to comprehensive safeguards agreements that have not yet adopted the modified text, to do so.

Russia has consistently supported the process of formalizing nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZs) under international law: our country has ratified all the protocols it has signed on negative security assurances to the treaties establishing such zones. Russia's traditional reservations to the aforementioned protocols are intended to provide clarity and do not affect the interests of States that faithfully comply with both the letter and the spirit of the agreements they have concluded.

Russia reaffirms its readiness to accede to the Protocol to the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone Treaty, with the relevant interpretative declarations, in the form and manner stated in 2012, when all we completed all the domestic procedures for such a step.

The relevance of our clarificatory reservations is confirmed by the situation surrounding the AUKUS partnership, which envisages the establishment of military

infrastructure belonging to nuclear-weapon States on the territory of Australia – not only a non-nuclear-weapon State, but also a Party to the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty. This partnership will significantly aggravate the already difficult situation in the Asia-Pacific region. Furthermore, Australia's acquisition of nuclear submarines will place an additional burden on the IAEA safeguards system.

Russia supports the 1995 resolution on the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD-free zone) and their delivery systems in the Middle East. We support the work of the Conference on a WMD-free zone within the UN, which meets annually in New York. We participate in the preparation of its sessions as an observer and actively facilitate them. We call upon Israel, and the United States, as a co-sponsor of the 1995 resolution, to join the process.

Russia has been a consistent proponent of a comprehensive nuclear test ban. We provide full support to the work of the Preparatory Commission for the CTBT Organization. In 2023, Russia completed the construction of its national segment of the International Monitoring System (IMS), which is the second largest in the world. We assume that, until the CTBT enters into force, the IMS is operating in test mode and any changes to its configuration are not possible.

We stress that the responsibility for the CTBT's failure to enter into force, three decades since its signature, rests primarily with the United States, which has not taken sufficient practical steps towards its ratification. Statements by Washington about the possible resumption of full-scale nuclear testing are a cause for concern. We are convinced that such a step would trigger a chain reaction, leading a number of States with military nuclear capabilities, including but not limited to NPT States Parties, to return to full-scale explosive nuclear weapons testing.

Our country advocates negotiating a universal and non-discriminatory treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices (FMCT). We believe that negotiations on such an agreement should be held exclusively within the framework of the comprehensive and balanced

programme of work of the Conference on Disarmament and on the basis of the 1995 Shannon mandate, set out in document CD/1299.

We believe that the activities of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Zangger Committee have proven in practice that it is possible to establish an agreed procedure for nuclear export control on a non-discriminatory basis. At the same time, international non-proliferation efforts should not lead to unfounded restrictions on legitimate trade in goods and technologies or on scientific and technological cooperation. Russia has founded its national export control system on the principles of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Zangger Committee, and the export rules and control lists produced by them (INFCIRC/254). Russia implements the recorded decisions of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Zangger Committee in its regulatory framework in a timely manner and without delay.

We are convinced that progress in strengthening the international nuclear non-proliferation regime can only be achieved through political will and the collective efforts of the NPT States Parties. We call upon all Conference participants to engage in a mutually respectful and constructive dialogue.

Thank you.