

STATEMENT
by the Head of the Delegation of the Russian Federation,
Ambassador-at-Large Andrey Belousov
at the 11th Review Conference of the Parties
to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
(Main Committee I, Nuclear Disarmament)

New York, 5 May 2026

Mr Chairman,

The goal of building a world free of nuclear weapons and safer for all remains among the foremost priorities of the international community. Russia has made a significant contribution to this endeavour, having substantially reduced its arsenal and reached the limits established under the New START Treaty ahead of schedule, which expired in February this year. Our country has put forward "post-INF" and "post-New START" initiatives with a view to maintaining predictability and restraint in strategic sphere. However, these proposals were rejected by the United States and its allies. Western countries have instead chosen to continue pursuing overwhelming military superiority through military-technical programmes and doctrinal concepts that adversely affect strategic stability.

Russia is fully aware of the consequences of nuclear war and remains convinced that it must never be fought. In order to prevent a conflict involving nuclear weapons, Russia initiated the adoption of the Joint Statement of the Leaders of the Five Nuclear-Weapon States on Preventing Nuclear War and Avoiding Arms Races of 3 January 2022. We note with concern that the three Western nuclear Powers are moving away from the understandings and commitments set out in the Joint Statement. By generating the risk of direct military confrontation between the nuclear Powers and infringing upon other

parties' core interests, they utterly discredit their ostentatious rhetoric on the importance of reducing strategic risks. We call on all co-signatories of the Statement to remain committed to its tenets.

The United States, France and the United Kingdom have now embarked on revising the positive achievements in nuclear disarmament over the past fifty years. Without any regard for the NPT, they are expanding their nuclear capabilities without constraints and building them up, while actively engaging non-nuclear allies in increasingly destabilising "nuclear umbrella" arrangements.

In particular, at France's initiative, the concept of "forward deterrence" is being implemented, which, together with the long-standing practice of NATO's "nuclear sharing" arrangements and growing number of the non-nuclear-weapon States involved, is intended to strengthen the "nuclear fist" aimed at Russia and its allies.

Furthermore, discussions are underway within the European Union regarding the possibility of creating its own "pan-European" nuclear military capabilities. Several non-nuclear European States are also flirting with the idea of acquiring nuclear weapons or of becoming recipients of such weapons of mass destruction.

All these actions are directly and clearly inflicting damage upon the NPT regime.

Russia remains committed to the idea of ridding the international community of nuclear threat as the ultimate goal of a progressive process of nuclear disarmament, in full accordance with a holistic reading of Article VI of the NPT. This implies that nuclear disarmament measures must be an integral part of comprehensive efforts towards general and complete disarmament. There is no viable alternative to this universal formula.

Any initiatives and practical measures in the field of disarmament, including nuclear disarmament, cannot be considered separately from the general political-military and strategic context. These should be pursued through consensus, in a step-by-step manner and in a way that promotes international peace, stability and increased and undiminished security for all. This approach is recorded by consensus in the final

documents of the previous NPT review cycles. Adherence to these principles is essential to developing feasible, effective and viable agreements and measures on mutually acceptable terms, which would enable progress in disarmament, including nuclear disarmament.

Today, due to the fault of the collective West, international security is faced with a multitude of outstanding challenges adversely affecting global strategic stability. Relations among nuclear-weapon States are in a deplorable state. Concerns about a sharp increase in strategic risks and the level of nuclear danger are entirely justified.

The situation cannot be remedied solely through disarmament and arms control measures that are divorced from political-military and strategic realities. The prevailing security environment and progress on the disarmament track are intrinsically linked. A thorough understanding of this relationship is essential for assessing the practical feasibility of disarmament initiatives.

Genuinely feasible and effective disarmament measures should be seamlessly integrated into comprehensive efforts to reduce the overall inter-State conflict potential. This is precisely what the NPT Parties should focus their efforts on, namely, creating a conducive international environment and enabling prerequisites for progress in disarmament. Unless preliminary efforts are taken on this track, no tangible progress can be made towards nuclear zero.

The elimination of the root causes of fundamental contradictions by applying the principles of equality, indivisible security and mutual respect for the parties' core interests should become the imperative. This is important for the comprehensive and lasting reduction of strategic risks in the relations between the nuclear powers. Without these measures, none of the models for reducing nuclear danger can be viable.

The negative security assurances provided by the Russian Federation to the non-nuclear-weapon States are set out in the UN Security Council resolution 984, and, with regard to States parties to nuclear-weapon-free zones, in the relevant protocols to the

treaties establishing such zones. The initiative to codify NSAs within a global, legally binding instrument deserves attention. However, there are several problematic aspects. In particular, we see no justification for placing on the same footing, and treating on an equal basis, the extremely dubious demands for NSAs from nominally non-nuclear-weapon States relying on destabilising "nuclear sharing" arrangements, "extended" and "forward" nuclear deterrence with the legitimate interest in NSAs shown by other NPT States parties that take their non-nuclear status seriously.

Russia remains committed to its declared moratorium on nuclear testing. We note with regret that, three decades since its opening for signature in 1996, the CTBT has still not entered into force. The primary responsibility for this situation lies with the US, which has not undertaken the necessary efforts to ratify the Treaty. We call upon the US to take immediate and unconditional steps towards the early ratification of the CTBT.

Russia supports the idea of negotiating a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear devices. We also believe that negotiations on such an agreement should be held exclusively within the framework of a comprehensive and balanced programme of work of the Conference on Disarmament and on the basis of the mandate set out in document CD/1299 of 1995, the Shannon mandate.

Specific elements for inclusion in any draft final documents are set out in our working papers NPT/CONF.2026/WP.38 and NPT/CONF.2026/WP.39.

Thank you.