



*The Permanent Mission of Portugal
to the United Nations*



PORTUGAL
United Nations Security Council
2027/2028

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11th Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Main Committee II (non-proliferation)

New York, 5 May 2026

Statement by Portugal

Delivered by Mr. Miguel Alegre,
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Chair,

Portugal aligns with the statement of the European Union and wishes to make a few remarks in its national capacity.

The second pillar of the NPT has, on the whole, been a success since the Treaty was adopted.

Indeed, the great majority of non-nuclear-weapon States have complied with their obligations under the Treaty, and the spread of nuclear weapons has been largely prevented.

At the same time, the non-proliferation regime is under strain due to a limited – but significant – cases of non-compliance.

Two of such cases are particularly flagrant: the DPRK and Iran. In the first case, Pyongyang already maintains a fully-fledged nuclear weapons program that openly violates the NPT and relevant Security Council resolutions, which are legally binding. In the second case, Tehran has repeatedly failed to fully cooperate with the IAEA and provide the necessary guarantees that its nuclear program is exclusively of a peaceful nature.

To prevent these cracks to break the non-proliferation architecture, this Review Conference must propose pragmatic steps. Portugal offers 10 ideas.

First, we must keep supporting the IAEA and its safeguards system. This means respecting and strengthening the Agency's impartial, independent and objective



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role as well as its verification system. But it also includes ensuring predictable and sustainable funding to the Agency, in whose Board of Governors Portugal is proud to currently serve.

Second, this Conference should recognize that the combination of a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and an Additional Protocol represents the modern verification standard.

Third, we urge concerned States to amend or rescind their Small Quantities Protocols immediately.

Fourth, cases of non-compliance must be openly addressed and strongly countered. But the means to achieve such goal should be diplomatic, based on dialogue, negotiations and strong incentive systems.

Fifth, the work on nuclear safety and security must progress. The entry into force, ten years ago, of the Amended Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material was an important step in this regard.

Sixth, as more attention is being placed on the role of Nuclear Weapon Free Zones, although their development can only be freely arrived at by States concerned, we support the establishment of a zone in the Middle East, as provided by relevant resolutions.

Seventh, we should strengthen relevant export control regimes, and therefore we invite States to adhere to the guidelines of the Zangger Committee, the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Missile Technology Control Regime.

Eighth, we must not neglect the issue of proliferation of ballistic missiles and missile technology, and therefore we call on States to subscribe to the Hague Code of Conduct.

Ninth, we should make the prevention of nuclear terrorism a priority. This means not just implementing Security Council resolution 1540, but also making sure that the 1540 Committee and its Group of Experts are functional.

Tenth, when designing bilateral or plurilateral development cooperation policies, States should include assistance, training and capacity-building activities in these areas.

I thank you.

[483 words]