

NEW AGENDA COALITION

Eleventh Review Conference of the Parties of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

New York

30 April 2026



The Arab Republic of Egypt



REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA



**GOBIERNO DE
MÉXICO**



**Te Kāwanatanga
o Aotearoa**
New Zealand Government



Ireland

Check against delivery

Thank you, Chair.

I take the floor on behalf of the New Agenda Coalition— Brazil, Egypt, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa, and my own country, Ireland.

Chair,

This Review Conference will have important consequences for the strength of our Treaty and the indispensable role it plays in underpinning the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime. The last two Review Cycles have failed to agree any steps forward, while nuclear-weapon States have failed to advance disarmament in line with their Article VI obligations and related commitments. The central role the Treaty has played in preventing nuclear proliferation, strengthening international peace and security, is undeniable. However, there is a clear deficit in Treaty implementation in respect of Pillar I nuclear disarmament. As the NAC stated at the 2022 Review Conference, the balance provided by the “Grand Bargain” must be restored, for the good of the Treaty and to make progress at achieving a nuclear weapon-free world.

The delivery of concrete and identifiable disarmament measures by the nuclear-weapon States is essential. For a start, they must recommit to achieving progress towards the full implementation of Article VI in line with their unequivocal undertaking to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals, the 13 Practical Steps and the 2010 Action Plan. Such a message would send a positive signal of nuclear-weapon States’ ongoing commitment to the Treaty.

Chair,

We are witnessing escalating nuclear risks, and threats to use nuclear weapons, endangering international peace and security. Nuclear weapons, and the threat of their use, are being incorrectly presented to the international community as an acceptable response to conditions of growing insecurity, whereas in fact they serve rather as a catalyst for that same insecurity. Such actions and threats must never be normalised. The nuclear-weapon States hold a particular and special responsibility, in line with Article VI and other associated undertakings. They must redouble their efforts to achieve nuclear disarmament, including through unilateral, bilateral, plurilateral and multilateral arms control and reduction measures without further delay.

Chair,

The humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons are real, severe and ever-present. No state or organisation would have the capacity to respond adequately to the consequences of the use of nuclear weapons and its cascading, transboundary impacts. The continued possession of nuclear weapons involves an ever-present risk, one which will persist as long as nuclear weapons continue to exist.

]Chair,

Our Working Paper presented to this Review Conference sets out concrete measures and recommendations towards the full implementation of obligations under the NPT, particularly those related to nuclear disarmament. In summary:

1. The Conference should reaffirm the validity of existing decisions and commitments made at previous Review Conferences in 1995, 2000 and 2010, without qualification.
2. The Conference should affirm that clear, detailed plans on reducing nuclear arsenals, leading to the total elimination of nuclear weapons, are urgently required.

3. The Conference should condemn all threats of use of nuclear weapons, whether implicit or explicit, irrespective of circumstance as unacceptable, illegitimate and dangerous.
4. The Conference should reiterate the need for interim, confidence-building steps to reduce current levels of nuclear risk, including removing operational nuclear weapons from high-alert status and removing non-strategic nuclear weapons from deployed sites.
5. The Conference should call on all nuclear-weapon states to reduce their nuclear arsenals, encompassing both strategic and non-strategic weapons, within the frameworks of robust, legally binding, transparent and verifiable arms control agreements. The Conference should also call upon the nuclear-weapon States to put in place additional legal and procedural safeguards aimed at reducing the risk of a nuclear detonation.
6. Pending the adoption of a new, comprehensive agreement between the Russian Federation and the United States, the Conference should also call for previous limits on stockpiles under New START to be respected by both sides.
7. The Conference should urge the agreement of new and expanding arms control and reduction frameworks. Such agreements should ensure concrete, time-bound progress towards the elimination of nuclear weapons in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner, and address worrying trends in the rapid and opaque expansion of arsenals.
8. The Conference should reaffirm the clear humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons, in line with the 2010 Review Conference outcome, and the science underpinning it, without qualification.
9. The Conference should strongly oppose any reversal or weakening of the norm against testing as dangerous and unacceptable.

10. The Conference should agree clear measures to advance transparency and accountability, along with the principles of verifiability and irreversibility, to ensure comparability and measurability, in the implementation of nuclear disarmament obligations and commitments. It should agree provisions for enhanced national reporting by nuclear-weapon States and associated formal, structured, and recurring interactive dialogue within the Treaty review cycle. Reporting should be sufficiently detailed so as to allow for vertical and horizontal comparability across nuclear-weapon States and enable objective assessment of implementation. Such assessment could be aided by agreed baselines and mutually understood criteria or benchmarks such as targets, indicators and deadlines to measure progress, or the lack thereof, on the implementation of nuclear disarmament obligations and commitments.
11. The Conference should reiterate the need for States Parties to continue addressing irreversibility and verification measures.
12. The Conference should call on nuclear-weapon States that have integrated artificial intelligence into the command, control and communications systems of nuclear weapons to ensure human control and oversight over these systems.
13. The Conference should re-affirm the need for urgent action on the necessary, full implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East for the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems.

Chair,

In conclusion, familiar arguments that progress in disarmament will follow only when security conditions improve are unconvincing and at odds not only with history, but with the legal obligations and commitments underpinning the Treaty. Our Treaty has an established *acquis* of commitments that remain valid to advance a world free of nuclear weapons. We can no longer wait for their faithful, and full, implementation. The status quo is not viable -- we need action now.

Thank you.