

**Statement by Ambassador KITANO Mitsuru,
Ambassador, Special Assistant to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan
Main Committee 2 for the 2026 Review Conference of the Parties
to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
on 5 May 2026**

Chair,

The international security environment is undergoing the most significant structural changes since the end of WWII. The international community as a whole should reaffirm its strong commitment to the nuclear non-proliferation regime founded on the NPT.

North Korea

Chair,

North Korea has advanced its unlawful nuclear and missile development and is flagrantly challenging the credibility and integrity of the NPT. The Review Conference should send a robust message to North Korea and the international community on the following points: 1) reaffirming our unwavering commitment to the goal of CVID of North Korea's nuclear weapons, any other existing WMD and ballistic missiles of all ranges as well as its related programs and facilities, 2) urging North Korea to return to full compliance with the NPT and IAEA safeguards, as well as fully comply with the relevant UNSCRs, 3) calling upon all states to uphold the non-proliferation regime and fully implement all relevant UNSCRs, and 4) reaffirming that North Korea cannot have the status of a nuclear-weapon State under the Treaty.

Iran

Iran must never obtain a nuclear weapon. Japan reiterates its serious concern over the accumulated highly enriched uranium. I will further address these issues at the subsidiary body 2.

Non-Proliferation along with the peaceful uses of nuclear technology

Chair,

Considering the security environment and growing international need for peaceful uses of nuclear technology, ensuring the highest standards of nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear security is more important than ever.

Safeguards

We need to strengthen IAEA safeguards to verify that all nuclear material and

technology are used only for peaceful purposes. Japan has been a “model state” of complying with NPT safeguards, as the IAEA has drawn, and continue to draw broader conclusion, and will continue this through strengthening our own safeguards implementation.

The CSA, along with an AP, should be the safeguards standard of the Treaty. Japan calls on all States that have not yet done so to conclude an AP, and where relevant, to amend or rescind the SQP. Japan will enhance its relevant assistance to other States through both multilateral fora and bilateral cooperation.

Export Controls

Chair,

Export controls are vital not only for nuclear non-proliferation but also for building trust and confidence among trade and investment partners through transparent and predictable commerce, and therefore, contribute to creating a favorable environment that supports further stable economic growth. Japan encourages all States to further strengthen national export controls in alignment with existing multilateral guidelines.

Nuclear Security

Nuclear security is an important foundation for the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Japan considers the relevant conventions to be vital legal frameworks for nuclear security and supports their effective implementation and further universalization.

Chair,

In concluding, we reiterate that Japan observes the Three Non-Nuclear Principles as policy guidelines. Japan as a staunch supporter of the NPT, has been advocating for the implementation of all its provisions. This of course entails compliance with its own obligations under the NPT.

Japan’s nuclear materials pose no proliferation concerns. Moreover, Japan continues to uphold the principle of “not possessing plutonium without specific purposes” and uses most of its plutonium stockpile for nuclear fuel of power plants, with the remaining amount used as material for peaceful nuclear research. Also, Japan has declared its policy to reduce the amount of its stockpile in 2018, and the amount has decreased since then. Under this policy, Japan will continue to take appropriate measures.

In this regard, Japan would like to point out that the working paper No. 64 submitted by a certain country contains unsubstantiated claims and numerous errors.

I would like to remind all of you of the importance of the INFCIRC 549 mechanism for civil plutonium management, and of the fact that the same state has

ceased to implement it in 2017. This is causing a serious lack of transparency.

Thank you, Chair.