

Main Committee II Statement by the Federal Republic of Germany

Delivered by Amb. Thomas Göbel

Chair,

First, let me congratulate you on your election and assure you of the full support of my delegation. Germany aligns itself with the statement delivered by the European Union. I would like to emphasize a few points in my national capacity.

The success of the NPT and the nuclear non-proliferation regime it established are unequalled. The near-universal treaty is constantly reaping benefits which make our daily lives safer, more secure and even more prosperous. The IAEA and its safeguards architecture are crucial in this endeavour and need to be strengthened wherever we can.

The full implementation and universalisation of the IAEA Comprehensive Safeguard Agreement (CSA) is the bare minimum for all NPT Non-Nuclear-Weapon States. As a member of the “Friends of the Additional Protocol” we are advocating that the CSAs should be accompanied by the implementation of the Additional Protocol. Both the CSA and the AP should become the verification standard of the 21st century.

Only stringent verification can create and preserve the trust that the NPT’s non-proliferation norm is adhered to. Director-General Grossi’s relentless efforts to allow the Agency to fulfil the duties conferred upon it by the NPT, and the work of all staff, in particular inspectors, deserve our full respect and are to be commended.

In the same vein, the CTBT has played a significant role in curbing the spread of nuclear weapons. A CTBT in force would enable on-site inspections. We therefore reiterate our call to states that have not signed or ratified the treaty. Pending its entry into force, all states should refrain from any nuclear test explosion at any yield. Questions revolving around non-compliance with the test moratorium should be clarified.

Chair,

The future of the NPT hinges on how the world is able to address some key challenges, where concerted efforts are required.

Let me highlight a few key points:

More than four years of Russia’s illegal war of aggression against Ukraine have resulted in direct threats to the safety and security of Ukrainian nuclear facilities, including through the illegal occupation of Ukraine’s largest nuclear power plant in Zaporizhzhia, making the verification work of the IAEA ever more challenging. We commend the IAEA on doing an outstanding job under these difficult circumstances,

both in the implementation of safeguards as well as in the support on nuclear safety and security in Ukraine.

We are further deeply concerned about Iran's continued violation of its safeguards obligations under the NPT in the past and at an unprecedented level over the past ten months Iran's decisions to curtail its co-operation with the IAEA, stop reporting to the Agency and to bar the IAEA inspectors from access entails substantial proliferation risks and challenges the global non-proliferation architecture. Iran is the only NPT Non-Nuclear-Weapon State to have produced and accumulated highly enriched uranium (HEU), for which there is no credible civilian justification. At the same time, in June 2025 Iran ceased to provide mandatory reports and suspended the Agency's access to proliferation-sensitive nuclear facilities and its uranium stockpile.

Iran must never be allowed to seek, develop or acquire a nuclear weapon. To this end, as part of the E3, we continue to work towards a diplomatic solution, which addresses the international community's serious concerns over Iran's nuclear programme. We urge Iran to fully cooperate with the IAEA, grant Agency inspectors full access to all nuclear sites without further delay and provide credible, objective guarantees to the international community that its nuclear programme is exclusively peaceful.

Looking at the DPRK, the expansion of its nuclear weapon program continues unabated despite numerous UN Security Council resolutions calling for the complete verifiable and irreversible discontinuation of all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programmes in the DPRK. We urge the DPRK to comply with the NPT and IAEA Safeguards, to refrain from any further nuclear test and to sign and ratify the CTBT. Furthermore, we stress that – despite its ongoing violations of the NPT, the IAEA Safeguards and several UNSC Resolutions – the DPRK will never have any other status than that of an NPT Non-Nuclear Weapon State.

Lastly, we commend the IAEA's efforts to engage with Syria. While we commend the Syrian authorities' stated readiness to resolve all outstanding safeguards issues stemming from the Asad regime, this must now be followed by concrete steps. Only then will the IAEA be in a position to state the exclusively peaceful nature of Syria's nuclear programme in line with the NPT. To this end, we also call on Syria to swiftly conclude and bring into force an Additional Protocol.

Chair,

While the NPT was and is an overall success story in curbing the spread of nuclear weapons, a number of challenges clearly stand out. We must be united in addressing these challenges, to preserve the centrality of the NPT within the non-proliferation

architecture and to ensure its safeguards architecture continues to be verified now and in the future by a strong nuclear watchdog, the IAEA.

Nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament are mutually reinforcing, and neither can thrive without the other. As NPT States parties, we should strive to succeed at both tasks.

Thank you.