

Canada thanks you Chair, and through you the President and Secretariat, for the zero draft. We believe this is a constructive basis for our negotiations to come and stand ready to engage in productive discussions to move forward. We are still reviewing the document in detail but will highlight a few initial reactions.

- We broadly support the draft language which reinforces the core role of IAEA safeguards to the effective implementation of the NPT's non-proliferation obligations. We would see value in additional language highlighting the need to respect the mandate, technical authority, and independence of the Agency.
- The draft text effectively recognizes the challenges to the Treaty posed by cases of non-compliance with non-proliferation obligations. We support references to the CSA and AP in line with previously agreed language and would encourage additional language highlight progress towards CSA universalization and greater AP adherence. The language could be strengthened to reinforce support for IAEA efforts to strengthen the effectiveness and efficiency of safeguards, including through concrete initiatives such as the IAEA Member State Support Program.
- Canada supports references to the need for a diplomatic solution for the Iran nuclear issues. It is imperative that the outcome document underscores the urgent need for Iran to resume substantive cooperation with the IAEA to address outstanding safeguards as identified by the Board, including with respect to its declared stockpile of HEU.
- Language on the DPRK accurately reflects the non-proliferation challenges posed by the DPRK's nuclear activities. Important that an outcome document not stay silent on these issues which strike at the heart of the Treaty's credibility.
- Canada is still studying the proposed language on armed attacks against nuclear facilities. Important that outcome document reference nuclear safety and security risks posed by such attacks wherever they occur (Iran, Ukraine) and to stress need for maximum constraint.
- We support balanced and factual language on NWFZ, including in the Middle East. Language on export controls lacks balance and fails to underscore how these regimes and their guidelines facilitate nuclear trade. In particular, paragraph 22 needs to be balanced to reference the fact that export control regimes such as NSG and Zangger Committee contribute to non-proliferation and act as enablers of nuclear trade.

Thank you chair.

