

**Statement by the Permanent Representative of Brazil to the Conference on Disarmament,
on behalf of the delegation of Brazil to the 2026 Review Conference of the Treaty on Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons**
Main Committee II – Nuclear Non-Proliferation
05 May 2026
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Mr. Chair,

Allow me to congratulate you on your assumption as Chair of the Main Committee II.

Brazil reiterates its long-standing position that non-proliferation cannot be meaningfully pursued in isolation from the disarmament obligations of Nuclear-Weapon States. At a time marked by intensified nuclear rhetoric, the expansion of nuclear-sharing arrangements, and a renewed reliance on deterrence-based security doctrines, the continued centrality of nuclear weapons reinforces instability. Any attempt to decouple Pillar II from the disarmament commitments underpinning the Treaty risks reproducing the very conditions of insecurity that the NPT was designed to overcome.

Brazil remains unequivocally committed to the non-proliferation objectives of the Treaty. Brazil has permanently renounced nuclear weapons, a decision anchored in its Constitution, and reinforced through adherence to a robust set of international legal obligations.

2

Pursuant to the Quadripartite Agreement also involving Argentina, ABACC, and the IAEA, Brazil is placed under a robust verification system, in which bilateral and multilateral inspections reinforce one another. This dual system delivers concrete results, as reflected in the IAEA's consistent conclusions that no diversion of declared nuclear material has occurred.

This year marks the thirty-fifth anniversary of ABACC, an institution that lies at the core of this innovative safeguards model. ABACC has demonstrated how regional ownership, mutual confidence, and rigorous verification can reinforce non-proliferation while enhancing stability and security.

Brazil believes that efforts to strengthen safeguards must take due account of existing verification arrangements that already provide credible assurances. In this regard, Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements remain the verification standard required under Article III of the NPT. Additional Protocols are voluntary, sovereign instruments, whose adoption cannot be treated as a condition for the exercise of Treaty rights, an understanding consistently reaffirmed by the IAEA General Conference resolutions and by the 2010 Final Document.

Mr. Chair,

Allow me to address the relevant issue of naval nuclear propulsion. As with other non-proscribed nuclear activities, there should be no one-size-fits-all approach. States pursue these projects within their respective legal and institutional frameworks and must comply fully with their applicable safeguards obligations. Nothing in the NPT, or, in Brazil's case, in the Treaty of Tlatelolco, precludes the use of nuclear energy for naval propulsion, which is explicitly foreseen within the safeguards regime.

Brazil's nuclear-powered submarine programme is fully compatible with its non-proliferation obligations. The submarine will be conventionally armed and will use low-enriched uranium. It does not pose proliferation risk. Brazil has engaged transparently and proactively with both the IAEA and ABACC to ensure full compliance with Article 13 of the Quadripartite Agreement, the relevant legal framework in our case.

Since 2022, Brazil has conducted regular consultations with both agencies to develop Special Procedures capable of preserving the IAEA's ability to provide assurances of non-diversion of nuclear material while protecting sensitive technological and operational information. Senior ABACC and IAEA officials have visited relevant facilities, and progress has been regularly reported to the Board of Governors through documents derestricted at Brazil's request. Additional information is also available in a dedicated working paper submitted by Brazil to this Conference.

Mr. Chair,

Brazil must express its serious concern regarding developments that undermine the integrity of the non-proliferation regime. Armed attacks against nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards are prohibited under international law, the UN Charter, and relevant IAEA provisions, including its Statute. Attempts to justify such acts through expansive interpretations of self-defence or other doctrines are legally unsustainable and profoundly destabilising. Should safeguarded nuclear installations come to be treated as legitimate targets, the logic of verification, confidence-building, and cooperation on which the NPT rests would be gravely weakened.

In conclusion, Brazil believes that the work of Main Committee II should contribute to restoring confidence in the Treaty through consistency, balance, and non-selectivity. Non-proliferation obligations can only remain sustainable if firmly rooted in genuine commitment to

disarmament and in respect for the rights and responsibilities of all States Parties.

6

Brazil stands ready to engage constructively in this endeavour.

Thank you.