

**Statement by the Permanent Representative of Brazil to the Conference of Disarmament,
on behalf of the delegation of Brazil to the 2026 Review Conference of the Treaty on Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons**

01 May 2026

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Mr. President,

Brazil aligns itself with the statement delivered by the New Agenda Coalition.

Since 1995, the central test of any NPT Review Conference is whether States Parties are prepared to reaffirm, preserve and advance the disarmament commitments that give concrete meaning to Article VI. In this regard, the commitments undertaken by consensus in 2000 and 2010 remain indispensable references. They are not historical footnotes. They are still the clearest collectively agreed roadmap for the implementation of nuclear disarmament obligations under the NPT.

The problem before us is not the absence of commitments, but the deficit of implementation that has dangerously accumulated over the years and now carries serious consequences for the credibility of the Treaty. Confidence in the balance of rights and responsibilities on which the NPT rests continues to erode, leading to a systemic concern for the sustainability of the regime itself.

Among the myriad of challenges, Brazil is particularly concerned that transparency and accountability still fall far short of what should be required of Nuclear-Weapon States. Greater clarity is needed regarding arsenals, doctrines, modernization programmes, fissile materials, and the concrete steps being taken - or not taken - towards the fulfilment of Article VI. Structured, comparable, and regular reporting is crucial to assess progress or to hold one another to the standards that have already been agreed. Transparency is not a peripheral issue. It is a condition for trust. Accountability is not punitive. It is indispensable for the credibility of our collective undertaking.

Mr. President,

Any serious discussion of nuclear disarmament must remain grounded in the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of the use of nuclear weapons. Those consequences would be immediate, massive and transboundary. No State, international organization, or humanitarian system could adequately respond to a nuclear detonation. The only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is their total elimination.

In that context, Brazil sees value in nuclear risk reduction measures as facilitators of nuclear disarmament. Efforts to reduce risks - including miscalculation, misunderstanding, unintended escalation, and accidental use - can help create conditions conducive to disarmament and reduce the dangers posed by the continued existence of nuclear arsenals. At the same time, such measures are no substitute for disarmament obligations. Risk reduction should support disarmament, not replace it.

Brazil welcomes recent progress in the area of nuclear disarmament verification, with the establishment of the Group of Scientific and Technical Experts on Nuclear Disarmament Verification, by the General Assembly. Verification can help anticipate practical solutions to future disarmament processes and foster confidence. Brazil has long advocated the strengthening of multilateral work in this field, and we are proud for having steered this effort jointly with Norway.

Mr. President,

Progress on the topic of fissile materials is of paramount importance for any progress on nuclear disarmament. The long-standing deadlock on this issue is unsustainable. Brazil recalls its proposal contained in document CD/1888, which offers a balanced basis for negotiations by addressing both future production and pre-existing stockpiles.

Finally, Brazil wishes to underline the enduring importance of nuclear-weapon-free zones. These zones are practical expressions of the determination of entire regions

to reject nuclear weapons and to strengthen peace, confidence and stability. For Latin America and the Caribbean, this legacy is both historic and current. The Treaty of Tlatelolco established the first nuclear-weapon-free zone in a densely populated area, and it helped demonstrate that regional security can be built on cooperation, mutual confidence and legally binding commitments rather than on nuclear deterrence. Our region is a living example of the contribution that such zones can make to the objectives of the NPT. These considerations highlight the importance of the work being currently undertaken by the Group of Qualified Experts convened to prepare a new comprehensive study on nuclear-weapon-free zones.

Mr. President,

We are meeting at a time marked by deepening mistrust, the erosion of arms control constraints, the normalization of nuclear rhetoric, and the continued modernization of nuclear arsenals.

With the expiration of New START, the world lost the last treaty imposing legally binding limits on the two largest nuclear arsenals, and a dangerous new nuclear arms race is looming on the horizon.

This Review Conference must send an unambiguous political message: the indefinite possession of nuclear weapons by a few cannot remain the organizing principle of international security, and the failure to implement disarmament commitments is no longer merely a matter of unfinished business, it is a direct challenge to international peace and security, and to the NPT itself.

Thank you.