



BELGIUM

Statement for Main Committee II (Non-Proliferation)

11th Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)

New York, 27 April – 22 May 2026

Chair,

Belgium aligns itself with the statement delivered on behalf of the European Union. Allow me to offer a few additional remarks from a national perspective.

Preventing the spread of nuclear weapons lies at the heart of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The Treaty's record is strong: it brought an end to several nuclear weapons programmes and established a norm that has largely endured, thereby strengthening global security. Its benefits are clear. States Parties are able to fully enjoy the peaceful uses of nuclear energy while providing credible assurances that these activities remain free of a military dimension. The NPT is a common good. Its integrity must be safeguarded, as even small breaches risk cascading into serious and irreversible damage to the entire regime.

For this reason, challenges to the Treaty must be confronted directly and not glossed over for the sake of expediency. Iran represents such a challenge. It continues to fall short of providing the necessary guarantees

regarding the exclusively peaceful nature of its nuclear programme. By refusing the IAEA access to its nuclear sites Iran is in breach of its legally binding obligations under its Safeguards Agreement and therefore, does not comply with the NPT. Iran must urgently rectify this situation and take concrete confidence-building measures, including accession to the Additional Protocol, which would allow for permanent enhanced monitoring. Unconditional, timely and full cooperation with the IAEA is essential to rebuilding trust. As an Annex II State, Iran should also ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, both as a confidence-building step and as tangible evidence of its professed commitment to nuclear disarmament.

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea continues the rapid expansion of its nuclear and ballistic missile programmes. Addressing this threat effectively requires a unified international response. That unity is being undermined by Russia, which flagrantly violates Security Council resolutions it previously supported. This weakens the sanctions regime and fragments the international response, creating yet another fissure in the NPT framework.

The DPRK's swift technological advances are facilitated by the illicit procurement of sensitive goods and technologies from abroad. This underlines the urgent need for stronger and more comprehensive export controls, at both national and multilateral levels. Belgium therefore calls on all States to adopt and fully implement the guidelines of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Missile Technology Control Regime.

Chair,

We find it striking that some States appear insufficiently concerned by the very real proliferation challenges confronting our regime, while directing criticism at practices that are fully consistent with the NPT, such as extended nuclear deterrence and NATO's nuclear-sharing arrangements. These arrangements are a necessary response to the existential threat posed by our eastern neighbour—a threat made starkly evident by Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine and by the irresponsible nuclear rhetoric that has accompanied it. At no point in their decades-long existence have nuclear-sharing arrangements contributed to proliferation or impeded disarmament. The historical record is clear: the most significant reductions in global nuclear arsenals since the end of the Cold War took place while these arrangements were in place.

Chair,

It is also important to recall that the Additional Protocol was negotiated in response to a real-world case where a comprehensive safeguards agreement proved insufficient to detect a clandestine military nuclear programme. The Additional Protocol should therefore not be regarded as an undue burden on non-nuclear-weapon States, nor as a negotiable concession. It constitutes the current verification standard, particularly for States developing or expanding nuclear programmes. Greater nuclear capability must be matched by greater responsibility and transparency. In the same spirit, we call on States concerned to amend or rescind their Small Quantities Protocols.