

**2026 Review Conference of the Parties to the  
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons**

**Cluster 2**

**Statement by the Republic of Austria**

**delivered by**

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Mr. Chair,

Congratulations on your election. You have our full support.

Austria aligns with the EU and VG10 statements.

Let me add some points on the most pressing nuclear proliferation risks:

On the DPRK - we are deeply worried about their nuclear path, its ballistic missile program and its persistent non-compliance with the IAEA. We call on the DPRK to reverse this course, to return to NPT compliance, to ratify the CTBT and to engage in good faith negotiations. There is no alternative to diplomacy and we therefore encourage all parties to work towards the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

In Iran we see a persistent lack of cooperation with the IAEA and enrichment of nuclear material beyond levels explicable for civilian application. We urge Iran to fulfill its NPT obligations including its safeguards agreement. A diplomatic solution is the only viable solution to Iran's nuclear program, including verification and irreversibility as key aspects.

The Russian Federation's illegal war of aggression against Ukraine not only caused death and unbearable human suffering, as well as large-scale destruction of civilian infrastructure. It was also accompanied by nuclear threats by Russia. These unacceptable threats and increased attempts of relying on nuclear deterrence further heighten nuclear risks, already at levels not seen in decades. We call on Russia to deescalate and to refrain from nuclear saber rattling.

These international security crises display the same worrying trend: The increasing allure of nuclear deterrence - nuclear weapons being considered as the "ultimate security guarantee". This trend leads to an erosion of the non-proliferation norm.

IAEA Director General Grossi expressed his worry about the risk of a “nuclear proliferation domino effect” - of a future with a growing number of nuclear armed states. We share his concern and call on the nuclear weapons states to fulfill their disarmament obligations under Article VI including by taking concrete steps to lower the risk of a renewed arms race, as a direct contribution to the non-proliferation regime.

Chair,

In this 30<sup>th</sup> anniversary year of the CTBT, we have much to celebrate, but equally, the challenges to the global test ban are deeply worrying. Any nuclear test at any yield is a blow to the global moratorium and contributes to weakening the non-proliferation pillar. It would also be a blow to survivors of nuclear use and testing, who endure the long-lasting consequences of nuclear explosions. Austria jointly with numerous other states will hold a statement in MC1, to uphold and strengthen the global norm against testing, including through the management of any disputes and by addressing allegations of non-compliance. We reiterate our urgent call on the Annex II states to sign and ratify the Treaty without precondition or delay and we strongly support efforts to strengthen the IMS.

Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the proliferation of nuclear weapons until the NPT, the thousands of nuclear tests and finally the scientific evidence about risks and the devastating humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons are the foundations for the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. The TPNW's prohibitions strengthen the NPT's non-proliferation pillar. Indeed, TPNW States Parties have not only taken on responsibilities on non-proliferation going beyond the NPT but the TPNW also foresees important safeguards provisions for any nuclear armed states joining the Treaty in order to strengthen the non-proliferation regime.

Chair,

The overwhelming majority of non-nuclear weapons states have taken their obligations towards a world free of nuclear weapons extremely seriously. They have implemented their nonproliferation obligations, implement safeguards and many have taken on higher obligations via additional protocol or the TPNW.

We cannot stand by idly, while the non-proliferation pillar becomes hollowed out by a number of countries increasingly considering nuclear weapons as a source of their national security. As scientific findings make clear: the risks for all of us are too high and the consequences too catastrophic. This review conference must therefore conclude with a meaningful recommitment by all to strengthen the non-proliferation pillar and overcome the current proliferation crisis.

Thank you.