Open-ended working group to elaborate a set of political commitments as a new global framework that will address existing gaps in through-life ammunition management

Note by the Secretary-General

The Secretary-General has the honour to transmit to the General Assembly the final report of the open-ended working group to elaborate a set of political commitments as a new global framework that will address existing gaps in through-life ammunition management.
Final report of the open-ended working group to elaborate a set of political commitments as a new global framework that will address existing gaps in through-life ammunition management

I. Introduction

1. The General Assembly, pursuant to its resolution 76/233, decided to establish an open-ended working group to elaborate a set of political commitments as a new global framework that would address existing gaps in through-life ammunition management, including international cooperation and assistance, without prejudice to national legal systems addressing national ammunition ownership, possession and use, and would be part of a comprehensive framework to support safe, secure and sustainable through-life ammunition management at the national, subregional, regional and global levels, building upon and complementing existing frameworks, whereas cooperation at the regional and subregional levels should be considered on a voluntary basis. The Assembly also decided that the working group should take into account the recommendations contained in the report of the Group of Governmental Experts established pursuant to resolution 72/55 and the views of all participating States and be informed by the series of informal consultations convened within the framework of its resolution 72/55 throughout 2018 and 2019, the informal paper presented by Germany on the informal consultative process and the inputs, both written and oral, received from Member States on the same matter. The Assembly further decided that the working group should convene for two five-day sessions in New York in 2022 and for one five-day session in Geneva in 2023, preceded by informal consultations as required, within available time frames and with the contribution of relevant international and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and should hold a two-day organizational session in advance of the first meeting. The Assembly decided that the working group should submit a report on its work, including recommendations on a set of political commitments as a new global framework on conventional ammunition, to the General Assembly at its seventy-eighth session.

2. By its decision 76/568, the General Assembly decided to convene the second five-day session in 2022 in Geneva and the third five-day session in New York. This change in location was made necessary by the unavailability of conference rooms in the Palais des Nations in Geneva in 2023 owing to renovation works.

3. By its decision 77/547, the General Assembly decided that the open-ended working group on conventional ammunition should convene for an additional session of five days in New York in 2023 to complete its work.

II. Organizational matters

A. Opening and duration of the sessions

4. The open-ended working group held its organizational session on 7 and 8 February 2022, its first substantive session from 23 to 27 May, its second substantive session from 15 to 19 August, its third substantive session from 13 to 17 February 2023 and its fourth substantive session from 5 to 9 June 2023. The second substantive session was held at the Palais des Nations in Geneva. All other sessions were held at Headquarters in New York.
5. The Office for Disarmament Affairs provided substantive support and secretariat services for the work of the working group.

B. Attendance


C. Officers

7. At its organizational session, on 7 February 2022, the working group elected Albrecht von Wittke (Germany) as Chair by acclamation.

8. At its first substantive session, on 23 May 2022, the working group elected Maritza Chan Valverde (Costa Rica) as Vice-Chair by acclamation.

D. Adoption of the agenda

9. At the organizational session, the working group adopted the agenda as contained in document A/CONF.239/2022/1/Rev.1 for all its sessions. The agenda reads as follows:

   1. Election of the Chair.
   2. Adoption of the agenda.
   3. Organization of work.
   4. General exchange of views.
   5. Elaboration of a new global framework that will address existing gaps in through-life ammunition management:
      (a) Matters related to conventional ammunition safety;
      (b) Matters related to conventional ammunition security;
      (c) Existing global, regional and subregional processes;
      (d) Existing international cooperation and assistance;
      (e) Comprehensive framework to support safe, secure and sustainable through-life ammunition management at the national, subregional, regional and global levels;
      (f) Elaboration of a set of political commitments as a new global framework that will address existing gaps in through-life ammunition management, including international cooperation and assistance.
   6. Other matters.
   7. Adoption of the final report.

E. Organization of work

10. At the first meeting of each substantive session, on 23 May and 15 August 2022 and 13 February and 5 June 2023, respectively, the working group agreed on its

11. The working group agreed, by means of a silence procedure, on 14 March 2022, to apply, mutatis mutandis, the rules of procedure of the United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects held in 2001, as contained in document A/CONF.192/16, to the work of the working group. A decision was formally adopted at the first meeting of the first substantive session of the working group, on 23 May 2022.

12. The working group also agreed on the following modalities regarding the application of rule 63 concerning NGOs for the purposes of the working group:

   (a) All open formal sessions of the working group will be broadcast on United Nations Web TV;

   (b) With regard to observers, NGOs that have consultative status with the Economic and Social Council are granted observer status in the open sessions of the working group. According to rule 63 (b), other interested NGOs relevant and competent to the scope and purpose of the working group can submit a written accreditation request, including information on the purpose, programmes and activities of the organization in areas relevant to the scope of the group. The Chair will subsequently provide Member States, through the Secretariat, with a list of relevant NGOs for consideration on a no-objection basis;

   (c) To achieve the meaningful participation of accredited NGOs, a dedicated half-day informal meeting with NGOs will be convened during the first substantive session. At the discretion of the Chair, one additional informal meeting with accredited NGOs could be convened in each of the subsequent sessions of the working group, if needed;

   (d) Accredited NGOs are invited to make written contributions to be published on the website of the working group;

   (e) In addition, the Chair may decide to convene informal meetings with accredited NGOs during the intersessional period as needed;

   (f) In addition, in accordance with past practice, at his discretion, the Chair may wish to invite briefers on subject matters directly relevant to the mandate of the working group to present their views to the group. These briefings will be conducted in an informal setting.

13. The approved list of NGOs is contained in document A/CONF.239/2022/INF/1.

F. Documentation

14. All official documents, working papers and other documents before the working group can be found at the following dedicated web page: https://meetings.unoda.org/oewg-ammo/open-ended-working-group-on-ammunition-2022.

G. Proceedings of the working group

15. At its first substantive session, the working group considered agenda items 3, 4, 5 (a–e) and 6 at its nine plenary meetings.

16. At its second substantive session, the working group considered agenda item 3, 4, 5 (a–f) and 6 at its nine plenary meetings.

17. At its third substantive session, the working group considered agenda items 3, 4, 5 (f) and 6.
18. At its fourth substantive session, the working group considered agenda items 3, 4, 5 (f), 6 and 7.

19. In accordance with the agreed modalities for stakeholder participation, one dedicated informal meeting was convened, in a hybrid format, for statements by international and regional organizations, followed by NGOs and civil society, at each substantive session, on 25 May and 17 August 2022 and 14 February and 8 June 2023, respectively.

20. On 17 May and 11 August 2022, 1 and 2 February and 23 and 24 May 2023, the Chair convened informal meetings with international and regional organizations and accredited NGOs.

III. Recommendations

21. In accordance with its mandate as contained in General Assembly resolution 76/233, the open-ended working group devoted 38 meetings to elaborate a set of political commitments as a new global framework that will address existing gaps in through-life ammunition management, including international cooperation and assistance. The working group agreed to recommend to the Assembly the adoption, at its seventy-eighth session, of the Global Framework for Through-life Conventional Ammunition Management annexed to the present report. The Global Framework is voluntary and contains a set of political commitments for strengthening and promoting existing initiatives on, and addressing existing gaps in, through-life conventional ammunition management.

IV. Adoption of the final report

22. At its fourth substantive session, on 9 June 2023, the open-ended working group considered agenda item 7, entitled “Adoption of the final report”.

23. The Russian Federation and Belarus disassociated themselves from the Global Framework and the recommendations of the open-ended working group.

24. Subsequently, the working group proceeded to adopt, without a vote, its final report to the General Assembly at its seventy-eighth session as contained in document A/CONF.239/2023/L.1/Rev.1, as orally revised, and authorized the Chair to finalize the report.
Annex

A Global Framework for Through-life Conventional Ammunition Management

I. Preamble

We, the Member States of the United Nations,

1. Expressing grave concern over the risks posed by the diversion\(^1\) of conventional ammunition of all types and calibres to unauthorized recipients, including criminals, organized criminal groups and terrorists, their trafficking into illicit markets, including their subsequent use in the manufacture of improvised explosive devices, as well as their contribution to the intensity and duration of armed conflict, armed violence, including gender-based armed violence, around the world, and the threat that their diversion and illicit trafficking poses to peace, security, stability, and sustainable development at the national, subregional, regional and global levels.

2. Also expressing grave concern over the destruction caused by unplanned explosions of conventional ammunition at ammunition sites, which claim thousands of lives, disrupt communities’ livelihoods, and can generate severe humanitarian, human rights, socio-economic, environmental and public health impacts.

3. Also mindful that unplanned explosions can destroy conventional ammunition and infrastructure needed by States for legitimate national defence and security requirements.

4. Recognizing the work of the General Assembly in considering steps to enhance cooperation with regard to the safety and security of conventional ammunition, and in this regard, welcoming the recommendations contained in the reports of the Groups of Governmental Experts established pursuant to resolutions 61/722 and 72/55,\(^2\) and recalling that these, and the views of all participating States, were foundations for the work of the Open-Ended Working Group on Conventional Ammunition established pursuant to resolution 76/233.

5. Recognizing the voluntary use by States of the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines to improve the safe, secure and sustainable through-life management of conventional ammunition.

6. Also recognizing that gaps exist to achieving a discernible reduction in the risks and impacts arising from the ineffective through-life management of conventional ammunition around the world, extending from the point of manufacture, through pre-transfer, transfer, relocation and transport, stockpiling and recovery, to their eventual use or disposal, and to this end, stressing the importance of addressing the safety and security risks and impacts emanating from the ineffective through-life management of conventional ammunition at the global level in a comprehensive manner to contribute to maintaining international peace and security.

7. Recognizing the need for the full, equal, meaningful, and effective participation of women in decision-making and implementation processes related to through-

\(^1\) Diversion can be defined as “the shifting of (...) ammunition or explosives from the legal market or owner to an illegal market or owner as a result of losses, theft, leakage or proliferation from a stockpile or other source” (International Ammunition Technical Guidelines 01.40 “Glossary of terms, definitions and abbreviations”, paragraph 3.83).

\(^2\) See: A/76/324.
life conventional ammunition management and encouraging mainstreaming a gender perspective into policy and practice to address the differential impacts of the safety and security aspects of conventional ammunition on women, men, girls and boys.

8. Further recognizing the contribution of relevant stakeholders, including non-governmental organisations and civil society, academia, research institutions and industry, in supporting efforts to inform and promote safe, secure and sustainable through-life conventional ammunition management, and also recognizing the importance of these multi-stakeholder partnerships towards forming a better understanding of challenges to effective through-life conventional ammunition management.

9. Deciding, in response, and bearing in mind the different needs, situations, capacities and priorities of States and regions to adopt a set of political commitments as a Global Framework to address existing gaps in through-life conventional ammunition management, dedicated to promoting and supporting, safe, secure and sustainable through-life conventional ammunition management, including through international cooperation and assistance, which neither prejudge the nature of, nor prejudice our national legal systems that address national conventional ammunition ownership, possession and use, so as to contribute to reducing the dual risks arising from ineffective through-life conventional ammunition management, including unplanned conventional ammunition explosions and the diversion and illicit trafficking of conventional ammunition to unauthorized recipients, including to criminals, organized criminal groups and terrorists.

II. Our guiding principles

10. This Global Framework rests upon, and reaffirms Member States’ respect for international law, including applicable international humanitarian law, and the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, including the sovereign equality of States, territorial integrity, the peaceful resolution of international disputes, non-interference in the internal matters of States and, on this basis, we:

11. Reaffirm the inherent right of all States to individual or collective self-defence in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations.

12. Also reaffirm the right of each State to legally manufacture, acquire, stockpile, manage and transfer conventional ammunition, including for its self-defence and security needs, as well as for its capacity to participate in peace operations, in a manner consistent with the Charter of the United Nations.

13. Further reaffirm the prerogative of each State to assess its conventional ammunition requirements in accordance with its legitimate defence and security needs and its national legislation, and that it is also for the individual State to decide on, inter alia, the structure, doctrine and equipment requirements of its military and security forces.

14. Recognize that responsibility for addressing the risks associated with ineffective through-life conventional ammunition management falls on States, consistent with national laws, and underline the importance of all States assuming strong national ownership in the through-life management of conventional ammunition.

15. Also recognize the importance of international cooperation and assistance in pursuing and supporting safe, secure and sustainable through-life conventional ammunition management nationally, sub-regionally, regionally and globally.
16. *Stress* the need for international cooperation among all States and other relevant stakeholders on through-life conventional ammunition management, acknowledging the support that they can provide, where appropriate and feasible, to States in addressing the risks posed by ineffective through-life conventional ammunition management.

17. *Recognize* the urgent necessity for assistance, where requested, appropriate and feasible, including technology transfers, technical, material, financial, legal assistance, or expertise for capacity-building and knowledge management, to support and facilitate efforts at national, subregional, regional and global levels to assess and address the risks associated with ineffective through-life conventional ammunition management and, in this regard, *underscore* the importance of a comprehensive and sustainable approach.

18. *Also underline* that this cooperative Global Framework is voluntary and without prejudice to obligations under relevant international, regional and subregional instruments to which States are a Party and to their other relevant political commitments and is subject to the respective legal and constitutional systems of States.

### III. Our cooperative framework

19. This Global Framework acknowledges different regional and national needs, circumstances and capacities and addresses safety and security risks associated with conventional ammunition in a comprehensive manner by promoting the through-life management, including through international cooperation and assistance, of all types of conventional ammunition, from small-calibre ammunition to the largest conventional ammunition and contributes to maintaining international peace and security.

20. We lay out the following set of political commitments as a new Global Framework that will address existing gaps in through-life conventional ammunition management, including international cooperation and assistance, without prejudice to national legal systems addressing national ammunition ownership, possession and use, and will be part of a comprehensive framework to support safe, secure and sustainable through-life conventional ammunition management at the national, subregional, regional and global levels, building upon and complementing existing frameworks, whereas cooperation at the regional and subregional levels should be considered on a voluntary basis. The Global Framework comprises 15 objectives:

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<tr>
<th>Objectives for safe, secure, and sustainable through-life conventional ammunition management</th>
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<tr>
<td>1. Use, promote and, where appropriate, enhance relevant international standards, guidelines and good practices on safe, secure and sustainable through-life conventional ammunition management.</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Adopt specific needs-driven and sustainable approaches to international cooperation and assistance, tailored to national, subregional or regional contexts, and prioritising full recipient participation and ownership.</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Support, where appropriate, regional and subregional mechanisms that address through-life conventional ammunition management.</td>
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3 States acknowledge the diverse challenges of identifying, preventing and combating the diversion of conventional ammunition in different regions, and that States and regions can, accordingly, consider adopting different practices to reduce diversion and through-life security risks effectively in accordance with different needs, situations, capacities and priorities.
4. Prioritise the sustainability of relevant national authorities’ capabilities in through-life conventional ammunition management.

5. Strive for the adequate systematic and sustainable surveillance of conventional ammunition in national stockpiles.

6. Employ adequate risk reduction processes for the management of national conventional ammunition stockpiles.

7. Establish adequate through-life systems for inventory management and record keeping of conventional ammunition under national ownership and control.

8. Promote supply chain transparency to comprehensively minimise and mitigate the risks of diversion when authorising conventional ammunition transfers.

9. Mitigate the risk of post-transfer conventional ammunition diversion, including through end user certificates and functionally equivalent documents in accordance with bilaterally determined clauses.

10. Deny unauthorized recipients, including criminals, organized criminal groups and terrorists, access to useable cached, abandoned and uncleared conventional ammunition and its energetic material.

11. Enhance the marking and tracing of conventional ammunition under national ownership and control.

12. Foster voluntary information-sharing on subregional, regional and international conventional ammunition diversion and illicit trafficking.

13. Enhance, where consistent with national laws, data collection and analysis by competent national authorities on diverted conventional ammunition.

14. Strengthen gender mainstreaming and the full, equal, meaningful and effective participation of women in through-life conventional ammunition management.

15. Encourage cooperation with relevant stakeholders, including non-governmental organizations and civil society, academia, research institutions and industry to enhance through-life conventional ammunition management.

21. We recognize that there may be multiple paths to realising these objectives and hence flexibility is needed in the configuration of common and additional possible enabling measures required to address them.

22. We commit ourselves to these objectives, and to take appropriate steps to achieve the common enabling measures designed to realise them, with the aim of enhancing through-life conventional ammunition management and without prejudice to national legal systems addressing national ammunition ownership, possession, and use.

23. Taking into consideration technological and economic gaps among States, and recognising diverse national laws, needs or priorities, as well as regional circumstances and specificities, we also list additional possible enabling measures that could contribute to achieving each objective in specific national or regional contexts.

24. A rationale for each objective, which describes its relevance, is referenced in the Annex of this Global Framework.

Objective 1: Use, promote and, where appropriate, enhance relevant international standards, guidelines and good practices on safe, secure and sustainable through-life conventional ammunition management

(a) Common enabling measures:

(i) Encourage prioritizing the use by relevant government institutions and national implementing bodies of the International Ammunition Technical
Guidelines, or corresponding standards or guidelines, when undertaking actions to enhance through-life conventional ammunition management, including where required their integration into national standards and regulations, as appropriate and consistent with national law.

(ii) Sustain ongoing reviews of the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines led by the UN SaferGuard programme.

(iii) Promote global accessibility by supporting the publication of the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines, and related support resources, online and in multiple languages.

(iv) Where they do not exist, support the development, in the framework of the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines and through the UN SaferGuard programme, of voluntary operational guidelines related to security aspects of the through-life management of conventional ammunition, taking into account and complementing relevant existing standards, guidelines and good practices, without duplicating them.

(b) Additional possible enabling measures:

(i) Continue to recognise that the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines, or corresponding standards or guidelines, inform and support existing bilateral and multilateral initiatives, projects and measures, which can serve, as appropriate, as examples of good practices for future policy making and international cooperation and assistance projects.

(ii) Provide, within the scope of international cooperation and assistance, and where requested, appropriate and feasible, legal, regulatory and procedural assistance (including the provision of relevant model regulations) that are aligned with the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines, or corresponding standards or guidelines.

Objective 2: Adopt specific needs-driven and sustainable approaches to international cooperation and assistance, tailored to national, subregional or regional contexts, and prioritising full recipient participation and ownership

(a) Common enabling measures:

(i) Prioritise full and inclusive recipient participation and ownership in the development of through-life conventional ammunition management programmes and initiatives supported through, as applicable, international cooperation and assistance.

(ii) Encourage, where feasible, appropriate and consistent with national law, technology transfer and capacity building activities, including, but not limited to equipment, financial or in-kind support and technical expertise for developing countries.

(iii) Consider, when needed, conducting voluntary assessments and analyses, under national ownership, to identify potential needs in through-life conventional ammunition management that can be addressed through national programming or tailored subregional, regional and international cooperation and assistance.

(a) Additional possible enabling measures:

(i) Encourage cooperation on through-life conventional ammunition management at the global, regional and subregional levels on a voluntary basis, including situating international cooperation and assistance within existing or emerging regional and subregional conventional ammunition management initiatives, without duplicating them.

(ii) Encourage designing and implementing international cooperation and assistance programmes on through-life conventional ammunition management as part of relevant humanitarian, peacebuilding, security
sector governance or sustainable development efforts of the requesting State, as appropriate and jointly decided with that State.

**Objective 3: Support, where appropriate, regional and subregional mechanisms that address through-life conventional ammunition management**

(a) Common enabling measures:
   (i) Encourage, and where appropriate support, strengthened exchanges and cooperation on through-life conventional ammunition management, including, *inter alia*, cooperation on capacity building and good practice-sharing, at regional and subregional levels.

(b) Additional possible enabling measures:
   (i) In devising implementation measures for regional or subregional cooperation, consider establishing structured strategic processes, such as comprehensive road maps and/or action plans on through-life conventional ammunition management, as a joint effort involving recipient States and key stakeholders in international cooperation and assistance.
   (ii) With specific reference to international cooperation and assistance, encourage recipient States and key stakeholders to meet regularly to provide feedback and share information, voluntarily and as appropriate, on assistance projects, lessons learned and good practices at regional and subregional levels, with the aim of identifying potential opportunities or gaps in the cooperation or assistance requested, and encouraging the mainstreaming of sustainable through-life conventional ammunition management into relevant existing programmes.
   (iii) Encourage, where relevant, States participating in regional and subregional initiatives to share information, voluntarily, on lessons learned and good practices at the global level, with the aim of identifying potential opportunities or gaps in cooperation and encouraging the mainstreaming of sustainable through-life conventional ammunition management into relevant existing initiatives.
   (iv) Consider strengthening regional and subregional mechanisms for international cooperation and assistance relevant to through-life conventional ammunition management, where they exist and as appropriate, or consider establishing such mechanisms where they do not exist.

**Objective 4: Prioritise the sustainability of relevant national authorities’ capabilities in through-life conventional ammunition management**

(a) Common enabling measures:
   (i) Promote developing, managing and sustaining adequate national processes, functional roles and capability enabling lines required for effective through-life conventional ammunition management, including in the design and development of international cooperation and assistance programmes.
   (ii) Promote clear and coherent systems for the oversight of through-life conventional ammunition management of national stockpiles.

(b) Additional possible enabling measures:
   (i) Assess, where appropriate, organizational capabilities including associated processes (i.e., risk assessments), functional roles (i.e., stakeholder assessments) and capability enabling lines, when needed (for example, within the framework of voluntary assessments and analyses or in the
design and development of international cooperation and assistance programmes).

(ii) Explore the coherent integration of through-life conventional ammunition management measures into conflict prevention, peacebuilding and sustaining peace, security sector governance and reform, sustainable development frameworks and the Women, Peace and Security Agenda, where relevant, at the policy and programme levels.

(iii) Take into consideration International Ammunition Technical Guidelines Module on Organizational capabilities as appropriate and consistent with national law.

Objective 5: Strive for the adequate, systematic and sustainable surveillance of conventional ammunition in national stockpiles

(a) Common enabling measures:
   (i) Encourage the establishment, by States, of the technical capabilities to perform adequate, systematic and sustainable surveillance of conventional ammunition in national stockpiles, as appropriate and consistent with national law, including through the provision and receipt of international cooperation and assistance.
   (ii) Employ suitable information management systems to record surveillance results and information on conventional ammunition in national stockpiles, where feasible and consistent with national law.

(b) Additional possible enabling measures:
   (i) Continue to develop guidance, methods and good practices on conventional ammunition surveillance of national stockpiles, with the aim of facilitating its widespread use by States, as appropriate, including within the framework of the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines, as appropriate and consistent with national law, in an inclusive and transparent manner under the UN SaferGuard programme, and with an emphasis on low-capacity and conflict-affected environments.
   (ii) In low-capacity or conflict-affected environments, consider integrating elements of the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines Module on Surveillance and in-service proof when undertaking voluntary assessments and analyses to identify potential needs in through-life conventional ammunition management.
   (iii) Explore the development, including in conjunction with industry and research institutions, of lower-technology surveillance measures that are tailored for temporary use in low-capacity and conflict-affected environments.

Objective 6: Employ adequate risk reduction processes for the management of national conventional ammunition stockpiles

(a) Common enabling measures:
   (i) Promote the reduction of safety risks posed by national conventional ammunition stockpiles, including through adequate risk analyses resulting in measures such as quantity limits and separation distances, compatibility group mixing, or explosive limit licencing, including through the provision and receipt of international cooperation and assistance, as appropriate.
   (ii) Adequately safeguard national conventional ammunition storage sites to ensure that civilian habitation and infrastructure is kept at a safe distance, and for existing sites that are situated in inhabited areas, enhance stockpile safety and, where serious risks to civilian populations persist, engage local communities in risk education.

(b) Additional possible enabling measures:
(i) Promote the use of International Ammunition Technical Guidelines Modules on Quantity and separation distances, on Licensing of explosives facilities and on Safeguarding of explosive facilities.

Objective 7: Establish adequate through-life systems for inventory management and record keeping of conventional ammunition under national ownership and control

(a) Common enabling measures:
   (i) Strengthen national capacities to develop, where necessary, and maintain adequate inventory management and record keeping systems required for the through-life management of conventional ammunition under national ownership and control.
   (ii) Prioritise, where applicable, the inclusion of relevant conventional ammunition classifications in inventory management and record-keeping systems for conventional ammunition under national ownership and control.
   (iii) Promote the use of technological solutions for efficient inventory management and record keeping systems for the through-life management of conventional ammunition under national ownership and control, including through international cooperation and assistance, as appropriate and feasible.
   (iv) Ensure, as appropriate and consistent with national law, that conventional ammunition under national ownership and control has been identified, classified and recorded in relevant inventory management and record keeping systems.
   (v) Encourage prioritising international cooperation and technology transfers, as appropriate and feasible, in order to strengthen the capacities stated in point 7(a)(i) in developing countries.

(b) Additional possible enabling measures:
   (i) In low-capacity and conflict-affected environments, develop adequate and maintenance-light information management solutions to support effective national inventory management and record keeping systems for the through-life management of conventional ammunition in national stockpiles, where appropriate and consistent with national law, including within the framework of international cooperation and assistance programmes.
   (ii) For States in a position to do so, provide, within the scope of international cooperation and assistance, and where appropriate and upon request and consistent with national law, assistance in national inventory management and record keeping, which is aligned with the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines, or corresponding standards or guidelines.

Objective 8: Promote supply chain transparency to comprehensively minimise and mitigate the risks of diversion when authorising conventional ammunition transfers

(a) Common enabling measures:
   (i) Consistent with national law, integrate consideration of diversion risk into national conventional ammunition transfer control systems, with the aim of minimising diversion comprehensively, and promote the disclosure of parties to the onward transfer chain in transfer license applications, and, where appropriate, in consultation with recipient States.
   (ii) Encourage bilateral pre- and post-delivery cooperation between originating and recipient States, including *inter alia* mitigating measures, as well as
recipient States alerting originating States to relevant cases of post-transfer diversion, where bilaterally agreed.

(iii) Use, where deemed beneficial, feasible, and consistent with national law, existing mechanisms where they exist, or consider developing new arrangements where they do not, to voluntarily share information on cases of diversion.

(iv) Consistent with national law, while acknowledging the legitimate needs of States to acquire conventional ammunition, in line with their right to self-defence, thoroughly assess whether there is an unacceptable risk of diversion when considering authorizing conventional ammunition transfers, including inter alia to areas affected by armed conflict, with a view to preventing diversion comprehensively.

(v) Where consistent with national law, deny making transfers to unauthorized recipients, including non-state actors\(^4\) engaged in criminal and terrorist activities.

(b) Additional possible enabling measures:

(i) Foster, where feasible and consistent with national law, inter-agency information exchange at the national level to provide transfer licensing authorities access to relevant nationally compiled, or internationally, regionally and sub-regionally shared information on cases of diverted conventional ammunition.

(ii) Consider the risk of diverted conventional ammunition being used to commit gender-based violence, and the differentiated impacts of diverted conventional ammunition on women, men, girls and boys, when considering diversion risks.

(iii) Reduce, where feasible, the risks of conventional ammunition diversion to unauthorized recipients, unless this prevents legitimate conventional ammunition transfers by States, by encouraging relevant national transfer control authorities to consider, inter alia, the following suggested elements of a pre-transfer consideration of diversion risks:

- a. Analyse the conventional ammunition in relation to the declared end user (for the purposes of identifying fraudulent end user certification and equivalent documents) and, if bilaterally agreed, end use.
- b. Consider the end user’s bona fides through, inter alia, identity checking and intelligence reports (i.e., is the end user who they claim to be?).
- c. Consider all relevant parties involved in the transfer, which may include freight forwarders, brokers, consignees and other intermediaries.
- d. Consider cases where the supply chain lacks transparency (parties do not produce sufficient documentation to enable adequate consideration of transfer risks) or where parties to the transfer have a history of diverting conventional ammunition previously.
- e. Maintain registers and databases of transfers, manufacturers, brokers, vessels and aircraft, as well as end users, shippers and freight forwarders that have a history of diversion or poor security measures.
- f. Consider the risks of diversion associated with transit, trans-shipment and the choice of route. Analyse all relevant information from primary and open sources. Verify and authenticate relevant documentation.
- g. Consider using delivery verification certificates.

(iv) Explore, where effective, feasible and consistent with national law, and at the request of recipient States, voluntary arrangements between transfer originating and recipient States to conduct joint International Ammunition Technical Guidelines risk-reduction process level assessments in the recipient State, to identify potential options for conventional ammunition

\(^4\) Definition for the purpose of this Global Framework only: Non-State actor: individual or entity, not acting under the lawful authority of any State.
management enhancements and/or needs for international cooperation and assistance.

Objective 9: Mitigate the risk of post-transfer conventional ammunition diversion, including through end user certificates or functionally equivalent documents with bilaterally determined clauses

(a) Common enabling measures:
   (i) Consider, where feasible and consistent with national law, the routine use of end user certificates, or functionally equivalent documents, in which the end user and, if bilaterally agreed, end use are identified for international transfers of conventional ammunition.
   (ii) Consider the routine inclusion, where appropriate, feasible and consistent with national law, of non-retransfer clauses in end user certificates, or functionally equivalent documents, which, when bilaterally determined, only allow end users to re-transfer conventional ammunition upon prior written approval of the originating State, or within the limits of clearly defined exceptions.

(b) Additional possible enabling measures:
   (i) Consider, where appropriate and feasible, and based on a national diversion risk assessment of a specific international transfer, authenticating end user certificates and associated transfer documentation by competent importing State authorities, or the provision of an import license issued by competent authorities.
   (ii) Encourage, without discharging export licensing authorities of their legal duties, ammunition exporting entities to exercise, where feasible, due diligence, for example, in verifying the identities of end users and other parties to the supply chain, being vigilant as to the forgery or misuse of end user documentation, declared end use, and flagging cases of attempted illicit acquisition to their competent national authorities.

Objective 10: Deny unauthorized recipients, including criminals, organized criminal groups and terrorists, access to useable cached, abandoned and uncleared conventional ammunition and its energetic material

(a) Common enabling measures:
   (i) Encourage prioritising clearance of abandoned unexploded ordnance and the safeguarding, safe storage, recovery and disposal of unguarded legacy or obsolete stockpiles of conventional ammunition that are still operational, and which are not under national ownership and control, as a means to deny access to conventional ammunition by unauthorized recipients, including criminals, organized criminal groups and terrorists.
   (ii) Continuously apply relevant safety and security measures to national conventional ammunition stockpiles that have been identified as surplus by relevant national authorities, in conformity with legitimate security needs, and enhance, where appropriate, related national capacities through the provision and receipt of international cooperation and assistance, including using methods that minimise negative impacts on the human population, civilian infrastructure or the environment.
   (iii) Encourage building national processes on responsible disposal, preferably through destruction of obsolete and unserviceable conventional ammunition, as determined by relevant national authorities.

(b) Additional possible enabling measures:
(i) Prioritize, if presented with widespread national stockpile security challenges, the physical security of conventional ammunition containing high quantities of explosive, whose acquisition may be attractive to unauthorized recipients, including criminals, organized criminal groups and terrorists.

(ii) Consider, where relevant and appropriate, supporting through international cooperation and assistance, national efforts to safeguard or clear useable cached, abandoned and uncleared conventional ammunition, which is not under national ownership and control, for the specific purpose of denying its acquisition by unauthorized recipients, including criminals, organized criminal groups and terrorists.

(iii) Encourage, where relevant, appropriate, and feasible, States to seek support of conventional ammunition manufacturers to declare to their national governments surplus and obsolete conventional ammunition stockpiles that could present safety and security risks, and explore cooperation on responsible disposal, preferably through destruction of such surplus or obsolete conventional ammunition stockpiles, as appropriate.

Objective 11: Enhance the marking and tracing of conventional ammunition under national ownership and control

(a) Common enabling measures:

(i) Consider, where feasible, economically viable and consistent with national law, applying minimum standards on markings (such as manufacturer and year of production) and collective identifiers (such as lot and batch numbers) as an integrated part of their regular manufacturing process.

(ii) In the absence of basic, regularly provided markings by the manufacturer, when procuring conventional ammunition, and where consistent with national law, in the specific case of conventional ammunition that is manufactured for States, and which is intended to remain under national ownership and control, and where feasible and economically viable, States should request appropriate markings as to allow for the identification of, inter alia: (a) the manufacturer; (b) the calibre or type; and (c) the lot number.

(iii) Where consistent with national law, States involved in international conventional ammunition transfers should keep relevant records.

(b) Additional possible enabling measures:

(i) When procuring conventional ammunition that is manufactured specifically for States, and where consistent with national law, feasible and economically viable, States could supplement existing inventory records by requesting the application of sub-lot numbers to progressively smaller units of ammunition packaging and, where consistent with national law, feasible and economically viable, to the item of conventional ammunition itself.

(ii) When procuring conventional ammunition, and where consistent with national law, feasible and economically viable, States should request that ammunition lots are not split among different national customers/end-users.

(iii) When procuring conventional ammunition that is manufactured specifically for States, and where consistent with national law, feasible and economically viable, States that request application of sub-lot numbers to conventional ammunition packaging may also request the inclusion of the same sub-lot numbers in relevant documentation and may record these sub-lot numbers in their own relevant inventory records.

(iv) States that have specific additional marking requirements for conventional ammunition should request these are applied by the manufacturer during the manufacturing process.
Objective 12: Foster voluntary information-sharing on subregional, regional and international conventional ammunition diversion and illicit trafficking

(a) Common enabling measures:
   (i) Where jointly agreed, feasible and consistent with their national laws, States should cooperate with each other and, where appropriate, with relevant international, regional and subregional organizations, in sharing relevant information to support national tracing, investigations, and criminal justice responses related to the diversion of conventional ammunition.

   (ii) Where beneficial, feasible and consistent with national and international law, States should use existing subregional, regional and international mechanisms where they exist, and in which a State participates, or foster new arrangements where they do not, to share information, voluntarily, on methods of shipment, means of concealment, the routes identified as used by criminals, organized criminal groups and terrorists engaged in conventional ammunition diversion and trafficking, and on the specific types of seized and recovered conventional ammunition.

   (iii) Where beneficial, feasible and consistent with national and international law, use existing subregional, regional and international mechanisms where they exist, or foster new arrangements where they do not, to share information, voluntarily, on seized and recovered conventional ammunition or its packaging (including lot and/or batch and, where relevant, container information), with a view to enhancing cross-border law enforcement cooperation and promoting more effective conventional ammunition counter-diversion and counter-trafficking measures.

   (iv) When prioritising effective investigations, give due regard to the risk posed by the characteristics of items, including but not limited to the particular risks posed by the diversion of easily trafficked small-calibre ammunition or technologically advanced conventional ammunition systems, such as ammunition for man-portable air defence systems (MANPADS) and ammunition for anti-tank guided weapon systems (ATGW).

(b) Additional possible enabling measures:
   (i) Consistent with States’ national laws and practices, and without prejudice to national security and legitimate commercial interests, encourage closer cooperation and consensual and voluntary information exchange, as appropriate, among parties investigating conventional ammunition diversion, including national law enforcement agencies, customs and border control, export and import licensing, defence forces, and intelligence services; international and regional law enforcement organizations, relevant regional entities; and relevant United Nations entities. In this respect, parties should ensure the accuracy of information if a third State is involved.

   (ii) Where beneficial, feasible, and consistent with national and international law, encourage closer cooperation and information exchange with relevant stakeholders, including non-governmental organizations and civil society, academia, research institutions and industry on issues related to conventional ammunition diversion and trafficking.

Objective 13: Enhance, where consistent with national laws, data collection and analysis by competent national authorities on diverted conventional ammunition

(a) Common enabling measures:
   (i) Encourage, where consistent with national law, feasible and appropriate, competent national authorities to collect data on seized and recovered
conventional ammunition and, if relevant, review existing data collection
directives, procedures, and processes.

(ii) Where consistent with national law, feasible and appropriate, take
reasonable measures to identify the origin (manufacturer or, in cases of
diversion, lawful end user) of seized and recovered conventional
ammunition for further analysis.

(iii) Where consistent with national law, feasible and appropriate, investigate
diversion through the analysis of any marks applied to conventional
ammunition or its packaging and by consulting any existing corresponding
transfer and inventory records.

(iv) Consider, where consistent with national law, feasible, appropriate and
economically viable, the development and application of new technology-
based enhancements for effective conventional ammunition
documentation, identification and tracing, to facilitate investigation of
conventional ammunition diversion and illicit trafficking.

(v) Encourage, where consistent with national law, feasible and appropriate,
international cooperation and technology transfers in order to strengthen
the capacities of competent authorities on data collection and analysis on
diverted and illicitly trafficked conventional ammunition especially in
developing countries.

(vi) In contexts where diverted conventional ammunition has been determined
to be associated with armed violence, including gender-based violence, or
violations or abuses of human rights or violations of international
humanitarian law, where consistent with national law, feasible and
appropriate, record information on victims, including sex and age
disaggregated data, to allow for an assessment of the role of diverted
conventional ammunition in different types of armed violence.

(b) Additional possible enabling measures:

(i) Encourage competent authorities to collect and analyse data on seized and
recovered conventional ammunition or its packaging, as appropriate, also
taking into account operational guidance developed in the framework of
the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines.

(ii) Provide relevant peer-to-peer training and mentoring, as appropriate and
upon request, to competent authorities, including national law
enforcement, customs and border control authorities, on the collection and
analysis of data on seized and recovered conventional ammunition or its
packaging, including through the framework of international cooperation
and assistance.

Objective 14: Strengthen gender mainstreaming and the full, equal,
meaningful and effective participation of women in through-life
conventional ammunition management

(a) Common enabling measures:

(i) Further assess and consider a gender perspective and gender implications
with respect to through-life conventional ammunition management to
inform gender-sensitive conventional ammunition management policies
and programming.

(ii) Promote the full, equal, meaningful and effective participation and
leadership of both women and men in conventional ammunition
management policy, practice and decision making, specifically in the
development of organizational capabilities, including through international
cooperation and assistance.

(iii) Increase understanding of the differentiated impact and humanitarian
consequences of unplanned explosions at conventional ammunition sites,
as well as the diversion of conventional ammunition, on women, men, girls
and boys and their lives, livelihoods and human rights.
(b) Additional possible enabling measures:
   (i) Consider the growing body of research and guidance for gender mainstreaming through-life conventional ammunition management in supporting the development and/or review of national conventional ammunition management policies and practices, and in the design and implementation of relevant international cooperation and assistance programmes, as appropriate.
   (ii) Exchange national experiences, lessons learned and good practices on mainstreaming a gender perspective into through-life conventional ammunition management.

**Objective 15: Encourage cooperation with relevant stakeholders, including non-governmental organizations and civil society, academia, research institutions and industry to enhance through-life conventional ammunition management**

(a) Common enabling measures:
   (i) Initiate exchanges with industry and technology experts, at national, subregional, regional and global levels, as appropriate, including under United Nations auspices, to explore current and emerging industry solutions to enhance supply chain integrity in the field of through-life conventional ammunition management.
   (ii) Encourage dialogue and strengthen, where feasible, the exchange of information and good practices with relevant stakeholders, including non-governmental organizations and civil society, academia, research institutions and industry, as appropriate, on technological, policy and normative developments in through-life conventional ammunition management.

(b) Additional possible enabling measures:
   (i) Consider exchanging with relevant stakeholders, including non-governmental organizations and civil society, academia, research institutions and industry, on potential contributions to, and training initiatives and research on, the development of systems that contribute to the more effective through-life management of conventional ammunition, as appropriate and consistent with national law.
   (ii) Encourage the conventional ammunition industry, as appropriate, to support government efforts in the implementation of the Global Framework through training initiatives and research, including with the participation of relevant stakeholders, including non-governmental organizations and civil society, academia, and research institutions.

**IV. International cooperation and assistance**

25. Bearing in mind the importance of international cooperation and assistance for the full and effective implementation of the purposes and objectives of this Global Framework, States commit, as appropriate and consistent with the objectives outlined in Section III of this Global Framework, to cooperate and coordinate with each other in efforts to strengthen through-life conventional ammunition management at the national, subregional, regional and global levels.

26. States should establish and strengthen cooperation and partnerships at all levels, as appropriate and consistent with their national laws, including with relevant international, regional and subregional organizations, and, where appropriate, relevant non-governmental organizations, academia, research institutions and the private sector.
27. States should designate a national point of contact for voluntary information sharing relating to the implementation of this Global Framework. States are encouraged to provide technical support to the national point of contact, or to the relevant government official directly responsible, on matters related to through-life conventional ammunition management and the collection and analysis of data on conventional ammunition diversion, and to include up-to-date contact information for the national point of contact in voluntary national reports and updates. Regional and subregional organizations are also encouraged to designate similar points of contact and to promote cooperation and coordination among them.

28. States that have identified needs pertaining to safe, secure and sustainable through-life conventional ammunition management may seek assistance, including technology transfers, technical, material, financial, legal assistance, gender mainstreaming and expertise for capacity-building and knowledge management, that may help address relevant aspects of through-life conventional ammunition management.

29. States and relevant international, regional and subregional organizations, as well as non-governmental organizations, in a position to do so, and upon request, should consider providing, as appropriate, needs-based, tailored and sustainable assistance to requesting States, in order to support the implementation of this Global Framework, while recognising that national ownership by States receiving assistance in implementing the Global Framework is a critical success factor for effective and sustainable assistance.

30. States may request, offer or receive, upon request, assistance through, *inter alia*, the United Nations, notably the UN SaferGuard programme, international, regional or subregional organizations, relevant non-governmental organizations, or on a bilateral basis, including through North-South, South-South, and triangular cooperation, or by contributing to trust funds within the United Nations system as well as other regional and subregional trust funds relevant to through-life conventional ammunition management. Regional and subregional organizations may also request and receive assistance from, and offer assistance to, one another through cross-regional cooperation, including through the United Nations as appropriate.

31. States request the Secretariat to establish under the UN SaferGuard programme an efficient and agile global mechanism for requesting, offering and receiving assistance in through-life conventional ammunition management, including modalities and processes, building upon and strengthening cooperation with other relevant stakeholders.

32. States request the Secretariat to maintain, under the UN SaferGuard programme, the roster of experts validated according to the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines, ensuring the full, equal, meaningful and effective participation of women and equitable geographic representation, and to complement such a roster, in line with the further development of these Guidelines, and invite relevant regional and subregional organizations to establish, where needed, and to maintain regional and subregional rosters of experts, as appropriate.

33. States are encouraged to use the findings of voluntary assessments and analyses as referenced in measure 2.a.iii to inform areas of enhancement of through-life conventional ammunition management.

34. States should exchange experiences and lessons learned on safe, secure and sustainable through-life conventional ammunition management, where feasible and appropriate, *inter alia* under the auspices of the United Nations, and
encourage relevant regional and subregional organizations to foster such exchanges at their levels respectively and across regions, as appropriate.

35. States commit to establish, within the immediately upcoming budgetary cycle of the United Nations following the adoption of this Global Framework, a standing dedicated fellowship training programme on conventional ammunition, in order to strengthen technical knowledge and expertise in areas related to the implementation of the Global Framework, and request the Secretariat to prepare options including the funding and administrative arrangements for the programme for consideration by States.

V. Follow-up and review

36. To promote the safe, secure, and sustainable through-life management of conventional ammunition, and particular needs and measures taken on international cooperation and assistance, we commit to take the following steps for the effective implementation and follow up of the Global Framework:

37. Convene a Preparatory Meeting of States in 2025, which will explore possible options for the development of the process and modalities for the effective implementation of the Global Framework and prepare for a Meeting of States in 2027.

38. Request the Secretariat, in consultation with States, to develop a template to facilitate voluntary national reporting to be discussed at the 2025 Preparatory Meeting of States and considered at the 2027 Meeting of States. This template should take into consideration existing templates and reporting modalities, and the diverse circumstances, specificities, needs, and priorities of States, including in relation to international cooperation and assistance.

39. States are encouraged to provide a voluntary initial overview in 2026, which includes steps taken to implement the Global Framework, with the aim of informing the discussions of the 2027 Meeting of States.

40. Convene a Meeting of States in 2027, and subsequently on a regular basis, to be determined at the 2027 Meeting of States in order to review the implementation of the Global Framework. Meetings of States should take stock of through-life conventional ammunition management practices and experiences, identify technological developments, and share lessons learned and progress made in the provision of international cooperation and assistance and the implementation of this Global Framework. Meetings of States should address gaps, challenges, and recommendations in through-life conventional ammunition management, including needs and measures taken on international cooperation and assistance, with the participation, as observers, of relevant international and regional organizations and other relevant stakeholders, including non-governmental organizations and civil society, academia, research institutions and industry.

41. Consider convening governmental Technical Experts Meetings, as decided by the Meetings of States, with the participation, as observers, of relevant international and regional organizations, and other relevant stakeholders, including non-governmental organizations and civil society, academia, research institutions and industry. These governmental Technical Experts Meetings should address particular issues and themes relevant to conventional ammunition management practices, under the Global Framework, including on international cooperation and assistance, to provide recommendations for consideration by the Meetings of States. States should consider the issues and themes of past and future Technical Expert Meetings at Meetings of States.
42. Invite States, international and regional organizations, and other relevant stakeholders, including non-governmental organizations and civil society, academia, research institutions and industry to provide technical papers to the Secretariat on any thematic issues or new gaps, needs, or measures identified in the implementation of the Global Framework, in particular on those particular issues and themes addressed in Technical Experts Meetings.

43. Following the 2027 Meeting of States, encourage States to provide voluntary national reports as well as voluntary updates, whenever relevant gaps, challenges and achievements arise and, where applicable and feasible, in advance of Meetings of States. Request the Secretariat, to receive and circulate national reports and relevant voluntary updates which States have allowed to be publicly disclosed.

44. Encourage relevant regional and subregional organizations to foster exchange on the implementation of this Global Framework at the regional and subregional level, as appropriate.

45. Request the Secretariat to continue serving as the custodian of the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines and to further develop and review the Guidelines with the assistance of technical experts from interested States, under the UN SaferGuard programme, covering relevant safety and security aspects of through-life conventional ammunition management and taking into account and complementing existing standards, guidelines and good practices, without duplicating them.

46. Request the Secretariat to collect information on subregional, regional and global initiatives on safe, secure and sustainable through-life conventional ammunition management and maintain such information on an appropriate online platform, taking into account relevant existing platforms.
Annex: The rationales for objectives in the Global Framework

This annex is provided to aid comprehension of the Global Framework. While it is not an essential component of the Framework, it is not provided to interpret it, imply no commitment and does not list implementable measures, it is provided to assist understanding of the objectives in the Global Framework, as well as to inform international cooperation and assistance.

Objective 1: Use, promote and, where appropriate, enhance relevant international standards, guidelines and good practices on safe, secure and sustainable through-life conventional ammunition management

Rationale for the objective: Existing international standards, guidelines and good practices promote and enhance safe, secure and sustainable through-life conventional ammunition management. The International Ammunition Technical Guidelines are not alone in providing comprehensive guidance on safe and secure through-life conventional ammunition management (certain States and international, regional and sub-regional organizations employ their own, corresponding standards and guidelines). Having been developed under United Nations auspices, however, their scope and application is designed to be global. They assist States with widely varying national capacities and form part of a wider framework of global conventional ammunition management enhancement activities under the UN SaferGuard programme and various bilateral, multilateral and multinational programmes. Greater use of the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines or corresponding standards or guidelines could positively impact the safe and secure management of conventional ammunition. The International Ammunition Technical Guidelines, specifically, require continued refinement to reflect new challenges and solutions in the field of through-life conventional ammunition management, including the development of supporting guidance and tools that are tailored towards implementation in specific national and/or subregional and regional circumstances and that promote gender mainstreaming in through-life conventional ammunition management. Additionally, while the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines provide substantial guidance on stockpiled conventional ammunition, there is a need to expand them to include specific guidance on conventional ammunition security risks (notably on mitigating diversion and illicit trafficking) throughout its supply chain, taking into account and complementing relevant existing standards, guidelines and good practices, without duplicating them.

Objective 2: Adopt specific needs-driven and sustainable approaches to international cooperation and assistance, tailored to national, subregional or regional contexts, and prioritising full recipient participation and ownership

Rationale for the objective: Sustainable through-life conventional ammunition management rests on States developing and maintaining their own national capabilities. However, international cooperation and assistance is crucial in the process of some States developing their own capacities and attaining overall success in sustainable through-life conventional ammunition management. When there is a divergence between national needs and resources and the support provided through
international cooperation and assistance, gains made in promoting safe and secure through-life conventional ammunition management can be short-lived. Moreover, duplications of international cooperation and assistance initiatives prevent the efficient allocation of valuable and scarce resources to recipients. This can be avoided through tailoring assistance to the different national and/or subregional/regional circumstances; broadening the number of national stakeholders involved in through-life conventional ammunition management decision making; enhancing dialogue and feedback between providers and recipients; recognising that national capabilities required for effective through-life conventional ammunition management often derive from, and need to be strengthened, across government and not just within the defence and security sectors; and encouraging, where appropriate, the participation of relevant stakeholders, including regional and subregional organisations (acknowledging that there may be similarities in the circumstances of States within the same regions and subregions and the benefits of ‘north-south,’ ‘south-south’ and triangular cooperation).

**Objective 3: Support where appropriate, regional and subregional mechanisms that address through-life conventional ammunition management**

*Rationale for the objective:* States may share greater commonalities in terms of conventional ammunition challenges and solutions at regional and subregional levels than they do globally. In some regions there are also established regional or subregional initiatives that are focused on, or have direct relevance for, through-life conventional ammunition management. Given strong unity of purpose and close cooperation in some regions and sub-regions, actions at these levels could serve to catalyse the realisation of global ambitions for actions on through-life conventional ammunition management.

**Objective 4: Prioritise the sustainability of relevant national authorities’ capabilities in through-life conventional ammunition management**

*Rationale for the objective:* Safe, secure and sustainable through-life conventional ammunition management is a multi-layered process, requiring a whole array of capabilities, which allow expertise to be applied and/or institutionalised. These capabilities, which enable an organization (e.g., military and security forces) to sustain its expertise, are also known as organizational capabilities. Organizational capabilities are not solely related to conventional ammunition management, but to the management of any asset. They include processes (i.e., through-life management), functional roles (i.e., stakeholders at all levels) as well as capability enabling lines. The term ‘capability enabling lines’ refers to the ability across an organization (e.g., a Ministry of Defence) to manage and allocate resources to produce a desired capability. These capability enabling lines include doctrine and concepts, organization, training, material, personnel, finances, infrastructure, and safety and security. Through-life conventional ammunition management should also be subject to principles of good governance, adopt transparent and accountable decision making and oversight mechanisms, and be considered, where applicable, within wider peace, security, development and conflict prevention frameworks. Evaluations of successful international cooperation and assistance suggest that States are more likely to sustain gains made in through-life conventional ammunition management when their organizational capabilities are appropriately understood, defined and resourced.

**Objective 5: Strive for the adequate systematic and sustainable surveillance of conventional ammunition in national stockpiles**
Rationale for the objective: Surveillance of conventional ammunition is the thorough gathering and assessment of all data on a unit of conventional ammunition to determine its condition throughout its life. Surveillance differs according to the type of ammunition and the safety risk that it poses. For larger-calibre conventional ammunition, surveillance is a fundamental and irreplaceable component of safe ammunition management, notably for monitoring the stability of energetic material, such as propellants. By contrast, surveillance requirements for small-calibre conventional ammunition may be much lower. Depending on the ammunition types, surveillance includes physical inspection, proof, chemical analysis of propellants and reporting on the use of conventional ammunition (including its accuracy, safety, any accidents or incidents, its age, components and the conditions and climates in which it has been used or stored). Of all through-life conventional ammunition management activities, systematic conventional ammunition surveillance—particularly of larger calibres—requires the highest technical capability (including the training of expert staff in physical inspection and chemical analysis of propellants and the development of testing facilities). Many States lack the necessary conventional ammunition surveillance capability, which means that despite other advances that they might make in safe conventional ammunition management, their stockpiles remain fundamentally at risk of ‘chemical shelf life’ instability and the consequent threat of unplanned ammunition explosions. As such, whether nationally, or in the context of international cooperation and assistance programmes, developing adequate systematic conventional ammunition surveillance capability is a major undertaking. In response, the sustainable capacity-building and training of personnel, the provision of appropriate testing facilities, and the continued development of guidance should be considered international priorities.

Objective 6: Employ adequate risk reduction processes for the management of national conventional ammunition stockpiles

Rationale for the objective: The storage of conventional ammunition within national stockpiles presents latent safety risks to people, protected areas and critical infrastructure. An adequate risk reduction process helps determine appropriate measures to achieve risk levels that each State considers acceptable. One of the most efficient means of reducing and/or mitigating the risks of an unplanned conventional ammunition explosion is the use of quantity limits and separation distances. Accompanying measures include defining maximum quantities of explosives for each conventional ammunition site (typically termed ‘licensing of explosive facilities’) and only storing compatible ammunition types together (typically termed ‘compatibility groups’). Such measures contribute to ensuring that, if there is an unplanned explosion, 1) there is sufficient distance within and between stores containing compatible conventional ammunition groups to prevent all ammunition stored on site from exploding, and 2) people, protected areas and critical infrastructure remain at tolerably safe distances. In the latter regard, preventing civilian encroachment into safety distances around conventional ammunition storage sites (typically termed ‘safeguarding of explosive facilities’) can be critical. While improving the safety of national stockpiles by developing adequate conventional ammunition surveillance capacity may take time, applying risk reduction processes may have an immediate effect on the risks posed by unsafely stored national conventional ammunition stockpiles.

Objective 7: Establish adequate through-life systems for inventory management and record keeping of conventional ammunition under national ownership and control

Rationale for the objective: National capacity to classify (allocate its conventional ammunition to different roles or processes), quantify and identify the location of
conventional ammunition under national ownership and control is one of the prerequisites of effective through-life conventional ammunition management. It is not only critical from the perspective of conventional ammunition safety (unstable conventional ammunition needs to be identified and disposed of) or physical security (the loss or theft of conventional ammunition needs to be identified and addressed); it is a national security requirement. States that are unable to classify, quantify and identify the location of conventional ammunition within their national stockpiles could face difficulties in *inter alia* forecasting conventional ammunition requirements (meeting daily ammunition expenditure rates) in the event of a need for self-defence; efficiently scheduling conventional ammunition procurement to replace unserviceable or obsolete conventional ammunition; and cost effectively replenishing the national conventional ammunition stockpile. It is, therefore, essential that States develop and maintain adequate national conventional ammunition stockpile inventory management and record keeping systems.

**Objective 8: Promote supply chain transparency to comprehensively minimise and mitigate the risks of diversion when authorising conventional ammunition transfers**

*Rationale for the objective:* Diversion can occur at any point along the conventional ammunition supply chain (from manufacture to eventual use or disposal). It is essential that the originating and recipient States of conventional ammunition transfers acknowledge responsibility for combating diversion. Because diversion is difficult to fully address post-event, promoting supply chain transparency (knowing more about the onward supply chain) and considering diversion risks prior to transfer contribute to reducing diversion. Generally, diversion occurs when a party to the supply chain either: 1) lacks the capacity to secure conventional ammunition from loss, theft or unauthorized acquisition; or 2) wilfully diverts the transferred materiel.

**Objective 9: Mitigate the risk of post-transfer conventional ammunition diversion, including through end user certificates or functionally equivalent documents with bilaterally determined clauses**

*Rationale for the objective:* End user certificates and functionally equivalent documents are widely, although not universally, employed by States to *inter alia* mitigate the risk of post-transfer conventional ammunition diversion and trafficking. In this specific regard, end user certification may serve two purposes: 1) to establish the identity of the end user and the declared end use, which allows the authorising State to assess whether that end user or end use poses a diversion risk; and 2) to ensure that the end user does not re-transfer conventional ammunition to a party that was not the object of the originating State’s pre-transfer diversion risk assessment. The surety that end user certification provides to the exporting State is enhanced by identifying the end user and end use more precisely and by introducing assurances with the end user; among the most advantageous being ‘non-retransfer clauses,’ which, when bilaterally determined, restrict the end user from re-transferring materiel without the prior, written consent of the originating State, or within the limits of clearly defined exceptions.

**Objective 10: Deny unauthorized recipients, including criminals, organized criminal groups and terrorists, access to useable cached, abandoned and unclesed conventional ammunition and its energetic material**

*Rationale for the objective:* Cached or abandoned ammunition is attractive to unauthorized recipients, including criminals, organized criminal groups and terrorists. In addition, conventional ammunition, or the explosives sourced from it, is frequently
used as a main charge in improvised explosive devices. Preventing the diversion, acquisition and illicit transfer of all conventional weapons, ammunition, and related materiel to, by and among unauthorized recipients, including criminals, organized criminal groups and terrorists, is a priority. The explosive material within conventional ammunition (including material harvested from abandoned explosive ordnance and unexploded ordnance) can provide terrorists – and certain criminal groups – with safer, more reliable and more enhanced performance than would typically be achieved through the production of homemade explosives. In addition, the mass production by criminals, organized criminal groups and terrorists of improvised weapon systems that are specifically designed to fire or launch conventional ammunition underscores the need for more effective recovery and disposal of useable cached, abandoned and uncleared energetic material, sourced from conventional ammunition.

Objective 11: Enhance the marking and tracing of conventional ammunition under national ownership and control

_Rationale for the objective:_ When investigating conventional ammunition diversion, authorities often need identifying information about the ammunition to subsequently establish the identity of the authorised State end user and, if possible, why the conventional ammunition is not in that State end user’s possession or control. With many types of conventional ammunition in national stockpiles, the primary identifier is the lot number, which is identical for all units in that lot. Lot numbers can be marked on conventional ammunition packaging or, particularly for larger types of conventional ammunition, on the individual item itself. Lots have volumes ranging from thousands to millions of units, depending on the type of conventional ammunition and manufacturing processes. For authorities investigating seized or recovered conventional ammunition, large lot sizes can pose challenges. Conventional ammunition from one lot may be used to fulfil different contracts/shipments to different procuring States/end users, and it may be very difficult, following post-diversion recovery, to determine from which of the authorized/lawful State customers the split lots may have been diverted. One possible solution, where consistent with national law, feasible, and economically viable, is for procuring States to request application of ‘sub-lot’ numbers at the time of manufacture. These numbers are a sub-set of the ‘actual’ or ‘head’ lot number and serve to sub-divide the lot. If used, sub-lot marking increases the possibility of identifying the State customer or end user in relevant records. Basic markings applied to individual units of conventional ammunition (identifying the manufacturer and year of production) may be employed in some cases, where consistent with national law, feasible and economically viable, to help detect and monitor ammunition diversion. In some cases, new technologies and processes may offer cost-effective solutions for individual marking during and after manufacture. These include _inter alia_ printing, stamping, laser marking, the application of micro tags or the integration or application of identifying combinations of rare earth elements (chemical tagging).

Objective 12: Foster voluntary information-sharing on subregional, regional and international conventional ammunition diversion and illicit trafficking

_Rationale for the objective:_ Cross-border illicit trafficking of conventional ammunition could be addressed more effectively through coordinated approaches at subregional, regional and international levels. Unauthorized recipients, including criminals, organized criminal groups and terrorists, that operate across borders often share common sources of conventional ammunition, which makes subregional, regional and international information-sharing on conventional ammunition diversion
and trafficking, particularly useful. Competent national authorities, such as law enforcement or customs and border control, tasked with interdiction, criminal investigations or involved in criminal judicial proceedings into cross-border conventional ammunition trafficking, benefit from access to information, shared on a voluntary basis, that identifies seized and recovered conventional ammunition inter alia by its type, calibre, lot number (where applicable), manufacturer, mode of shipping or mode of concealment.

**Objective 13: Enhance, where consistent with national laws, data collection and analysis on diverted conventional ammunition by competent national authorities on diverted conventional ammunition**

**Rationale for the objective:** Collecting data on seized and recovered conventional ammunition, within the context of national law enforcement and customs and border control operations, is fundamental to identifying, analysing and redressing diversion. In some instances, competent national authorities overlook conventional ammunition while investigating illicit weapon trafficking. More widespread and granular data collection and analysis of diverted conventional ammunition would support efforts to control conventional ammunition diversion and trafficking and refine tools to address it. This information can also support transfer licensing risk assessments and, ultimately, the administration and, if necessary, revision of transfer control laws, regulations and processes.

**Objective 14: Strengthen gender mainstreaming and the full, equal, meaningful and effective participation of women in through-life conventional ammunition management**

**Rationale for the objective:** States have long recognised the negative consequences of unplanned explosions at conventional ammunition sites as well as diversion and illicit trafficking of conventional ammunition, and their differing impacts on women, men, girls and boys and their lives, livelihoods and human rights. Women, in particular, are more at risk of violence stemming from ineffective conventional ammunition management committed through gender-based violence. There is also an increased recognition of the importance for the full, equal, meaningful, and effective participation and leadership of women in all aspects of through-life conventional ammunition management. However, there remain gaps in mainstreaming a gender perspective into through-life conventional ammunition management activities, and in better understanding the implications of the differential impacts resulting from ineffective through-life management of conventional ammunition on women, men, girls and boys. A gender perspective provides key insights into how individuals and groups are differentially impacted by armed conflict and weapons, and gender mainstreaming makes for better and more effective arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation. The growing body of research in this area indicates gaps in inter alia data collection on gendered impacts resulting from ineffective management of national conventional ammunition stockpiles; and the exchange of good practice and lessons learned in integrating a gender perspective into conventional ammunition management policy and practice, including in the context of international, regional and subregional cooperation and assistance. In order to address such gaps, there is a need to consider conventional ammunition management through its life cycle, using a gender analysis, in order to identify relevant entry points for gender mainstreaming.

**Objective 15: Encourage cooperation with relevant stakeholders, including non-governmental organizations and civil society, academia, research institutions and industry to enhance through-life conventional ammunition management**
**Rationale for the objective:** Non-governmental sectors, including non-governmental organizations, academia, research institutions and industry, where appropriate and consistent with national laws, could have complementary roles to play in relevant fields of through-life conventional ammunition management, including *inter alia* and where consistent with national laws: technological developments pertaining to the safety, security and traceability of conventional ammunition; the development of through-life supply chain management systems (including systems developed to enhance the supply chain security of civilian market commodities); investigations into conventional ammunition accidents (notably unplanned explosions); and the evaluation of programmes that are designed to enhance through-life conventional ammunition management, including within the framework of international cooperation and assistance. Technical solutions, research and good practices derived from these fields could have the potential to improve through-life conventional ammunition management.