

**OPEN-ENDED WORKING GROUP ON CONVENTIONAL AMMUNITION
SECOND SUBSTANTIVE SESSION
(Geneva, August 15-19, 2022)**

**Statement by Commodore Nitin Parvataneni, Director (Military Affairs),
Ministry of External Affairs**

on

**GENERAL PRINCIPLES TO PROMOTE THE SAFE, SECURE AND SUSTAINABLE
THROUGH-LIFE MANAGEMENT OF CONVENTIONAL AMMUNITION
(August 16, 2022)**

Good afternoon Mr. Chairman and to all the esteemed colleagues. Allow us to complement you Mr. Chair on your professional and objective approach towards positive results in this OEWG.

Allow me to also share with you that we celebrated the 75th anniversary of our independence yesterday. Despite being a young nation, we have made significant progress in setting up frameworks and more importantly in amending those frameworks, or the rules within, to match contemporary security scenarios.

We feel that the current approach of the OEWG is towards a tactical perspective and may result in more focus on details without adequately addressing the strategic end state. We would recommend a more strategic approach to deal with the issue on a global scale starting with strategic objectives that are concise.

Following that line of thought, I would begin by offering our thoughts on the risks and impact of ineffective ammunition management. The strategic impact of ineffective management of ammunition, whether in surplus or not, is creation of what we like to call – ROGUE AMMUNITION - ammunition that is ripe for diversion. Risk is only a consequence of that creation of rogue ammunition and can fall under a framework based on sound principles which we could lay out as a group, by consensus.

On principles, we believe that the following are essential principles of ammunition management:

1. National ownership
2. Standardise organisational architecture
3. Data Management
4. Risk Management
5. Safety Protocols

6. Security Protocols, which will include transfer procedures.
7. Deterrence measures

Each of these principles must contribute to the strategic end state of eliminating creation of rogue ammunition, and if created, eliminate chances of its diversion to unauthorised users.

This being the strategic outlook towards laying out the principles, the operational and tactical aspects would follow. Let me take the example of Data management. India maintains a National Database of Arms and Ammunition – Arms Licenses Issuance System and computerised inventory control to help not only in information management, but also in decision-support right till the end-user. Salient features of this effective data management are Unique ID number, electronic licence, effective tracing, secure supply chain management, accurate forecasting, weeding out of non-moving inventory, better lifecycle management. Better database management leads to more visibility and transparency that achieves our strategic end states.

I thank you.

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**Statement by Commodore Nitin Parvataneni, Director (Military Affairs),
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on

**PROMOTING NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND THE USE INTERNATIONAL
GUIDELINES FOR SAFE, SECURE AND SUSTAINABLE THROUGH-LIFE
MANAGEMENT OF CONVENTIONAL AMMUNITION
(August 16, 2022)**

Mr. Chairman,

Two key areas that could be considered by the OEWG in the are the following:

First, the differing national capabilities and capacities of member states in addressing the problems in ammunition management has been widely recognised. Therefore, while updating and standardising the international guidelines, without making commensurate resources available to member states, especially developing countries, through international cooperation and assistance they would yield limited results. These resources are not just limited to financial assistance, but also include offering technical and legal expertise, providing equipment and material support and facilitating technology transfers, where required. Focussed efforts to bridge this global gap would be required to promote the use of international guidelines / standards on ammunition management.

Second, effectiveness of international cooperation and assistance in strengthening national efforts in ammunition management can be enhanced when there is a clear determination/ specification of the needs and requirements. Regular review and assessment of national policy and implementation frameworks would be required for identification of such needs and requirements. The OEWG must discuss and elaborate on how a culture of national review of ammunition framework could be promoted.

Assessment of national frameworks can also be carried out through international cooperation between member states. Can the expertise available at the regional and sub-regional be deployed to States, who may require and request such assistance. Can the UN play a role facilitate such reviews and if so, what would be its role?

Addressing the above questions, we believe, would contribute in promoting national ownership and ensuring the effectiveness of the international cooperation and assistance in supporting it.

We also believe that there is scope for improvement in the international guidance on the security aspects of ammunition management. While traditionally the focus has been on stockpile security, we need to address the ammunition security holistically, which will include security measures throughout the ammunition lifecycle. We also believe that IATG can be developed further to address these issues. We hope this could be addressed by this Group.

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on

**SECURING THROUGH-LIFE MANAGEMENT OF CONVENTIONAL AMMUNITION
(August 17, 2022)**

Mr. Chairman,

Unlike the safety aspects of ammunition management, its security aspects can have an extra-territorial impact i.e lack of stringent implementation of security measures by one country can unduly affect another, particularly when ammunition is diverted into the hands of terrorist groups and crime syndicates across borders. Therefore, the security aspects, we daresay, assume critical importance and priority over safety in a global framework on ammunition management.

As we had mentioned earlier, the aim of an effective and secure ammunition management system is the prevention of creation of what we call ‘rogue’ ammunition, prevent the diversion of such rogue ammunition, when it is created, and prevent the illicit diversion of ammunition to rogue elements.

The objectives for a securing ammunition throughout its lifecycle can be encapsulated in 12 words:

- Ensuring stockpile security
- Effective accounting,
- Stringent transfer controls and
- Post-export verification

Allow me explain the above in detail.

First, robust measures for ensuring stockpile security will help in preventing the creation of rogue ammunition. We do not identify the word ‘stockpile’ only with the storage phase at the ammunition depots, but also the stockpiles post-manufacturing and during the transportation phases as well.

Two, deploying effective and efficient accounting systems will help detect the rogue ammunition. When complemented by appropriate marking and tracing measures, diversion of rogue ammunition can be prevented or stopped early.

Three, stringent transfer controls, both internally within a country and when it is exported, will ensure that no ammunition is transferred to rogue elements, but only to authorised recipients. Assessment of the security protocols and measures at the end-user level transferred ammunition forms ‘the key’ component of transfer controls.

Four, Post-export/ transfer verification is the ability of exporter to verify authentically that the transferred ammunition has indeed reached the authorised end-user safely. International cooperation and information-sharing is an immutable requirement to achieve this.

The OEWG should discuss detailed measures to achieve the above objectives, without which the Global Framework would be incomplete. In this regard, as we had mentioned earlier, there is scope for improvement in the international guidance on the security aspects of ammunition management, including developing IATG further to address these issues. We hope this could be addressed by this Group.

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**Statement by Commodore Nitin Parvataneni, Director (Military Affairs),
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on

**ENABLING FACTORS THAT COULD CONTRIBUTE TO A SAFE, SECURE AND
SUSTAINABLE THROUGH-LIFE AMMUNITION MANAGEMENT OF
CONVENTIONAL AMMUNITION AT THE NATIONAL, REGIONAL AND GLOBAL
LEVELS
(August 18, 2022)**

Mr. Chairman,

On today's agenda, we believe that...

- States hold the primary responsibility for ensuring the safety and security of conventional ammunition through its lifecycle. We also recognize the value of international cooperation, particularly when it comes to security aspects of ammunition management. As recognised in resolution 76/233, such cooperation at the regional and subregional levels should be considered on a voluntary basis. This is a key principle that needs to be reflected in the Global framework as well.

- An important aspect of international support to regional and sub-regional mechanisms would be in the area of capacity building. Developing technical expertise at the national level through the effective use of regional and sub-regional mechanisms, including by leveraging such expertise available locally within the region, should be accorded top priority. We will elaborate on this point in greater detail when we discuss 'other unidentified measures'.

- One of the key enabling factors that needs to be considered by the OEWG is the issue of sustainability of international assistance. Some of the political commitments that are being envisaged in the draft global framework are ambitious. Fulfilling such commitments would need considerable allocation of financial resources over a considerable period of time. To cite an example, developing ammunition surveillance capability is a major undertaking. It involves establishment of dedicated testing facilities and constant training of personnel, among other things. For such safety techniques to yield the desired results, mutually accepted international guidelines and

sustained international assistance with a long-term perspective through constant assessment of impact would be required.

To sum it up, the the points that need serious consideration under this set of questions are -

- a) Enhancement of national capacities through regional and international cooperation and the necessary financial allocation for the same
- b) Creation of a regional-level frameworks for capacity building by pooling in local expertise and
- c) Sustainability of the international assistance through constant reassessment and reviews.

And finally, yesterday, we were priveleged to hear the contributions by the civil society and international organizations in creating guidelines and handbooks in addition to some technological breakthroughs. For eg, the OSCE handbook of best practices on conventional ammunition. And we, as a delegation, sincerely appreciate their efforts.

Thank you for the opportunity to present our views.

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on

**OTHER UNIDENTIFIED GAPS OR MEASURES TO SUPPORT SAFE,
SECURE, AND SUSTAINABLE THOUGH-LIFE AMMUNITION
MANAGEMENT
(August 18, 2022)**

We feel that the gap lies in inability or restricted ability of all countries to plug into any suggested global network due to differing capacities, standards and expertise levels.

To alleviate this, we propose a Two-tiered mechanism:

At global level, there must be a platform for regular exchange of information – on national implementation, on best practices, on contemporary challenges, on enhancing the traceability of seized and recovered ammunition etc.

But at the regional and sub-regional level, we propose a mechanism for provision of actual technical, legal, and other training-related assistance so that we can, as a comity of nations, promote national implementation by following a certain set of international guidelines agreed upon by us.

Towards this, we recommend regional anchors. We can call them preferred partners. In effect, we suggest something equivalent to a joint cooperation centre at regional levels manned by countries in the region. And these joint coordination centers could plug into international system. We propose this at a micro-level for the following reasons:

- Locally available expertise within the region and sub-region, including from the industry and the non-governmental sectors, can be easily tapped into such a mechanism.
- Such expertise would be familiar with the political-security environment and challenges in the region and hence have a better understanding in extending the necessary cooperation and assistance.

- The micro-level participation may enhance the agility in response for requests of assistance.

- This would complement the existing global mechanisms and not result in duplication of efforts.

This is something like a global 911, but at a regional level, that we suggested on the first day.

Thank you for your time.
