India’s views on nuclear disarmament verification should be read in conjunction with its views contained in the reports of the Secretary-General on nuclear disarmament verification A/72/304 and A/75/126. India supported the General Assembly resolution 71/67 that led to the establishment of the Group of Governmental Experts to consider the role of verification in advancing nuclear disarmament. India welcomed the report (A/74/90) produced by the Group which was adopted by consensus. India supported General Assembly resolution 74/50 that led to the establishment of the Group of Governmental Experts to further consider nuclear disarmament verification issues, building on the report (A/74/90). India welcomed the report produced by the Group (A/78/120), which was adopted by consensus.

India is unequivocal in its commitment to universal, non-discriminatory and verifiable nuclear disarmament. India’s Working Paper (CD/1816) submitted to the Conference on Disarmament in 2007 envisions a step-by-step process underwritten by a universal commitment and an agreed global and non-discriminatory multilateral framework. India acknowledges the utility of technical work on verification. Our future work, if required, should build upon the reports of the Group of Governmental Experts (A/74/90 and A/78/120), past work conducted by the Disarmament Commission on the subject of verification, and in accordance with the principles enshrined in the final document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly (special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament). Such work, however, cannot prejudge the nature and scope of any eventual nuclear disarmament instrument, which would in turn impact on the verification elements to be agreed and specific to that instrument.

It is India’s view that a substantive consideration of this issue should be in the context of the negotiation of a nuclear weapons convention prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of nuclear weapons and on their destruction, leading to the global, non-discriminatory and verifiable elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified time frame.

Nuclear disarmament verification must be universal and non-discriminatory. A nuclear disarmament verification regime must strike a balance inter alia between providing assurance about compliance, national security concerns, protection of confidential information, proliferation concerns, and costs.
Relevant verification experience from a treaty banning an entire category of weapons of mass destruction and providing for their internationally verifiable elimination, namely the Chemical Weapons Convention, could be usefully studied in the context of nuclear disarmament verification. Any role for organizations such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) would be limited to what is specified in the IAEA Statute.

International and effective verification is also an important aspect of the agreed mandate for a future treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

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