Egypt welcomes the report of the GGE established pursuant to Resolution 74/50, as contained in document A/78/120 and commends the efforts of the Group leading to the successful adoption of this substantive consensus report that represents an important contribution to the discourse on nuclear disarmament verification (NDV), especially on the conceptual framework and the technical and legal aspects.

While the report cannot be viewed as a perfect document, it does reflect consensus on several fundamental principles and key conceptual elements, as well as a number of pertinent and useful perspectives that must form the basis of any future discussions on NDV and any efforts related to verifying ongoing or future nuclear disarmament.

For the first time, we have a United Nations document that explicitly breaks down and unpacks the nuclear disarmament process into seven specific and distinct steps identifying the actual key actions required, starting from the submission of declarations by the State in question until the verification of the correctness and completeness of such declarations.

It also links each step with the set of tools and techniques that are already available to verify the relevant actions, based on previous experiences with the relevant disarmament and arms control treaties and best practices.

Moreover, the report contains a working definition of nuclear disarmament verification, and explicitly states that “work on NDV is not an end in itself and is not a prerequisite to progress on nuclear disarmament”.

The report and the well-elaborated working papers annexed to it also illustrate the basic fact that a State cannot acquire nuclear weapons without access to the necessary fissile material, and that the placement of such material under safeguards by an impartial multilateral inspectorate, such as the IAEA, is the necessary condition for achieving verifiable and irreversible nuclear disarmament.

It is obvious that the divergent views expressed in the report on some specific points came as a result of the reluctance by the nuclear-weapon States (NWS) to make progress towards nuclear disarmament itself, not because of controversies or ambiguities regarding the technical and legal requirements for NDV per se.
- Egypt reiterates that the international community already possesses all the necessary conceptual, technical, and scientific means to effectively verify irreversible nuclear disarmament as it occurs and the absence of nuclear weapons in any given State through verifying the correctness and completeness of the declarations of that State on its nuclear material. This ability has been proven through multiple previous examples and experiences. What we actually lack is the political will to implement the relevant longstanding obligations and commitments by the NWS and the other States that continue to rely on nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence for their security.

- Arguments that there must be new treaties on nuclear disarmament in order to reinvent a nuclear verification regime run counter to the fact that nuclear disarmament can and should be pursued in an internationally verifiable manner through unilateral measures or in implementation of the agreed obligations and commitments under the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons and its Review Conference.