The views presented below are Brazil’s response to operative paragraph 2 of resolution 78/239 “Nuclear disarmament verification” adopted by the UN General Assembly, which mandated the the Secretary-General to seek the substantive views of Member States on the report of the Group of Governmental Experts to further consider nuclear disarmament verification issues and to report back to the General Assembly at its seventy-ninth session.

Complete, irreversible and verifiable elimination of nuclear arsenals is a priority in a deteriorating international security environment, where the risk of nuclear conflict is higher than it has been in decades. This makes the work of the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) to further consider nuclear disarmament verification issues even more valuable, as it elaborates on crucial steps to reach the goal of achieving and maintaining a world free of nuclear weapons.

In terms of the report of the GGE, Brazil underscores the importance of Section D of the document, titled “The concept of a Group of Scientific and Technical Experts on nuclear disarmament verification”. In Brazil’s view, the establishment of a Group of Scientific and Technical Experts (GSTE) on nuclear disarmament verification (NDV) would be of great benefit to the disarmament machinery, as it would add a technical component to an environment that has long suffered with political inaction. It would bring together Member States in a UN multilateral setting to address technical challenges associated with verifiable nuclear disarmament, a common goal for all.

Although there was no consensus on the issue, the report acknowledges that much work on the concept of a GSTE has been undertaken. In this respect, Brazil supports the following points raised at the GGE: (i) the GSTE-NDV should be part of the disarmament machinery; (ii) its work should be deliberative, with a focus on scientific and technical exchanges that enhance knowledge of NDV options; (iii) the group should be comprised of representatives of both nuclear weapon possessing States and those who do not possess such weapons, in a voluntary manner; (iv) its deliberations will be not legally-binding; (v) the GSTE-NDV should not be tasked to negotiate any treaty on nuclear disarmament, nor should its establishment imply any commitment that negotiations might follow or prejudge their possible outcome.

A disarmament machinery that could count on such work would be much better equipped to deal with the challenges of NDV, and thus, as it stated in the SSOD-I final document, seek security in disarmament.