National Opinion of El Salvador

Scope, structure and content of the Programme of action to advance responsible State behaviour in the use of information and communications technologies in the context of international security.

1. Introduction
   a. It is observed with increased interest how the majority of the Member States of the United Nations give more importance to what happens in cyberspace, which must be seen in the light of the responsibilities and rights of the States in accordance with international law and the United Nations Charter\(^{10}\).
   b. The growing dependence on information and communication technologies (ICT) and the capacities that can be developed in cyberspace have the capacity to influence internally the affairs of other States and cause severe disruptions to peace and security.
   c. It is important that all Member States of the United Nations assimilate that what happens in cyberspace affects the processes of construction and maintenance of international peace and security and are therefore more prepared to assume the challenges, address the challenges and capitalize on the opportunities.
   d. Considering that this topic has been worked on for around 25 years in the United Nations and is evolutionary and cumulative, it is considered essential that future advances can be made based on the consensus results generated by the work of the Groups of Governmental Experts and the previous\(^11\) and the current Open Ended Working Group\(^12\), without prejudging its results, in the case of the OEWG whose mandate will end in 2025.
   e. The reports of the 2010\(^{13}\), 2013\(^{14}\), 2015\(^{15}\) and 2021\(^{16}\) Groups of Governmental Experts lay the foundations of the framework of norms, rules and principles for the responsible behavior of States in cyberspace.
   f. The evolution in the discussions and the common understanding between States will generate greater adherence to the consensus framework based on political commitments while advancing to the next natural stage of development of the law, which is the generation of a legally binding instrument that regulates the behavior of States in cyberspace.

\(^{10}\) Para 19 General Assembly Resolution A/68/98
\(^{11}\) See General Assembly Resolution A/75/816
\(^{12}\) See General Assembly Resolution A/75/240, mandated until 2025.
\(^{13}\) See General Assembly Resolution A/65/201
\(^{14}\) See General Assembly Resolution A/68/98
\(^{15}\) See General Assembly Resolution A/70/174
\(^{16}\) See General Assembly Resolution A/76/135
2. Goals and Scope
   a. General:
      i. The POA shall be envisioned as a regular action-oriented mechanism that monitors advances in information and communication technologies in the context of international security through the preservation of an open, stable, secure, accessible, affordable and peaceful ICT environment. Decision-making must be consensual in matters of substance, in continuity with the practice that has been generated around this process.

   b. Specifics:
      i. Provide an institutionalized framework that can address the urgent needs of the international community for international cooperation and assistance, including financial and technical assistance, under more favorable conditions, to support and facilitate efforts at the national, regional and international levels related to threats in the field of information security.
      ii. Advance the common understanding on the implementation of the existing framework for responsible behavior of States in cyberspace, which is based on the applicability of international law, actual and potential emerging threats, confidence-building measures in cyberspace, and capacity building.
      iii. Generate an enabling environment to advance in the reduction of digital divides, particularly the gender digital divide, create cyber resilience and maintain a human-centered approach.

3. Structure:
   a. The POA could be based on a political document endorsed by the General Assembly, with the aim of creating a permanent institutional mechanism. Resource forecasts and technical expertise should be planned to promote the implementation of the POA.
   b. For the functioning of the structure, the United Nations Office for Disarmament must act as the Secretariat.

4. Establishment:
   a. The national opinions and contributions of the Member States, collected in the Report of the Secretary General in accordance with the provisions of General Assembly Resolution

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17 Preambular para 9 General Assembly Resolution A/77/37.
A/77/37\textsuperscript{18} and the consensus results of the OEWG of information and communications technologies in the context of international security (2021-2025) should be the basis for defining the scope, structure and content of the POA.

b. Active involvement in the dialogues on the Periodic Institutional Dialogue of the OEWG (2021-2015), can generate relevant inputs for the establishment of the POA and it can be endorsed as a result of the OEWG, if this is a determination reached by consensus.

c. Regarding this process, there must be a vision that avoids duplication of efforts.

d. Additionally, broad informal consultations with Member States can generate additional inputs for those States that do not submit national opinions, offering another forum for them to express their ideas, priorities, and interests regarding the establishment of the POA.

e. It is considered useful for the operationalization of the POA, the establishment of Points of Contact (POC) that act as a liaison between States in matters related to implementation. Synergies, where applicable, with the initiative of the Global Directory of Points of Contact, within the framework of the OEWG (2021-2015) - Confidence Building Measures, can be considered once their implementation has been defined.

f. The possibility of convening an International Conference 4 years after the establishment of the POA to review its progress and implementation, can be considered.

g. The Meetings of the States Parties shall be convened on a biannual basis, to consider the implementation of the POA at the national, regional and international levels. However, the focus should be a review of the implementation of practical measures, to avoid renegotiation of recurring instruments, which have declarative purposes. The POA should have a practical approach, based on capacity building.

h. The convening of Working Groups to consider progress on specific elements can be considered in the intersessional periods.

i. The generation of permanent awareness programs on cybersecurity can be considered as a transversal objective of the POA.

5. Meetings frequency:

In order to advance in the implementation of the POA and verify compliance with its lines of action, it is deemed pertinent to convene:

a. Review Meetings of States Parties every 2 years, with a practical focus.

b. Review Conferences of States Parties every 4 years, pending the results of the First Review Conference

\textsuperscript{18} Operative para 3 General Assembly Resolution A/77/37.
The previous to allocate enough time between sessions for preparation and not overload delegations with other existing processes in the field of international security. A subsequent analysis must be carried out to verify the most appropriate years to start the cycle of meetings, with the objective that they do not coincide with other processes already mandated in the field of disarmament and international security.

The main objective of the follow-up meetings should be to update the practical measures of the national and regional implementation, where applicable, of the lines of action of the POA.

6. Reports to the POA
   a. The POA will encourage voluntary reporting, which can build on existing mechanisms such as the UNIDIR Survey of Implementation of the Rules of Responsible Behavior of States in Cyberspace
   b. Additional reporting instruments must take into account avoiding “reporting fatigue” and seek complementarities with other existing instruments.
   c. In the event that new reporting instruments are agreed upon by consensus, they must be user-friendly, enabled on an online platform, so that all delegations can generate reports that generate data that evaluates the implementation of the POA objectives, as well as the approach to emerging needs in the ICT environment.

7. Participation of other stakeholders
   a. States are primarily responsible for maintaining international peace and security, so the negotiation process will retain its intergovernmental nature.
   b. However, due to the private nature of the Internet infrastructure and the role that other relevant organizations play in the design and development of technological advances, it is considered essential to have contributions from civil society, non-governmental organizations, academia and industry. Through a clear and defined mechanism in the POA agreed by consensus, accommodating all the views of the Member States on the modalities of participation of other stakeholders.