

STATEMENT
by Head of the Delegation of the Russian Federation,
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of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
of the Russian Federation Oleg POSTNIKOV
at the General Debate in the First Committee
of the 80th session of the UN General Assembly

(New York, 10 October 2025)

Mr. Chair,

We would like one more time to congratulate you on the appointment to this post. We expect that under your leadership the session of the UNGA First Committee will be successful and productive. Please be assured that the Russian delegation will provide you with utmost support.

This year we celebrate a historical date – the 80th anniversary since the foundation of the United Nations. The World Organization was established after the most devastating war in history as an instrument for ensuring international peace and security based on the principles of equality and sovereignty of states. Over the eight decades of its existence, the UN has played a key role in preventing major global conflicts and maintaining international security. Today, this organization is rightly considered the central institution of multilateral diplomacy, unrivalled in its representation and universality. The principles of the UN Charter, agreed upon by the founding fathers of the World Organization, remain relevant in the era of multipolarity. It is essential that all Member States, without exception, adhere to these principles – in their full entirety and interconnection.

It was the UN that laid the foundation for the system of multilateral agreements on arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation (ACDN), in which the disarmament "triad", including the UNGA First Committee, plays a key role. As the UN founding state and a permanent member of the UN Security Council, Russia recognizes its special responsibility to preserve this legacy and consistently advocates for strengthening the central role of the UN in global affairs.

Mr. Chair,

We approach the 80th anniversary of the UN amid a grave crisis in the field of international security. The situation is deteriorating at a dramatic rate. An increase in tensions and conflicts is observed almost everywhere. Due to the destructive, egocentric steps taken by the group of Western countries, the foundations of stability, based on the principles of inclusivity and multilateralism, have been seriously eroded. For the same reasons, relations between the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, which are at the same time nuclear weapon states under the NPT and bear special responsibility for maintaining international peace and security, have deeply deteriorated. This has led to an increase in strategic risks, that are fraught with direct military clashes between P5 countries.

It is also alarming that illegal unilateral sanctions have long become the main tool of Western policy. Moreover, no matter the pretexts used to justify them, the essence of such sanctions is the same – to suppress and intimidate competitors in the world economy and politics.

Against this backdrop, the divisions in the global community deepen, intergovernmental contradictions are being intensified, the role of power factor increases, local and regional conflicts are multiplied, including those involving states that de facto possess nuclear capabilities. Recently, the principle of non-use of force or the threat of force has been repeatedly violated. Today, Israel's illegal

use of force against the Palestinians and aggressive actions against Iran, Qatar, Yemen, Lebanon, Syria and Iraq threaten to detonate the entire Middle East.

General tensions and the high level of conflicts in the field of international security continue to be fueled by the unrelenting struggle over a future model of the world order. Within this confrontation, hegemonic ambitions, bloc thinking, and neocolonial practices are increasingly confronted by the aspiration of the countries of the World Majority for a just polycentricity, genuinely indivisible security, unconditional recognition of sovereign equality, and unwavering respect for the fundamental interests of all parties.

Despite significant adjustments in Washington's approach under the new US administration, provocative impulses continue to emanate from Western countries, capable of leading to further escalation of the Ukrainian crisis. This negative dynamic is primarily driven by the reckless policies of leading European capitals, which are unwilling to deviate from their extremely hostile anti-Russian course. While promoting the propaganda myth of a "threat of Russia's attack on the European NATO Member States," in reality, they are continuing a "proxy" war against our country and remain obsessed with the idea of further expansion of the North Atlantic bloc to the detriment of the Russian security. At the same time, the militarization of Europe is rapidly accelerating, in addition to the already existing and highly threatening collective capabilities and plans of Western countries to gain overwhelming military superiority over any opponent, including Russia.

Under these circumstances, we are forced to take steps to mitigate threats to the national security of our country through effective military and technical measures. In particular, in order to respond to the programs of deployment in Europe and the Asia-Pacific region of intermediate-range and shorter-range ground-launched missile systems produced in the US and other Western countries,

Russia announced the abandonment of its previously existing unilateral self-restrictions regarding the deployment of similar weapons.

At the same time, we seek to keep a "window of opportunity" open for political and diplomatic steps to maintain predictability and restraint in the nuclear and missile sphere. For instance, on September 22, the President of the Russian Federation on his own initiative declared readiness of our country to continue to adhere voluntarily to the central quantitative limits of the New START Treaty for at least one year after its expiration, provided that the United States does not violate the existing balance of deterrence capabilities. This is our contribution to stabilizing the situation between nuclear powers and creating an atmosphere for constructive strategic dialogue between them as the necessary preconditions for this dialogue will develop.

Mr. Chair,

We are deeply concerned about the current state of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, namely the NPT – one of the fundamental treaties of the system of international security. As we approach the 2026 NPT Review Conference, we regret to note that the number of disagreements among States Parties on issues related to its implementation is just growing.

It is becoming increasingly obvious that a number of States, primarily Western countries, perceive the discussions within the NPT as an opportunity to promote their own politically motivated agenda. The use of non-proliferation rhetoric to make pressure on states whose sovereign policy and independence do not suit them, or even to justify military aggression and intervention, is gradually becoming a new norm for Western countries, which is unacceptable. What are only the far-fetched justifications for attacks on peaceful cities, civilian population and nuclear energy infrastructure in Iran – despite its active cooperation with the IAEA and faithful fulfilment of its NPT obligations.

In a similar vein, Western colleagues are attempting to manipulate the Treaty's verification mechanism – the IAEA safeguards system. For political reasons, they are attempting to use intrusive inspections to restrict access for “disagreeable” states to civilian nuclear technologies, though the right to develop those technologies is inalienable under the NPT.

As we have repeatedly noted, introducing into the review process agenda issues that have nothing to do with nuclear non-proliferation objectives as well as exploiting the Treaty provisions for the purposes of political ambitions are absolutely counterproductive. Such actions obviously reduce the possibility to achieve consensus decisions within the NPT and also create a real threat to its functioning.

We believe it is essential to re-establish a mutually respectful dialogue on an equitable basis within the NPT. Unwillingness to take alternative viewpoints into consideration is fraught with sliding into a stalemate. The results of the 2026 NPT Review Conference and the adoption of its final document mostly will depend on the ability of the States Parties to overcome their “overheated” and unjustified political ambitions. We believe that the only way to adopt a final report by consensus is to develop it on the principle of the lowest common denominator.

Mr. Chair,

Attempts by Western States to reshape the ACDN regimes, which have evolved over the years, to serve their own narrowly selfish objectives directly affect the functioning of relevant international structures. These destructive actions have led to divisions among Member States of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the politicization of its activities, a departure from the principle of consensus-based decision-making, and the loss of independence of its Technical Secretariat. All of those causes irreparable damage to the work and

reputation of the OPCW and undermines the foundations of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).

Biological security issues are becoming increasingly relevant today. The source of serious concern is the military and biological activity of certain states outside their national territory conducted under the plausible pretext of cooperation "for preventive or other peaceful purposes" bypassing the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC). The Russian Federation's officially raised, well-reasoned questions regarding the revealed facts of illegal military and biological activities by the United States and Ukraine on the Ukrainian territory remain unanswered. Those questions require a solution to resolve the current situation.

Under these circumstances, efforts for universalizing and strengthening the BTWC regime are more urgent than ever. It is primarily to resume the work on a legally binding protocol to the Convention that would provide an effective verification mechanism. In this context, we attach particular importance to achieving tangible results within the framework of the relevant Working Group established by the BTWC Ninth Review Conference. We are convinced that only decisions taken collectively on the basis of consensus could provide credible guarantees of faithful compliance with the obligations under Convention, as well as prevent the development and the use of biological weapons. At the same time it is important to avoid any artificial obstacles for the development of biological technologies for civil purposes as well as for international cooperation, as envisaged in the relevant provisions of the BTWC.

The task to update the principles and procedures of the UN Secretary-General's Mechanism for Investigation of Alleged Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons (UNSGM), which have not been updated since its establishment long ago in 1990, remains on the agenda. The need to review the current principles and procedures of the UNSGM is shared by many Member States, as evidenced by

joint statements on this matter in the First Committee of the 78th and 79th sessions of the UN General Assembly, as well as at the Meetings of States Parties to the BTWC in Geneva. We expect that the UN Secretary-General will heed these calls and promptly begin the relevant review, engaging expert consultants and taking into account proposals of Member States. For our part, we reaffirm our readiness to actively contribute to this work.

The constructive cooperation in the field of ACDN is hampered by Western countries' attempts to promote their opportunistic interests under the guise of non-proliferation imperatives, use export control instruments to exert political, economic and technological pressure on States that firmly defend their sovereign course and independent policies. Such actions contradict the immutable principles enshrined in the NPT, CWC and BTWC regarding the inadmissibility of creating unjustified obstacles to mutually beneficial cooperation and restricting legitimate access to the benefits of scientific and technological progress.

Mr. Chair,

Today, we are witnessing the growing risks of transformation of outer space into a new springboard for aggression and war. Western countries are openly pursuing the policy aimed at placing weapons in outer space and using outer space for combat operations to ensure their dominance. Large-scale programs are underway to develop weapons systems designed to use force or the threat of force in, from, or against outer space. The illustrative example is the US efforts under the "Golden Dome for America" national missile defense program which provides, inter alia, the deployment of space-based interceptors.

The chances of preventing a full-scale arms race in outer space are rapidly diminishing. Before the point of no return is passed, the international community must urgently launch the development of an international legally binding instrument on PAROS with guarantees regarding the prevention of placement of

weapons of any kind in outer space, the use or threat of force against or by means of space objects. The basis for the relevant negotiation process exists – the 2014 updated Russian-Chinese draft treaty on the prevention of the placement of weapons in outer space, the threat or use of force against outer space objects, as well as the 2024 consensus report of the UN Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on PAROS. We expect that the substantive discussions initiated within the UN Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) on PAROS will focus on the substantive elements of a relevant international legally binding instrument and will make an important contribution to PAROS efforts.

The international initiative/political commitment on no first placement of weapons in outer space (NFP) is gaining increasing support. The number of its full-fledged participants has almost approached to four dozen. We are grateful to the countries that have joined this initiative and encourage Member States that remain outside its framework, to join the NFP. The global political commitment not to place weapons in outer space would be an important step towards concluding an international legally binding instrument containing safeguards against the placement of strike weapon systems in low-Earth orbit.

The Russian Federation is submitting draft resolutions on further practical measures on PAROS, NFP and transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities (TCBMs) to the UNGA First Committee for consideration. We hope for their maximal support and co-sponsorship by delegations.

Mr. Chair,

We welcome the successful completion of the work of the UN Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) on Security of and in the Use of ICTs 2021-2025. Over five years of its activities, the Group – established on Russia's initiative – has proven its effectiveness, relevance, and ability to deliver concrete practical results. Its most significant achievement was the consensus agreement to launch, in 2026, a

permanent UN negotiating body on ICT which is intended to become the central and irreplaceable global platform for discussing all aspects of security in the use of ICTs. We expect that the decision to establish this new mechanism will be approved by the relevant UNGA draft resolution submitted by Singapore.

Mr. Chair,

A serious obstacle to developing balanced, mutually acceptable solutions on the ACDN issues is the increased politicization of discussions at disarmament fora, the retreat from substantive dialogue, the continuing attempts to turn them into instruments of pressure on "disagreeable" states, to erode the mandate, and to revise the rules of procedure and fundamental principles of work, including the rule of consensus. All these actions seriously undermine the normal functioning of the disarmament "triad," create obstacles to dialogue on important ACDN issues, and are fraught with the most negative consequences for international peace and security.

For our part, we are committed to advancing a unifying agenda in the UNGA First Committee and in other disarmament fora. We are focused on achieving mutually acceptable solutions. We look forward to constructive interaction across the entire spectrum of issues related to international peace and security.

Thank you.