Statement by the Deputy Head of the Delegation of the Russian Federation, Deputy Director of the Department for Non-Proliferation and Arms Control of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Konstantin Vorontsov at the Thematic Debate on Cluster V "Other disarmament measures and international security" in the First Committee of the 80th Session of the UN General Assembly
(New York, October 27, 2025)

Madam Chair,

We welcome the successful conclusion of the work of the UN Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) on Security of and in the Use of ICTs 2021-2025. Over five years, the Group – serving as the central global platform for addressing information security issues – has demonstrated its relevance and effectiveness. It has clearly become one of the most efficient OEWGs in the UN history, having produced four consensus reports and delivered concrete practical solutions. Among these achievements was the launch, on Russia's initiative, of the first universal confidence-building measure in the digital domain – the global intergovernmental Points of Contact (PoC) Directory for exchange of information on computer attacks/incidents. We take particular pride in the fact that it was Russia who initiated the establishment of the Group.

The key outcome of the OEWG's work was the agreement to establish the Global Mechanism (GM) on Developments in the Field of ICTs as its successor after 2026. The creation of a permanent body on international information security will further strengthen the UN's fundamental role in discussing all aspects of information security. We welcome the approval of the successor mechanism's parameters reflecting the interests of the global majority. Decision-making by consensus – on both political and procedural matters – will ensure the equal participation of each and every UN Member

State. The intergovernmental nature of negotiations has been preserved, with a transparent and fair mechanism for States to regulate the involvement of NGOs in the future mechanism's work having been established.

The priority focus of the GM's activities should be capacity-building. We expect the new body to take concrete steps toward bridging the digital divide and strengthening the digital sovereignty of developing countries.

We are committed to launching – in line with the future mechanism's mandate – a substantive discussion on the legal aspects of international information security, including the possibility of developing legally binding agreements. It is crucial to continue shaping a comprehensive international legal framework regulating the ICT domain, especially in the context of the adoption of the UN Convention against Cybercrime. We stand ready to discuss this topic within the new body with all participants.

We support the draft resolution submitted by Singapore under the agenda item "Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security", which endorses the OEWG's outcomes and the decision to launch its successor body. We call on all Member States to support this draft.

Madam Chair,

The Russian Federation attaches great importance to matters relating to the application of artificial intelligence (AI) technologies in the military domain.

Position of the Russian Federation on key aspects of "military" AI and our vision for further steps in this field are reflected in detail in the national contribution to the report of the UN Secretary-General issued in accordance with the paragraph 7 of the UNGA Resolution 79/239.

We confirm our interest in a substantive discussion of this issue at relevant international fora. We consider the Group of Governmental Experts on lethal autonomous weapons systems (GGE on LAWS), established by the High

Contracting Parties to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW), to be the best forum for such a discussion. It is precisely the GGE that is called upon to maintain a reasonable balance between humanitarian concerns and the legitimate defense interests of States in relation to such weapons, and to take consensus-based decisions. Consideration of the military application of AI by the Group is broad in scope, is not limited to the issue of LAWS, and touches upon a number of important aspects (including legal, technical and military) related to the use of the technology for military purposes. We welcome the discussions which are currently being conducted within the Group with the aim to bring the positions of participants closer on this relatively new issue for the international community. We expect the GGE to reach substantive results by the end of 2026.

We do not object to the consideration of the topic of "military" AI in the UN Disarmament Commission (UNDC). We also note the discussion of this issue within the framework of arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation regimes. At the same time we would like to underline that such an exchange of views should be aimed at agreeing on recommendations on those aspects of "military" AI that are not discussed in other fora in order to avoid duplication of discussions.

We are concerned about attempts of some States to move issues related to the use of AI technology for military purposes to new, non-inclusive fora. Discussions on this topic there take place without the participation of the overwhelming majority of UN member States (including the major developers of weapons systems with the use of AI, including the Russian Federation). Such "summits" are intended to replace ongoing practical discussion on "military" AI among States at relevant fora, seeking to develop, within a narrow circle, certain understandings and standards in this area.

Consequently the intention is simply to put the international community before the fact of the existence of some agreed "behind closed doors"

arrangements and propose their formal approval. Matters have already reached the point where certain reports from expert bodies created under this formula are presented to States. These reports contain biased conclusions and recommendations, aimed at substituting the practical work of the UN member States on this topic. Such practice is unacceptable, contradicts the principles of the World Organization and undermines the prospects of detailed discussions on "military" AI issues that are already being conducted in relevant fora.

At this stage, it would be useful to further develop optimal parameters for further discussion on "military" AI. Such an exchange of views should be held within the framework of the UNDC under the agenda item "Recommendations on common understandings related to emerging technologies in the context of international security." Organization of relevant consultations among member States within the Working Group 2 of the Commission, which works in informal mode, could help minimize the risk of blurring the topic of "military" AI and ensure inclusive discussion of issues by all interested parties. The UNDC is one of the key expert platforms of the UN "disarmament triad," established in accordance with the decisions of the First UNGA Special Session on Disarmament in 1978, which granted the organization advisory authority on arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation issues. The parameters for its functioning have long been agreed upon and do not require further approval. The principle of consensus and the inclusive nature which are in the center of its work would ensure that the views of all member States on such a sensitive issue are taken into account. In addition, discussions within the Commission would help raise the profile and strengthen the disarmament mechanism of the United Nations as a whole.

The topic of "military" AI is relatively new to the international community. At the same time, it is already clear that weapons systems with the use of AI and military equipment can significantly reduce the negative consequences of their use in the context of international law, including

international humanitarian law (IHL), and demonstrate greater efficiency and accuracy than human operators in achieving their objectives. In this regard, it is crucial for States to gain a clearer understanding of the subject matter and the prospects for discussing this issue. For this purpose, the expert substantive work to develop a working definition of such technologies carried out in relevant fora is essential. Such definition should be universal, take into account the future development of technologies using "military" AI, and preserve opportunities for further technical progress in the field of peaceful robotics and AI.

To date, there are no convincing grounds for introducing additional restrictions and prohibitions on weapons systems with the use of AI. International law, including the IHL, is fully applicable to military means using AI and contains a number of important restrictions, in particular, on the inadmissibility of their indiscriminate, disproportionate use against civilians, as well as without taking precautions to protect them; the implementation of any military use of such means in accordance with the principle of proportionality between military necessity and the damage caused. In the context of regulating weapons systems with the use of AI, it is also important to consider the limitations on the decision-making process regarding the use of weapons systems with AI technology by a person planning a military operation and creating scenarios for their use. Finally, the current IHL includes provisions for conducting a legal review when studying, developing, acquiring, or adopting new types of weapons in accordance with Article 36 of 1977 Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 1949.

For this reason, statements about the principles of humanity, the dictates of public conscience, or the human rights component as an absolute and sole sufficient condition for the introduction of additional restrictive and prohibitive regimes are unfounded. Addressing concerns about weapons and military equipment with the use of AI lies in the good-faith implementation of existing international legal norms. By working towards a common understanding among

countries regarding the application of existing international law, including the IHL, to weapons systems with the use of AI, we can ensure that States fully comply with these norms and principles.

As an important limitation we consider human control over the operation of weapons systems and military equipment with the use of AI. However, the specific forms and methods of human control should be left to the discretion of States, and direct control should not be the only option. During the discussions at relevant international fora, it seems promising to focus on certain aspects of ensuring human control over such means.

Thank you.