



2025 UNGA First Committee

**Explanation of Vote on Cluster 1 Nuclear
Disarmament**

Statement by Kate de Boer

3 November 2025

I take the floor to explain New Zealand's vote on resolution L.4, entitled "**Steps to building a common roadmap towards a world without nuclear weapons**". New Zealand once again abstained on this resolution.

While we note minor improvements from last year, overall we remain disappointed with several aspects of the text. In view of limited time, I will mention only a few of those concerns.

On **PP5**, as we have noted in previous years, the clear expectation in the 1995 NPT outcome was that subsequent NPT PrepComs should adopt their reports by consensus. Welcoming the practice of 'Chairs' Papers' is incongruent with this principle.

In **PP6** we have concerns with the reference to "irresponsible" nuclear rhetoric, which suggests there is such a thing as "responsible" nuclear rhetoric. In **PP7**, we also have concerns about the inclusion of the 'non-transparent' and 'opaque' qualifications, rather than communicating concern about *all* expansion of nuclear forces.

We continue to have significant reservations about **PP16**, including how it adds conditionality to the advancement of nuclear disarmament, which is a legal obligation. In our view, effective measures to progress nuclear disarmament would advance international stability and lower the temperature, thereby improving international peace and security, not the other way around. For years, New Zealand has been consistent in our view that we do not support the conditionality in PP16, and yet it continues to appear in this resolution. For that reason we, as part of the New Agenda Coalition, called for a vote – a step we do not take lightly.

On **PP23**, we reiterate New Zealand's continued commitment to finding ways to progress transparency and reporting with a view to improving accountability with nuclear disarmament obligations and commitments. We note that despite a welcome increase in engagement on this theme in the NPT, including from the nuclear-weapon States, we are yet to see evidence of *new* steps they have taken to demonstrate transparency with respect to their nuclear weapons, for example additional numerical and qualitative information. We therefore abstained again on this paragraph.

On **OP3**, we still have several concerns. The paragraph still includes, for example, the phrase "to provide frequent and detailed reporting on the implementation of the Treaty", which extends the scope of reporting to all pillars of the Treaty rather than on Article VI, the pillar with the deficit.

Finally, we have concerns with **OP4** and urge the drafters to be more direct in stating the problem, which is that overall nuclear weapon numbers appear to be increasing once again.

Chair, in closing we welcome new resolution L.56, entitled "Possible risks of integration of artificial intelligence in command, control and communication systems of nuclear weapons". We thank Mexico for its efforts and we were pleased vote in favour of it.

Thank you.