

**Statement by the Delegation of the Arab Republic of Egypt  
80<sup>TH</sup> Session of the United Nations General Assembly First Committee  
Explanation of Vote After the Vote by Egypt: Cluster 1: Nuclear  
Weapons**

**Check Against Delivery**

Mr. Chairperson,

- 1- My delegation wishes to explain its vote after the vote on **resolution L.43 entitled “Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty”**, and thanks its main sponsors Australia, Mexico and New Zealand.
- 2- As a signatory of CTBT and an active participant at the preparatory work of the CTBTO, Egypt strongly believes in the purposes and principles of CTBT, a key legal instrument that provides concrete measures in support of both nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. For this reason, Egypt continued to vote in favor of this resolution.
- 3- We continue to engage constructively at CTBT's Article 14 conferences, tasked with advancing the entry into force of the Treaty and the realization of its universality, and joined the declaration of its most recent Conference held on 26 September in NY.
- 4- Nevertheless, like previous years, we continue to disagree with the resolution's failure to capture the different respective responsibilities vis-à-vis the entry into force of the Treaty. We recall in this regard Action 10 of the NPT 2010 Review Conference's outcome document which underlined that all nuclear weapon States undertake to ratify CTBT with all

expediency, and also the nuclear weapon States' special responsibility in encouraging Annex 2 countries, in particular those which have not acceded to NPT and continue to operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities to sign and ratify.

- 5- In light of these considerations, Egypt abstained on paragraphs PP6, OP1 and OP7.

Mr. Chairperson,

- 6- We thank Mexico for the leadership it demonstrated in tabling **L.56 on risks of integration of artificial intelligence into NC3 of Nuclear Weapons**. Mexico led a commendable consultative process and brought an issue of common concern to most of the international community to the UN. Egypt supports the objective of the resolution and voted in favor.
- 7- On the other hand, we regret that the text had to give up on a considerable portion of its ambitious and robust outlook in supporting the objective of nuclear disarmament and disciplined nuclear risk reduction. We further that regret that with Mexico's genuine attempts to seek convergence of views, Nuclear Weapon States still elected to turn their back. On the other hand, we reiterate that risks of integration of AI in the entire life cycle of nuclear weapons are real and not possible. We need an urgent scientific-evidence based discussion to frame this discussion before it is too late.

Mr. Chairperson

- 8- We extend our appreciation to Brazil and Norway for their efforts on **L.59 entitled “Establishment of a Group of Scientific and Technical Experts on Nuclear Disarmament Verification”**.
- 9- We acknowledge the good intentions behind the initiative as a potential contribution to discussions on implementation of nuclear disarmament obligations and commitments. For that reason, we voted in favor.
- 10- However, we underline once again that existing national and international experiences, complemented by the role of IAEA in confirming that nuclear material and facilities are used for exclusively peaceful purposes, already can respond to the arising needs.
- 11- Egypt cautions against the abuse of the discussion on enhancing capabilities of nuclear disarmament verification as one more way to distract the focus on the essential matters related to nuclear disarmament or as an additional pretext to delay implementation of obligations and commitments by nuclear weapon states. As mentioned in PP13 of this resolution “the decisive factor for achieving real measures of disarmament is the political will of states, especially the nuclear-weapon States”. We are also concerned with the budgetary-centric character that the discussion acquired during the process.

Mr. Chairperson,

- 12- We clarify that our voting in favor of **decision L.39 to maintain the agenda item “Treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices”** is without prejudice to our long-standing position that for such a treaty to be balanced, effective, credible, it must encompass existing stockpiles. We call and continue to call for a fissile material treaty and not a fissile material cut-off treaty.
- 13- Finally, we thank Kiribati and Kazakhstan on tabling **L.57**, that we supported for the third year. However, we underscore that for OP1 any formal UN meeting is automatically provided by conference service, with or without this insertion. Meanwhile, for OP2 the participation of stakeholders need to observe the rules of procedures and relevant applicable participation modalities.

Thank you.