

**80th session of the United Nations General Assembly  
First Committee**

Cluster I – Nuclear Weapons

**Explanation of vote**

After the vote

(To Be Delivered)

**Submitted by the United States of America**

New York, October 31, 2025

Chair,

The United States remains committed to preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and preventing nuclear war. Our votes at this year's First Committee reflect that commitment and the Administration's priority to make the UN more efficient and fit for purpose.

The United States **voted to abstain on L.4**, *"Steps to building a common roadmap towards a world without nuclear weapons,"* because of policy differences with multiple paragraphs in this year's resolution, including on gender and Sustainable Development Goals. We will address U.S. policy on these two matters during a later cluster Explanation of Position, as they appear in multiple resolutions across the UN First Committee. Our L.4 vote in no way reflects on our steadfast commitment to our Japanese allies. We support the incremental and verifiable approach to nuclear disarmament at the heart of this resolution, especially the emphasis on avoiding a new nuclear arms race and the call for nuclear weapon states to engage with one

another to make progress towards the goal of a world without nuclear weapons.

Let us be clear—the obstacle to nuclear disarmament today is not a shortage of conferences, working groups, or joint statements. The obstacle is that China and Russia have not engaged in meaningful arms control, while China rapidly and opaquely expands its nuclear forces and Russia pursues novel and destabilizing nuclear weapons systems. After a decades-long decline in global nuclear stockpiles, China is engaging in the largest nuclear weapons buildup since the end of the Cold War with no end in sight. China cannot claim to be working to prevent an arms race with this behavior.

Meanwhile, Russia is developing novel and destabilizing nuclear systems, including conducting tests of a nuclear-powered cruise missile and the underwater nuclear-powered Poseidon during this very UN First Committee. By contrast, President Trump wants to restrict nuclear weapons. All countries should encourage Russia and China to engage with the United States on nuclear arms control to advance the goals of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

The United States voted **No on L.43**, “*Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty*,” because several paragraphs are inconsistent with U.S. policy or are undergoing policy review. This vote in no way reflects on our steadfast commitment to our Australian allies. The United States is not currently

pursuing CTBT ratification and therefore cannot support calls for ratification and entry into force.

We appreciate the interest many other countries have taken in strengthening disarmament verification and share that goal.

Effective arms control and disarmament verification measures can help prevent one side from cheating to gain a strategic advantage and build confidence among parties. Nonetheless, we **voted against L.59**, *“Establishment of a group of scientific and technical experts on nuclear disarmament verification,”* due to our concerns regarding the extensive costs associated with the establishment of a Group of Scientific and Technical Experts process in this challenging budget environment.

Concerning **L.31**, *“Prohibition of the dumping of radioactive wastes,”* we have substantive concerns with some of the radiological weapons language in the resolution and how it relates to future negotiations. While we agree that nonproliferation efforts are critical for preventing both State and non-State actor development or acquisition of radiological weapons, this resolution is not the best place to address issues pertaining to this unique category of weapons.

Chair,

The United States understands the importance some countries attach to

their annual nuclear cluster resolutions, even when we have long disagreed on substance and policy. Nonetheless, we reiterate our request to shift them to biennial or triennial schedules in future years to avoid having the same contentious votes every year, particularly for resolutions that seldom change substantively.

I also refer you to our joint explanation of vote with our British and French allies that expands on our position on a number of resolutions in this cluster. We will submit this statement to the Secretariat for posting on the website. Thank you.