

EUROPEAN EXTERNAL ACTION SERVICE



SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY DIRECTORATE

Disarmament, Non-Proliferation
and Arms Export Control Division

EU joint reply to UNGA Resolution 79/42: "Measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction" 30 May 2025

Disclaimer: This EU joint reply complements the previous EU joint replies submitted in past years on this subject. It should be read in conjunction with those earlier submissions, as it builds upon and updates the EU's established positions and contributions.

1. The EU promotes peace and protects its citizens by restricting the spread and use of weapons worldwide. Through diplomatic, technical, and financial support, the EU helps enforce applicable international treaties that ban or restrict nuclear, chemical, biological, and conventional weapons. The EU works with third countries, international organisations, and civil society to reduce global weapons stockpiles, prevent their diversion to criminals and terrorists, and regulate the development of new weapons agents and technologies. The EU, together with its Member States in their national capacity, is one of the world's biggest donors in this area.
2. The EU remains strongly committed to preventing terrorists from acquiring nuclear, chemical, biological, and missile materials, technical know-how and technology. This commitment is based on the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy, the European Security Strategy (2003), the EU Strategy against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (2003), the New Lines for Action in combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their delivery systems (2008, 2013), the EU Global Strategy (2016), the Counter-Terrorism Agenda for the EU (2020) and the EU Strategic Compass for Security and Defence (2022) and. The EU and its Member States apply comprehensive export controls and implement stringently UNSC Resolutions 1540 (2004), 1887 (2009), 1977 (2011), and 2325 (2016). All EU agreements with third countries contain a clause on the non-proliferation of WMD.
3. The EU regards UNSC Resolution 1540 (2004) as a fundamental pillar of the global framework for preventing the spread of WMD. It plays a crucial role in international efforts to curb proliferation, particularly to terrorist groups and other non-state actors.
4. Effective prevention of proliferation, including controlling materials and expertise, requires not only the adoption of national legislation but also consistent enforcement and oversight across borders and sectors.
5. The EU works with partner countries to strengthen their capacity to adhere to the provisions of UNSCR 1540 and supports UN agencies in their work to promote understanding and compliance. Thus, the EU continues to provide financial support for the implementation of UNSC Resolution 1540, through the Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/654 providing a

further 2.6 million EUR over three years. This decision builds on the EU's prior experience in supporting the implementation of UNSCR 1540, emphasizing tailored support to countries' specific needs, long-term sustainability through national and regional ownership, and fostering partnerships between EU and non-EU countries. It aims to strengthen national capacities for implementation, raise awareness, and facilitate cooperation through training, development of action plans, and outreach activities. The supported initiatives include workshops, targeted training for regional focal points, assistance in drafting national plans, virtual and regional conferences, and the dissemination of knowledge on emerging threats and best practices.

6. Export controls are crucial in the context of UNSC Resolution 1540; they prevent the proliferation of WMD. The Resolution calls on States to establish, develop and maintain appropriate effective national export and trans-shipment controls over materials related to nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons, or their means of delivery, and to take cooperative action to prevent their illicit trafficking.
7. The EU continued to fully support the existing multilateral export control regimes (Australia Group, Missile Technology Control Regime, Nuclear Suppliers Group, Wassenaar Arrangement). It stresses their crucial role in the prevention of the proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery, in the implementation of UNSC embargoes, and in promoting transparency and greater responsibility in transfers of conventional arms and dual-use goods and technologies, thus preventing destabilizing accumulations. Export control regimes are based on public control lists, and they provide clear guidelines, giving exporting states the necessary assurances to export sensitive products to trusted recipients. In that sense, they facilitate trade by building trust. By implementing the NSG, MTCR and Australia Group export control lists, the EU contributes to preventing the access of terrorist networks to WMD and related technology and deters their efforts to develop such kind of weapons.
8. The EU also works to strengthen the multinational efforts to stop proliferation related trade in WMD, related materials and delivery system by promoting the adherence to the principles of the Proliferation Security Initiative, a voluntary initiative geared toward enhancing individual and collective capabilities to take appropriate actions to deal with proliferation networks.
9. The EU continued to participate actively in the meetings of the G7 Non-Proliferation Directors' Group (NPDG). In 2024, the EU participated in the meetings under the presidency of Italy.
10. The EU supports other multilateral efforts, such as the Nuclear Security Contact Group, in our common interest to ensure worldwide commitment to nuclear security best practices in order to prevent terrorism acquiring nuclear weapons or materials.
11. The EU is committed to upholding the highest international standards in nuclear security. While states bear the prime responsibility for nuclear security, international cooperation helps to strengthen it. Since 2003, the EU has provided EUR67 million in support of the IAEA's nuclear security activities through nine consecutive actions under the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The most recent of these actions, which is currently underway, is Council Decision (CFSP) 2024/656 on Union support for the activities of the International Atomic Energy Agency in the areas of nuclear security. The EU have allocated a total amount of EUR 7.2 million for a 36-month period. The following three specific objectives are targeted: a) build capacity in IAEA Member States and assist them to strengthen nuclear security; b) provide nuclear security assistance to Ukraine, including

by supporting the continued presence of IAEA staff at all nuclear sites in Ukraine; and c) strengthen the participation of women in careers related to nuclear security, in particular through the IAEA's Marie Skłodowska-Curie Fellowship Programme.

12. Similar to previous years, the EU sponsored and negotiated the annual nuclear security resolution that was adopted by consensus at the IAEA General Conference in September 2024.¹ This resolution reaffirms the responsibility of each Member State to maintain effective nuclear security for all nuclear and other radioactive materials. It emphasizes the importance of international cooperation, technical assistance, and the role of the IAEA in supporting national nuclear security regimes. The resolution acknowledges challenges posed by technological developments, including cyber threats, and highlights the need for continuous improvement in nuclear security measures. It also notes the significance of physical protection, nuclear forensics, and the security of radioactive material during transport.
13. Throughout 2024, the EU continued to promote the universalisation and the implementation of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT) and the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and its the Amendment, as fundamental elements of the global nuclear security and anti-terrorism architecture. Several events were organised in Vienna to this end. Furthermore, as these conventions only address violations of international legal framework by non-state actors, the European Commission, together with the European Nuclear Safety Regulators Group (ENSREG), called on the international community to start a reflection on how to improve existing international instruments to protect nuclear sites in the context of war.
14. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and the United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism continued implementing Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/1187 on Union support for the universalisation and effective implementation of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism. It aims to increase the number of adherents to ICSANT, to improve national capacities to investigate, prosecute and adjudicate cases in which ICSANT is of relevance, to improve knowledge and understanding of the threat of radiological and nuclear terrorism and other criminal conduct involving such materials, to enhance policies, practices and procedures to prevent, detect and respond to the threat of nuclear terrorism as well as to enhance international cooperation on the matter.
15. The EU actively contributed to the 2024 ICONS Conference “Nuclear Security: Shaping the Future”, which brought together Ministers, policy makers, senior officials and nuclear security experts to discuss global nuclear security. In addition, the EU and its Member States joined a cross-regional Joint Statement delivered by Ukraine on behalf of 54 delegations to highlight the nuclear threats caused by Russia's war of aggression. During the Ministerial Conference, the EU organized or funded five side events.
16. The EU continued to support the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) and its mission to strengthen global capacity to prevent, detect, and respond to nuclear terrorism. Following Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine in 2022, the United States and Russia mutually agreed to pause all official GICNT activities, creating a significant gap in international efforts to address radiological and nuclear terrorism. In order to bridge this gap, sixty-three countries and six international organizations, including the EU, convened in Bucharest on 13-15 November 2024 for the inaugural meeting of the Global Forum to Prevent Radiological and Nuclear Terrorism (Global FPRNT). Global FPRNT reaffirms the importance of multilateral cooperation to counter radiological and nuclear

¹ <https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gc/gc68-res9.pdf>

terrorism, explores the current and evolving risk environment, and catalyses future capacity-building activities to address these risks.

17. The EU Nuclear Security Training Centre for detection and response to illicit acts with nuclear and other radioactive materials (EUSECTRA) has operated since 2013 for the benefit of EU Member States and partner countries, among them several GICNT members. The Centre, operated by the European Commission Joint Research Centre (JRC), also organizes exercises on countering nuclear smuggling. EUSECTRA is active in addressing the training needs of EU Member States and EU partners among the whole range of nuclear security from detection to response and nuclear forensics, including coordinated trainings for customs, EOD teams and law enforcement officers. Upon request by EU Member States, it also provides assessment of equipment performance.
18. The European Commission (EC) continues to play a major role in international nuclear security efforts, demonstrating its commitment to strengthening global nuclear security. Notably, the JRC co-chairs the International Technical Working Group on Nuclear Forensics (ITWG), providing leadership and expertise in the development of guidelines and best practices for nuclear forensics. Additionally, the EC is an active participant in the Border Monitoring Working Group (BMWG), serving as part of the rotating Chairs and contributing to the work of its two sub-groups on Detection Technologies and Capacity Building.
19. The EC and EU Member States continued their nuclear forensics activities on the basic characterisation of intercepted nuclear material, using an advanced nuclear forensic investigation at the JRC site in Karlsruhe (Germany).
20. The EU and its Member States have been in the forefront of international efforts to bring into existence a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices (FMCT). The EU and its Member States continue to call for immediate commencement and early conclusion of such negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament, on the basis of document CD/1299 and the mandate contained therein.
21. On 20 February 2024, the European Union and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) signed a Cooperation Agreement taking the form of a Memorandum of Understanding. The agreement formalises the long-standing relationship and constitutes a framework for strengthening of cooperation in the implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). The EU continued its firm support for the work of the OPCW in investigating chemical weapons use in Syria by state and non-state actors, as well as in seeking to verify Syria's initial declaration on its chemical weapons. Additionally, since July 2024, through the Council Decision (CFSP) 2024/1984 in support of the Institutional Transitional Planning for Non-Routine Missions, the EU voluntary financial support aims to strengthen the OPCW Secretariat's capacity to respond effectively and credibly to chemical weapons use and allegations thereof. It also enables the OPCW's contribution to international accountability efforts against the use of chemical weapons.
22. The listings under the EU's framework on restrictive measures addressing the use and proliferation of chemical weapons were extended for another year by Council Decision (CFSP) 2024/2695, which amends and prolongs Decision (CFSP) 2018/1544.
23. The EU continues its strong political and financial support for the full and effective implementation and universalisation of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), including through a follow-on action under Council Decision (CFSP) 2024/349 of 16 January 2024 in support of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, and by

adopting Council Decision (CFSP) 2025/494 of 11 March 2025 in support of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, its inter-sessional programme and the preparations for its Tenth Review Conference.

24. The EU is actively engaged in the work of the Working Group on the strengthening of the Convention that was established by the Review Conference. The priorities in the context of the BTWC include establishing a Science and Technology Review (S&T) mechanism and an International Cooperation Assistance (ICA) mechanism, enhancing national implementation, and establishing a compliance and verification mechanism while continuing to promote confidence-building measures and transparency such as peer-reviews, voluntary visits and other initiatives, promoting international cooperation and assistance; operationalising Article V consultative provisions and Article VII provisions on assistance, response and preparedness, promoting universal adherence to the Convention, as well as gender equality and the empowerment of women as an important cross-cutting priority. The EU calls on organisation of a Special Conference to progress with the process of strengthening of the Convention by establishing the ICA and the S&T mechanisms.
25. The EU is a staunch and long-standing supporter of the UN Secretary-General's Mechanism for Investigation of Alleged Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons (UNSGM). This independent instrument is as a critical component of the international non-proliferation and disarmament architecture, providing a mechanism for impartial investigations. The EU has provided it with financial support through Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/732 of 2 June 2020, later amended by Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/2787 of 8 December 2023.
26. Through the Council Decision (CFSP) 2024/645 in support of strengthening biological safety and security in Latin America in line with the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004) on non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, the EU's support to the strengthening of biological safety and security in Latin America in line with the implementation of UNSCR 1540 continued. This Decision provides for 2.7 million EUR over three years. Through the implementation of this decision, the EU aims at strengthening biological safety and security in beneficiary countries notably by improving their legislative and regulatory basis as well as by raising awareness among relevant sectors, including through the enforcement of effective domestic measures to prevent the proliferation of biological weapons and their means of delivery.
27. The EU is a longstanding supporter of the implementation, the efficient functioning and the universal adherence to the only multilateral transparency and confidence building instrument against ballistic missile proliferation, the Hague Code of Conduct (HCoC). Since 2008, the EU has financed a series of consecutive projects in support of HCoC with a focus on the universalisation and effective implementation of the HCoC, consisting of outreach activities (side-events, research papers, expert meetings and regional awareness seminars) and inreach activities focussing on the implementation of the Code. These activities are carried out by the Paris-based *Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique*, frequently also involving the rotating HCoC Chair and Immediate Central Contact. The EU currently continues to support HCoC through the implementation of Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/124 in support of the Hague Code of Conduct and ballistic missile non-proliferation in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction.
28. As a member of the G7-led Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, the EU, through its CBRN Risk Mitigation Centres of

Excellence (CoE) Initiative, provides support for capacity-building and training to 63 partner countries grouped around 8 Regional Secretariats, located in the following regions: African Atlantic Façade; Central Asia; Eastern and Central Africa; Gulf Cooperation Council Countries; Middle East; North Africa and Sahel; South East Asia; South East and Eastern Europe. The CoE Initiative focuses on developing and implementing National CBRN Action Plans, establishing inter-agency CBRN national teams, enhancing regional and international cooperation, facilitating the transfer of best practices and knowledge. By 2024, more than 100 capacity-building projects had been funded, supporting 46 countries in strengthening CBRN risk governance.

29. The CoE Initiative is financed under the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI) 2021–27, and aims to mitigate risks related to CBRN materials, strengthen partner countries' preparedness, and nurture security culture and governance. Participating countries are supported in their efforts to establish, on a voluntary basis and following a demand-driven, regional approach, national and regional coordination and governance structures. These platforms develop and reinforce national CBRN policies and build capacities based on specific needs assessments and national action plans.
30. On the side-lines of ICONS 2024, the EU and the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI) presented 'A Prosecutor's Guide to Radiological and Nuclear Crimes', a high-level publication aimed at increasing awareness and the skills needed to investigate and prosecute radiological and nuclear crimes. This Guide aims to provide police, prosecutors, and relevant investigative agencies with guidance to support the successful prosecution of incidents involving the deliberate acquisition, stockpiling, production, transfers, or use of radiological or nuclear agents. It features a related capacity-building and training package to support its implementation. With EU funding, a few partner countries of the EU CBRN CoE Initiative will pilot the integration of the entire training package as part of their respective national training curricula.
31. In its bilateral relations with third countries and regional organisations, the EU aims to strengthen the global non-proliferation infrastructure, enhance CBRN security and contribute to the prevention of acts of terrorism. Work towards these goals has been continued with partners. Non-proliferation, CBRN security and counter-terrorism measures were also integral parts of dialogues with third countries.
32. The EU P2P Programme's overall objective is to contribute to the establishment, consolidation or update of effective strategic trade control (STC) systems for both military and dual-use goods by offering a long-term perspective for cooperation and mutual economic benefits of export controls convergence. The EU P2P portal (<https://export-control.jrc.ec.europa.eu/>) continued to serve as a platform for all EU outreach programmes on export control of military and dual-use goods.
33. The EU P2P pillar dedicated to dual-use items and technologies aims at cooperating with strategic partners to jointly enhance the effectiveness of dual-use trade control systems worldwide by sharing experiences and best practices and supporting compliance with international obligations under the CWC, BTWC, NPT and most notably under UNSC Resolution 1540. Hence, the partnerships established through the EU P2P regional projects contribute to CBRN risk mitigation and, more specifically, to the fight against the proliferation of WMD by focusing on dual-use materials, equipment and technology. The pillar is financed under the NDICI 2021-2027.

34. In the framework of the Science and Technology Center of Ukraine, with the support of the EU through JRC and in collaboration with the US Department of Energy and the Kyiv Institute for Nuclear Research, the EU continued its support for the organisation' mission. The STCU is an international organisation funded by the US government and the EU involved in the non-proliferation of WMD and other CBRN associated issues.
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