

Japan's views on possible options for the establishment of a Group of Scientific and Technical Experts on Nuclear Disarmament Verification within the United Nations pursuant to UN General Assembly resolution 79/240

Summary

Japan supports establishment of a Group of Scientific and Technical Experts on Nuclear Disarmament Verification because Japan strongly believes in the importance of studying potential verification measures and related activities, and in developing tools and technologies for verification in the nuclear disarmament process. Japan has amassed highly advanced knowledge and technologies related to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, including robust IAEA safeguards technology and its verification experience, as well as expertise in on-site inspections of the Chemical Weapons Convention. This knowledge can contribute to discussions on nuclear disarmament verification.

The three principles of verifiability, irreversibility and transparency are needed to advance the nuclear disarmament process, and are indispensable to ensuring the effectiveness of nuclear disarmament measures. Nuclear disarmament verification should provide credible assurance while ensuring the protection of highly sensitive and confidential information. Further studies are still needed on how non-nuclear-weapon States should participate in actual verification activities for the nuclear disarmament of nuclear-weapon States. However, it is imperative to engage both nuclear- and non-nuclear-weapon States in efforts to construct a robust and credible international verification regime. Non-nuclear-weapon States' technical and institutional contributions are crucial to attaining and maintaining a world free of nuclear weapons.

In order to make nuclear disarmament verification more practical and effective, followings are necessary in studying and developing such measures: a) effectiveness of verification; b) protection of proliferation-sensitive information; c) safety of personnel, such as inspectors, and of items to be verified, such as nuclear materials and related facilities; d) contribution to confidence-building; and e) efficiency of verification while constructing the most effective verification system possible.

1. Japan has been taking a realistic and practical approach in promoting nuclear disarmament, and underlines the importance of studying potential verification measures and activities, as well as of developing tools and technologies for verification in the nuclear disarmament process. This will facilitate medium- and long-term efforts to achieve a world free of nuclear weapons. In this regard, Japan supports establishment of a Group of Scientific and Technical Experts on Nuclear Disarmament Verification.
2. Japan has amassed highly advanced knowledge and technologies related to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, including robust IAEA safeguards technology and its verification experience, as well as expertise in on-site inspections of the Chemical Weapons Convention. This knowledge can contribute to discussions on nuclear disarmament verification.
3. Based on the abovementioned expertise, Japan has actively contributed to discussions on nuclear disarmament verification including the groups of governmental experts referred to in the resolution 79/240. Japan also contributed to discussion on verification technologies as well as operating procedures of on-site inspections in the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification (IPNDV), in which both nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States work together to explore solutions to complex challenges involved in the verification of nuclear disarmament.

□ Importance of verification in achieving and maintaining a world free of nuclear weapons

4. Pursuant to Article VI of the NPT, all States parties, including non-nuclear-weapon States as well as nuclear-weapon States, are responsible for efforts towards a world free of nuclear weapons.
5. Advancing the nuclear disarmament process and ensuring the effectiveness of nuclear disarmament measures, the three principles of verifiability, irreversibility and transparency are needed. Verifiability is required in order to confirm whether parties implement and comply with their obligations under treaties or agreements relating to nuclear disarmament and arms control.
6. It is extremely difficult technically to conduct verification on nuclear disarmament even among nuclear-weapon States because this involves national security at the most confidential level. Serious challenges will arise in nuclear disarmament verification efforts with the involvement of non-nuclear-weapon States due to obligations in Article 1 and Article 2 of the NPT: under Article 1, nuclear-weapon States undertake not to

transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices; under Article 2 of the NPT, non-nuclear-weapon States undertake not to acquire or exercise control over nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and not to seek or receive assistance in the manufacture of such devices. Nuclear disarmament verification should provide credible assurance while ensuring the protection of highly sensitive and confidential information.

7. While further studies are still needed on the role to be played by non-nuclear-weapon States in actual verification activities for the nuclear disarmament of nuclear-weapon States, it is imperative to engage both nuclear and non-nuclear weapon States in efforts to construct a robust and credible international verification regime. Non-nuclear-weapon States' technical and institutional contributions are crucial to attaining and maintaining a world free of nuclear weapons.

(for practical and effective nuclear disarmament verification measures □

8. The following factors, among others, should be taken into account in studying and developing practical and effective measures on nuclear disarmament verification:
 - a) Verification must be effective, and must provide sufficient confidence and transparency to relevant parties to an agreement that other parties are complying with obligations;
 - b) Verification mechanism must prevent transfer of proliferation-sensitive information, including design information and manufacturing techniques related to nuclear weapons or other explosive devices;
 - c) Verification mechanism must ensure the safety of personnel, such as inspectors, carrying out verification activities. It must also ensure the security of items to be verified which may be targeted by criminal activity, such as nuclear materials and related facilities;
 - d) Verification mechanism must contribute to confidence-building;
 - e) Verification mechanism must be as effective as possible while still considering its efficiency.
9. The Group should also build on the relevant research and examination efforts for the verification of nuclear disarmament including by the groups of governmental experts established by General Assembly resolutions and the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification (IPNDV), in which both nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States work together to explore solutions to complex challenges involved in the verification of nuclear disarmament; the Trilateral Initiative, a cooperative effort by

the IAEA, the United States and the Russian Federation; the US-UK technical collaboration; and the UK-Norway Initiative (UKNI) on verification of warhead dismantlement.

End