

Written Submission by the Arab Republic of Egypt to the UNSG Report pursuant to UN General Assembly resolution 79/240 “Group of Scientific and Technical Experts on Nuclear Disarmament Verification”

- Egypt welcomes the convening of three informal consultations pursuant to resolution 79/240 and looks forward to the UNSG report. Egypt appreciates the efforts of the two main sponsors Brazil and Norway, their good intentions in contributing to advancing nuclear disarmament discussions at the UN, and the incremental approach that allows for further engagement with and among Member States.
- As a State Party to the NPT, Egypt subscribes to the recognition of transparency, verifiability, and irreversibility as key principles for nuclear disarmament, and their continued relevance and applicability. On these basis, and as a point of departure, Egypt voted in favor of previous relevant UNGA resolutions, including most recently resolution 79/240.
- Egypt welcomes that resolution 79/240 underlined that work on nuclear disarmament verification is not an end in itself and is not a prerequisite, precondition or substitute for progress in nuclear disarmament, and that it recognized that the decisive factor for achieving real measures of disarmament is the political will of States, especially the nuclear-weapon States.
- Egypt underlines the major importance of the report of the GGE established pursuant to Resolution 74/50, as contained in document A/78/120 and commends the efforts of the Group leading to the successful adoption of this substantive report that represents an important contribution to the global narrative and common understandings on nuclear disarmament verification (NDV), especially the conceptual framework and the technical and legal aspects.
- While the report cannot be viewed as an exhaustive document, it does reflect consensus on several fundamental principles and key conceptual elements, as well as a number of pertinent and useful perspectives that must form the basis

of any future discussions on NDV and any efforts related to verifying ongoing or future nuclear disarmament.

- The document is pioneer in explicitly unpacking the nuclear disarmament process and breaking it down into seven specific and distinct steps identifying the key actions required, starting from the submission of declarations by the State until the verification of the correctness and completeness of such declarations. This delegation would have preferred to avail more time for the nuclear disarmament machinery to digest this landmark report and socialize it within its discussions with a view of cementing the understandings arrived at in its recommendations and to build further upon them.
- The report links each step with the set of tools and techniques that are already available to verify the relevant actions, based on previous experiences with the relevant disarmament and arms control treaties and best practices.
- Moreover, the report contains a working definition of nuclear disarmament verification, and explicitly states that “work on NDV is not an end in itself and is not a prerequisite to progress on nuclear disarmament”.
- The report and the well-elaborated working papers annexed to it also illustrate the basic fact that a State cannot acquire nuclear weapons without access to the necessary fissile material, and that the placement of such material under safeguards by an impartial multilateral inspectorate, such as the IAEA, is the necessary condition for achieving verifiable and irreversible nuclear disarmament.
- The delegation of Egypt reiterates its views about the potential role that the IAEA, within the framework of its statute, can play in supporting the implementation of nuclear disarmament verification measures including in the context of the implementation of Actions 17, 18 and 19 of the 2010 NPT Review Conference Action Plan.
- Egypt reiterates that the international community already possesses all the necessary conceptual, technical, and scientific means to effectively verify

irreversible nuclear disarmament as it occurs and the absence of nuclear weapons in any given State through verifying the correctness and completeness of the declarations of that State on its nuclear material. This ability has been proven through multiple previous examples and experiences. What we actually lack is the political will to implement the relevant longstanding obligations and commitments by the NWS.

- We caution against attempts to abuse the expansion in the discussion on nuclear disarmament verification to further delay the implementation of actual disarmament verification measures, or to further fracture the nuclear disarmament discussion and lowering the ceiling of its ambition and agreed objectives pursuant to the respective obligations and commitments.

 - Arguments that there must be new treaties on nuclear disarmament in order to reinvent a nuclear verification regime run counter to the fact that nuclear disarmament can and should be pursued in an internationally verifiable manner through unilateral measures or in implementation of the agreed obligations and commitments under the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and its Review Conference.
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