

中国政府关于核裁军核查问题科技专家组的立场文件

根据联合国大会第79/240号“核裁军核查问题科技专家组”决议相关要求，中国对核裁军核查问题科技专家组的立场如下：

一、有效的核裁军核查措施有助于提高核裁军条约履约的可信度，是实现最终全面禁止和彻底销毁核武器的重要保障。就核裁军核查问题进行沟通，有利于增进核武器国家之间，以及核武器国家同无核武器国家之间的互信。

二、中国支持各方围绕科技专家组有关问题广泛交换意见。可在明确授权、目标和协商一致工作方法的前提下，在日内瓦裁军谈判会议框架下成立科技专家组，以具有权威性、代表性和影响力的方式进一步深化核裁军核查技术研究，促进核裁军核查能力建设。

三、核裁军核查问题复杂性和敏感性突出，涉及运载工具、核弹头、核材料、相关核设施等多个方面。科技专家组工作亦应充分考虑上述因素，遵循平衡、非歧视、防扩散原则，以循序渐进、先易后难方式推进工作，并采取协商一致规则充分反映各方合理关切。

四、核裁军核查必须与具体核裁军条约相结合，不能脱离具体条约制定核查措施，也不应寻求建立普遍适用的统一核查模板。科技专家组应避免变相制订核裁军核查标准模式或对未来核裁军条约预设模板。

五、设立任何新机制要充分考虑其与联合国相关裁军机构的互动关系，以确保其专业、有效运行。裁谈会作为唯一多边裁军谈判机构，应在授权成立科技专家组、指导其开展工作、定期听取其报告、评估其运行情况和延期等方面发挥作用。

六、国际社会围绕核裁军核查的讨论不能替代核裁军本身。核裁军应采取公正合理、逐步削减、向下平衡的步骤，坚持“维护全球战略稳定”和“各国安全不受减损”原则，循序渐进加以推进。拥有最大核武库的国家应继续履行核裁军特殊、优先责任。

七、中国政府专家建设性参与两届联合国政府专家组工作，为专家组取得成果发挥积极作用。中国高度重视并积极开展核裁军核查科学研究和能力建设，支持探索新技术在核裁军核查领域中的应用，鼓励相关领域专家参与国际学术交流与合作，在核查概念与理论、核查技术方法、核查机制与流程等方面积累了经验，未来将继续积极参与成立科技专家组的国际讨论。

中方希望上述观点能反映在联合国秘书长相关报告中。

**Positions and views of the Government of China
on Group of Scientific and Technical Experts on Nuclear Disarmament
Verification**

Pursuant to the United Nations General Assembly resolution 79/240 entitled *Group of Scientific and Technical Experts on Nuclear Disarmament Verification*, the Government of China presents herewith the following positions and views on the issue of Group of Scientific and Technical Experts (GSTE) on nuclear disarmament verification:

1. Effective nuclear disarmament verification measures are conducive to enhancing the credibility of compliance with nuclear disarmament treaties, and could serve as important guarantee for the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. Engaging in communication on the issue of nuclear disarmament verification will facilitate mutual trust among nuclear-weapon States, as well as between nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States.

2. China supports all parties in extensively exchanging views on issues related to the potential GSTE. Under the premise of clear mandate, objective and consensus-based working method, a GSTE could be established within the framework under the Conference on Disarmament (CD) to further deepen nuclear disarmament verification technical research and promote nuclear disarmament verification capacity-building in an authoritative, representative and influential manner.

3. Nuclear disarmament verification is notably complex and sensitive,

involving multiple aspects such as delivery means, nuclear warheads, nuclear materials and related nuclear facilities. The work of the potential GSTE should take these factors into full consideration, adhere to the principles of balance, non-discrimination and non-proliferation, advance its work in a step-by-step approach starting from the easier tasks first, and follow the consensus-based rules to adequately reflect the legitimate concerns of all parties.

4. Nuclear disarmament verification must be coupled to specific nuclear disarmament treaties. Verification measures cannot be developed away from the specific treaties. We should not seek to establish a unified verification template that is universally applicable. The potential GSTE should avoid directly or in disguised form creating standardized nuclear disarmament verification models or predetermining templates for future nuclear disarmament treaties.

5. The establishment of any new institution must give full consideration to its interactive relationship with existing UN disarmament bodies to ensure its professional and effective operation. The CD, as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum, should dully play its role with regard to the potential GSTE, including but not limited to authorizing its establishment, guiding its work, regularly considering its reports, evaluating its operation, and reviewing its mandate renewal.

6. The discussions of the international society regarding nuclear disarmament verification cannot replace nuclear disarmament, Nuclear disarmament should be a just and reasonable process of gradual reduction

toward a downward balance, following the principles of “maintaining global strategic stability” and “undiminished security for all” in a step-by-step approach. The countries with the largest nuclear arsenals bear special and primary responsibility for nuclear disarmament.

7. The Chinese Governmental experts have taken a constructive part in the work of the two United Nations Groups of Governmental Experts on nuclear disarmament verification, and positively facilitated their conclusion of reports. China attaches high importance to and actively conducted the scientific and technology research and capacity-building of nuclear disarmament verification, supports the exploration of application of new technologies in nuclear disarmament verification, encourages experts to participate in international academic exchanges and cooperation, and has accumulated substantive experience regarding verification concepts, theories, technical methodologies, mechanisms and procedures. China will continue to actively engage in international discussions regarding the establishment of a GSTE.

China hopes the above views will be reflected in the report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations.