

## **Canada's Submission**

This submission provides a summary of Canada's views on UNGA resolution A/RES/79/240 entitled "Group of Scientific and Technical Experts on Nuclear Disarmament Verification." This submission responds to a note verbale from the Office of Disarmament Affairs (ODA/2025-00037/NDV), pursuant to OP5 of the above-mentioned resolution, requesting the Secretary-General to seek the views of Member States.

### ***Canada's support for nuclear disarmament verification***

Nuclear disarmament verification (NDV) is an integral component of reaching and maintaining a world free of nuclear weapons. Confidence in nuclear disarmament declarations will be key to ensuring a future free of nuclear weapons, without fear of clandestine stockpiles. Though various treaties have developed forms of NDV, no existing verification regime is comprehensive enough to verify a global state of zero nuclear weapons. The scale, speed, and certifiability necessary to reach global zero necessitates further work on NDV.

Multilateral efforts to prepare an NDV regime have been successful. Canada participated in the second Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) and the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification (IPNDV). Domestically, Canada has significant nuclear expertise from an advanced nuclear industry, national nuclear laboratories, and contributions to the IAEA's global safeguards regime.

Past GGEs and the IPNDV have discussed definitions, scope, and the appropriate use of NDV. In these forums, experts and diplomats balance the need to agree on concepts, norms, and guiding principles of verification, with testing and developing technologies, techniques, processes, and procedures that both protect sensitive information and provide assurances to inspecting parties. Greater attention and resources are needed to develop technologies and tools to adequately verify nuclear disarmament.

### ***Increased need for nuclear disarmament verification expertise***

Sustainable nuclear disarmament requires all states to be confident that disarmament is occurring according to legally binding treaties and agreements. As such, the development of a comprehensive, treaty-agnostic, proliferation-sensitive, and universally applicable NDV regime is a top priority. Though political will is currently lacking for a universal disarmament treaty, NDV can act as a trust and confidence-building measure, allowing adversaries and allies to work together in a neutral forum towards a mutually beneficial goal.

Canada is supportive of the establishment of a Group of Scientific and Technical Experts (GSTE) on NDV, which would discuss technical means and requirements of NDV in a non-politicized, unbiased forum. A GSTE can, and should, draw from scientists from across the globe to collectively develop verification solutions. Geographic and gender diversity should be prioritized in the Group's makeup, with an eye to empowering the next generation of nuclear scientists.

Canada would like to see the GSTE develop a menu of NDV options that meet a standard of certifiability agreed upon by the international community. This menu can be used by nuclear-weapon States when

negotiating treaties, and the community of scientists can be drawn upon to solve context-specific challenges.