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REVIEW OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS AND DECISIONS
ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AT ITS TENTH SPECIAL SESSION

Letter dated 10 May 1982 from the representatives of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

In joint memoranda circulated in the First Committee of the General Assembly on 1 November 1979 (A/C.1/34/4) and on 3 November 1980 (A/C.1/35/10), the five Nordic countries expressed their deep concern about the possible development and achievement of nuclear explosive capability by any additional State or States. These memoranda called upon all States to do their utmost to enhance international confidence and trust so that nuclear weapons proliferation to additional States would not take place. Subsequent developments related to the possibility that additional States may have acquired or may be pursuing nuclear weapons capability give added urgency to international non-proliferation efforts. At the same time, risks of proliferation are hampering international co-operation for the promotion of peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In view of these developments, the Nordic countries hereby submit the attached working paper for consideration by the General Assembly at the second special session devoted to disarmament.

* A/S-12/10.

We would be grateful if the working paper could be circulated as an official document of the twelfth special session of the General Assembly under item 9 of the provisional agenda.

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ANNEX

Working paper on the question of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons submitted by Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden

The development of increased international confidence and trust so that proliferation of nuclear weapons to additional states does not take place is essential for the security of states and international peace, as well as for enhanced co-operation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Measures to prevent the spread of nuclear explosive capability should be seen as an integral part of efforts to curb and reverse the nuclear arms race.

Further steps with the objective of halting and reversing the nuclear arms race and preventing additional states from seeking and acquiring nuclear explosive capability, should include:

- Adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, to which 116 states are now parties, by the largest possible number of states.
- Acceptance by all non-nuclear-weapon states of full scope IAEA safeguards on all their present and future nuclear activities. The worldwide acceptance of effective non-proliferation measures will increase the security of all states, will promote predictability of supply in the peaceful non-explosive uses of nuclear energy and will enhance international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Acquisition of nuclear weapons and/or nuclear explosive devices by additional states, or steps in that direction will, on the other hand, seriously jeopardize current international attempts

to promote such efforts.

- The requirement of full scope safeguards as a condition for all export of relevant nuclear material, equipment and technology. It should be in the interest of all nations - and the responsibility of all states involved in nuclear cooperation - to make every effort to ensure that effective safeguards are being applied as a measure against the proliferation of nuclear weapons capability.
- Contribution by all states to further strengthening the safeguard system of the IAEA and related activities and full cooperation with the Agency in its implementation of safeguards under existing and future bilateral and multilateral agreements. Actions, which could undermine the confidence in the safeguard system of the IAEA, are unacceptable.
- Early conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty, and adherence to this treaty by all states.
- Continued renunciation of any act which would defeat the object and purpose of the SALT process and an early resumption of negotiations with the aim of achieving substantial balanced reductions in strategic nuclear arms as well as a successful conclusion of the ongoing talks between the United States and the Soviet Union in Geneva relating to nuclear weapons.
- Agreement on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon states against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

- The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones. Such zones may in the proper circumstances constitute a significant measure against the proliferation of nuclear weapons and of increasing the security of states in the region. Such zones must be based on the voluntary agreement of the states in the region, taking into account the existing situation there and the security policies of the states involved.

- Other national, bilateral and international measures aimed at preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

There is a close relationship between non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and nuclear disarmament. Both are essential in order to avert the danger of nuclear war. Nuclear-weapon states have the primary responsibility for ending the nuclear arms race and for initiating measures of nuclear disarmament. All states must share the responsibility for further efforts to halt the proliferation of nuclear arms. Lack of progress in nuclear disarmament calls for strong reactions but should not be used as a pretext for neglecting non-proliferation measures, or the acquisition of nuclear explosive capabilities.

Rather than adding to the security of any state, the achievement of nuclear explosive capability by additional states may be expected to lead to regional and international destabilization and tension. It would also be highly detrimental to the ongoing efforts, i.a. in the International Atomic

Energy Agency, to promote international cooperation and security of supply in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy as well as to the prospects for the 1983 UN Conference for the promotion of international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
