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Item 12 of the provisional agenda\*

ENHANCEMENT OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF MACHINERY IN THE FIELD  
OF DISARMAMENT AND STRENGTHENING OF THE ROLE OF THE UNITED  
NATIONS IN THIS FIELD, INCLUDING THE POSSIBLE CONVENING OF  
A WORLD DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE

### Report of the Secretary-General

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## I. INTRODUCTION

1. At its thirty-sixth session, the General Assembly adopted resolution 36/97 D entitled "Institutional arrangements relating to the process of disarmament", the operative part of which read as follows:

"The General Assembly,

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1. Takes note of the report of the Secretary-General and of the study contained therein;
2. Expresses its appreciation to the Secretary-General and the experts who assisted him for the efficient manner in which the report was prepared;
3. Recommends that all Member States should study the report;
4. Invites all Member States to transmit to the Secretary-General by 31 March 1982 their comments on the study and its conclusions and recommendations;
5. Requests the Secretary-General to transmit the study to the Committee on Disarmament;
6. Decides to transmit the report and the comments of Member States to the General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament for substantive consideration and the adoption of appropriate decisions;
7. Further decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-seventh session an item entitled "Institutional arrangements relating to the process of disarmament."

2. Pursuant to paragraph 5 of the resolution, the Secretary-General submits herewith the replies received from Member States concerning their comments on the study prepared by the Group of Governmental Experts to Study the Institutional Arrangements relating to the Process of Disarmament (A/36/392), and its conclusions and recommendations.

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## II. REPLIES RECEIVED FROM GOVERNMENTS

### AUSTRIA

[Original: English]

[31 March 1982]

1. Progress towards disarmament depends ultimately on the awareness of Governments of the immense danger of the arms race and their determination to end it. Institutional arrangements in the field of disarmament cannot compensate for the lack of political will to this effect. They can, however, if they are adjusted to the changing requirements contribute to the promotion of disarmament goals, to facilitating negotiations on disarmament agreements and to their implementation and control. Austria therefore welcomes the study on the institutional arrangements relating to the process of disarmament and welcomes it as a basis for the second special session on disarmament to consider possible measures to enhance the effectiveness of the institutional arrangements of the United Nations in this area.

2. Austria shares the assessment by the Expert Group that the Centre for Disarmament is currently performing its functions in a highly satisfactory way. This fact is particularly significant as the growing interest of States in disarmament matters, the proliferation of meetings and the increasing agenda of the disarmament bodies have multiplied the work-load and severely strained the resources of the Centre. As these trends can be expected to continue throughout the 1980s, steps should be taken in time to meet these growing needs. In particular, Austria agrees with the Expert Group's suggestion that the Secretary-General should consider possibilities to strengthen the Centre with an appropriate number of additional staff. Since increases in financial expenditures must be minimized these additions should come from the existing resources of the United Nations. Whether the Centre needs a change in its organizational status should be the subject of further careful consideration. In view of the number of bodies now handling disarmament matters within the United Nations system there appears to be a clear necessity for co-ordination among these bodies. The head of the Centre has a major role to perform in this task of United Nations-wide co-ordination.

3. Austria believes that the second special session on disarmament should review the present arrangements concerning the carrying out of studies on disarmament matters and supports the relevant recommendations of the Expert Group. The review would have to cover the status of the Institute for Disarmament Research clarifying the division of work between the Centre and the Institute and facilitating a fuller utilization of existing resources. The mandate of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies should be re-examined with a view to enabling this body to assume co-ordinating functions for all disarmament research activities of the United Nations system.

4. In presenting these comments Austria wishes to restate its interest in the various proposals for the creation of a world disarmament organization. While an

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implementation of this idea seems unattainable in the present unsatisfactory state of the disarmament process, real progress in arms control and disarmament will eventually demand a corresponding expansion of the institutional arrangements. In such a situation a world disarmament organization established as a special organization of the United Nations could provide the institutional framework to further advance the disarmament process. Apart from the functions currently performed by the Centre this organization could also assume important additional responsibilities in the areas of the verification of disarmament agreements and in the dissemination of information on military and disarmament matters. Austria favours continued consideration and study of the political and organizational implications of a world disarmament organization.

BULGARIA

[Original: Russian]

[9 April 1982]

1. The People's Republic of Bulgaria consistently and firmly follows a policy aimed at consolidating peace, continuing international détente and removing the threat of war. In pursuance of that peace-loving and constructive foreign policy, Bulgaria consistently seeks ways to promote the work of all international forums, including the United Nations, in which negotiations for limiting the arms race and for disarmament are, or ought to be, conducted.
2. Taking into account the growing significance of disarmament problems, the United Nations General Assembly has adopted a number of decisions for further improving the existing structure and functions of United Nations machinery in this field. For example, the Disarmament Affairs Division has been changed to the Centre for Disarmament within the Department of Political and Security Council Affairs. The first special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament decided to establish an advisory board of eminent persons to advise the Secretary-General and adopted a number of other decisions for improving the organizational system in the field of disarmament. The object of these changes was to facilitate the successful performance by the United Nations of its functions in the disarmament field over the long term.
3. The experts' report (A/36/392) shows that the United Nations Centre for Disarmament within the Department of Political and Security Council Affairs is successfully performing its functions, and Bulgaria therefore sees no reason to raise the question of a fundamental reorganization of the Centre, or of the establishment in the Secretariat of a special department for disarmament problems. This view is confirmed by the fact that the study contains no joint recommendations to change the existing arrangements for discussion and negotiation in the disarmament field.
4. In their conclusions and recommendations specifically in paragraph 92 (a), the experts rightly point out that "whatever the adequacy of the means provided by the United Nations in the service of the task of disarmament, it was ultimately the

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will of States ... and their political readiness to negotiate which would determine how much progress was made in that regard". It is well known that the lack of success in disarmament is due not to any deficiencies or imperfections in the existing arrangements but to some States' lack of political will and reluctance to take measures for curtailing the arms race and to their drive to increase armaments.

5. At the present time, efforts must be concentrated not on structural reforms but on seizing every opportunity of resuming interrupted negotiations and quickening the pace of current ones for limiting the arms race and for disarmament, in order to achieve tangible results in this field. There must be new initiatives and efforts at all levels and by all States if this goal is to be attained.

BYELORUSSIAN SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLIC

[Original: Russian]

[6 April 1982]

1. The Byelorussian SSR, together with the other States of the socialist community, has repeatedly underscored the urgent need to halt the arms race and has stressed the need for a decisive turn-about from the build-up of weapons for waging war to their limitation and reduction, and for resolving the question of real disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament. There are no weapons which the socialist countries would not be prepared to limit, reduce or prohibit, provided, of course, that the principle of equality and equal security is maintained.

2. This position of principle forms the basis for the attitude of the Byelorussian SSR with regard to the conclusions and recommendations of the study of the institutional arrangements relating to the process of disarmament (A/36/392).

3. The Byelorussian SSR shares the opinion of the Group of Experts, expressed in paragraphs 93 and 94, that in spite of the considerable increase in its responsibilities, which is evident from the report of the Group of Experts, the United Nations Centre for Disarmament, acting as a part of the Department of Political and Security Council Affairs of the Secretariat, is carrying out in a completely satisfactory manner its functions in every aspect of the organizational and other servicing of the efforts made by Member States in negotiations on disarmament problems.

4. The unanimous nature of this conclusion of the Group of Experts and the lack of any common view concerning a need to change the current machinery for servicing disarmament negotiations bears witness once again to the fact that the Centre for Disarmament, as the unit of the Secretariat concerned with these questions, meets current needs and that there are no objective reasons to call for a radical restructuring of the Centre, and in particular for turning it into a department for disarmament problems.

5. The work of the United Nations Centre for Disarmament, as one of the principal units of the Department of Political and Security Council Affairs, reflects to the fullest extent the organic link between the problems of disarmament and of international security - a link whose existence has been repeatedly affirmed in

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many decisions of the General Assembly and in the practice of the latter's main political organs. An artificial break in the interrelated functions of the United Nations Secretariat in servicing efforts in the field of disarmament and the strengthening of international security would have a negative effect both on the fruitfulness of these efforts and on the efficiency of the Secretariat's work.

6. The introduction and discussion of the question of splitting up the negotiation machinery without regard to realities and needs diverts the attention of Member States from the substance of disarmament problems and impedes effective negotiations and measures relating to the limitation of armaments, to disarmament and to the implementation of United Nations decisions in this field. The frequent and unnecessary reorganization of certain units of the Secretariat has a negative effect on the effectiveness of their practical work. Furthermore, this type of reorganization - in particular, the creation within the Secretariat of a separate department for disarmament problems - entails unjustified financial implications, thus aggravating the problem of excessive expenditures in maintaining the Secretariat.

7. The existing structure of the Secretariat in the field of disarmament has great potential, and the main task under present conditions is to use them fully, in order, inter alia, to improve further the work of the Centre for Disarmament, particularly to increase its staff by the redeployment of staff among the various units of the Secretariat and to improve the structure of the Centre itself.

8. In view of the growing role of the Department of Political and Security Council Affairs in the institutional arrangements for all United Nations disarmament activities, the Byelorussian SSR believes that the logical way to complete the 1977-1978 reorganization of the work of this unit would be to change its name formally to "Department of Political, Disarmament and Security Council Affairs", which would reflect its real functions and tasks.

9. Despite the importance of the question of the organizational structure of the United Nations in the disarmament field, it should be kept in mind that whatever the adequacy of the means provided by the United Nations in the service of the task of disarmament, it is ultimately the political will of States to make the best use of them and their readiness decisively and consistently to take steps - deeds, not words - aimed at halting the arms race, rather than stepping it up, which will determine how much progress is made in promoting disarmament. In this regard, the Byelorussian SSR, which actively advocates halting the arms race and achieving disarmament, fully shares the conclusion contained in paragraph 92 (a) of the report of the Group of Experts.

CANADA

[Original: English]

[29 April 1982]

1. The Canadian Government considers that the study of the institutional arrangements relating to the process of disarmament has been a valuable exercise, and it is grateful to those who have been involved in its conception and execution.

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### Disarmament Commission

2. Although the Canadian Government agrees with the study's conclusions in paragraphs 92 (b) and (c) inasmuch as they concern the Committee on Disarmament, it considers that the situation is clearer with regard to the Disarmament Commission. One of the main problems with this body appears to be its inability to focus on a limited number of subjects in the short time available to it, and its tendency to discuss unrealistically wide subjects, or peripheral ones. If these shortcomings cannot be corrected at the second special session on disarmament, the suggestion that the Commission be adjourned sine die should perhaps be addressed.

### Centre for Disarmament

3. Because of the enhanced role in the field of disarmament which member Governments have given the United Nations to play, it is considered that the Secretary-General should be enabled to take an increased and more direct interest in the work of the Centre. For this reason, the Canadian Government considers that serious thought should be given to changing the Centre into a department for disarmament affairs, headed by an Under-Secretary-General. However, additional resources would have to be justified by additional responsibilities, and should be obtained from within the existing over-all resources of the United Nations.

4. It might also be desirable for the second special session on disarmament to recognize the primacy of the Centre for Disarmament in disarmament matters or, at least, to recognize the need for the Centre to play a co-ordinating role vis-à-vis all specialized agencies.

### Secretary-General's Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies

5. Recommendations in paragraph 95 (d), (e) and (f) of the study on institutional arrangements (A/36/356) are relevant and appear eminently sensible. However, if the Advisory Board is unable to influence the terms of reference of studies proposed by delegations in the General Assembly, is there justification for the Board's continued existence? Although the Board has reflected on its future role (paras. 17-19 of the Board's report to the Secretary-General), consideration might be given to the Board's adjournment sine die. Otherwise, it should be given the opportunity to comment on any General Assembly proposals for a study, by assessing it in the light of the factors listed in paragraph 95 (f) of the institutional arrangements study. This might be done by having the Board meet in November to consider delegation proposals which would have to be submitted by a predetermined date. A complementary procedure would be to have the Board, as has been suggested by some of its members, develop a list of proposals for new studies at its spring meeting, so as to enable the Secretary-General to bring these to the attention of Member States well before the beginning of the General Assembly.

6. In order to decrease the expense involved, the Board's size should be reduced, while maintaining a geographical balance.

7. The idea has also been suggested that the Board become the sole directing body, or Advisory Council of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament

Research. This would allow the Board not only to advise the General Assembly on studies to be undertaken, but also to direct an ongoing programme of research, and could offer a solution to the Board's seeming lack of precise role at present.

United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research

8. The second special session on disarmament will be expected to decide whether or not a permanent status should be accorded to the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research and what, for example, should be its mechanism of direction. Although it was intended that these decisions be based on an assessment of its performance, it may be too early to judge. The second special session should perhaps extend the life of the Institute for about four years, at which time its future existence could be reviewed again.

9. It has been suggested that the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research's role in research vis-à-vis the role of the Centre for Disarmament should be clarified. The Canadian Government agrees with the suggestion that the Institute should undertake research of a technical and long-term nature, whereas the Centre's work would be more "political" and shorter term. It does appear that the Centre is better placed to carry out the political studies which necessitate the formation of experts groups.

10. With regard to financing, Canada considers that part of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research's support should come from the regular United Nations budget and part from voluntary contributions.

CUBA

[Original: Spanish]

[18 March 1982]

1. The Government of the Republic of Cuba had the opportunity to express its views on the question of institutional arrangements relating to the process of disarmament both by letter dated 11 March 1980 addressed to the Secretary-General and directly to the Group of Governmental Experts established by resolution 34/87 E with regard to the participation of a Cuban government expert in that Group.

2. In the light of the foregoing, the Government of Cuba, through its representatives, endorsed resolution 36/97 D and now reaffirms its support for the report submitted by the Secretary-General transmitting the study prepared by the Group of Governmental Experts as well as the conclusions and recommendations it contains.

3. The foregoing notwithstanding, and generally speaking, the Government of Cuba wishes to state that although there has been no substantial progress with respect to limitation or reduction of arms since the tenth special session devoted to disarmament, the international machinery established as a result of that special session has provided ample opportunity for Member States to hold discussions and

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negotiations on questions of disarmament and has helped to clarify further the areas in which disarmament measures are imperative.

4. Cuba is of the view that the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament is the most appropriate forum for appraising the performance of the machinery established in 1978, introducing the necessary improvements, defining more strictly the functions of the advisory and research bodies and establishing guidelines for improved co-ordination between the various institutions dealing with matters of disarmament, with a view to ensuring the implementation of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session and achieving the objectives of the Second Disarmament Decade.

5. The Government of Cuba wishes to emphasize, because of its importance, one of the questions which the Group of Experts stressed in its conclusions and recommendations, namely, that it recognized that "whatever the adequacy of the means provided by the United Nations in the service of the task of disarmament, it was ultimately the will of States to make the best use of them and their political readiness to negotiate which would determine how much progress was made in that regard".

6. The Government of Cuba is of the view that although the international machinery can be improved in order more effectively to advance the disarmament process, it is precisely the lack of political will on the part of some States that has been preventing all possibility of serious progress towards the established goals.

7. That lack of political will is manifested when attempts are made to negotiate from positions of strength or when States seek to achieve military superiority and then attempt to impose particular positions.

8. In another sense, positive political will is lacking when, in defiance of the clamour of world public opinion, decisions are taken to build neutron bombs and large arsenals of chemical weapons, the concept of limited nuclear war is developed, large-scale aggressive military manoeuvres are carried out and astronomical military budgets are imposed on other countries, thus jeopardizing international peace and security and impeding the execution of programmes for the economic and social improvement of their peoples.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

[Original: English]

[8 April 1982]

1. The Czechoslovak Socialist Republic holds the view that the most important current task is to halt the arms race. This applies, first of all, to the field of nuclear arms of all types, but also to other weapons of mass destruction, such as bacteriological, biological, chemical and recently also binary weapons.

2. That is why Czechoslovakia has been consistently and systematically advocating effective negotiations aimed at adopting specific and realistic disarmament measures, particularly in the nuclear field, and why it has taken part in a number of such negotiations. Furthermore, by practising a peaceful policy, Czechoslovakia encourages the creation of favourable conditions for actual disarmament negotiations. On Czechoslovak initiative, the thirty-fourth session of the United Nations General Assembly in 1979 adopted the Declaration on International Co-operation for Disarmament and the thirty-sixth session of the General Assembly adopted the resolution on international co-operation for disarmament. Czechoslovakia is taking an equally active part in the preparations for the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. It does so both in the Geneva Committee on Disarmament and in the Preparatory Committee for that session.

3. Czechoslovakia has been striving to contribute to the speeding up of the process of disarmament by assisting in the resolution of yet other issues relating to disarmament. In that connexion, it has carefully studied the Secretary-General's note, dated 19 January 1982, concerning a study on the institutional arrangements relating to the process of disarmament.

4. It is the view of the Czechoslovak Government that the United Nations Centre for Disarmament is providing high-quality services to Committees and Conferences and to groups of experts engaged in the study of the questions of disarmament. The Centre moreover compiles and duly disseminates relevant information. This, by the way, was borne out by the documentation from the session and the report of the Group of Experts, from whose side not a single critical comment was made in respect of the Centre's work.

5. The current situation, as far as institutional arrangements for disarmament negotiations are concerned, is fully in keeping with the changed situation. This becomes particularly apparent in comparison with the situation in 1977 when the Centre was established. That is why we do not see any reason for a fundamental restructuring of the Centre, including the establishment in the United Nations Secretariat of a special department for questions of disarmament. And, indeed, even the conclusions reached in the expert study do not contain any joint recommendation for a change of the present machinery providing services for disarmament negotiations.

6. Moreover, the fact that the Centre is currently functioning within the Department of Political and Security Council Affairs permits the United Nations Secretariat to establish in practice the interrelation between disarmament and international security. The necessity of this interrelation was repeatedly pointed out by sessions of the General Assembly, including the last thirty-sixth session. An artificial separation of the Secretariat's functions relating to disarmament negotiations from its activities aimed at co-ordination of efforts by States in the field of strengthening international security could be only to the detriment of the entire process.

7. This unfounded restructuring of the machinery would, to a considerable extent, draw attention away from topical disarmament issues and would also entail

unnecessary financial expenditures at a time when the constantly growing costs of financing the United Nations Secretariat are arousing dissatisfaction of many States. This, of course, does not mean that the work of the Centre could not be improved by expanding its staff by a certain number of workers. Along with some other States, Czechoslovakia is of the view that also the name of the Department should be in keeping with the current needs and should thus include political affairs, disarmament and Security Council affairs.

8. Czechoslovakia, none the less, holds the opinion that it is not matters of an organizational nature but matters of substance relating to disarmament which should be in the centre of the attention of States, because the preservation of peace will not be guaranteed even by the most ingenious restructuring of the machinery, but rather by political good will and determination of States to act in the interest of peace on our planet.

#### FINLAND

[Original: English]

[31 March 1982]

1. Any consideration of institutional arrangements in the field of disarmament obviously has to proceed from substantive and concrete requirements designed to make the United Nations able to respond in an adequate manner to the needs of the international community in this field. In the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session, the General Assembly underlined the central role and primary responsibility of the United Nations in the sphere of disarmament and called for the strengthening of this role. Since the first special session of the General Assembly on disarmament, more States have become actively involved in disarmament questions. At the same time, the disarmament agenda before the bodies dealing with these questions has grown, and disarmament issues have become increasingly complex.

2. In 1975-1976, an Ad Hoc Committee reviewed the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament. That review, inter alia, led to a restructuring of the Committee on Disarmament and strengthening of the United Nations Secretariat. The study prepared by the Group of Governmental Experts continues that work.

3. The Government of Finland welcomes the study. In its view, the study provides, inter alia, useful guidelines for possible decisions on the organization, functions and structure of the disarmament machinery to meet present and future needs. However, improvements in machinery or procedures are as such no guarantee for progress in arms limitation and disarmament. The main reason for lack of progress is substantive, not procedural; political, not related to machinery. In that respect, Finland fully concurs with the conclusion of the Group of Experts to the effect that regardless of the adequacy of the means provided by the United Nations in disarmament, in essence progress depends on how States make use of the Organization and their preparedness to negotiate.

4. In the view of Finland, the existing United Nations machinery as revised by decisions of the General Assembly, has by and large fulfilled the role outlined in

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the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session. Improved opportunities according to States not members of the Committee on Disarmament to contribute to and participate in the Committee's work are a case in point. Further, the Disarmament Centre of the United Nations Secretariat has performed its functions in a generally satisfactory manner, given its comparatively limited resources. In the field of research, the establishment of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research should in a useful manner complement other activities.

5. The study on the institutional arrangements contains, inter alia, a comprehensive survey of the diverse views expressed on present arrangements and future estimated needs in the United Nations relating to the process of disarmament, including deliberation, negotiation, implementation, verification, information, studies and training, infrastructure and co-ordination. That survey is most useful in view of possible conclusions and decisions by the second special session on the subject. As far as infrastructure is concerned, the proposals discussed in the group ranged from the establishment of a world disarmament agency within the United Nations system and the transformation of the Disarmament Centre into a department, to the preservation of the existing arrangements. Finland considers that the criteria for future organization must be purely pragmatic, i.e., an organizational framework that is best capable of fulfilling the needs that the United Nations should expect in the field of disarmament.

6. Whatever the organizational model adopted, the responsibilities of the United Nations and its Secretariat in the field of disarmament will continue to grow considerably in the near future. To meet those needs, increased resources will be necessary.

7. In general, Finland concurs with the recommendations contained in the report by the Group of Experts. Finland takes note that the Group particularly underlined the co-ordinating responsibility of the Secretary-General for the activities undertaken in the field of disarmament within the United Nations system, the need for co-ordination of studies produced by the United Nations and related bodies as well as factors to be considered when discussing proposals for disarmament studies.

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

[Original: English]

[26 April 1982]

1. The first special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament reviewed the activities of the United Nations Secretariat and of the deliberative bodies of the General Assembly concerning disarmament questions. The conclusions drawn from that review as well as measures relating to the Geneva Committee on Disarmament were laid down in section IV of the Final Document adopted by the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament. The Final Document in all its parts remains the yardstick and long-term orientation for United Nations activities in the field of arms limitation and disarmament. In accordance with the priorities set by the Final Document it is of utmost importance

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to take practical and urgent measures for reducing the danger of a nuclear catastrophe and for the cessation of the arms race, especially in the nuclear field, and to enter into constructive negotiations. With this objective in mind, the German Democratic Republic, together with the other socialist States, has launched numerous initiatives with regard to the most burning problems of arms limitation and disarmament, most recently at the thirty-sixth session of the General Assembly.

2. Practical experience made since the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament reaffirms the conclusion that genuine progress in the field of arms limitation, arms reduction and disarmament can only be achieved, when all States, and particularly all nuclear-weapon States and militarily significant States, exercise the political will required to take effective disarmament steps. This is why the reasons for stagnation and setbacks in the implementation of the Final Document, in the view of the German Democratic Republic, cannot be sought in organizational or structural deficiencies of the deliberative and negotiating bodies or of the relevant Secretariat units. They are rather to be ascribed to the blocking of constructive and effective disarmament negotiations and the pursuance of a course of unbridled all-out rearmament by NATO States, in particular the United States of America.

3. The United Nations plays a prominent role in the process of dialogue and negotiation on disarmament. Its effectiveness depends in the first place on the willingness of States to fulfil their obligation stipulated in numerous international agreements, i.e. to participate constructively in disarmament negotiations. The machinery for disarmament established by States serves the purpose of co-ordinating or supporting the activities aimed at bringing about a solution to disarmament questions and at channelling such activities towards fruitful negotiations. It should be shaped accordingly.

4. The German Democratic Republic does, by no means, underestimate the significance of a harmonization of the organizational structures with the practical requirements of deliberative and negotiating bodies. Deliberations on organizational matters should, however, not divert attention from negotiations on questions of substance. They cannot be a substitute for disarmament negotiations. Furthermore, the German Democratic Republic would come out strongly against measures causing further budget increases.

5. The German Democratic Republic holds the view that the institutional arrangements agreed upon in the Final Document have been translated into practice. It agrees with the conclusion contained in the study that the machinery has a more representative character and offers wider opportunities for deliberations and negotiations. The main effort should now be directed at increasing the efficiency of the machinery thus established and at making full use of its opportunities. The convening of a world disarmament conference as an international forum with the broadest possible participation of States would be of extraordinary importance for the adoption of effective measures towards halting and reversing the arms race.

6. As far as the First Committee of the General Assembly is concerned, the correctness of the provision contained in the Final Document has been proven that it should exclusively deal with questions of disarmament and related questions of international security. The fact that the Committee at the twenty-sixth session of the General Assembly adopted 14 resolutions and held 20 meetings on seven agenda items, while at the thirty-sixth session it adopted 52 resolutions and held 53 meetings on 22 items testifies, first of all, to the increased commitment of the overwhelming majority of States to the process of disarmament, to their growing concern about the dangers and consequences of superarmament in all its aspects. The resolutions adopted constitute, in their majority, a valuable basis for the deliberative and negotiating bodies. This applies especially to those containing substantial demands for the limitation of the arms race and for disarmament.

7. The Disarmament Commission fulfils an important task as a deliberative body. It has made a significant contribution towards elaborating the elements for the comprehensive disarmament programme and for resolution 35/46 proclaiming the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade, as well as towards discussing topical questions of the process of disarmament. In the view of the German Democratic Republic, the Commission should be made better use of in order to review the implementation of the programme for the Second Disarmament Decade and other concrete items.

8. The Committee on Disarmament, as the single multilateral negotiating body, plays a unique role in the implementation of the process of disarmament. The Committee should, therefore, be enabled, especially through the attitude of all nuclear-weapon States, to enter into constructive negotiations on all priority tasks on its agenda. This applies particularly to the negotiations on effective and comprehensive measures for the cessation of the nuclear arms race and for nuclear disarmament as well as for a comprehensive nuclear-weapon test-ban. The potential of the Committee on Disarmament and its working groups has by far not been exhausted. A suitable proportion should be maintained between the Committee's membership and its negotiating capability.

9. An important support function is being fulfilled by the Secretariat units, especially the Centre for Disarmament, which form the Department for Political and Security Council Affairs. As it is correctly stated in the study, the Centre has performed its functions to complete satisfaction. It is of special importance that the existing structure of the Department takes into account the close relationship between disarmament and international security. In this way, the practical connexion between these questions is ensured, the necessity of which has again been stressed by the General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session in resolution 36/102, supported also by the socialist States. A separation of the Centre for Disarmament from the Department would be in contrast to the organic relationship between disarmament and international security and have detrimental effects on the support of disarmament negotiations. It rather appears suitable to strengthen the Centre for Disarmament within the existing resources of the United Nations, as it has been recommended in the study. This would enable the Centre also in the future to discharge its valuable and proven support, research, information, co-ordination and training functions. The Centre's performance of these tasks could be reflected in changing the relevant Department's title to read as Department for Political, Disarmament and Security Council Affairs.

HUNGARY

[Original: English]

[21 April 1982]

1. In its reply submitted under resolution 36/81 A relating to the substantive aspects of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, the Hungarian Government expressed its expectations concerning the special session:

"The special session should focus attention on elaborating effective disarmament measures, on reaching an understanding to that effect.

...

"As far as questions of procedure and the disarmament machinery are concerned, the session should keep in view that the failure to make progress in the past period was due not to the shortcomings of the organs dealing with disarmament but to the lack of political will on the part of certain States. Consequently, change is necessary in respect of the political will of States, not of the institutional framework."

2. The study on the institutional arrangements relating to the process of disarmament is a concise and well-arranged document, clearly reflecting both the present organizational system of the United Nations with respect to disarmament and the different views expressed thereon.

3. As far as section III of the study containing the conclusions and proposals is concerned, the Hungarian Government wishes to state the following:

(a) Deliberation and negotiation

The Government agrees with the statement that the competent section of the United Nations Secretariat, the Centre for Disarmament has performed its functions to full satisfaction.

(b) Implementation and verification

The future role, if any, to be assigned to the United Nations Secretariat in this respect depends on the concrete disarmament agreements, including verification agreements.

(c) Studies

Representatives of the Hungarian Government have repeatedly expressed doubts about whether the study activities may contribute to the promotion of disarmament in general. The probable high costs of the study activity are an added factor. Therefore, the Hungarian Government still has reservations concerning the study activity, although it admits the possibility for some particular studies to be instrumental in starting the process of disarmament negotiations and thereby in

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achieving concrete disarmament results. This, however, cannot be decided in general but it is practicable to consider each case at the appropriate forum, e.g. the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly.

(d) Infrastructure

According to the Hungarian Government, there is no need for structural changes: the Centre for Disarmament fulfils its functions in the framework of the Department of Political and Security Council Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat in a highly satisfactory way.

4. This does not mean that the Centre for Disarmament cannot be strengthened, for example, with an appropriate number of additional staff, but such a step should be connected with increase in concrete tasks such as the establishment of new working groups in the Geneva Committee on Disarmament or the launching of the World Campaign for Disarmament. However, all these tasks can, and in fact, must be realized without structural change.

5. Maintaining the present structure is all the more important because any change in it would give the semblance of progress being achieved in the field of disarmament. This would create useless illusions in public opinion, which would cause definite political damage, coupled with financial loss: a structural change would involve increased administrative costs with no compensation by a widening of substantive disarmament activity.

INDONESIA

[Original: English]

[30 March 1982]

1. Indonesia has always believed and will continue to believe that tangible progress in disarmament negotiations would depend primarily on the political readiness of all States, the nuclear-weapon and other militarily significant States in particular, to negotiate and achieve concrete results.

2. Indonesia is open-minded to any suggestions on the possible restructuring or strengthening of the existing institutions dealing with disarmament matters or the establishment of new ones, as long as they would strengthen the central role and primary responsibility of the United Nations in the sphere of disarmament.

3. A distinction should be made between:

(a) Review of the implementation of recommendations and resolutions of the General Assembly relating to disarmament matters;

(b) Verification of implementation of specific measures that States parties to disarmament agreements have to carry out under the provisions of the agreements concerned;

(c) Examination of complaints on non-compliance of disarmament agreements.

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4. With regard to implementation of recommendations and resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly relating to disarmament measures, annual reviews should continue to be carried out by the First Committee of the General Assembly. However, in addition to its normal review functions referred to earlier, the First Committee should also be entrusted to carry out periodic reviews within the review machinery of the implementation of the comprehensive programme of disarmament to be adopted, hopefully, by the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. Indonesia shares the view that the matter should be carefully and thoroughly examined by the said special session considering the institutional implications for the United Nations system of such an agreement.
5. As to verification of implementation of specific measures that States should carry out under the provisions of disarmament agreements, this would naturally depend on the machinery set forth in the individual agreement concerned.
6. As regards examination of complaints or allegation on non-compliance of disarmament agreements, this would also depend on the individual agreement concerned. A number of disarmament agreements have indeed provided that such complaints be referred to the Security Council. What is essential in this matter is the workability of such machinery and the observance of the principle that States parties to the agreement concerned should be entitled to participate in the examination of such question and that all States parties should co-operate in the functioning of such a mechanism.
7. As regards information on disarmament, Indonesia agrees with the conclusion that a clearer co-ordination of functions between the Centre for Disarmament and the Department of Public Information is desirable. Such a co-ordination should be guided by the principles that these two offices should assist each other in providing all those concerned with detailed and up-to-date information on disarmament matters.
8. Indonesia is of the opinion that improvements in the conduct of studies by the United Nations and related bodies are not only possible but also desirable in order to avoid possible duplication. Such studies should contain objective analysis and reliable up-to-date data which should help facilitate the conclusion of disarmament agreements.
9. Indonesia agrees with the recommendation that training programmes and the United Nations programme of fellowships on disarmament should be continued and that priorities should be accorded to candidates from the developing countries.

JAPAN

[Original: English]

[20 April 1982]

1. The Government of Japan notes that the study of the institutional arrangements relating to the process of disarmament (A/36/392) was prepared by taking fully into account the views of Member States and the disarmament-related activities of the

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United Nations Secretariat, particularly the Centre for Disarmament, and the specialized activities within the United Nations system. Japan is therefore of the view that the study provides a useful basis for examining the functions and problems of institutions related to disarmament at the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

2. In presenting its views on this question to the Secretary-General in March 1980, Japan pointed out that it would be useful to adjust the functions and structure of the United Nations in order to facilitate the progress of disarmament deliberations and negotiations as well as to assure the effective implementation of various disarmament measures already adopted. It also stated that the present institutions and organs related to disarmament should be fully utilized and made more effective, and that placing additional burdens on the regular budget of the United Nations should be avoided.

3. In the light of the aforementioned, the Government of Japan supports the reaffirmation, as called for in paragraph 95 (a) of the Secretary-General's report, of the co-ordinating responsibility vested in the Secretary-General for the activities undertaken in the field of disarmament by the various organs within the United Nations system. Its aim in doing so is to improve the effectiveness of efforts in the disarmament field by ensuring better use of limited human and material resources while avoiding duplication and overlapping of activities.

4. It is noted that, as stated in the above-mentioned paragraph, the Assistant Secretary-General in charge of the Centre for Disarmament is the most appropriate person for implementing a central co-ordinating role in the sphere of disarmament.

5. Although no concrete recommendations have been submitted with regard to the role of the United Nations in the implementation and verification of international agreements related to disarmament, Japan supports the view, as mentioned in paragraph 49 of the report, that in the light of envisaged demands for future United Nations involvement in the verification field, the Centre for Disarmament should accumulate information and knowledge on the field.

6. Japan takes note of the efforts made by the Centre for Disarmament in the sphere of information dissemination as mentioned in paragraph 93 (c) of the report and, recognizing their potential usefulness, supports the application of data-processing techniques in that field.

7. Although the study has not taken up matters relating to the negotiating and deliberative bodies on disarmament, it is hoped that at the forthcoming second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament the institutional problems will be taken up with a view to promoting disarmament, while bearing in mind the central role to be played by the Centre for Disarmament among the various departments of the United Nations.

MEXICO

[Original: Spanish]

[5 April 1982]

1. In response to the General Assembly's invitation to Member States in its resolution 36/97 D of 9 December 1981, the Government of Mexico is pleased to summarize the main observations it considers relevant to the study prepared by the Secretary-General, with the assistance of qualified governmental experts (A/36/392).
2. As can be seen from the report, even though the experts failed to agree on some of the most important aspects considered, the study will undoubtedly constitute a very valuable element in helping to "assess current institutional requirements and future estimated needs in the United Nations management of disarmament affairs", to use the words of the first preambular paragraph of the above-mentioned General Assembly resolution.
3. Among those requirements and needs, the Government of Mexico gives first priority to what is described in the report as the "infrastructure" of the unit of the United Nations Secretariat in charge of disarmament affairs. The fact that the members of the Group of Experts failed to achieve unanimity on that issue is all the more regrettable when we consider the "increasing demands on United Nations management of disarmament affairs for purposes such as the promotion, substantive preparation, implementation and control of the process of disarmament", which are expressly referred to in resolution 34/87 E of 11 December 1979.
4. In view of that fact, the Government of Mexico considers it appropriate to reproduce below what it stated in the view transmitted to the Secretary-General in compliance with the request made in that resolution:

"Probably the main observation that can be put forward for the time being with regard to the best way of coping with these demands is a recommendation that the United Nations Secretariat should continue, as it has done up to now, to strengthen and expand the structure and functions of the section concerned with disarmament in a gradual manner; thus, the next step would be to change the existing 'United Nations Centre for Disarmament' into a 'Department for Disarmament Affairs', which would be headed by an Under-Secretary-General who would report directly to the Secretary-General and would be at the same level as the other departments, such as the Department of Political and Security Council Affairs and the Department of International Economic and Social Affairs. After a few years, in the light of the results achieved and of future requirements in the sphere of disarmament, the United Nations could consider whether it would be justified to establish a specialized agency devoted to disarmament, in accordance with proposals already submitted to the General Assembly."

5. The Government of Mexico wishes to take this opportunity to emphasize that it would be appropriate for the General Assembly, at its second special session devoted to disarmament, to take the necessary steps to give effect to the above suggestion.

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MOZAMBIQUE

[Original: English]

[5 April 1982]

1. The People's Republic of Mozambique, understanding the disarmament problem as an eminently political one and strictly linked to international security, believes that any attempt aimed at disassociating these two items has no real basis and would create obstacles to the disarmament process in favour of the enemies of peace.

2. This is not the unique negative consequence coming from the reshuffle of the Disarmament Centre of the United Nations. The creation within the Secretariat of the United Nations of a special department brings about additional expenditures to be defrayed by the States, when present expenditures inherent in the size of the Secretariat apparatus constitute an already enormous weight for many countries, specifically the developing ones.

3. On the other hand, the multiplication of the department causes serious difficulties to the developing countries which have scarcely enough cadres to respond for their domestic requirements.

4. Mozambique considers that it is not the organizational matters of the structures of the United Nations which blocks the achievement of a general and complete disarmament. We are convinced that it is the lack of political good will of some Members of the Organization which results in the stalemate in taking positive measures in order to end the arms race.

5. The existing Centre of the United Nations, within the framework of the Department of Political and Security Council Affairs of the Secretariat, is capable of undertaking the work done by the Centre since its creation. Because of these reasons, we think it is unnecessary and unwise to reshuffle the Centre, including the creation in the Secretariat of a special department for disarmament matters.

NORWAY

[Original: English]

[6 April 1982]

General considerations

1. Norway welcomes the Secretary-General's report on the institutional arrangements relating to the process of disarmament (A/36/392) and recognizes the great importance of these questions. While institutional arrangements and improvements can by themselves never provide any substitute for real progress in disarmament matters, nor structural changes decisively influence substantive results in this field, the need for a well-functioning machinery is clear, especially in view of the fact that substantive progress in the field of

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disarmament will always be difficult. It must, therefore, be made sure that at least the machinery is adequate and capable of meeting the needs as they arise.

2. For these reasons it is the view of the Norwegian Government that an institutional review process should also occupy an important place in the deliberations to take place during the second special session on disarmament.

#### General Assembly

3. The General Assembly through its First Committee remains the most important deliberative forum in the field of disarmament within the United Nations. This essential function should be maintained and, if possible, strengthened. The reorganization of the work of the First Committee following the decision taken by the first special session devoted to disarmament has been beneficial.

4. The Committee's work-load remains considerable, however, and ways should be considered to make it possible for the Committee to discharge its duties more effectively.

5. As the United Nations membership approaches universality it is understandable that the growth in membership should also be reflected in the fact that the Committee must deal with a broader variety of views and therefore a larger number of resolutions, reflecting the growing diversity. It is, nevertheless, of importance to the Committee that all Members display the necessary discipline when it comes to tabling resolutions. While no attempt should be made at restricting the right of all Members to present their views also in the form of resolutions, it is important that new initiatives not impinge on the Committee's capacity to deal with issues that have a direct and important bearing on efforts to halt and reverse the arms race in a more immediate way.

6. Hence, it might be desirable to study ways in which a better division of labour between the First Committee and the United Nations Disarmament Commission might be possible in order to allow for more thoroughgoing deliberations and improved capacity to deal with the growing number of resolutions.

#### Disarmament Commission

7. It may still be somewhat premature at this stage to draw definite conclusions about the role of the Disarmament Commission, including its relationship to the First Committee, on the one hand, and the Committee on Disarmament, on the other.

8. The Commission may be able to assume tasks that at present are not dealt with in depth by the First Committee due to constraints of time and heavy work-load, or take up issues that have not found a place on the agenda of the Committee on Disarmament. Hence, it seems that the preparatory function of the Commission should be strengthened.

9. The work of the Commission has been based on the principle of consensus. This is a valuable yardstick in the work of the Commission and should be maintained.

#### Centre for Disarmament

10. The Centre for Disarmament has played an important role in the past and performed services of great value to the disarmament deliberations within the United Nations system. The Centre has, over the last few years, been given added responsibilities which require a strengthening of its capacity. This situation has been created by the Member States themselves owing to added responsibilities and an increase in the number of requests to the Centre for assistance in a variety of disarmament matters. It is therefore the responsibility of Member States to enable the Centre adequately to perform these functions. Consequently, the Centre for Disarmament should be strengthened, especially through a substantial increase of personnel.

11. The study on institutional arrangements (A/36/392) refers to a number of views as to possible ways to strengthen the position of the Centre for Disarmament with the Secretariat, including the suggestion that the Centre should become a department for disarmament affairs directly responsible to the Secretary-General.

12. Norway holds the view that it is the prerogative of the Secretary-General to organize the work of the Secretariat without undue interference from Member States. As the functions discharged by the Centre increase, ways to reflect this development in the organization of the Centre and its place within the Secretariat should be considered. An institutional strengthening of the Centre's role would underline the importance which Member States attach to questions of disarmament within the United Nations system. In this perspective the suggestion that the Centre be transformed into a department for disarmament affairs might be considered.

#### United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research

13. Norway welcomed the decision to establish the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research. The establishment of the Institute represents a significant strengthening of the research activities of the United Nations in the field of disarmament. In addition, the Institute might have a role to play also in a broader context. There is a need for an institute which independently can undertake disarmament research on both a short-term and a long-term basis. For this reason, the Institute should become an autonomous United Nations institution.

#### Advisory Board

14. The role and functions of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Research and Information is in need of review. It might be a suitable body to serve as a consultative council of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research. This would give the Advisory Board a precise and added responsibility, and would be one way of implementing the recommendation in paragraph 93 (d) of the study on the institutional arrangements relating to the process of disarmament (A/36/392).

#### Committee on Disarmament

15. In resolution 36/97 adopted by the General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session, it was recommended that the first review of the membership of the

Committee on Disarmament should be completed, following appropriate consultation among Member States, during the next special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

16. In the view of the Norwegian Government it is vitally important that the Committee on Disarmament remain the single multilateral negotiating forum. Hence, nothing in the above-mentioned review ought to impair the negotiating character of this body. Nevertheless, Norway, for its part, would favour yet another limited expansion of the present membership of the Committee. Such a limited expansion would increase the representative nature of the Committee without hampering its negotiating character. A limited expansion of the membership would allow countries with special expertise and interest to contribute more actively to the work of the Committee than is the case today.

17. In connexion with such a limited expansion of the membership it might be desirable to study ways in which the work of the Committee might be restructured in order to increase its effectiveness further.

POLAND

[Original: English]

[30 April 1982]

1. In the light of the growing danger of nuclear catastrophe, efforts to curb the arms race - especially in the nuclear sphere - and promote measures of genuine disarmament have become fundamental and pressing in order to consolidate international security and ensure conditions of peaceful co-operation of nations. These efforts have traditionally figured - as they do at present among the top foreign policy priorities of Poland.

2. The Government of Poland is convinced that the political will of all States, principally the nuclear-weapon Powers and other States with substantial military and economic potential, to pursue efforts with a view to curbing the arms race and promoting genuine disarmament, in accordance with the principles of equality and equal security, is the primary condition of effectiveness of disarmament efforts. It has been therefore, with considerable satisfaction that we have taken note of the report's key conclusion that while institutional aspects of the task of disarmament constitute one of the factors of the role of the United Nations in that sphere, it is the political will of States which will determine how much progress is made in disarmament efforts. We interpret this general statement as a warning not to attach excessive significance to the formal side of disarmament, at the expense of its substance.

3. The Government of Poland fully shares the view expressed in the report of the Secretary-General that the United Nations Centre for Disarmament - an integral part of the Department of Political and Security Council Affairs and the principal Secretariat unit in the field of disarmament - is performing its functions to complete satisfaction, despite its increased responsibilities as from the first

special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. It is for this reason, therefore, that we regard as well founded the views of those experts who - as it follows from the study - have held that there is no objective need for major institutional changes in the anticipation of an increase of responsibilities that could follow as a result of a possible acceleration of the process of disarmament. Consequently, we consider that possible increased responsibilities of the United Nations Centre for Disarmament could be met through appropriate internal measures, including reassignment of staff from less burdened Secretariat units, without incurring increased budgetary spending. By diverting the attention of the international community from real difficulties encountered in the disarmament efforts, the reorganization of institutional structures in the sphere of disarmament would, to a degree, deceive public opinion.

4. In Poland's view, the undeniably complementary nature of disarmament and international security argues against separating the Centre for Disarmament from the Department for Political and Security Council Affairs. That complementary nature of disarmament and international security is confirmed not only by the specific role of the Security Council in the functioning of a number of multilateral arms limitation agreements but also by effective joint consideration of these problems in such disarmament deliberative and negotiating bodies as the First Committee of the General Assembly, the Disarmament Commission and the Geneva Disarmament Committee.

5. Proceeding from the unquestioned relationship of disarmament and international security, the Government of Poland supports with satisfaction the suggestions to change the name of the Department for Political and Security Council Affairs to a more precise name of the Department for Political, Disarmament and Security Council Affairs.

ROMANIA

[Original: French]

[12 April 1982]

1. In reply to the letter dated 19 January 1982 from the Secretary-General of the United Nations concerning the study by the Group of Governmental Experts to Study the Institutional Arrangements relating to the Process of Disarmament (A/36/392), the Government of the Socialist Republic of Romania wishes to make the following comments.

2. The conclusions and recommendations of the Group of Governmental Experts again revealed the intrinsic link between the political will of States to enter resolutely into genuine disarmament negotiations and the necessary institutional framework which States wish to use in order to achieve that objective. The institutional framework for the negotiation, conclusion and implementation of treaties in the field of disarmament and the other structures relating to information, management training, studies and research constitute an interlocking mechanism that is subject to change depending on the intensification or stagnation of disarmament negotiations.

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3. The Romanian Government attaches great importance to the decisions adopted, at the first special session devoted to disarmament, by the General Assembly, which reaffirmed the central role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament and established a broader and more democratic institutional framework for discussions and negotiations. The extent to which States have used that framework will, as the study also concluded, be the subject of a political review by the General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament.

4. In our opinion, the statement that the Centre for Disarmament of the United Nations Secretariat has satisfactorily met the growing needs of negotiating organs dealing with disarmament truly reflects the facts.

5. As to the contribution which the United Nations could make in the implementation and verification of international agreements, it should be noted that Romania has always taken the view that the Organization should have a larger and larger role both in negotiation and in the implementation and verification of agreements.

6. In view of the ever-increasing burden imposed on all peoples by military expenditure, it is more and more necessary for the general public to be better informed of the gravity of the arms race, the chances of eliminating that scourge and the progress of negotiations aimed at mobilizing the public for pro-disarmament activities. The Department of Public Information of the Secretariat, in close consultation with the Centre for Disarmament, has a major role in this area.

7. The studies prepared by groups of experts under the auspices of the United Nations have also been very instrumental in promoting awareness, among politicians and the general public, of the complex and important aspects of the arms race and disarmament. Given the actual requirements of negotiations and, in particular, the needs of the developing countries, which have limited opportunities for studying and researching the basic disarmament issues, United Nations activities in this area must be stepped up in the future. In this connexion, there is a key role to be played by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, which must become an integral part of the complex United Nations machinery - research, discussion and negotiation - in the field of disarmament.

8. Since the Group of Experts was unable to reach unanimous conclusions on most of the matters relating to the institutional arrangements required for the process of disarmament and since Member States, in their replies to the letter from the Secretary-General of the United Nations, have put forward a number of valuable ideas and suggestions, the review of all aspects of this question must continue at the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

9. In this connexion, the Government of the Socialist Republic of Romania wishes to reaffirm that the proposals and suggestions contained in its reply of 7 April 1980 addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations (A/36/392) were all still as current as before.

SENEGAL

[Original: French]

[4 March 1982]

1. As a member of the Group of Governmental Experts to Study the Institutional Arrangements relating to the Process of Disarmament, Senegal actively participated in the preparation of the study on institutional arrangements relating to the process of disarmament.
2. As for the recommendations formulated in the Group's report, Senegal believes that in the present state of affairs it should be sufficient to strengthen the United Nations Centre for Disarmament, or at most to raise it to the level of a department, since some practical thought is still required to determine the appropriate institutional framework for the establishment of a world disarmament agency.
3. The purpose would be to decide whether such an agency should be established by combining existing institutions (such as the International Atomic Energy Agency), or whether it should exist concurrently with them. In the meanwhile, Senegal could accept either of the above-mentioned options.

SWEDEN

[Original: English]

[20 April 1982]

1. In the history of disarmament negotiations, a number of proposals have been made for the creation of an international institution for disarmament. During the preparations for the first special session on disarmament several delegations commented on this matter.
2. The Swedish Foreign Minister, in a statement before the First Committee on 29 October 1979, suggested that the possibilities of establishing a United Nations disarmament organization be studied in a comprehensive manner. The General Assembly decided in the same year to carry out a study of the institutional arrangements relating to the process of disarmament.
3. The position of the Swedish Government on this matter was presented to the group of experts carrying out the study and was, to a certain degree, reflected in their report to the General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session (A/36/392). Sweden called for the establishment of a United Nations Disarmament Agency organized to meet the priorities and more ambitious goals that the United Nations should set for the 1980s and beyond. The Swedish position in no way implied a criticism of the present Centre for Disarmament.
4. The United Nations Disarmament Agency should have an independent position within the United Nations system, but would report directly to the General

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Assembly. It should facilitate co-ordination of disarmament activities within the United Nations system and assist Governments in the drafting of common programmes and in the achievement of agreed options in arms control and disarmament. Its function would include services for deliberation, negotiation, implementation, verification, information, research and study, disarmament and development - in co-operation with other competent offices of the Secretariat - and training. It would also ensure that the work programme which will be agreed by the second special session be matched by adequate Secretariat resources. In this context, the role and administrative-organizational framework of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research should also receive careful attention.

5. The United Nations expert study contains a number of useful comments on these matters but does not recommend specific action in the direction suggested by Sweden. It is, therefore, suggested that the second special session should devote further attention to the matter with a view to taking certain action to strengthen the United Nations disarmament machinery. It is recommended that the General Assembly should decide in principle to establish a United Nations Disarmament Agency, and that it should request the Security Council to work out a concrete proposal on the practical implementation, organization, staffing, etc. of such an agency, bearing in mind, inter alia, that the agency should have sufficient resources, that it should have an independent position within the United Nations system, that it should have a governing body elected by the General Assembly and adequate regular funding to be able to undertake the work requested by Member States, and that it should report directly to the General Assembly.

UKRAINIAN SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLIC

[Original: Russian]

[13 April 1982]

1. The Ukrainian SSR invariably and consistently advocates an end to the arms race, particularly in the nuclear sphere, a reduction in stocks of weapons of any kind, and a move towards real disarmament on a fair, reciprocal basis. The decisive factor for success in these crucial tasks is, of course, the political will of the States taking part in disarmament negotiations.
2. The real reason for the lack of progress on basic disarmament issues, therefore, is not the way in which the work of the relevant United Nations machinery is organized, but the reluctance of certain powerful, primarily nuclear, States to halt the arms race in their eagerness to amass weapons. The danger of such a policy is growing with the development of the notion that nuclear war and the first use of nuclear weapons are admissible.
3. In the view of the Ukrainian SSR, the United Nations Centre for Disarmament is fulfilling its functions quite satisfactorily. It is staffed with competent personnel, who provide qualified servicing for meetings of various bodies, and undertake expert work in connexion with the preparation of research on disarmament issues, as well as collecting and disseminating information on the subject.

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4. Accordingly, there is no need at the moment to restructure the machinery that has evolved in the United Nations to service disarmament negotiations. This is equally true as regards the question of reorganizing the Centre for Disarmament, including the proposal to create a separate department for disarmament affairs within the United Nations Secretariat.

5. The Centre for Disarmament is a subdivision of the Department of Political and Security Council Affairs. This arrangement is entirely legitimate, since it provides favourable conditions for taking into account and maintaining the close relationship between such important political issues as disarmament and international security. Any artificial division of the institutional support provided for such issues would, therefore, be unwarranted and at variance with the decisions taken by the General Assembly.

6. In this connexion, it is timely to recall the possibility of renaming the Department of Political and Security Council Affairs the Department of Political, Disarmament and Security Council Affairs. Such a change would be entirely in keeping with the functions and responsibilities currently assigned to that part of the Secretariat.

7. Attention could also be given to the possibility of strengthening the Centre with additional staff members as part of a more rational reallocation of staff among different parts of the Secretariat, which would not lead to a growth in financial outlays.

UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

[Original: Russian]

[18 March 1982]

1. The Soviet Union is firmly convinced that it is now more than ever necessary to take specific, really practical action with a view to curbing the arms race and making the transition to essential disarmament measures, especially in the nuclear field. For its part, the Soviet Union is prepared to come to an agreement about the limitation, reduction or prohibition of any kind of armaments on an equitable and reciprocal basis.

2. It is in this light that the Soviet Union assesses all questions relating to the organization of negotiations on disarmament questions. Pursuing this approach, it took part in the work of the Group of Governmental Experts to Study the Institutional Arrangements relating to the Process of Disarmament.

3. As the study carried out by the experts (A/36/392) convincingly showed, the Centre for Disarmament, a part of the Secretariat's Department of Political and Security Council Affairs, is capably servicing committees, conferences and the groups of experts engaged in the study of disarmament questions and also assembling and disseminating relevant information. The Centre is staffed with competent personnel who cope quite satisfactorily with the tasks entrusted to them. The

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records of the meetings of the Group of Experts and its report show that members of the Group made no critical comments about the work of the Centre.

4. If the present state of affairs with regard to the organizational servicing of disarmament negotiations is compared with that which existed in 1977, when the Centre for Disarmament was created by a decision of the General Assembly, it is impossible to avoid the conclusion that this subdivision of the United Nations Secretariat has proven sufficiently adapted to the changed situation and that there is no reason whatever to raise the question of a radical reconstruction of the Centre, including the creation within the Secretariat of a separate Department for Disarmament Questions. In our view, that is precisely why the experts making a special study of the question of institutional arrangements relating to disarmament did not arrive at any common conclusions on changing the present machinery for servicing disarmament negotiations.

5. The fact that the Centre for Disarmament now functions as a component part of the Department of Political and Security Council Affairs is an important advantage. This circumstance enables the United Nations Secretariat in practice to provide a link between disarmament and international security, the need for which has been repeatedly indicated by the General Assembly, notably in the resolutions adopted at its thirty-sixth session. Disarmament is one of the most reliable means of strengthening international security. For this reason, the occasionally proposed artificial separation between the Secretariat's function of servicing disarmament negotiations and its activities in support of the efforts of States to strengthen international security would only harm the interests of the cause.

6. Unjustified disruption of the machinery for servicing disarmament negotiations could also have other negative consequences. To a certain degree, it would divert attention from the urgent questions of disarmament towards the institution of useless organizational changes which could only mislead public opinion. For example, the implementation of such a proposal as the one that a separate Department for Disarmament should be created within the United Nations Secretariat could also lead to unnecessary financial expenditures, at a time when the apparatus of the Secretariat is already excessively inflated and the growing outlays on its maintenance are causing concern to many States.

7. Of course, the foregoing considerations in no way exclude the need to discover and utilize opportunities for further improving the activity of the Centre for Disarmament, strengthening it with some reasonable number of additional staff members by redistributing personnel among the various subdivisions of the Secretariat, and further improving the structure of the Centre.

8. As the Soviet Union has already observed, the Department of Political and Security Council Affairs, which includes the Centre for Disarmament, should be renamed in keeping with the functions it fulfils by calling it the Department of Political, Disarmament and Security Council Affairs. This would reflect more accurately the tasks with which it is entrusted at the present time.