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REVIEW OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS AND
DECISIONS ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AT ITS TENTH
SPECIAL SESSION

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION OF THE 1980s AS THE SECOND
DISARMAMENT DECADE AND CONSIDERATION OF INITIATIVES AND
PROPOSALS OF MEMBER STATES

Prevention of nuclear war

Report of the Secretary-General

CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
I. INTRODUCTION	2
II. REPLIES RECEIVED FROM GOVERNMENTS	2
BELGIUM	2
CHINA	3
CUBA	4
FINLAND	6
INDIA	9
MEXICO	10
SENEGAL	14

* A/36/49, para. 18.

I. INTRODUCTION

1. At its thirty-sixth session, the General Assembly adopted, under the item "Second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament", resolution 36/81 B of 9 December 1981 entitled "Prevention of nuclear war", the operative part of which reads as follows:

"The General Assembly,

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"1. Urges all nuclear-weapon States to submit to the Secretary-General by 30 April 1982, for consideration at the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, their views, proposals and practical suggestions for ensuring the prevention of nuclear war;

"2. Invites all other Member States that so desire to do likewise;

"3. Requests the Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament a report containing the views, proposals and practical suggestions referred to in paragraph 1 above, as well as those received from other Member States."

2. Pursuant to paragraph 3 of the resolution, the Secretary-General submits herewith the replies received from Member States concerning their views, proposals and practical suggestions for ensuring the prevention of nuclear war.

II. REPLIES RECEIVED FROM GOVERNMENTS

BELGIUM

[Original: French]

[19 April 1982]

1. Belgium believes that, in the search for appropriate means of avoiding a nuclear war, the main role must revert to the nuclear-weapon States, and it is for them to negotiate directly among themselves the limitation and progressive reduction of their nuclear systems in order to maintain an equal degree of security at a lower level of armament. It points out, in this connexion, that as long as an agreement has not been reached on the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, they constitute an essential factor in the search for balance and security.

2. It is no less evident that the non-nuclear-weapon States have a very great interest in seeing such negotiations initiated and followed through with a firm will to bring them to a successful conclusion. It is for that reason that Belgium has expressed on many occasions its unconditional support for the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks which it would like to see resumed as soon as possible. This has been its attitude also with respect to the negotiations which began in Geneva last November.

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3. The non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is also one of the main factors conducive to the prevention of a nuclear war. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is, in this respect, the corner-stone of the system of collective security. Belgium has acceded to it and earnestly hopes that all States will do the same so as to make that system world-wide in scope.

4. Belgium is also in favour of the complete cessation of nuclear-weapon tests and hopes that the negotiations on the conclusion of a convention which will put an end to those tests once and for all will be quickly initiated.

5. Finally, Belgium welcomes the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, wherever the necessary conditions exist, especially as it is convinced that it is for the States of the region concerned to take the action required. In that connexion, the 1967 Treaty of Tlatelolco, which establishes most of Latin America as a denuclearized zone, is an important step. Belgium hopes that that example will be followed in other regions of the world, especially in the Middle East.

CHINA

[Original: Chinese/English]

[28 April 1982]

1. The Chinese Government considers that the threat of nuclear war comes from the two super-Powers which are intensifying their nuclear arms race and stepping up their deployment and preparations for nuclear war. They possess the largest nuclear arsenals in the world and are the only countries having the strength to launch a nuclear war. Their increasingly fierce rivalry for world hegemony is the root cause of turbulence and tension in the world.

2. The Chinese Government consistently holds that only by the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons can mankind be really free from the threat of nuclear war. In order to reduce the threat of nuclear war when the two super-Powers still possess such huge amounts of nuclear armament and are continuing their arms race, it is imperative, first of all, to check the arms race of the super-Powers and demand immediate and drastic reduction of their nuclear arsenals. After the great disparity between the super-Powers and the other nuclear countries is narrowed, the other nuclear countries, including China, should join them in the reduction according to reasonable proportions.

3. Pending the realization of complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons, all nuclear countries must undertake unconditionally not to use or threaten to use such weapons against non-nuclear countries and nuclear-free zones.

4. As is known to all, the Chinese Government has long declared on its own initiative and unilaterally that at no time and under no circumstances will China be the first to use nuclear weapons, and that it undertakes unconditionally not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear countries and nuclear-free zones.

5. Once a conflict occurs between the two super-Powers which are capable of launching a world war, it might lead to a nuclear war or, more likely, a conventional war. Therefore, while carrying out nuclear disarmament, the two super-Powers should be urged also to take the lead in drastically cutting their enormous conventional armaments.

6. In the opinion of the Chinese Government, in order to maintain world peace and prevent war, it is essential to combine the struggle for disarmament with the struggle to oppose and stop the super-Powers using their tremendous military strength to threaten and carry out aggression and expansion against other nations, the struggle for the elimination of all forms of foreign military presence and for the withdrawal of foreign occupation troops and the struggle against imperialism, hegemony, colonialism and racism.

CUBA

[Original: Spanish]

[30 March 1982]

1. The Government of the Republic of Cuba reiterates its view that nuclear weapons and the stockpiling and constant quantitative and qualitative improvement of such weapons constitute the major threat now facing mankind.

2. Never before in the history of human civilization have there been such huge nuclear arsenals as are now threatening the survival of civilization itself; never before have the prospects for nuclear conflagration been as real and immediate as they are today.

3. The Government of the Republic of Cuba has always taken the view that the scientific and technological advances which man has been able to achieve must be made to serve noble causes and, specifically, must help to improve the human condition and to promote the full economic and social development of all peoples.

4. Accordingly, the Government of the Republic of Cuba advocates the total prohibition of nuclear weapons and their complete elimination from the face of the earth. It has therefore supported initiatives to that end in the United Nations, the non-aligned movement and other international institutions and organizations.

5. In that connexion, Cuba gave its support to the Final Document (resolution S-10/2) of the tenth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, in particular paragraphs 47 to 50 and 56 to 58, which deal with the prevention of nuclear war. In Cuba's opinion, those provisions retain their full validity.

6. The Government of the Republic of Cuba considers that the only way to ensure the prevention of nuclear war is through the manifestation of a genuine political will to ban nuclear weapons and take action to eliminate them completely, by immediately initiating serious and constructive discussions conducive to agreements to freeze, limit and subsequently reduce the level of existing arsenals, with the ultimate goal of eliminating all nuclear weapons.

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7. In practical terms, the following measures should be applied with immediate effect:

- (a) Renunciation by the nuclear Powers of the threat or use of nuclear weapons and provision of guarantees by those Powers to the non-nuclear States;
- (b) Freezing at current levels, the development and production of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery;
- (c) Placing under the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards system all the nuclear installations and materials of all countries;
- (d) Full participation by all the nuclear Powers in the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water;
- (e) Total prohibition of nuclear-weapon testing (including underground testing);
- (f) Ratification of the SALT II agreements by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America and continuation of the SALT process;
- (g) Commitment not to station nuclear weapons in outer space;
- (h) Conclusion of agreements to freeze, reduce, completely eliminate and destroy nuclear weapons throughout the world, particularly in Europe;
- (i) Initiation of discussions with a view to concluding international agreements to prohibit the development, production and storage of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery and to make the destruction of such weapons and means of delivery mandatory.

8. The Government of the Republic of Cuba believes that the implementation of the measures set forth above would be extremely helpful in preventing nuclear war.

9. Given the current international situation and in the light of the repeated appeals by the non-aligned, neutral and peace-loving countries, as well as the steady flow of substantive initiatives from the socialist countries, in particular, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, regarding the prevention of nuclear war and the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, it is now clearly up to the States members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and, in particular, the United States Government, to demonstrate the necessary political will and to take the necessary steps to implement measures to prevent an outbreak of nuclear war.

10. The prevention of a nuclear catastrophe and the improvement and strengthening of international peace and security depend wholly on the position taken by the States members of NATO and, in particular, by the United States Government, which appears committed to impeding any process likely to lead to peace.

FINLAND

[Original: English]

[21 April 1982]

1. Today, public opinion everywhere in the world is more acutely aware of the threat of nuclear war and its catastrophic consequences to humanity than ever before. This profound anxiety is felt by everyone, experts as well as laymen.

2. This is particularly true of Europe. In addition to thousands of nuclear warheads deployed in or targeted at the continent, Europe continues to be the region of the deadliest concentration of weapons, both nuclear and conventional, ever seen in history. Additional nuclear weapons systems are being deployed or have been scheduled to be deployed.

3. The reasons for the deepening anxiety are many. The nuclear arms race continues in both qualitative and quantitative terms. Constant technological refinement produces increasingly sophisticated nuclear weapons and weapons systems. Concomitantly, new strategic concepts and doctrines are evolved, which give rise to doubts about the proclaimed doctrine of using nuclear weapons for deterrence only. The real or perceived changes in the relative nuclear strengths of the major nuclear powers have led to suspicions that the nuclear balance is no longer stable.

4. At the same time, political confrontation between the major powers and the resultant increase in international tensions underline the threat of nuclear weapons. Almost all meaningful negotiations on limitations of nuclear weapons have come to a halt; prospects of real progress in the few remaining talks seem meagre. Finally, nuclear explosive capability is spreading to countries in regions where international peace and security are already in jeopardy.

5. It is natural, therefore, that effective measures of nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war should have been singled out as a most urgent task towards the ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament. That priority was reaffirmed by the General Assembly in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session, the first special session devoted to disarmament. According to resolution 36/81 B, the prevention of nuclear war and the reduction of the risks of nuclear war are matters of the highest priority, which should be considered by the second special session on disarmament. The Government of Finland fully concurs with that assessment.

6. The present situation is in bleak contrast with the 1960s and 1970s, when limited yet significant results were achieved in efforts to contain the nuclear arms race.

7. By the 1963 partial test ban treaty, nuclear test explosions in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water were prohibited. In 1967, the placing of nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction in outer space was banned by a treaty. The same year, the Treaty of Tlatelolco established the first nuclear-weapon-free zone in inhabited areas. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation

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of Nuclear Weapons of 1968 put effective curbs on the spread of nuclear weapons; it remains the most significant multilateral arms control agreement achieved. The emplacement of nuclear weapons on the sea-bed was prohibited in 1971.

8. Most important were the talks on strategic arms limitation, which led to the SALT I agreement and the concomitant treaty on anti-ballistic missile systems between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The SALT II Treaty was signed in 1979 but has not been ratified to date. In addition, the United States and the Soviet Union concluded in 1971 an agreement on measures to reduce the risk of outbreak of nuclear war between them and, in 1973, an agreement on the prevention of nuclear war. Similar bilateral agreements were concluded between France and the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Soviet Union.

9. Limited though these results were, they were part of a continuous effort to reduce the danger of nuclear war. In addition, their inherent political value was an important contribution towards the establishment of a more stable international order. Today, by contrast, even these limited results are put in jeopardy by the loss of momentum of negotiations and the accelerating arms race.

10. It is vital that efforts to eliminate the dangers posed by nuclear weapons and to halt and reverse the nuclear arms race be intensified. Further aspects of nuclear arms build-up should be brought within the scope of negotiations. A variety of approaches must be used. In the view of the Government of Finland, the following measures are particularly topical:

(a) While limited in scope and geographical application, nuclear disarmament measures in Europe are the most immediate concern. Concrete and comprehensive results in the Geneva talks on nuclear weapons are an urgent necessity for Europe. These negotiations should lead to diminishing the danger of nuclear confrontation in Europe and reducing the threat posed by nuclear arms deployed or scheduled to be deployed.

(b) Nuclear strategic balance is by definition a global concept. It cannot be divided into parts whether according to geographical location, type or destructive power. All real results therefore require a comprehensive approach, which can only be reached in talks on the limitation and reduction of nuclear weapons in general, in particular strategic weapons. It is obvious that the nuclear arsenals of all nuclear powers have an impact on the general nuclear strategic balance.

(c) It is imperative that the process which led to the SALT I and SALT II agreements be resumed as soon as possible. In the meantime, the restraints stipulated in the unratified SALT II agreement should continue to be observed. The treaty on the limitation of anti-ballistic missile systems concluded in the context of SALT I comes under review later this year. The continued maintenance of the agreed constraints on anti-ballistic missiles is of vital importance to nuclear stability.

(d) A comprehensive prohibition of nuclear testing has been sought since the agreement on a partial test ban in 1963. That measure is long overdue. It would

imply effective curbs on the qualitative development of nuclear weapons and would contribute to stopping the spread of nuclear weapons. The interrupted trilateral negotiations on a comprehensive test ban should therefore be resumed, in co-ordination with the work of the Committee on Disarmament.

(e) An agreed cessation of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes would be an important measure by putting additional restraints on further production of nuclear weapons.

(f) The prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other explosive nuclear devices is a central element in the efforts to contain the dangers of an outbreak of nuclear war. In this regard, the non-proliferation treaty remains the best instrument. As the acquisition of nuclear weapons by more States is against the security interest of all States, nuclear and non-nuclear alike, further efforts should be made to strengthen the non-proliferation régime in the interest of the international community as a whole. The international community should be prepared to take adequate collective measures in order to ward off the possibility of nuclear proliferation. Promotion of international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy requires a strict and effective non-proliferation régime. The safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency should be strengthened and increased resources be put at its disposal for this purpose.

(g) Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons should be undertaken. Such assurances should be as comprehensive as possible. The unilateral statements made by the five nuclear-weapon States contribute to the further consideration of the question, but they obviously fall short of the goal of effective international arrangements.

(h) A particular aspect of security assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons concern nuclear-weapon-free zones. A zonal approach provides the best basis for reciprocal commitments, including security assurances by nuclear-weapon States.

(i) Arrangements for the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones continue to be topical in various parts of the world. In addition to the existing nuclear-weapon-free zone of Latin America, proposals have been made, inter alia, for the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones in the Balkans, northern Europe, the Middle East and South Asia and for the denuclearization of Africa. The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones should be based on arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned. Recent developments are a reminder of the particular dangers inherent in the emergence of new nuclear-weapon States in regions of international tension and serve to underline the significance of nuclear-weapon-free zones.

11. While negotiations are under way on a number of aspects of nuclear weapons, it is reasonable to assume that these negotiations cannot be concluded in the immediate future. Furthermore, while these negotiations fundamentally deal with the same body of questions, in their particular aspects they are discussed

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separately and in different fora. While it is necessary to continue these efforts, it is suggested that the following additional and intermediate approaches serving the general aim of the prevention of nuclear war could be considered:

(a) International agreement on the prevention of nuclear war

A broad-based consideration of certain measures for the prevention of nuclear war, taking as a point of departure a multilateral approach as envisaged in paragraph 58 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly would be desirable. By the bilateral agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union on the prevention of nuclear war, the parties committed themselves to acting in such a manner as to avoid military confrontation and to exclude the outbreak of nuclear war between them or between either party and other countries. A multilateral approach to the question could draw on that bilateral agreement.

(b) Global measures by non-nuclear-weapon States

While the responsibility for nuclear weapons and nuclear disarmament obviously lies with nuclear-weapon States, the non-nuclear-weapon States have from time to time taken the initiative aimed at guarding against the threat of nuclear war. In the same manner, all non-nuclear-weapon States could together devise a global approach to the problem. An example of this is provided by the proposal made by Sweden and adopted by the General Assembly in 1961 (resolution 1664 (XVI)).

(c) Review of the comprehensive study on nuclear-weapon-free zones

The United Nations study in 1975 of the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones in all its aspects, contained in the special report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, 1/ has been of considerable value in furthering the zonal approach. However, circumstances and factors pertinent to the study have undergone changes, which would seem to make the review of the study appropriate.

INDIA

[Original: English]

[8 February 1982]

(See document A/AC.206/19, pp. 11-13)

1/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirtieth Session, Supplement No. 27 A (A/10027/Add.1).

MEXICO

[Original: Spanish]

[27 April 1982]

1. The first two preambular paragraphs of resolution 36/81 B which, moreover, merely repeat, almost verbatim, opinions expressed in the Final Document (resolution S-10/2), adopted by consensus by the General Assembly at its first special session devoted to disarmament in 1978, would seem to be in themselves sufficient to emphasize the extreme urgency of giving serious consideration to the adoption of effective measures for avoiding a nuclear holocaust.

2. In that document, the General Assembly expressed its alarm at the "threat to the very survival of mankind" posed by the existence of nuclear weapons and also stressed that "removing the threat of a world war - a nuclear war - is the most acute and urgent task of the present day" (section II, para. 18).

3. To these categorical pronouncements, other similar statements also appearing in this document could easily be added, of which it is sufficient to mention only the following four:

"The accumulation of weapons, particularly nuclear weapons, today constitutes much more a threat than a protection on the future of mankind" (section I, para. 1).

"Mankind today is confronted with an unprecedented threat of self-extinction arising from the massive and competitive accumulation of the most destructive weapons ever produced. Existing arsenals of nuclear weapons alone are more than sufficient to destroy all life on earth" (section II, para. 11).

"Enduring international peace and security cannot be built on the accumulation of weaponry by military alliances nor be sustained by a precarious balance of deterrents or doctrines of strategic superiority" (section II, para. 13).

"Mankind is confronted with a choice: we must halt the arms race and proceed to disarmament or face annihilation" (section II, para. 18).

4. Starting from this premise, the General Assembly, which also reiterated in its resolution 36/81 B two other points which were given a prominent place in the Final Document - "the vital interest" of all the peoples of the world in disarmament and "the special responsibility of nuclear-weapons States in the task of achieving the goals of nuclear disarmament - emphasized, as a follow-up to all the foregoing, that the "prevention of nuclear war and reduction of the risks of nuclear war are matters of the highest priority, which should be considered by the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament" (resolution 36/81 B, fifth preambular paragraph).

5. Since, as is to be hoped, no one can doubt the cogency of the above-mentioned pronouncements by the most representative organ of the international community, it

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will be readily understood that the General Assembly wished to ensure that, at its twelfth special session devoted to disarmament, scheduled to open on 7 June 1982, it had the benefit of the largest possible number of "views, proposals and practical suggestions for ensuring the prevention of nuclear war" submitted by Member States. It is also easy to understand that the request made for this purpose in the first two substantive paragraphs of the resolution was expressed much more categorically in the case of the nuclear-weapon States, for which it uses the term "urges", than for non-nuclear-weapon States, to which the Assembly issued a simple "invitation".

6. The requirement that the nuclear-weapon Powers should submit to the Assembly practical proposals and suggestions for the purpose defined in paragraph 8 of the Final Document as the "elimination of the danger of a nuclear war" will be easier to appreciate if it is borne in mind that the number of nuclear warheads existing at present is higher than 50,000, with an energy equivalent of some 16,000 million tons of dynamite. The aforesaid immense destructive power constituted by the nuclear arsenals would be sufficient, in terms of the effects of the bomb which devastated Hiroshima, to annihilate the entire population of the earth not only once but 50 times.

7. Although the arms race is not a new phenomenon, the present distressing situation of mankind is unique. Over a quarter of a century ago, in the historic document known as the "Russell-Einstein Manifesto" which was to serve as a starting point for the productive Pugwash conferences, it was emphasized that, if many hydrogen bombs were used, there would be death on a world-wide scale: sudden death for a minority and slow death for the majority subjected to the torture of sickness and gradual disintegration, and two years later, the eminent philosopher of history, Arnold Toynbee, declared:

"Mankind has not been in such a situation since the end of the Stone Age. That was when we succeeded in taming the lions, tigers and other similar wild beasts. From then on the survival of the human race seemed assured. But since 1945 our survival has again become uncertain because we have, so to speak, turned into our own lions and tigers. In fact, the threat to mankind's survival is much greater since 1945 than it was in the first million years of history."

8. Another extremely alarming factor must also be borne in mind: the steadily increasing role that technology has been assuming as regards nuclear weapons, the inevitable breakdowns of computers and the false alarms arising from such breakdowns. Suffice it to mention in this connexion, that in October 1980, a report of the Armed Services Committee of the United States Senate was published, constituting the most conclusive evidence of the extent to which man's mastery of nuclear weapons and the means of delivering those terrible instruments of mass destruction is relative and unpredictable. That report, together with the irrefutable authority of its source, revealed that in a period of 18 months the United States Defense Command had recorded 147 nuclear false alarms which were sufficiently serious to necessitate an evaluation as to whether or not they represented a potential attack, whereas four other alarms had been much more serious and had resulted in orders having to be given to the crews of B-52 bombers

and the units responsible for intercontinental ballistic missiles to be ready to go into action.

9. Referring to the three most serious of those alarms, an expert of recognized authority in military technology, Robert C. Aldridge, wrote as follows in an article published on 26 July 1980:

"Three times in the course of seven months, the United States strategic nuclear forces have been placed on alert owing to errors in the electronic equipment. On November 9th, 1979, the NORAD computer announced an attack with missiles launched from submarines. On June 3rd, 1980, it announced a mass attack, allegedly including missiles also launched from submarines. Three days later it reported that missiles from submarines which were lying in wait about a thousand miles from the coasts of the United States could reach targets in approximately ten minutes. The scare of November lasted six minutes and the alarms of June lasted three, which is a considerable part of the time available for taking decisions. It is terrifying to think of the consequences the alerts might have had if they had lasted only a few crucial minutes more."

10. If the foregoing is borne in mind, it will be very readily understood why measures such as the only ones which the nuclear-weapon Powers have so far managed to agree on, such as those pertaining to the establishment of lines of direct communication between the Heads of State of the nuclear-weapon super-Powers, however laudable, may be described as cosmetic measures in the context of the horrifying situation facing the world.

11. What all the peoples of the world whose vital interests are at stake have been hoping for over many years are effective measures for the definitive removal of the threat of a nuclear war. The Government of Mexico is convinced that the formula required is very simple: it would be sufficient to take seriously the provisions adopted by consensus in 1978 which were set forth in the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

12. If it were necessary to select from among these numerous provisions those most relevant to the topic under consideration, the following provisions in paragraphs 47 and 50 of the Final Document could be singled out without any hesitation:

"47. Nuclear weapons pose the greatest danger to mankind and to the survival of civilization. It is essential to halt and reverse the nuclear arms race in all its aspects in order to avert the danger of war involving nuclear weapons. The ultimate goal in this context is the complete elimination of nuclear weapons."

"50. The achievement of nuclear disarmament will require urgent negotiation of agreements at appropriate stages and with adequate measures of verification satisfactory to the States concerned for:

"(a) Cessation of the qualitative improvement and development of nuclear-weapon systems;

"(b) Cessation of the production of all types of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, and of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes;

"(c) A comprehensive, phased programme with agreed time-frames, whenever feasible, for progressive and balanced reduction of stockpiles of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, leading to their ultimate and complete elimination at the earliest possible time."

13. Obviously it has not been the lack of well-defined methods and procedures which up to the present has hampered the adoption of measures for preventing a nuclear war. The fact of the matter is that there has been a total absence of political will on the part of States on which the greatest responsibility lies for remedying the alarming situation facing the world.

14. The Government of Mexico is therefore firmly convinced that "the pressing need now is to translate into practical terms" the commitments already entered into and those that may be entered into at the forthcoming second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament "to proceed along the road of binding and effective international agreements in the field of disarmament", as stated in paragraph 17 of the Final Document, and to adopt, in the most binding terms possible, a "comprehensive programme of disarmament" which, starting with nuclear disarmament, also encompasses - as was, furthermore, expressly specified in paragraph 109 of the same document - "all measures thought to be advisable in order to ensure that the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control becomes a reality in a world in which international peace and security prevail and in which the new international economic is strengthened and consolidated."

15. It is to be hoped that the nuclear-weapon States and, very especially the two nuclear-weapon super-Powers, will reach the same conclusion and adjust their international conduct accordingly. We believe that this will not be difficult for them if they bear in mind that it is absurd to try to achieve national security by increasing universal insecurity, that the nuclear stockpiles accumulated are sufficient and more than sufficient to kill, not once but many times, the entire population of the world either instantaneously or through slow and agonizing disintegration, and that, as stated in one of the conclusions of the last report of the Secretary-General on nuclear weapons (A/35/392, annex, of 12 September 1980), it is inadmissible that the prospect of the annihilation of human civilization is used by some States to promote their security; the future of mankind is then made hostage to the perceived security of a few nuclear-weapon States and most notably that of the two super-Powers (A/35/392, annex, para. 497).

SENEGAL

[Original: French]

[4 March 1982]

1. For years the Government of Senegal has continually voiced its concern and anxiety regarding the growing threat to mankind posed by the frantic arms race.
 2. One example of this arms race is the growth of nuclear arsenals, which have increased to an unprecedented degree the risks of accidental self-destruction of mankind either through a failure in the armament systems or accidentally or simply inadvertently.
 3. In Senegal's view, the prevention of a nuclear war must inevitably involve the removal of the option of using nuclear weapons. Indeed, this is the subject of General Assembly resolution 36/92 I of 9 December 1981 on the non-use of nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear war, which Senegal supported without reservations.
 4. Senegal has been particularly outspoken in supporting the conclusion of an international convention, or some other form of agreement, on the non-use of nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear war, pending the actual achievement of nuclear disarmament.
 5. Until then, a first step might be to remove the danger of nuclear war occurring by accident or as a result of an interruption of communications between the nuclear Powers; this could be done by installing "hot lines", by regular consultations on security matters and by the exchange of certain kinds of information between those Powers.
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