



General Assembly

Distr.  
LIMITED

UN LIBRARY

A/S-12/AC.1/WG.I/L.4  
6 July 1982

JUL 8 1982

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

UN/SA COLLECTION

AD HOC COMMITTEE OF THE  
TWELFTH SPECIAL SESSION  
Working Group I

Text submitted by Drafting Group D

OTHER MEASURES

1. Confidence-building [and security] measures

(a) While strictly observing the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and fulfilling in good faith the obligations under existing agreements on disarmament, all States, especially the militarily significant States, shall undertake confidence-building [and security] measures such as the following and other measures yet to be agreed upon, as a contribution to preparing for further progress in disarmament:

- measures relating to the improvement of communications between Governments, particularly in areas of tension, by the establishment of "hot lines" on the basis of mutual agreement and other methods of reducing the risks of conflict with a view to prevent attacks which take place by accident, miscalculation or communications failure;
- other measures relating to the prevention of a possibility of surprise attack;
- assessment of the possible implications of military research and development [, as well as of the acquisition of new arms, [and of disarmament proposals] for existing agreements and further efforts in the field of disarmament;
- promotion of economic co-operation bilaterally, regionally as well as globally.

(b) States shall seek to reach agreement on [effective] confidence-building measures at a global and regional level, especially in regions of arms concentration and where international tensions and disputes exist, taking into account their security interests, as well as the specific needs and the situation of the region, such as the following:

- publication [and exchange] of information on military and security-related matters, including those related to the process of disarmament;
- [- regular bilateral and/or regional consultations of governmental representatives on such security-related matters;]
- provisions of scholarships in military schools for the military personnel of other States;
- exchange of military delegations and military attachés;
- [provision] of information on scope and extent of specific military activities like manoeuvres, specified movements according to pre-established procedures;
- [- notification well in advance of major military ground manoeuvres involving a substantial portion of the State's ground forces independently or combined with amphibious and airborne components. Each State would notify the United Nations Secretary-General of each reportable manoeuvre at the same time the neighbouring States are notified;]
- invitation to [appropriate foreign experts to observe notifiable] [military observers in connexion with] military manoeuvres;
- [- annual universal reporting to the Secretary-General of national military expenditures [according to the established United Nations reporting system;]]
- limitations [and exclusions] of certain military activities;
- [- renunciation of military manoeuvres and demonstrations, particularly those with the participation of several States, near the national borders of other States;]
- [- disengagement of armed forces deployed or stationed on international borders;]
- [- the development of [effective] confidence and security building measures on the basis of the relevant provisions of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, in particular by achievement of an agreement on the convening of a Conference on Confidence and Security building measures and Disarmament in Europe [as an integral part of the process initiated by the CSCE] [as a substantial and integral part of the multilateral process initiated by the CSCE.] [The measures to be negotiated within the scope of the Conference would be of military significance and politically binding, and would be provided with adequate forums of verification which correspond to their content;]
- [- the extension to the Mediterranean Sea area of confidence-building measures in the military sphere, agreed reduction of armed forces, the withdrawal of warships carrying nuclear weapons, the renunciation of the deployment of nuclear weapons on the territories of non-nuclear Mediterranean countries, the renunciation by nuclear-weapon States of the use of nuclear weapons against any Mediterranean country which does not permit the stationing of such weapons on its territory;]

[- application of confidence-building measures adopted by the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe to the Mediterranean Sea area, particularly the extension of those measures to major military-naval activities, in accordance with the provisions and goals set by the Final Act of the Conference and relevant recommendations in the context of the follow-up process of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe;]

[- efforts aimed at achieving agreed reduction of armed forces, the withdrawal of warships carrying nuclear weapons, the renunciation of the deployment of nuclear weapons on the territories of non-nuclear Mediterranean countries, the renunciation by nuclear-weapon States of the use of nuclear weapons against any Mediterranean country which does not permit the stationing of such weapons on its territory.]

[- development of confidence-building measures in the Far East and the holding of negotiations to that end among all interested countries;]

[c. Unilateral measures such as reduction of armaments, military forces or military expenditure, especially when they are followed by similar measures adopted by other States on the basis of mutual example, could contribute to strengthen the confidence among States. The exercise of self-restraint by all States, particularly by the most heavily armed States, in their military expenditure could also have a positive influence in strengthening the confidence among nations.]

In adopting such confidence-building measures, States will bear in mind comprehensive study on the subject prepared by the United Nations Group of Governmental Experts.

## 2. Measures aimed at achieving relaxation of international tension

In addition to measures aimed at the strengthening of international peace and security at lower levels of forces by the limitation and reduction of armed forces and armaments, the following measures, which would contribute to the relaxation of international tension, should be undertaken during the first stage:

(a) Withdrawal of all foreign [occupation] [aggression] forces from the territories of other States [and dismantling foreign military bases] in accordance with the relevant United Nations [Security Council] resolutions and the purposes and principles and provisions of the United Nations Charter [and the definition of aggression contained in resolution 3314 (XXIX)].

[ The urgent settlement of international disputes and conflicts by peaceful means in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter and through full implementation of the relevant United Nations resolutions.]

[ A Declaration of the United Nations General Assembly on the peaceful settlement of disputes between States should be adopted in order to strengthen the commitment of States to solve all their disputes by peaceful means. [Efforts should be made to encourage States to make full use of the United Nations machinery for peaceful settlements of international disputes between them and to further enhance the effectiveness of this machinery.]

[(b) International agreements for the dismantling of foreign military bases and the elimination of the military presence [and rivalry] [and confrontation] among foreign powers in various regions of the world, [as the situation in specific regions may allow] [including in particular the withdrawal of foreign occupation forces from the territories of other States] [including the sea areas in particular the Indian Ocean, the Atlantic Ocean, the Pacific Ocean, the Mediterranean Sea and the region of the Persian Gulf.]]

(c) [Mutually agreed limitation and reduction of naval activities by member States of military alliances, particularly in areas where military conflicts are most likely to arise; mutually agreed withdrawal of missile submarines from their present extensive patrol areas and restriction of missile submarine patrol areas. Extension of confidence-building measures to the seas and oceans, especially to areas with major shipping lanes.]

(d) [An undertaking not to enlarge existing or to establish new military alliances.]

(e) [The ending of the division of Europe into military-political alliances and, as a first step, the abolition of the military organizations of both groupings, starting with mutual reduction of military activities.]

(f) [Conclusion of a convention on mutual non-aggression and non-use of force between States of Asia and the Pacific Ocean.]

(f) [In order to ensure that war is no longer an instrument for settling international disputes and that the use and the threat of force are eliminated from international life, as provided for in the Charter of the United Nations, States are called upon to strictly abide by the Charter and to pursue efforts [to avert aggression and particularly bring about a complete withdrawal of all foreign occupation troops to facilitate the reaching of agreement on the prevention of the use and the threat of use of force] on a bilateral, regional and multilateral basis to reach agreements to that end.]

(g) [Adoption by the Security Council of a decision forbidding any co-operation in the nuclear field which would assist the apartheid régime to manufacture nuclear weapons.]

[(h) To reduce secrecy and ambiguity with respect to strategic nuclear forces; nuclear-weapon States should take steps to expand the exchange of strategic forces data and provide notification of strategic exercises and test missile launches.]

### 3. Preventing the use of force in international relations

(a) Strict adherence to and effective compliance with all the principles and purposes embodied in the United Nations Charter, [in particular Article 2, para. 4,] which imposes on member States the obligation to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State [or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.]

(b) In order to facilitate the full implementation of the above-mentioned provisions, States shall settle their disputes through peaceful means. In this context the following measures should be adopted:

- Full implementation of all procedures and mechanisms, referred to in Chapter VI of the United Nations Charter, for the peaceful settlement of disputes.
- Strengthening of the role of the United Nations in the maintenance of international peace and security, in particular by enhancing the effectiveness of the Security Council for prompt action according to Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations.
- Resort to regional arrangements or agencies, in conformity with Chapter VIII of the Charter, for dealing with matters relating to international peace and security.

[Conclusion of a world treaty on the non-use of force in international relations.]

[Conclusion among all States participants in the European Conference of a treaty, all parties to which would undertake not to be the first to use either nuclear or conventional weapons against one another.]

4. [Mobilization [Activation] of world public opinion in favour of disarmament]  
[Promotion of public awareness of disarmament]\*

[(a) In order to [mobilize] [activate] world public opinion in favour of disarmament, the specific measures set forth below, designed to increase the dissemination of information about the armaments race and the efforts to halt and reverse it, should be adopted in all regions of the world in a balanced, factual and objective manner.

(b) With a view to contributing to a greater understanding and awareness of the problems created by the armaments race and of the need for disarmament, Governments and governmental and non-governmental international organizations are urged to take steps to develop programmes of education for disarmament and peace studies at all levels.

(c) It is important to show the disastrous consequences for mankind to which war, in particular nuclear war, would lead. It is equally imperative to demonstrate the necessity of averting a nuclear [or conventional] catastrophe, [inter alia by the establishment of an authoritative international committee.] To that end, throughout the implementation of the Programme, governmental and non-governmental information organs of Member States and those of the United Nations and its specialized agencies as well as non-governmental organizations should, as appropriate, undertake further programmes of information relating to the danger of

---

\* This text has as yet not been negotiated.

the armaments race as well as to disarmament efforts and negotiations and their results, particularly by means of annual activities conducted in connexion with Disarmament Week. These actions should [constitute a programme to] further alert world opinion to the danger of war in general and nuclear war in particular]. [The holding of a world disarmament campaign, world-wide action for collecting signatures in support of measures to prevent nuclear war, to curb the arms race and for disarmament, and the implementation of the principles of the Declaration on the Preparation of Societies for Life in Peace would also be of great significance in this respect.] [All Governments should take steps to prohibit war propaganda in any form.]

As part of the process of facilitating the consideration of issues in the field of disarmament, studies on specific questions should be undertaken on the decision of the General Assembly, when necessary for preparing the ground for negotiations or reaching agreement. [Also, studies pursued under the auspices of the United Nations, in particular by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research established by Assembly resolution 34/83 M of 11 December 1979 within the framework of the United Nations Institute for Training and Research could bring a useful contribution to the knowledge and exploration of disarmament problems, especially in the long term.]]

#### DISARMAMENT AND DEVELOPMENT

(Text to come)

#### DISARMAMENT AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

1. Disarmament and international security are directly related to each other. Together they constitute the fundamental elements of the system for the maintenance of international peace and security contained in the Charter of the United Nations. All States are fully committed to the purposes of the United Nations Charter and to the observance of its principles as well as of other relevant and generally accepted principles of international law relating to the maintenance of international peace and security.

2. Enduring international peace and security cannot be built on the accumulation of weaponry by military alliances nor be sustained by a precarious balance of deterrence or doctrines of strategic superiority. Genuine and lasting peace can only be created through the effective implementation of the security system provided for in the Charter of the United Nations and the speedy and substantial reduction of arms and armed forces, by international agreement and mutual example, leading ultimately to general and complete disarmament under effective international control. At the same time, the causes of the arms race and the threats to peace must be reduced and to this end effective action should be taken to eliminate tensions and settle disputes by peaceful means.

3. Progress in disarmament should be accompanied by measures to strengthen institutions for maintaining peace and the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means. During and after the implementation of the programme of general and complete disarmament, there should be taken, in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, the necessary measures to maintain international peace and security, including the obligation of States to place at the disposal of the United Nations agreed manpower necessary for an international peace force to be equipped with agreed types of armaments. Arrangements for the use of this force should ensure that the United Nations can effectively deter or suppress any threat or use of arms in violation of the purposes and principles of the United Nations.

4. In view of the interrelationship between disarmament and international security, the adoption of disarmament measures should take place in such an equitable and balanced manner as to ensure the right of each State to security and to ensure that no individual State or group of States may obtain advantages over others at any stage. At each stage, the objective should be undiminished security at the lowest possible level of armaments and armed forces. [In the negotiations [between States with equal levels of armaments and armed forces] the principle of equality and equal security must be strictly observed.]

5. Progress in disarmament has a beneficial effect on the strengthening of international security and would also help to enhance the security of States; at the same time, the effective implementation of the security system provided for in the Charter of the United Nations, including the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means, would facilitate the adoption of measures of disarmament. Failure in one sphere has negative effects on the other. Progress in disarmament and in the strengthening of international security should thus be pursued on a parallel course.

In the elaboration of measures in this field, the conclusion of the United Nations study on the relationship between disarmament and international security should be borne in mind.

- In particular, in the pursuit of security, States should take urgent measures to halt the arms race, particularly in the nuclear field, and to avert any kind of military conflict, in particular a nuclear war. With the same intention, the issue of conventional disarmament should be resolutely pursued within the framework of progress towards general and complete disarmament.

At the same time it is imperative to pursue in parallel the following measures:

- States shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.
- States should urgently settle their disputes through the strict implementation of the Charter of the United Nations and in accordance with the generally accepted principles of international law and in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered.

- In order to improve the capability of the United Nations to maintain international peace and security, all States should support the strengthening of the role of the United Nations, in particular by enhancing its effectiveness in accordance with Chapters VI and VII of the Charter of the United Nations, [particularly art. 43] in the following areas:
  - action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression;
  - pacific settlement of disputes as well as in international co-operation in the widest possible range of spheres.

#### VI. Machinery and procedues\*

[1. In conformity with its central role in the field of disarmament, the United Nations should assume the primary responsibility in the implementation of the Comprehensive Programme on Disarmament including [its review and subsequent modifications and adjustments as necessary] [through negotiations relating to specific measures included in the comprehensive programme as well as the review of the implementation of the programme and subsequent modifications and adjustments as necessary.]]

[1. In conformity with a central role and primary responsibility of the United Nations in the sphere of disarmament, the United Nations should play a more active role in this field and make every effort to facilitate the implementation of the disarmament measures included in the CPD, its review and subsequent modifications and adjustments as necessary.]

2. Negotiations on the various disarmament measures that are susceptible to multilateral negotiations and specified in the comprehensive programme should, as a rule, be conducted within the Committee on Disarmament, the single multilateral negotiating body in the field of disarmament. Immediately after the adoption of the programme, the Committee on Disarmament is called upon to initiate [as appropriate] negotiations on such measures pertaining to the first stage of the programme.

3. Bilateral and regional disarmament negotiations may also play an important role and could facilitate negotiations of multilateral agreements in the field of disarmament. [The States involved in such negotiations should undertake to provide at regular intervals full information on the status and details of such negotiations to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and to the Committee on Disarmament.] [Wherever feasible and appropriate, the United Nations should be invited as an observer to such negotiations and could be requested to assist these negotiations by providing objective information and advice and such other support as may be required.]

---

\* This text is tentative.

4. As a general rule, the Secretary-General of the United Nations could be designated as the depositary of international agreements negotiated within the framework of the Comprehensive Programme.

[5. In order to assure continued progress towards the full realization of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, a special session of the General Assembly shall be convened at the end of each stage of the Programme to review its implementation. The first special session devoted to the review of the Programme's implementation shall be held in ..... Such special sessions of the General Assembly shall assess the implementation of the measures included in the stage under review. Should the assessment reveal that the full implementation of those measures has not been achieved, consideration would be given to the re-adjustments that need to be made and to the steps that are necessary to stimulate progress in the implementation of the Programme. In addition, the review shall also serve the purpose of elaborating in more concrete terms, the measures to be implemented in Stages [II, III and IV] of the Programme, taking into account the existing situation, including developments in science and technology.]

6. In addition to the periodic reviews to be carried out [at the end of each stage] of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, there should be an annual review of the implementation of the Programme. Therefore, an item entitled "Review of the implementation of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament" should be annually included on the agenda of the regular session of the General Assembly. To facilitate the work of the Assembly in this regard, the Secretary-General should annually submit a report to the General Assembly on progress in the implementation of the Programme.

7. During its annual review, or [at its periodic special session] to review the implementation of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, the General Assembly may, as appropriate, provide for further measures and procedures to enhance the implementation of the Programme.

8. The Disarmament Commission should play an active role in preparing the ground for subsequent negotiations on concrete agreements [including through the in-depth consideration of various expert studies in the field of disarmament prepared under the aegis of the United Nations.] It could also assist the General Assembly in the review and appraisal of the implementation of the comprehensive programme, particularly in the interval between review conferences [including by further elaborating as appropriate the disarmament measures belonging to the later stages of the Programme.]

9. As part of the process of facilitating the consideration of issues in the field of disarmament, studies on specific questions should be undertaken [either through ad hoc groups of experts or relevant institutions of the United Nations family, including as appropriate, UNIDIR] on the decision of the General Assembly, when necessary for preparing the ground for negotiations or reaching agreement. Whenever feasible, studies should contain concrete proposals and suggestions for negotiations or other steps to be taken.

[9. In the implementation of the Comprehensive Programme on Disarmament, the United Nations should make use of the necessary technical expertise of scientists. As they may deem it appropriate, the United Nations could request scientists to provide it with information on technical questions.]

[10. Disarmament and arms limitation agreements should provide for adequate measures of verification satisfactory to all parties concerned in order to create the necessary confidence and ensure that they are being observed by all parties. The form and modalities of the verification to be provided for in any specific agreement depend upon and should be determined by the purposes, scope and nature of the agreement. Agreements should provide for the participation of parties directly or through the United Nations system in the verification process. Where appropriate, a combination of several methods of verification as well as other compliance procedures should be employed.]

[11. Wherever feasible, the United Nations should be entrusted with the primary responsibility of monitoring the implementation of and compliance with disarmament agreements reached within the framework of the Comprehensive Programme. In this context, the United Nations should gradually develop the necessary organizational capacity and expertise required for a co-ordinated and effective and equitable international verification system designed to monitor and ensure compliance with various international, regional and bilateral disarmament agreements. As a first step, necessary arrangements should be made within the United Nations so as to enable it to co-ordinate information and data concerning verification of various disarmament agreements and to discharge such responsibilities as may be entrusted to it in the field of verification [under agreements reached on the disarmament measures included in the Comprehensive Programme.]

11. [The United Nations machinery for disarmament should be appropriately strengthened in order to enable the United Nations to carry out its role in contributing to and carrying out a review of the implementation of the CPD. In particular, the Centre for Disarmament should be provided with the resources and personnel necessary to strengthen its functions relating to (i) support and assistance to multilateral negotiations, (ii) dissemination and co-ordination of information relating to disarmament matters and (iii) research studies with respect to specific areas of disarmament.]

[12. An independent unit should be established within the United Nations Secretariat in order, inter alia, to assist in the negotiation of the disarmament measures included in the Comprehensive Programme, monitoring progress in such negotiations, co-ordinating verification and compliance procedures provided for in disarmament agreements, and providing such other support, advice or information as may be required by States or intergovernmental organs. This unit should be provided with adequate staff and resources and should be headed by an official at the appropriately senior level.]

12. [With regard to specific measures of disarmament, parties engaged in negotiations on such measures should, as appropriate, in accordance with the central role and primary responsibility of the United Nations in the field of disarmament, provide for the fullest possible utilization of United Nations

machinery and procedures in ensuring compliance with specific agreements. Necessary arrangements should be made within the United Nations to enable it to discharge such responsibilities as may be entrusted to it in the field of verification under agreements reached on the disarmament measures included in the CPD.]

[13. An international disarmament organization under United Nations auspices should be established, charged, inter alia, with the following tasks with respect to existing and future arms control and disarmament agreements:

- implementation
- verification, including fact finding
- organization of review and amendment conferences
- provision of information]

[13. The General Assembly decides in particular to establish a United Nations Disarmament Agency. The Secretary-General shall submit a concrete proposal to the thirty-eighth session regarding the practical implementation, organization and staffing of such an agency, bearing in mind, inter alia, that the agency should have sufficient resources, that it should have an independent position within the United Nations system, that it should have a governing body elected by the General Assembly and adequate regular funding to be able to undertake the work requested by Member States, and that it should report directly to the Assembly.

As a first step towards an independent disarmament agency within the United Nations framework the Centre for Disarmament shall be transformed into a Department for Disarmament Affairs within the United Nations Secretariat.]

#### [VII. VERIFICATION]

1. Disarmament and arms limitation agreements should provide for adequate measures of verification satisfactory to all parties concerned in order to create the necessary confidence and ensure that they are being observed by all parties. Verification measures should be designed to not only ensure that specific agreements are being complied with, but also to contribute to confidence among States. [Disarmament measures concern the vital security interests of the States involved, and the implementation of these measures must provide for the maintenance of undiminished security of States during the disarmament process.] For this to happen, States must be assured that obligations contained in disarmament agreements are being fulfilled. [Effective verification must, therefore, in practice be reflected by the inclusion of necessary and appropriate verification measures and arrangements in specific disarmament and arms limitation agreements.]

2. In the context of international disarmament negotiations, the problem of verification should be further examined and adequate methods and procedures in this field be considered. Adequate and effective verification and means to ensure compliance with disarmament agreements are significant factors in making progress

towards general and complete disarmament under effective international control [and a key factor to ensure undiminished security to the Parties involved. The importance of adequate and effective verification in the process of general and complete disarmament is twofold: as one of the essential principles upon which progress towards disarmament is based; and as an indispensable part of specific agreements to be negotiated in the implementation of the comprehensive programme of disarmament.]

[3. In order to facilitate the conclusion and effective implementation of disarmament agreements and to create confidence, States should accept appropriate provisions for verification in such agreements. States should take a positive approach to the development of the necessary and appropriate measures of verification for each particular agreement and show a willingness to accept such measures. [without exaggerating difficulties involved in their implementation.]

[A most important [pre-condition] [element] for the application of specific agreed measures in the field of arms limitation and disarmament is the political will of Governments: references to technical difficulties of monitoring should not be used as a pretext for refusing to reach agreement [on verification measures] [on such measures and] on measures for halting the arms race.]]

4. The form and modalities of the verification to be provided for in any specific agreement depend upon and should be determined by the purposes, scope and nature of the agreement. In the negotiation of specific agreements, where the scope of the agreement and verification measures have reciprocal influence, questions of scope and verification should be taken up and negotiated concurrently. [Questions relating to verification should be considered and decided upon simultaneously and in a manner organically linked with the consideration of specific disarmament problems rather than separately from them.]

Where appropriate, a combination of several methods of verification as well as other compliance procedures [should] [may] be employed. Every effort should be made to develop appropriate methods and procedures of verification that are non-discriminatory in nature and which do not [unduly] interfere with the internal affairs of other States or jeopardize their economic and social development. Such methods and procedures [may] [should] encompass, as appropriate, both national and international means and include provisions as necessary [and appropriate] for on-site inspection. Consideration should also be given to experience gained to date in the development and implementation of agreements in the field of arms limitation and disarmament. [National technical means constitute the most reliable form of verification of compliance with agreements concluded thus far. However, different methods of verification can be envisaged for carrying out, on voluntary basis, depending on the purposes, scope and nature of specific agreements.]

[5. In the implementation of the comprehensive programme on disarmament, multilateral disarmament negotiations will play an important role and experience has increasingly demonstrated the need for closer attention to the development by parties to multilateral agreements of appropriate, equitable, and non-discriminatory machinery and procedures to ensure verification of and compliance with multilateral agreements. Since many States may not possess a

national capability to effectively make national evaluations of compliance with agreements to which they may be a party, such agreements should provide for the participation of parties directly or through the United Nations system in the verification process. The United Nations should therefore play an appropriate role in monitoring and implementation of and compliance with multilateral agreements reached within the comprehensive programme. In this context the United Nations should gradually develop the necessary organizational capacity and expertise in the light of the increased responsibilities that may devolve upon it as a result of the conclusion of multilateral disarmament agreements. [In particular negotiations should be pursued with a view to the conclusion of an agreement for the creation of an international satellite monitoring agency.] [Also, the establishment of an international disarmament organization under United Nations auspices would be of great significance in this respect.] Necessary arrangements should be made within the United Nations so as to enable it to co-ordinate information and data regarding various disarmament agreements.]

-----