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Working Group II

Review of the implementation of the recommendations and
decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth
special session

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the first special session devoted to disarmament, held in 1978, was an event of historic significance. The Special Session was convened in response to a growing concern among the peoples of the world that the arms race, especially the nuclear arms race, represented ever-increasing threats to human well-being and even to the survival of mankind. At the session the international community of nations achieved, for the first time in the history of disarmament negotiations, a consensus on an international disarmament strategy the immediate goal of which is elimination of the danger of nuclear war and implementation of measures to halt and reverse the arms race. The final objective of the strategy is to achieve general and complete disarmament under effective international control. The conviction that all peoples had a legitimate right to expect early and significant progress in disarmament and a vital interest in its success led to the United Nations being given a central role and primary responsibility in the field of disarmament.

2. The historic consensus embodied in the Final Document of the first special session devoted to disarmament (General Assembly resolution S-10/2), was rooted in a common awareness that the accumulation of weapons, particularly nuclear weapons, constitutes much more of a threat to, than a protection of mankind. It was also based on recognition that the time had come to put an end to this situation, to abandon the use of force in international relations and to seek security in disarmament, that is to say, through a gradual but effective process beginning with a reduction in the present level of armaments. The Final Document recognized that in the contemporary world the security of States could greatly be enhanced by effective action aimed at preventing nuclear war, ending the arms race, and achieving real disarmament. Progress in disarmament would significantly contribute

to pursuing the goals of economic and social development, particularly of developing countries. The consensus embodied in the Final Document sought to place disarmament negotiations in a unified perspective and became a most significant and integral part of the context within which negotiations on disarmament have been pursued.

3. Developments since 1978 have not lived up to the hopes engendered by the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. Efforts have been made by the international community to implement the decisions and recommendations of that session on a multilateral, bilateral and regional level, including action in the United Nations General Assembly and the Committee on Disarmament, and steps have been taken on some specific measures contained in the final document. Nevertheless, the objectives, priorities and principles there laid down have not been generally observed. The Programme of Action contained in the final document remains largely unimplemented. A number of important negotiations either have not begun or have been suspended, efforts in the Committee on Disarmament and other fora have produced little tangible result and, while there has been some progress, there have been insufficient achievements on many priority items of disarmament and no achievements in nuclear disarmament. On the contrary, the arms race, in particular the nuclear arms race, has assumed more dangerous proportions and global military expenditures have more than doubled. In short, since the adoption of the Final Document, there has been no significant progress in the field of arms limitation and disarmament and the seriousness of the situation has increased.

4. The final document stressed the direct relationship between disarmament, relaxation of international tension, respect for the right to self-determination and national independence, the peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, and the strengthening of international peace and security. The past four years have witnessed increasing recourse to the use or threat of use of force against the sovereignty and territorial integrity of States, military intervention, occupation, annexation and interference, and denial of the inalienable right to self-determination and independence of peoples under colonial or foreign domination. The consequent tensions and confrontations have set back the cause of disarmament. At the same time the atmosphere of tension and confrontation has been compounded by the failure to make significant progress towards disarmament, the continued elaboration of nuclear military doctrines and the accumulation of weapons of all kinds.

5. The Final Document drew attention to the fact that, in a world of finite resources, there is a close relationship between expenditures on armaments and economic and social development. The vast increase in military budgets since 1978 and the development and deployment of new weapon systems represent a huge and growing diversion, indeed a colossal waste of human and material resources.

6. The trends evident over the past four years constitute major impediments to progress in disarmament and undermine international peace and security. The Final Document pointed out that enduring peace and security cannot be built on the accumulation of weaponry by military alliances nor be sustained by a precarious balance of deterrence or doctrines of strategic superiority. Genuine and lasting

peace can only be created through the effective implementation of the security system provided in the Charter of the United Nations and the speedy and substantial reduction of arms and armed forces, by international agreement and mutual example, leading ultimately to general and complete disarmament under effective international control. The Final Document noted, moreover, that since the process of disarmament affects the vital security interests of all States, they must all be actively concerned with and contribute to the measures of disarmament and arms limitation, which have an essential part to play in maintaining and strengthening international security.

7. In conducting the review of the extent to which effect has been given to the decisions and recommendations adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth special session, the Members of the United Nations reaffirm their support for the Final Document and the path it charted. In so doing, all member States show their determination to restore confidence in the process and machinery introduced since 1978; to bring a fresh spirit to the conduct of negotiations; and to embark anew on the constructive pursuit of international peace and security through disarmament.

II. REVIEW AND ASSESSMENT

8. In the section entitled "Programme of Action" in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly (see General Assembly resolution S-10/2, sect. III), specific measures of disarmament which were to be implemented at the earliest possible date were enumerated. Among these measures, as stated in paragraph 45 of the Final Document, priorities in disarmament negotiations should be: nuclear weapons; other weapons of mass destruction, including chemical weapons; convention weapons, including any which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects; and reduction of armed forces. Moreover, it was pointed out that nothing should preclude States from conducting negotiations on all priority items concurrently.

9. Subsequently, in the Declaration of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade (General Assembly resolution 35/46) the Committee on Disarmament was charged with the responsibility of submitting agreed texts, where possible, before the second special session devoted to disarmament on:

- (a) a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty;
- (b) a treaty on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and their destruction;
- (c) a treaty on the prohibition of the development, production and use of radiological weapons;
- (d) effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, taking into account all proposals and suggestions that have been made in this regard.

Prevention of nuclear war and nuclear disarmament

10. The Final Document stated that among genuine measures of disarmament, which took into account the need of States to protect their security, effective measures of nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war had the highest priority; to this end it was imperative to remove the threat of nuclear weapons, to halt and reverse the nuclear arms race until the total elimination of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems had been achieved, and to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. It also stated that at the same time, other measures designed to prevent the outbreak of nuclear war and to lessen the danger of the threat or use of nuclear weapons should be taken.

11. The Final Document pointed out that in the task of achieving the goals of nuclear disarmament, all the nuclear-weapon States, in particular those among them which possess the most important nuclear arsenals, bear a special responsibility and that the progress of nuclear disarmament should be carried out in such a way, and required measures to ensure, that the security of all States is guaranteed at progressively lower levels of nuclear armaments.

12. It was agreed in the Final Document that the achievement of nuclear disarmament would require urgent negotiation of agreements at appropriate stages and with adequate measures of verification satisfactory to the States concerned for: cessation of the qualitative improvement and development of nuclear-weapon systems; cessation of the production of all types of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, and of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes; and a comprehensive, phased programme with agreed time-frames, whenever feasible, for progressive and balanced reduction of stockpiles of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, leading to their ultimate and complete elimination at the earliest possible time. The Final Document also recognized the importance of the cessation of nuclear-weapon testing by all States within the framework of an effective nuclear disarmament process and stated that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America should conclude the agreement known as SALT II at the earliest possible date; this agreement should be followed by further strategic arms limitations negotiations between the two parties, leading to agreed significant reductions of, and qualitative limitations on, strategic arms.

13. Since 1978, there has been a substantial increase of nuclear weapons among nuclear-weapon States, particularly the two major nuclear-weapon States. In parallel with the further refinement and the qualitative development of nuclear weapons and nuclear-weapon systems, the concept of limited nuclear war has been developed along with the doctrine of nuclear deterrence. As a consequence, the use of nuclear weapons has been conceivable and the danger of the outbreak of nuclear war has become immediate.

14. It was pointed out in the Final Document that the most effective guarantee against the danger of nuclear war and the use of nuclear weapons is nuclear disarmament and the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. The Final Document also stated that the nuclear-weapon States have special responsibilities to undertake measures aimed at preventing the outbreak of nuclear war, and of the use of force in international relations, subject to the provisions of the Charter of

the United Nations, including the use of nuclear weapons. In this context all States, in particular nuclear-weapon States, should consider as soon as possible various proposals designed to secure the avoidance of the use of nuclear weapons, the prevention of nuclear war and related objectives, where possible through international agreement, and thereby ensure that the survival of mankind is not endangered. In this connexion, it should be pointed out that the General Assembly has adopted various resolutions on the subject, in particular resolutions:

(a) 36/81 B entitled "Prevention of nuclear war"; (b) 36/92 I entitled "Non-use of nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear war"; and (c) 36/100 entitled "Declaration on the Prevention of Nuclear Catastrophe". In addition, the General Assembly took note of the declarations made by two nuclear-weapon States not to be the first to use nuclear weapons.

15. So far, the existing measures for the prevention of the outbreak of nuclear war are limited agreements among some of the nuclear-weapon States to reduce the risk of a nuclear war which may take place by accident, miscalculation or failure of communication. However, several instances in the recent past involving the failure of the control and safeguard systems for nuclear weapons demonstrate the need for further urgent action in this area. As the technical and technological complexity of weapon systems increases, the risk of technical failure or human error would increase. In this regard, specific measures should be urgently considered.

16. As pointed out in the Final Document, the cessation of nuclear weapon testing by all States within the framework of an effective nuclear disarmament process would be in the interest of mankind. It would make a significant contribution to the aim of ending the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and the development of new types of such weapons and of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. However, the testing of nuclear weapons has continued unabated since 1978. Since the conclusion of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament more than 200 nuclear-weapon tests have been conducted even while restricted negotiations among the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and the United States were under way. These negotiations were suspended in September 1980 without having been successfully concluded.

17. At its very first session in 1979, the Committee on Disarmament adopted as the first item on its agenda the question of a nuclear test ban. Subsequently, at its 1980 and 1981 sessions, the Committee failed to reach consensus on the establishment of a working group on the subject with a view to the negotiation of a comprehensive test ban treaty. From 1979 to 1980 the Committee received reports concerning the trilateral negotiations which were in progress between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom and the United States. At the first part of its 1982 session the Committee established, in the exercise of its responsibilities as the multilateral disarmament negotiation forum in accordance with paragraph 120 of the Final Document, an ad hoc working group on the item on its agenda entitled "Nuclear Test Ban".

18. The establishment of a working group on a comprehensive nuclear-test ban was favourably received as a first step towards negotiations for a treaty on a

comprehensive nuclear test ban. Negotiations on the text of such a multilateral treaty must commence without further delay in the Committee on Disarmament. That treaty should aim at the cessation of the testing of nuclear weapons in all environments by all States for all time and include agreed measures of verification applied on a universal and non-discriminatory basis.

19. International disarmament agreements must include international verification measures which give States parties to the agreement the right and the possibility to participate in the verification process. As to the question of verification of a comprehensive test ban treaty, the seismic expert group working under the auspices of the Committee on Disarmament has continued its efforts in developing an international system for the seismic monitoring of a comprehensive test ban. In this connexion, a new proposal has been made to identify certain nuclear explosions by analysing samples of airborne radio-activity, which would be a useful complement to other verification methods to organize existing and future stations in an international monitoring system.

20. As recognized in the Final Document, the Committee on Disarmament is the single multilateral negotiating forum on disarmament issues. It was also pointed out in the Final Document that bilateral and regional disarmament negotiations may also play an important role and could facilitate negotiations of multilateral agreements in the field of disarmament.

21. The Committee on Disarmament has placed the question of nuclear disarmament entitled "cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament" on its agenda as a priority item since its very first session in 1979. During the various sessions of the Committee, a proposal has been made for the establishment of an ad hoc working group on the subject. Although the Committee on Disarmament held substantive discussions on the question, it has not yet been able to set up such a working group.

22. The paramount importance of nuclear disarmament has been universally recognized. At present, when there is an impasse in the negotiations between the major nuclear-weapon States and at a time when a climate of confrontation and suspicion characterizes their mutual relations, it is all the more necessary that the Committee on Disarmament should open substantive negotiations with the participation of all nuclear-weapon States on questions relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament in conformity with and to achieve the objectives specified in paragraph 50 of the Final Document. Bilateral and regional negotiations, especially with regard to specific areas where the concentration of nuclear armaments increases the danger of confrontation, are useful and should be intensified; however, multilateral negotiations on questions of vital interest to nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States alike should be initiated without delay in the Committee on Disarmament.

23. In the course of deliberations on the subject, proposals have been made that the Committee on Disarmament should set up without further delay an ad hoc working group with a mandate to elaborate on paragraph 50 of the Final Document and to identify substantive issues for multilateral negotiations such as:

- (a) The elaboration and clarification of the stages of nuclear disarmament envisaged in paragraph 50 of the Final Document, including identification of the responsibilities of the nuclear-weapon States and the role of the non-nuclear-weapon States in the process of achieving nuclear disarmament;
- (b) Clarification of the issues involved in prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, pending nuclear disarmament, and in the prevention of nuclear war;
- (c) Clarification of the issues involved in eliminating reliance on the doctrine of nuclear deterrence;
- (d) Measures to ensure an effective discharge by the Committee on Disarmament of its role as the single multilateral negotiating body in the field of disarmament and in this context its relationship with negotiations relating to nuclear disarmament conducted in bilateral, regional and other restricted forums;
- (e) Negotiations on nuclear disarmament should be oriented towards elaboration, adoption, and stage-by-stage implementation of the programme as specified in paragraph 50 of the Final Document;
- (f) The limitation and reduction of nuclear weapons should cover all nuclear weapons systems, including strategic and medium-range weapons systems, as well as other new types of nuclear weapons;
- (g) The resources released at each stage of nuclear disarmament should be channelled towards peaceful purposes, including assistance to developing countries;
- (h) Appropriate verification systems acceptable to all parties concerned should be established during the course of consideration of nuclear disarmament measures.

24. As called for by the Final Document, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America should conclude at the earliest possible date the agreement they have been pursuing for several years in the second series of the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT II) and transmit in good time the text of the agreement to the General Assembly. However, the SALT II Agreement which was concluded in 1979 has not yet been ratified. Noting the intention of the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to continue negotiations on an agreement providing not only for limitations but also for substantial reductions of strategic weapons, the General Assembly welcomed the resumption of their negotiations on the subject on 29 June 1982, and believed that success in these negotiations would make a fundamental contribution to enhancing peace and security and constitute an important step in the direction of nuclear disarmament and ultimately of establishing a world free of such weapons.

25. Moreover, a deep concern is engendered by the situation in Europe, where huge arsenals of armaments, both nuclear and conventional, are concentrated. The deployment and development of new medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe is seriously aggravating the danger of nuclear war and is heightening the tension

existing in this region. Such an evolution can only exacerbate the arms race and have a negative impact on international peace and security. The present ongoing negotiations at Geneva between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America are most welcome and should lead to urgent concrete agreements on the cessation of deployment and development of new nuclear weapons, on the withdrawal of the existing medium-range nuclear weapons from Europe and on their complete destruction. The ultimate goal should be the elimination of all nuclear weapons from this continent. In this connexion, as the security of every European State is directly threatened by these nuclear weapons, it is in the vital interest of all European States to participate in an appropriate framework, thus bringing their contribution to a successful conclusion of these negotiations.

26. At its first special session devoted to disarmament, the General Assembly noted the declarations made by the nuclear-weapon States concerning security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States and urged them to pursue efforts to conclude, as appropriate, effective arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

27. Since 1979, the question of security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States has been discussed in an ad hoc working group established by the Committee on Disarmament, particularly the search for a "common approach" or "formula" acceptable to all which could be included in an international instrument of a legally binding character. There was no objection, in principle, to the idea of an international convention; however, the difficulties involved were also pointed out. In addition, the idea of interim arrangements, particularly the proposals for an appropriate Security Council resolution, has also been raised, but divergent views on these proposals continued to be maintained. During the past three sessions of the Committee, negotiations on the substance of the effective arrangements revealed that specific difficulties were related to differing perceptions of security interests of some nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States as well as to the complex nature of the issues involved in evolving a "common formula" acceptable to all which could be included in an international instrument of a legally binding character. Although the negotiations on the subject in the Working Group have clarified many of the issues involved, the Working Group has been unable to reach agreement on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

28. As reaffirmed by the Committee on Disarmament, non-nuclear-weapon States should be effectively assured by the nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. There was continuing recognition of the urgent need to reach agreement on effective international arrangements on security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States, especially in view of the goal of nuclear disarmament and of general and complete disarmament. Accordingly, further ways and means should be explored to overcome the difficulties encountered in the negotiations in the Committee on Disarmament with a view to reaching agreement on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Such ways and means could include the review of the present policies of certain nuclear-weapon States concerned, taking into full account the position and security interests of the neutral, non-aligned and other developing non-nuclear-weapon States outside major military alliances.

29. Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is a matter of universal concern. As stated in the final document, it is imperative, as an integral part of the effort to halt and reverse the arms race, to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Full implementation of all the provisions of existing instruments on non-proliferation, such as the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and/or the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) by States parties to those instruments will be an important contribution to this end. The General Assembly noted with satisfaction that the Second Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, held at Geneva from 11 August to 7 September 1980, confirmed the full validity of the Treaty. It is, however, regrettable that the Conference did not reach consensus on a final document.

30. The important work of the International Atomic Energy Agency in applying the relevant provisions of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons through appropriate international safeguards system and of the international treaties, conventions and agreements designed to achieve the same objectives has been generally recognized. However, the importance of further progress in strengthening the non-proliferation régime was also underlined.

31. The neutral, non-aligned and other developing non-nuclear-weapon States endorse the objective recognized in the final document of preventing the horizontal and vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons. However, it should be pointed out that since 1978, unfortunately, the nuclear arms race has escalated at an ever-increasing pace and plans have been announced to add further to the already oversaturated arsenals of nuclear weapons. This is clearly contrary to the objective of progressively reducing and eventually eliminating nuclear weapons altogether, which is an integral aspect of the goal of nuclear non-proliferation.

32. As stated in the final document, non-proliferation measures should not jeopardize the full exercise of the inalienable rights of all States to apply and develop their programmes for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy for economic and social development in conformity with their priorities, interests and needs. All States should also have access to and be free to acquire technology, equipment and materials for peaceful uses of nuclear energy, taking into account the particular needs of the developing countries. International co-operation in this field should be under agreed and appropriate international safeguards applied through the International Atomic Energy Agency on a non-discriminatory basis in order to prevent effectively the proliferation of nuclear weapons. However, it should be pointed out that since 1978, non-nuclear-weapon States have faced increasingly restrictive barriers in gaining access to technology and material for peaceful applications of nuclear energy. These restrictions which have been imposed unilaterally by some of the supplier countries have had an adverse impact on the economic and social development, particularly of developing countries. Some developing countries have been subjected to external pressure and coercion designed to hamper their peaceful nuclear programmes. Specifically indeed, the peaceful nuclear facilities of one developing country have been subjected to an unprovoked military attack, the incident of the Israeli air attack of 7 June 1981 on the Tammuz nuclear research centre near Baghdad, which was unanimously condemned by Member States. Furthermore, further measures in order to develop an international

consensus on this subject, as called for in the Final Document, have yet to be undertaken. It is hoped that the Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy which is scheduled to be held in 1983 will, among other issues, address this very important question.

33. It has been the general belief that an international consensus of ways and means to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons could be enhanced by the following elements:

(a) Measures for the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament;

(b) Measures to enable the full exercise of the inalienable rights of all States to apply and develop their programmes for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy for economic and social development in conformity with their priorities, interests and needs;

(c) Measures to ensure unhindered access for all States to nuclear technology, equipment and material for peaceful uses of nuclear energy, taking into account the particular needs of the developing countries;

(d) Respect for each country's choices and decisions in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy without jeopardizing their respective fuel cycle policies or international co-operation, agreements or contracts for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy;

(e) Agreed measures of verification applied on a universal and non-discriminatory basis.

34. Since the first special session, developments related to the possibility that additional States may have acquired or may be pursuing nuclear-weapon capability give added urgency to international non-proliferation efforts. At the same time, risks of proliferation are hampering international co-operation for the promotion of peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Rather than adding to the security of any State, the achievement of nuclear-explosive capability by additional States may be expected to lead to regional and international destabilization and tension. It should be noted that the General Assembly has conducted two studies in this regard, namely: (a) "South Africa's plan and capability in the nuclear field" (A/35/402) and "Israeli nuclear armament" (A/36/431).

35. As stated in the Final Document, the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned constitutes an important disarmament measure. The process of establishing such zones in different parts of the world should be encouraged with the ultimate objective of achieving a world entirely free of nuclear weapons. In the process of establishing such zones, the characteristics of each region should be taken into account.

36. Accordingly, non-nuclear-weapon States in several regions of the world have actively pursued proposals for the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones as an

important disarmament measure and the first such zone has already been in existence in Latin America for the past several years. With regard to the proposal to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, resolutions were adopted by consensus at the thirty-fifth and thirty-sixth sessions of the General Assembly (resolutions 35/147 and 36/87 A). In Africa, where the growing threat of South Africa's nuclear capability continuously poses serious dangers to the security of that region as well as the international peace and security, the Security Council and indeed, all States have been called upon by the General Assembly to take effective measures to prevent the negative impact on the objective of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa. All States in the region of South Asia have expressed their determination to keep their countries free of nuclear weapons. NO action should be taken by them which might deviate from that objective. In this context, the question of establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia has been dealt with in several resolutions of the General Assembly, which is keeping the subject under consideration. Moreover, it has been stated that the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones or zones of peace in different parts of Europe, such as Northern Europe and the Balkans would have a positive effect on the relaxation of tension in Europe and would constitute an important contribution to disarmament in this region.

37. It has been pointed out that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various parts of the world must be pursued within the framework of and integrated with an effective nuclear disarmament process. In this context, the problem posed by the possible existence of clandestine nuclear-weapon arsenals in certain regions of the world should be duly considered.

38. It has been the general view that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various regions of the world on the basis of principles set forth in the Final Document of the first special session should be pursued with greater vigour. In particular, efforts should be made through mutual consultations to remove any existing divergence and to harmonize views of the States concerned, so that the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons becomes a reality.

Zones of peace

39. As stated in the Final Document, the establishment of zones of peace in various regions of the world under appropriate conditions, to be clearly defined and determined freely by the States concerned in the zone, taking into account the characteristics of the zone and the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and in conformity with international law, can contribute to strengthening the security of States within such zones and to international peace and security as a whole.

40. The Final Document contained proposals for the establishment of zones of peace, inter alia, in the Indian Ocean and in South-East Asia. However, since 1978 the Indian Ocean has become a region of growing build-up of great-Power military presence, and military activity in all forms and manifestations of the great Powers have intensified, leading to a marked deterioration in the climate of peace and security in the area. The area is witnessing a renewed search for new military and naval bases by outside Powers. This further underlines the need for an early

convening of the Conference on the Indian Ocean. In this connexion, the discussions in the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean revealed a strong feeling that the Committee should proceed without delay to practical preparations for the Conference and make every effort to complete the necessary preparations for holding the Conference not later than the first half of 1983, as a necessary step for the implementation of the declaration on the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace, adopted in 1971. On the other hand, it was emphasized by some delegations that the lack of real progress on the harmonization of views and the prevailing political and security climate in the region were not conducive, at this stage, to the convening of the Conference.

41. In light of the urgency of this question, it is recommended that the General Assembly might wish to make specific recommendations to facilitate the expeditious discharge by the Ad Hoc Committee of its mandate and to implement Assembly resolution 36/90 with a view to achieving the objectives of the Declaration on the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace. In the meantime, concrete action should be taken urgently to ensure conditions of peace and security within the region. In addition, the talks between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the reduction and subsequent elimination of military activities in the region of the Indian Ocean should also be resumed without delay.

42. The countries of South-East Asia have proposed the establishment of a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality in their region. Steps should be taken by the States concerned to further elaborate this concept with a view to concluding an early agreement on its establishment.

Other weapons of mass destruction, chemical weapons and biological weapons

43. The Final document stated that the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and their destruction represent one of the most urgent measures of disarmament. Consequently, the conclusion of a convention to this end, on which negotiations have been going on for several years, is one of the most urgent tasks of multilateral negotiations. Accordingly, since 1979, the Committee on Disarmament has included this subject in its agenda as a priority item, which was subsequently considered in an ad hoc working group. During the two years of its existence, the Ad Hoc Working Group has made considerable progress in identifying some of the major draft elements which would be included in a future convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. While certain important areas of convergence of views have been identified, divergences of views persist on certain key elements, particularly the questions of "scope" and "verification and compliance" of the proposed convention. In this connexion, it should be noted that the General Assembly adopted various resolutions at its thirty-sixth session on "Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons", namely: Resolutions 36/96 A, 36/96 B and 36/96 C. Moreover, it has been the general view that the Committee on Disarmament should commence its work at the earliest possible date to negotiate the text of a chemical weapons convention, taking into account the existing proposals as well as new initiatives which may be surfaced during the course of deliberations. Meantime, any activity that could complicate the negotiations should be avoided with a view to achieving an early conclusion of a chemical weapon convention.

44. The political climate within which such negotiations are taking place has been vitiated by recent evidence that the world may be on the brink of a new and potentially alarming chemical weapons race as well as the recent allegations concerning the use of chemical weapons in certain regions of the world. In this connexion, the General Assembly has established the Group of Experts to Investigate Reports on the Alleged Use of Chemical Weapons.

45. In view of the urgency of making substantive progress on the negotiations of the complete, effective and verifiable prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and their destruction, the general view has been expressed that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America should resume at the earliest possible date their bilateral talks on the subject which began in 1974 but were suspended in 1980, in parallel with the multilateral negotiations conducted in the Committee on Disarmament.

46. As stated in the Final Document, all States which have not yet done so should consider adhering to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction. Since 1978, a number of States have become parties to this Convention. At its various sessions, the General Assembly expressed the hope for the widest possible adherence to it. The Review Conference of the Parties to this Convention, which took place in 1980, in its final declaration reaffirmed strong determination of the States Parties, for the sake of all mankind, to exclude completely the possibility of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins being used as weapons, their strong support for the convention and their continued dedication to its principles and objectives and their commitment to implement effectively its provisions. In this connexion, it has been pointed out that further consideration of the question of the adequacy of the complaints procedure of the Convention is desired. As reaffirmed by the General Assembly in resolution 2662 (XXV) of 7 December 1970, an effective mechanism should be based on a combination of national and international measures, which would complement and supplement each other to provide a system that would ensure the effective implementation of the Convention. Further measures should be considered in this regard.

Biological weapons

47. In the Final Document, the General Assembly had also called for the conclusion of a convention prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons. Negotiations on such a draft convention have taken place in an ad hoc working group established by the Committee on Disarmament in 1980 on the basis of a USSR-USA joint initiative. Since then it has been recommended that radiological weapons should be defined in a manner which does not contain an exclusion clause with respect to nuclear weapons. The future convention must also contain an explicit commitment to the urgent pursuit of the goal of nuclear disarmament. It has been further recommended that the future convention should seek to strengthen international co-operation in the peaceful uses of radio-active material and sources of radiation and reaffirm the inalienable rights of all States to develop and apply their programmes for the peaceful uses of radio-active material and sources of radiation. The proposal has also been made to incorporate

in the convention on radiological weapons an undertaking not to attack, or to deliberately damage, nuclear facilities. Objections were expressed about the examination of this question in connexion with such a convention. However, it was agreed that consideration of relevant issues could take place in the working group as a separate item. There is wide recognition of the need to reach agreement on an early conclusion of an international convention prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons, as a preventive measure, though such weapons do not exist at present.

New types of weapons of mass destruction

48. The Final Document recommended the adoption of effective measures to avoid the danger and prevent the emergence of new types of weapons of mass destruction based on new scientific principles and achievements. It calls for efforts to be pursued aiming at the prohibition of such new types and new systems of weapons of mass destruction, including specific agreements on particular types of new weapons of mass destruction which may be identified.

49. Negotiations on concrete measures in this regard have yet to begin. The Committee on Disarmament undertook a periodic review of questions that could result from any development of new weapons of mass destruction based on new scientific principles. It was agreed that this review would be continued at regular intervals in order to identify cases in which appropriate measures should be taken to prevent the development of such weapons.

50. With regard to concrete measures on this question, various alternative proposals have been made, such as the establishment of an ad hoc working group of the Committee on Disarmament in order to explore necessary ways and means and the establishment of an ad hoc group of governmental experts under the aegis of the Committee to study all the aspects of this problem and recommend to the Committee specific ways of dealing with it. Consideration may also be given to the convening of a group of scientific and technical experts under the aegis of the United Nations to prepare a report on the subject and recommend specific courses of action.

51. The Final Document attached great importance to the periodic review of the need for a further prohibition of military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques in order to eliminate the dangers to mankind from such use. The human environment would greatly benefit from an international atmosphere of peace and security, free from threats of war, especially nuclear war, and the waste of intellectual and natural resources on armaments. The General Assembly requests the Secretary-General in co-operation with the United Nations Environment Programme to undertake continuing assessment, monitoring and evaluation of the impact of military activities on the environment.

Conventional disarmament

52. The Final Document recommended that together with negotiations on nuclear disarmament measures, the limitation and gradual reduction of armed forces and conventional weapons should be resolutely pursued within the framework of progress towards general and complete disarmament. It was also stated that States with the

largest military arsenals had a special responsibility in pursuing the process of conventional armaments reduction. The Final Document also called for bilateral, regional and multilateral consultations and conferences, where appropriate conditions exist, with the participation of all the countries concerned for the consideration of different aspects of conventional disarmament. It further envisaged consultations among major arms suppliers and recipient countries on the limitation of all types of international transfer of conventional weapons.

53. Measures for conventional disarmament should be based on the principle that States with the largest military arsenals have a special responsibility in this regard. The States with the largest conventional arsenals together with other militarily significant States should undertake a balanced reduction in the level of their conventional armaments and armed forces. Moreover, it was pointed out that the States with the largest conventional arsenals shall first substantially reduce their conventional weapons and equipments. When significant progress has been made in this regard, the other militarily significant States shall join them in reducing conventional armaments according to reasonable ratios. In parallel with the reductions carried out in conventional weapons and armed forces, there should be an agreed proportionate reduction by the States concerned of the production of conventional weapons.

54. It has been pointed out that a global approach to the limitation and reduction of conventional weapons must be pursued within the framework of progress towards general and complete disarmament, bearing in mind that the achievement of nuclear disarmament has been accorded the highest priority. The view has been also expressed that the regional approach to disarmament both in the conventional and the nuclear fields could be an effective complement to global measures for disarmament.

55. As stated in the Final Document, consultations should be carried out among major arms supplier and recipient countries on the limitation of all types of international transfer of conventional weapons, based in particular on the principle of undiminished security of the parties with a view to promoting or enhancing stability at a lower military level, taking into account the need of all States to protect their security as well as the inalienable right to self-determination and independence of peoples under colonial or foreign domination and the obligations of States to respect that right, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States.

56. The problem of the limitation of international transfers of conventional weapons has not yet been solved satisfactorily since 1978. It would be appropriate to hold thorough exchanges of views in order to examine this question in depth and develop the necessary practical measures. In this respect, favourable consideration should be given to any initiative coming from the States concerned - both supplying States and acquiring States - and looking at the problem first in a regional context, which would permit progress in this direction without, however, jeopardizing the right of each State to determine quite independently ways and means of assuring its own security. Most of the trade in armaments takes place between members of the two major alliance systems and should be restrained through

their bilateral and regional negotiations. The flow of armaments to developing countries is still a small proportion of the world trade in armaments and is directly related to the existence of conflicts and disputes in various regions of the world. Most developing countries do not possess the capacity to produce armaments and are thus dependent on the purchase of weapons to acquire the means for self-defence. The consideration of the question of international transfer of conventional weapons must take this fully into account.

57. In the Final Document, the achievement of a more stable situation in Europe at a lower level of military potential on the basis of approximate equality and parity has been given special emphasis. Since 1978, there has been rapid accumulation of conventional armaments and their further qualitative development, especially by States possessing the largest military arsenals. It is these States which develop, produce, stockpile, and sell by far the largest proportion of the world's conventional armaments. Europe, which is the region of the highest concentration of both nuclear and conventional weapons and armed forces continues to be the theatre of further and more rapid deployment of such weapons. While talks are still in progress at Vienna on the mutual reduction of armed forces and armaments and associated measures in Central Europe, no progress has been made towards the actual reduction of forces in this region.

58. With respect to conventional weapons, only one agreement has been reached so far since 1978, namely, the conclusion in 1980 of a Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects. While this agreement is of a limited character, it constitutes important progress, particularly from the point of view of international humanitarian law, but also to some extent as a contribution to arms limitation and disarmament. All States should proceed rapidly to ratify and accede to the Convention, which deals with particularly inhumane weapons. Continued action in this field should be undertaken in order to further limit or prohibit the use of such weapons as may be deemed to be indiscriminate and excessively injurious. Furthermore, it has been pointed out that consideration of the question of establishing adequate machinery for investigating any violations of the Convention should be pursued. Such machinery would greatly contribute to strict and effective observance of the provisions.

59. The General Assembly has adopted resolutions concerning the carrying out of a United Nations study on conventional disarmament. At its 1982 session, the Disarmament Commission has adopted "Guidelines for the study on conventional disarmament" and the Group of Experts will shortly begin its work.

Military utilization of the sea-bed

60. The Final Document requested to promote the peaceful use of and to avoid an arms race on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof. As a result of the 1977 Review Conference of the parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof, the consideration of further measures in the field of disarmament for the prevention of an arms race in that environment has been recommended. Furthermore, proposals have been made that

appropriate recommendations for the convening of the Second Review Conference of the Parties to the Sea-Bed Treaty should be formulated. The major military Powers are the most advanced in ocean technology and therefore have a special responsibility to contribute to a review of such technological developments as affect the operation of the Treaty. Such a survey would provide background for an evaluation whether developments of new technologies already present, or might be expected to present, increased risks for an arms race on the sea-bed, be it nuclear or conventional. It has been suggested that in consultation with States parties to the Treaty, the Committee on Disarmament should consider examining relevant technological developments with the assistance of experts.

Outer space

61. As pointed out in the Final Document, further measures for the prevention of an arms race in outer space deserve special attention. Since 1978, rapid development of science and technology has brought closer the danger of the extension of the arms race into outer space. Research and development on weapons that may be based in space, as also on anti-satellite weapon systems, have created the possibility that outer space will become the new arena for military confrontation among the major Powers. The item has been inscribed on the agenda of the Committee on Disarmament for its current session and initial consideration has begun in informal meetings. It has been suggested that the Committee on Disarmament should set up an ad hoc working group to undertake multilateral negotiations on the prohibition of the stationing of weapons of any kind in outer space as well as the banning of anti-satellite systems. Pending the conclusion of an agreement, all States, in particular those possessing advanced space technology, should refrain from actions that may complicate negotiations.

62. Further steps to prevent an arms race in outer space should be without prejudice to the right of all States to pursue peaceful research and exploration of outer space. The exploration of outer space has an important bearing on the economic and social development of all States, including developing countries. Negotiations on this subject should, therefore, not only take this important factor into account but should also provide for international co-operation in the peaceful uses of outer space.

Reduction of military budgets

63. The Final Document stated that gradual reduction of military budgets on a mutually agreed basis, for example, in absolute figures or in terms of percentage points, particularly by nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant States would be a measure that would contribute to the curbing of the arms race and would increase the possibilities of reallocation of resources now being used for military purposes to economic and social development, particularly for the benefit of the developing countries. The Final Document also contained a recommendation that the General Assembly should continue to consider what concrete steps should be taken to facilitate the reduction of military budgets, bearing in mind the relevant proposals and documents of the United Nations on this question.

64. Since 1978, the world's total military expenditures have shown a steady increase and have now reached an estimated value of about \$US 600 billion,

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representing a heavy burden for the economies of all nations and having extremely harmful effects on international peace and security. This colossal waste of resources is in dramatic contrast to the situation of poverty and under-development in which two thirds of the world's population live and is diverting to military purposes important material and human resources which are urgently needed for development in all countries, particularly in the developing countries. The military expenditures are detrimental to the establishment of a new international economic order based on justice, equity and co-operation. Consequently, resources released as a result of the reduction of military budgets and of disarmament measures should be used so as to promote the well-being of all peoples and improve the economic conditions of the developing countries.

65. The General Assembly, in resolutions 35/142 A and 36/82 B adopted by consensus, called for increased efforts aimed at reaching international agreements to freeze, reduce or restrain military expenditures, and appealed to all States, in particular the most heavily armed States, pending the conclusion of such agreements, to exercise self-restraint in their military expenditures.

66. The Disarmament Commission has examined the question of the reduction of military budgets since 1980 and has started the consideration of the principles which should govern further action of States in the field of freezing and reduction of military expenditures, keeping in mind the possibility of embodying such principles into a suitable document at an appropriate stage.

67. With regard to the negotiation and conclusion of verifiable agreements aimed at the reduction of military budgets, importance has been attached to ways of ensuring the accuracy of military expenditures. In this context, the view has been expressed that the common reporting instrument developed in the United Nations framework and designed to enhance comparability should be completed universally, as recommended in the study entitled "Reduction of Military Budgets" (A/35/479) and as requested in successive General Assembly resolutions.

Verification

68. In the Final Document, the General Assembly stressed throughout that disarmament and arms limitation agreements should provide for adequate measures of verification satisfactory to all parties concerned in order to create the necessary confidence and ensure that they were being observed by all parties. The form and modalities of the verification to be provided for in any specific agreement depend upon and should be determined by the purposes, scope and nature of the agreement. Agreements should provide for the participation of parties directly or through the United Nations system in the verification process. Where appropriate, a combination of several methods of verification as well as other compliance procedures should be employed. It was also pointed out in the Final Document that in the context of international disarmament negotiations, the problem of verification should be further examined and adequate methods and procedures in this field be considered. Every effort should be made to develop appropriate methods and procedures which are non-discriminatory and which do not unduly interfere with the internal affairs of other States or jeopardize their economic and social development.

69. Disarmament negotiations since 1978 have confirmed that effective verification is important for progress in disarmament negotiations and for maintenance of undiminished security of States. Moreover, the importance of appropriate international verification measures has been emphasized. In this regard, particular reference has been made to the proposal to establish a satellite monitoring agency.

Confidence-building measures

70. It was stated in the Final Document that, in order to facilitate the process of disarmament, it was necessary to take measures and pursue policies to strengthen international peace and security and to build confidence among States. Commitment to confidence-building measures could significantly contribute to preparing for further progress in disarmament. They contribute to overcoming fear, apprehension and mistrust between States and create and improve conditions conducive to negotiations on measures of disarmament.

71. The implementation of the confidence-building measures agreed upon in the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe has continued since 1978. Efforts have been made to further develop and extend binding, militarily significant and verifiable confidence-building measures in Europe. It is to be regretted that, since 1978, the international situation has deteriorated and that confidence among States has consequently been undermined. This development has, however, made the elaboration of principles for and the application of confidence-building measures more urgent.

72. A comprehensive study on confidence-building measures has been prepared by the Secretary-General (A/36/474 and Corr.1). The study, which the General Assembly took note of in its resolution 36/97 F, adopted by consensus, underlined that the principal goal of confidence-building measures is to contribute to reducing or eliminating the underlying causes of mistrust, fear, tensions and hostilities. Foremost among these causes is a mutual misperception resulting from a lack of reliable information on the military potentials and the political objectives of other States. Elements of fear and speculation must therefore be reduced in order progressively to achieve a more accurate and more reliable reciprocal assessment of both the capabilities and the perceptions determining security relations between States.

73. The hope has been expressed that a new impetus should be given to universal implementation of the existing confidence-building measures and that all States should consider the introduction of various confidence-building measures in their regions and where possible negotiate on them in keeping with the particular conditions and requirements prevailing in their respective regions.

Regional approach to disarmament

74. In the Final Document, the General Assembly encouraged the quest for agreements or other measures on a regional basis aimed at strengthening peace and security at lower force levels. The regional approach to disarmament both in the conventional and the nuclear fields provides a most promising modality of arresting

the arms race and limiting the expenditure on armaments. Though in no way a substitute for general and complete disarmament, it can be an effective complement to global measures and an important constituent in the step-by-step approach to global disarmament. Bearing in mind that regional disarmament should take place in the perspective of ultimately achieving general and complete disarmament under effective international control, the principles governing negotiations in the field of disarmament generally should form the foundation on which regional disarmament should be based. These general principles include in particular those embodied in the United Nations Charter and other generally accepted rules of international law

75. As security factors, and consequently disarmament conditions, are associated in many cases with regional conditions, the regional approach has been recognized as one able to offer real and encouraging possibilities. It was the subject of a study in the context of work conducted by the United Nations (A/35/416); the study was approved by consensus by General Assembly resolution 36/97 H, and should serve as a basis for a more exhaustive consideration of these possibilities.

Disarmament and development

76. The close relationship between disarmament and development was strongly stressed in the Final Document and, as a consequence, examined in an as detailed and as complete as possible way in a study conducted by a group of experts under the auspices of the Secretary-General (A/36/356 and Corr.1). While there are some controversial elements, the study contains a number of important points and conclusions. They deserve to be further considered and, as appropriate, acted upon in view of the huge interest that the question of the release of resources for economical and social development generates in all countries, particularly developing countries.

World public opinion and disarmament

77. As stated in the Final Document, great importance has been attached to the mobilization of world public opinion on behalf of disarmament. The free and unrestricted access of peoples of all States to information about the danger of nuclear war, the arms race and the efforts to halt and reverse it, as well as their right freely to express their views on the subject have been underlined.

78. The peoples, public opinion, should have an essential role in promoting and intensifying the efforts aimed at halting and reversing the arms race, particularly the nuclear arms race, and at achieving the objective of disarmament. A significant contribution is made in this field by scientists and their organizations. The movements for peace and disarmament throughout the world reflect the increase of consciousness of peoples towards the grave danger posed by the existence of the nuclear weapons, of their high responsibility for the fate of international peace and security.

79. In accordance with the provisions of the Final Document, specific measures aimed at mobilizing world public opinion were adopted by governmental and non-governmental organs, the United Nations and its specialized agencies. Among such measures, the week devoted to fostering the objectives of disarmament has

become an important instrument for linking the efforts of the United Nations with the struggle of world public opinion for peace and disarmament. In this context, various measures have been mentioned since 1978, such as: (a) the establishment of an authoritative international committee concerning the prevention of nuclear war; (b) the holding of a world disarmament campaign; (c) the collection of signatures in support of measures for the prevention of nuclear war, the limitation of the arms race and disarmament; (d) the implementation of the principles of the Declaration on the Preparation of Societies for Life in Peace.

Training programme

80. In accordance with decisions taken at the first special session devoted to disarmament, the United Nations Programme of fellowships on disarmament was established in 1979. Every year since then, the General Assembly has adopted a resolution by which it has, inter alia, decided to continue the programme. Member States have continued to manifest their interest in the programme and emphasized the importance for the training of specialists on disarmament affairs, particularly for developing countries.

81. In the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session, the General Assembly underlined the central role and responsibility of the United Nations in the sphere of disarmament. Towards this end it was affirmed that the General Assembly should remain the main deliberative organ of the United Nations in the field of disarmament. It was also decided that the First Committee of the General Assembly should deal only with questions of disarmament and related international security questions and that the Disarmament Commission should be established as a deliberative body, a subsidiary organ of the General Assembly. The Tenth Special Session also welcomed the agreement reached after appropriate consultations among Member States concerning the Committee on Disarmament, which would be open to the nuclear-weapon States and 32 to 35 other States. The Tenth Special Session also recognized the role of the United Nations Centre for Disarmament and made recommendations to enable it to discharge effectively its added responsibilities. The General Assembly also requested the Secretary-General to set up an advisory board of eminent persons to advise him on various aspects of studies to be made under the auspices of the United Nations in the field of disarmament and arms limitation.

82. The General Assembly has adopted, since the Tenth Special Session, a growing number of resolutions and decisions that reflect the collective awareness and concern of the international community at the continued arms race, especially in its nuclear aspect, and the sense of urgency attached to achieving progress on disarmament.

83. As a main organ of the General Assembly, the First Committee has been performing, inter alia, the role of reviewing progress on arms limitation and disarmament efforts. It continues to provide a forum in which the entire membership of the United Nations is able to exchange views and make recommendations on a wide range of disarmament issues. Notwithstanding the contribution of the First Committee to disarmament efforts, there exist further possibilities to enhance its efficiency and effectiveness.

84. At the Tenth Special Session the General Assembly established the Disarmament Commission, defined its mandate and determined its functions (see para. 118 of the Final Document). The Commission has submitted annual reports for 1978, 1979, 1980 and 1981 to the General Assembly and a special report to the Twelfth Special Session in 1982, reference to which should be made for detailed information concerning the Commission's work. In its deliberative capacity, the Disarmament Commission has played a useful role in the discussion and development of various issues in the field of disarmament, amongst which have been the formulation of the draft elements of a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament for elaboration by the Committee on Disarmament and a definition of the goals of the Second Disarmament Decade. However, the matter of the Disarmament Commission's agenda and the manner in which the Commission conducts its work have not been conducive to the establishment of a precise profile for the Commission. It has not therefore been possible, to date, for the Commission to strengthen its deliberative and guidance role by conducting such activities as detailed examinations or assessments of specific disarmament problems entrusted to it by the General Assembly.

85. The Committee on Disarmament first met in January 1979 and subsequently worked in conformity with the agreement reached by member States during the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly and reflected in paragraph 120 of the Final Document. The Committee has made annual reports for 1979, 1980 and 1981 and a special report on the occasion of the Twelfth Special Session in 1982, reference to which should be made for detailed information concerning the Committee's work. As the single multilateral negotiating body the Committee on Disarmament has worked intensively since its inception in 1979 and, with respect to negotiations on some items on its agenda, modest results have been achieved. The lack of political will to give substance to the work of the Committee on Disarmament is one of the major factors leading to the difficulties experienced by the Committee in carrying out its multilateral negotiating functions, particularly with respect to issues relating to nuclear weapons. The Committee is in the process of increasing its effectiveness, improving the organization of its work and considering aspects of its membership. In its special report, the Committee states its intention to continue to examine ways and means of enhancing the effectiveness of its operations by streamlining the organization of its work and procedures and by increasing the activities of its subsidiary bodies through the allocation of more time, by holding more informal meetings and consultation with the participation of experts. The Committee intends to continue its consideration of these questions during the second part of its 1982 session.

86. The United Nations Centre for Disarmament has provided valuable support for activities in the field of disarmament and taken on the additional tasks assigned to it by the General Assembly at the Tenth Special Session. The past four years have seen a significant increase in committees and other bodies to be serviced, information and study activities and relations with non-governmental organizations and other sectors of the public. This increase in the Centre's activities related to disarmament has not been matched by an appropriate increase in the resources available to the Centre; its further strengthening and status should properly reflect the central role and primary responsibility of the United Nations in the disarmament field.

87. The Advisory Board on Studies was established by the Secretary-General, as requested by the General Assembly, in 1978 and the Secretary-General has since reported to every regular session of the General Assembly on the work of the Board. It is considered that a more precise mandate would make better use of the capacities of the Advisory Board and in the area of disarmament research it may be relevant to determine a definitive status for the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) and its relationship with the United Nations Centre for Disarmament, together with a consideration of the resources needed to perform its assigned function.

III. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

[To be added]
