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PARTS OF THE PROGRAMME OF ACTION AS DISCUSSED AND AMENDED
IN DRAFTING GROUP NO. 1. OF WORKING GROUP B

(d) [Non-use of nuclear weapons and prevention
of the outbreak of nuclear war]

The most efficient guarantee against the danger of nuclear war and use of nuclear weapons is nuclear disarmament and complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

[Since the use of nuclear weapons would cause indiscriminate suffering and destruction to mankind and, as such, is a crime contrary to the rules of international law and the laws of humanity, as long as nuclear weapons exist [threatening the security of all States, particularly the non-nuclear-weapon States], the following measures will be taken:

- A convention on the non-use of nuclear weapons should be urgently concluded.
- Nuclear-weapon States should renounce [in a legally binding form] the use [or threat of use] of nuclear weapons [against States which have no nuclear weapons on their territories] [against States not parties to the nuclear security arrangements of some nuclear Powers].
- [Nuclear-weapon States should undertake], [jointly or individually], not to be the first to use nuclear weapons.]

Alternative 1 [Strict implementation of the principle of non-use of force in international relations can be realized through full compliance with the Charter of the United Nations.]

Alternative 2 It is important to ensure the non-use of force in international relations and the permanent prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. Speedy conclusion of the treaty to this effect would effectively prevent the use of nuclear as well as conventional weapons.

So long as nuclear weapons exist and bearing in mind the potentially devastating results of nuclear war to belligerents and non-belligerents, the nuclear-weapon States have special responsibilities to do everything possible to avoid the risk of the outbreak of such a war, and it is incumbent upon them in particular:

- To maintain and whenever necessary to improve their existing organizational and technical arrangements for guarding against the accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons under their control;
- To conclude appropriate bilateral agreements on the prevention of accidental nuclear war;
- To exercise restraint in their mutual relations, to negotiate and settle differences by peaceful means and to prevent conflicts and avoid situations which may exacerbate international tensions;
- To give appropriate assurance to increase the confidence of non-nuclear-weapon States in their own security from nuclear attack, in particular by committing themselves not to use nuclear weapons except in self-defence under Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations in circumstances of an actual armed attack on themselves, their territory, their armed forces or their allies;
- To rededicate themselves to the principles of the Charter, and to work for their observance by all States in order to reduce the danger of any conflict leading to nuclear war.

/Together with the measures for the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament all possible measures specially aimed at preventing the danger of an outbreak of nuclear war should be taken and for this purpose:

/All States should act in such a way as to avert situations which could cause a dangerous aggravation of relations between them and avoid military confrontations which could lead to a nuclear war, making full use to that end of the possibilities of the Security Council in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations;/

/The nuclear-weapon States, in view of their special responsibility as permanent members of the Security Council, should always exercise restraint in their mutual relations, show a willingness to negotiate and settle differences by peaceful means and do all in their power to prevent conflicts and situations which could exacerbate international tension;/

/Those nuclear-weapon States which have not yet done so should conclude agreements with other nuclear-weapon States concerning measures to diminish and avert the danger of nuclear war and to prevent the accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons, and those nuclear-weapon States which have concluded such agreements with each other should improve and develop such measures.//

New paragraph for inclusion before paragraph 4 of present text

U.S.S.R. The declarations of nuclear-weapon States that they will not use nuclear weapons against those States which renounce the production and acquisition of nuclear weapons and have no nuclear weapons on their territories are of important significance for ensuring the security of such non-nuclear States. All nuclear States must make similar declarations. Special bilateral agreements between nuclear and appropriate non-nuclear States must be concluded to that effect.

(e) Nuclear-weapon-free zones

The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned, or through unilateral declarations, constitutes an important disarmament measure, provided that such zones are genuinely free from nuclear-weapons, that relevant agreements contain no loop-holes and fully correspond to the generally recognized norms of international law.

The process of establishing such zones should be encouraged with the ultimate objective of achieving a world entirely free of nuclear weapons.

Alternative 1 With respect to nuclear-weapon-free zones, the nuclear-weapon States are called upon to give undertakings, in particular:

- (a) to refrain from introducing nuclear weapons in such zones;
- (b) to refrain from the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against the States of such zones.

Alternative 2 The nuclear-weapon States can make an important contribution to the greater effectiveness of nuclear-weapon-free zones by agreeing to respect their status and, in particular, by undertaking an obligation to refrain from the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against the States included in such zones. Therefore the nuclear-weapon States are urged to respond sympathetically to proposals for their cooperation in connexion with these zones.

In appropriate cases, the effectiveness of nuclear-weapon-free zones could be enhanced by the dismantling of all foreign military bases and by not subjecting any State in the region to acts of aggression.

In the light of existing conditions, the following measures are especially desirable:

(a) Adoption by the States concerned of all relevant measures to ensure the full application of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco);

(b) Signature and ratification of the Additional Protocols of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) by the States entitled to become parties to those instruments which have not yet done so;

(c) In Africa, where the Organization of African Unity has affirmed a decision for the denuclearization of the region, the Security Council shall take appropriate effective steps whenever necessary to prevent the frustration of this objective;

(d) The serious consideration of the practical and urgent steps required for the implementation of the proposal for a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East where all parties directly concerned have expressed their support for the concept and where the implications of nuclear-weapon proliferation are would be acute;

(e) All States and parties in the region of Parties to the nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia should take consider taking steps to implement the objective of keeping their region free of nuclear weapons. In the meantime, no action should be taken by them which would retard the establishment of the nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region. All States

and parties in the region Parties to the nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region should accept the application of the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards over their nuclear facilities on a non-discriminatory basis. The United Nations should continue to encourage measures to establish the could keep the establishment of the nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region under review .

The creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones should be promoted by more active regional co-operation in the development of peaceful nuclear energy through facilitating the establishment of regional fuel cycle centres, under the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards, with their attendant economic and physical security benefits for extracting uranium, fabricating nuclear fuel, reprocessing plutonium, and handling nuclear wastes .

Additions to paragraph 1.

Finland The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned, or through unilateral declarations, constitutes an important regional disarmament measure, and as such contributes to the security of the members of such zones to the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear-weapons and to the goal of general and complete disarmament, provided that such zones are genuinely free from nuclear-weapons, that relevant agreements contain no loop-holes and fully correspond to the generally recognized norms of international law .

Iran Conditions in which nuclear-weapon-free zones might be viable and might enhance security are bound to vary from region to region, hence, the characteristics of each region should be taken into account.

Addition to paragraph 2.

Finland The process of establishing such zones in different parts of the world should be encouraged with the ultimate objective of achieving a world entirely free of nuclear weapons.

New paragraph 3

Pakistan The desire of all the nuclear-weapon States to encourage the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones in other regions of the world besides Latin America and their willingness to enter into the obligations entailed is to be welcomed.

Alternative text for Alternative 2

France The nuclear-weapon States can help considerably in strengthening the effectiveness of the nuclear-weapon-free zones by agreeing to respect the status of the zones and, in particular, by entering into negotiations with a view to assuming, under agreed conditions, an undertaking to refrain from using nuclear weapons against the States belonging to those zones. The nuclear-weapon States are therefore urged to respond favourably to proposals aimed at obtaining their co-operation with respect to those zones.

Deletion of brackets in sub-section (b)

Mexico Signature and ratification of the Additional Protocols of the
France
U.S.S.R. Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) by the States entitled to become parties to those instruments which have not yet done so;

Additions to sub-section (d)

Egypt Pending the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, States of the region should solemnly declare to refrain on a reciprocal basis from producing, acquiring, or on any other way, possessing nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive devices, and from permitting the stationing of nuclear weapons on their territory by any third party and agree to place all their nuclear activities under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards.

The Security Council should consider preventive measures to ensure that the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East should not be frustrated by any State in the region.

New sub-section (f)

Romania The States belonging to the Balkans should be encouraged to convert it into an area of good neighborliness, without nuclear-weapons.

Turkey Requests brackets around text.

(f) Zones of peace

Alternative 1 Where all States in a region agree to establish a clearly defined zone of peace, involving mutual restraint on their military activities, the strengthening of confidence, as well as methods of peaceful settlement of disputes, under conditions to be determined in conformity with international law, and with which outside Powers can be associated, such a zone could

Alternative 2 The establishment of zones of peace under appropriate conditions in various regions of the world taking into account the characteristics of a region can also

contribute to strengthening the security of States within such zones and should be conceived of within the framework of international security as a whole.

It would be of great importance to establish a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean that would be free from great-Power rivalry and of great-Power military presence as well as the presence of nuclear weapons. The great Powers in this context are urged to agree at an early date to reduce the nuclear-arms race in the region with a view to eliminating altogether the military presence and rivalry from the region.

Alternative 1 While the General Assembly takes note of the consultations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, these two Powers and other major maritime users are called upon to work towards the elimination of foreign military presence and rivalry from the Indian Ocean.

Alternative 2 /Negotiations which have been initiated between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, based on a staged approach with a view not to increase their current military presence and to move on promptly to negotiations on reductions, should continue and lead to early and positive results. This would be a significant contribution to enhancing stability in the Indian Ocean./

Alternative 1 /The littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean at their forthcoming meeting should consider measures for the implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace./

Alternative 2 /In this connexion Member States note the proposal to hold a conference on the Indian Ocean with a view to considering such a zone of peace./

Alternative 1 /The concept of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace also includes the necessity for mutual restraint on the part of the littoral and hinterland States./

Alternative 2 /The littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean, at their forthcoming meeting, should, inter alia, reach agreement on measures such as a commitment to settle outstanding disputes by peaceful means, the renunciation of nuclear weapons and the maintenance of a reasonable military balance among themselves, in order to promote conditions of security within the Indian Ocean region./

Consultations regarding all aspects of the zonal concept should take place with the participation of all States concerned with a view to the early convening of a conference on the Indian Ocean to establish such a zone, the status of which should could be respected by all States particularly by nuclear-weapon States and major maritime users.

It would be desirable to create other zones of peace wherever feasible and particularly in South-East Asia and the Mediterranean.

The nuclear-weapon States should enter into negotiations with a view to reaching agreement on the withdrawal of ships carrying nuclear weapons from certain areas of the world's oceans and on other possible measures to limit the nuclear-arms race in those areas.

Maritime zones of peace should not present obstacles to freedom of navigation on the high seas and in the air or conflict with the right of innocent passage under the law of the sea.

(g) Non-proliferation

It is imperative, as an integral part of the effort to halt and reverse the arms race, to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. This involves obligations and responsibilities on the part of both nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States, the former undertaking to stop the nuclear-arms race and to achieve nuclear disarmament by urgent application of measures to stop vertical proliferation, to stop the development and further production of nuclear weapons and to achieve nuclear disarmament through the reduction and elimination of existing stockpiles of nuclear weapons, as set out in the relevant sections of this Programme of Action, and all States undertaking the necessary measures to prevent the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Further measures should be undertaken jointly by the nuclear-weapon States and the non-nuclear-weapon States to develop an international consensus on additional ways and means to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons on a universal and non-discriminatory basis, including agreed measures to strengthen and consolidate the nuclear non-proliferation régime in conformity with the principles of independence and sovereignty of States, based primarily on adherence of all States to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and on the system of safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

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To this end:

Steps should be taken to ensure that all nuclear facilities source and special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities of all States are placed under agreed and appropriate international safeguards arrangements applied through the International Atomic Energy Agency on a universal, standardized and non-discriminatory basis.

Steps should be taken by the nuclear-weapon States for a binding commitment to halt and reverse the nuclear-arms race leading towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons, to stop the refinement of nuclear weapons and the production of new systems of such weapons and to undertake not to use nuclear weapons which would lead to the removal of the threat of use of nuclear weapons.

All peaceful nuclear facilities in all States source and special fissionable material which are not presently subject to international inspection and control should be brought under the International Atomic Energy Agency system of safeguards.

Alternative 1 Universal adherence to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons should be encouraged. All States should be urged to ratify the Treaty or at least to abide by its provisions and objectives.

Alternative 2 All States could be encouraged to commit themselves to the goal of non-proliferation through possible adherence to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, nuclear-weapon-free zones or the International Atomic Energy Agency system of safeguards.

Alternative 3 Steps should be taken to create the necessary conditions to facilitate universal adherence to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

The International Atomic Energy Agency should be assisted in its attempts to strengthen its safeguards system in evolving a standardized system of safeguards to be applied on a universal and non-discriminatory basis.

Agreements should be reached on adequate standards for the physical protection of nuclear materials.

Alternative and more proliferation-resistant nuclear technologies should be studied with a view to their development.

The possibility of giving suitable international character to appropriate nuclear fuel cycle operations, and to effective measures for the control of plutonium in civil nuclear programmes should be examined; and

The work currently being undertaken in the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluations should be supported.

Alternative text for preceding three paragraphs Contribute to the success of the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluations in accordance with the objectives set out in the joint communiqué of its organizing conference.

These non-proliferation measures should be designed to enable not hinder the exercise of the inalienable right of all States to apply and develop as embodied in article IV of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear

Weapons/ their programmes for the peaceful use of nuclear technology for economic and social development, in conformity with their priorities, interests and needs, and to have access to and /be free to/ acquire technology, equipment and materials /for the peaceful use of nuclear energy/ taking into account the particular needs of the developing countries /and to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other nuclear-explosive devices/.

/Substantive and timely measures should be devised in order to guarantee to all States the exercise of their inalienable right to develop - under appropriate internationally agreed safeguards and through an increased international co-operation - research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and to enjoy the benefits thereof./

/An international programme should be considered/ /International programmes should be supported/ under the auspices of the United Nations system, for the promotion of transfer and utilization of nuclear technology /under appropriate and agreed international safeguards/ /applied on a universal, standardized and non-discriminatory basis,/ for economic and social development, especially of the developing countries /in accordance with/ /taking into account/ the principles approved in the United Nations General Assembly resolution 32/50.

/International agreements and contracts for the transfer and development of nuclear equipment, material and technology for peaceful purposes should be implemented faithfully in accordance with their terms and provisions./

(g) [Non-proliferation]Alternative texts proposed for the whole Sub-section (g)

Australia

It is imperative, as an integral part of the effort to halt and reverse the arms race, to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. This involves obligations and responsibilities on the part of both nuclear weapons states and non-nuclear weapons states, the former undertaking to stop the nuclear arms race by urgent application of measures leading to nuclear disarmament and all states undertaking the necessary measures to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.

2. Further measures should be undertaken jointly by the nuclear and non-nuclear weapons states to develop an international consensus on ways and means to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, based primarily on the commitment of all states to fulfil the obligations of the NPT and on the system of safeguards of the IAEA.

3. To this end:

- Steps should be taken to facilitate and stimulate universal adherence to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. All states are urged to commit themselves to its objectives.

- Internationally agreed non-proliferation measures should enable all states to exercise their inalienable right, as defined in Article IV of the NPT, to apply and develop their programmes for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy

for economic and social development, in conformity with their priorities, interests and needs, and to have access to, and acquire, technology, equipment and materials for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, taking into account the particular needs of the developing countries. International programmes under the auspices of the United Nations system for the promotion of the transfer and utilisation of nuclear technology for economic and social development, especially of the developing countries, should be supported. Efforts should also be made to bring the work of the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation to a successful conclusion in accordance with the objectives set out in the joint communique of its Organising Conference.

— The use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, including international co-operation in this field, should take place under agreed and appropriate international safeguards as applied through the IAEA on a non-discriminatory basis in order to prevent effectively proliferation of nuclear weapons. The IAEA should be assisted in its efforts to improve the technical effectiveness of safeguards arrangements and encouraged to develop a standardised system of safeguards to be applied on a universal and non-discriminatory basis. Agreement should also be reached on adequate standards for the physical protection of nuclear materials.

It is imperative, as an integral part of the effort to halt and reverse the arms race, to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. This involves obligations and responsibilities on the part of both nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States, the former undertaking to stop the nuclear arms race and to achieve nuclear disarmament by urgent application of measures to stop the development and further production of nuclear weapons and to achieve nuclear disarmament through the reduction and elimination of existing stockpiles of nuclear weapons.

Further measures should be undertaken jointly by the nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States to develop an international consensus on ways and means to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons on a universal and non-discriminatory basis.

To this end:

- Steps should be taken to ensure that all nuclear facilities of all States are placed under agreed and appropriate international safeguards.
- Steps should be taken by the nuclear-weapon States for a binding commitment to halt and reverse the nuclear arms race leading towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons, to stop the refinement of nuclear weapons and the production of new systems of such weapons.
- All nuclear facilities in all States which are not presently subject to international inspection and control should be brought under the IAEA system of safeguards.
- Steps should be taken to create the necessary conditions to facilitate universal adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
- The IAEA should be assisted in its attempts in evolving a standardized system of safeguards to be applied on a universal and non-discriminatory basis.

- Agreements should be reached on adequate standards for the physical protection of nuclear materials.
- Non-proliferation measures should not hinder the exercise of the inalienable right of all States to apply and develop their programmes for the peaceful use of nuclear technology for economic and social development, in conformity with their priorities, interests and needs, and to have access to and be free to acquire technology, equipment, and materials taking into account the particular needs of the developing countries.

Additional text proposed for Alternative 3, para. 1

Egypt [Steps should be taken to create the necessary conditions to facilitate universal adherence to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.] and in particular steps to provide credible and effective security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States.

New para. 2 of the Alternative text for Alternatives 1-3

Pakistan Urges all States, in particular the nuclear supplier countries, to adhere strictly to the principles contained in resolution 32/50 of the General Assembly regarding international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear technology.