

[A/5-10/AC.1]

Conference Room Paper No. 9**
26 June 1978

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

Ad Hoc Committee of the
Tenth Special Session

DRAFT RESOLUTION EMBODYING A DRAFT FINAL DOCUMENT PREPARED IN
ACCORDANCE WITH THE DECISION ADOPTED BY THE AD HOC COMMITTEE
AT ITS 13th MEETING ON 23 JUNE 1978**

The General Assembly,

Alarmed by the threat to the very survival of mankind posed by the existence of nuclear weapons and the continuing arms race, and recalling the devastation inflicted by all wars,

Convinced that disarmament and arms limitation, particularly in the nuclear field, are essential for the prevention of the danger of nuclear war and the strengthening of international peace and security and for the economic and social advancement of all peoples, thus facilitating the achievement of the new international economic order,

Having resolved to lay the foundations of an international disarmament strategy which, through co-ordinated and persevering efforts in which the United Nations should play a more effective role, aims at general and complete disarmament under effective international control,

Adopts the following Final Document of this special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

* Reissued for technical reasons.

** All paragraphs of the draft Final Document are numbered consecutively. Alternative texts have the same paragraph number. Numbers within brackets at the end of paragraphs correspond to those they had in Conference Room Papers 7 and 8. Please note that not all parts of Conference Room Papers 7 and 8 were numbered.

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I. INTRODUCTION

1. Attainment of the objective of security, which is an inseparable element of peace, has always been one of the most profound aspirations of humanity. States have for a long time sought to maintain their security through the possession of arms. Admittedly, their survival has, in certain cases, effectively depended on whether they could count on appropriate means of defence. Yet the accumulation of weapons, particularly nuclear weapons, today constitutes much more a threat than a protection for the future of mankind. The time has therefore come to put an end to this situation, to abandon the use of force in international relations and to seek security in disarmament, that is to say, through a gradual but effective process beginning with a reduction in the present level of armaments. The ending of the arms race and the achievement of real disarmament are tasks of primary importance and urgency. To meet this historic challenge is in the political and economic interests of all the nations and peoples of the world as well as in the interests of ensuring their genuine security and peaceful future. (1)
2. Unless its avenues are closed, the continued arms race means a growing threat to international peace and security and even to the very survival of mankind. The nuclear and conventional arms build-up threatens to stall the efforts aimed at reaching the goals of development, to become an obstacle on the road of achieving the new international economic order and to hinder the solution of other vital problems facing mankind. (2)
3. Dynamic development of détente, encompassing all spheres of international relations in all regions of the world, with the participation of all countries, would create conditions conducive to the efforts of States to end the arms race, which has engulfed the world, thus reducing the danger of war. Progress on détente and progress on disarmament mutually complement and strengthen each other. (3)
4. The Disarmament Decade solemnly declared in 1969 by the United Nations is coming to an end. Unfortunately, the objectives established on that occasion by the General Assembly appear to be as far away today as they were then, or even further because the arms race is not diminishing but increasing and outstrips by far the efforts to curb it. While it is true that some limited agreements have been reached, "effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament" continue to elude man's grasp. Yet the implementation of such measures is urgently required. There has not been either any real progress that might lead to the conclusion of a treaty on general and complete disarmament under effective international control. Furthermore, it has not been possible to free any amount, however modest, of the enormous resources, both material and human, that are wasted on the unproductive and spiralling arms race, and which should be made available for the purpose of economic and social development, especially since such a race "places a great burden on both the developing and the developed countries". (4)
5. The Members of the United Nations are fully aware of the conviction of their peoples, that the question of general and complete disarmament is of utmost importance and that peace, security and economic and social development are indivisible and have therefore recognized that the corresponding obligations and responsibilities are universal. (5)

6. Thus a powerful current of opinion has gradually formed, leading to the convening of what will go down in the annals of the United Nations as the first special session of the General Assembly devoted entirely to disarmament. (6)

7. The outcome of this special session, whose deliberations have to a large extent been facilitated by the five sessions of the Preparatory Committee which preceded it, is the present Final Document. This introduction serves as a preface to the document which comprises also the following three sections: a Declaration, a Programme of Action and recommendations concerning the international machinery for disarmament negotiations. (7)

8. While the final objective of the efforts of all States should continue to be general and complete disarmament under effective international control, the immediate goal is that of the elimination of the danger of a nuclear war and the implementation of measures to halt and reverse the arms race and clear the path towards lasting peace. Negotiations on the entire range of those issues should be based on the strict observance of the purposes and principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, with full recognition of the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament and reflecting the vital interest of all the peoples of the world in this sphere. The aim of the Declaration is to review and assess the existing situation, outline the objectives and the priority tasks and set forth fundamental principles for disarmament negotiations. (8)

9. For disarmament, the aims and purposes of which the Declaration proclaims, to become a reality it was essential to agree on a series of specific disarmament measures, selected by common accord as those on which there is a consensus to the effect that their subsequent realization in the short term appears to be feasible. There is also a need to prepare through agreed procedures a comprehensive disarmament programme. That programme, passing through all the necessary stages, should lead to general and complete disarmament under effective international control. Procedures for watching over the fulfilment of the obligations thus assumed had also to be agreed upon. That is the purpose of the Programme of Action. (9)

10. Although the decisive factor for achieving real measures of disarmament is the "political will" of States, and especially of those possessing nuclear weapons, a significant role can also be played by the effective functioning of an appropriate international machinery designed to deal with the problems of disarmament in its various aspects. Consequently, it would be necessary that the two kinds of organs required to that end, the deliberative and the negotiating organs, have the appropriate organization and procedures that would be most conducive to obtaining constructive results. The fourth and last section of the Final Document has been prepared with that end in view. (10)

II. DECLARATION

A. Review and Appraisal

11. Mankind today is confronted with an unprecedented threat of self-extinction arising from the massive and competitive accumulation of the most destructive weapons ever produced. Existing arsenals of nuclear weapons alone are more than sufficient to destroy all life on earth. Failure of efforts to halt and reverse the arms race, in particular the nuclear arms race, increases the danger of the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Yet the arms race continues. Military budgets are constantly growing, with enormous consumption of human and material resources. The increase in weapons, especially nuclear weapons, far from helping to strengthen international security, on the contrary weakens it. The vast stockpiles and tremendous build-up of arms and armed forces and the competition for qualitative refinement of weapons of all kinds to which scientific resources and technological advances are diverted, pose incalculable threats to peace. This situation both reflects and aggravates international tensions, sharpens conflicts in various regions of the world, hinders the process of détente, exacerbates the differences between opposing military alliances, jeopardizes the security of all States, heightens the sense of insecurity among all States, including the non-nuclear-weapon States, and increases the threat of nuclear war. (1)

Alternative 1:

12. Since the end of the Second World War, unresolved conflicts of national interests, uncertainty and distrust among States, //combined with rivalry among major Powers on a global scale/ /the actions of the enemies of détente and disarmament and the interests of the military industrial complex// and an unprecedented technological revolution in weaponry /inter alia/ have resulted in a massive arms race. The arms race, particularly in its nuclear aspect, runs counter to efforts to achieve further relaxation of international tension, to establish international relations based on peaceful coexistence and trust between all States, and to develop broad international co-operation and understanding. The arms race impedes the realization of the purposes and is incompatible with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations especially respect for sovereignty, refraining from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or the political independence of any State, peaceful settlement of disputes and non-intervention and non-interference in the internal affairs of States. It also adversely affects the rights of peoples freely to determine their systems of social and economic development, and hinders the struggle for self-determination and the elimination of colonial rule, racial or foreign domination or occupation. /Indeed, the massive accumulation of armaments and the acquisition of conventional and nuclear armaments technology by racist régimes present a challenging and increasingly dangerous obstacle to a world community faced with the urgent need to disarm./ /It is important to prevent the acquisition of arms and arms technology by racist régimes through strict adherence by all States to the terms of the Security Council resolutions imposing sanctions on the shipment of arms to and various economic sanctions against such régimes. Moreover, the acquisition by such régimes of conventional arms of any sort and the development of nuclear facilities not subject

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to international safeguards or the acquisition by them of nuclear weapons present increasingly dangerous obstacles and challenges to a world community faced with the need to disarm. / It is important to prevent the acquisition of arms and arms technology by racist régimes through strict adherence by all States to the terms of the Security Council resolutions imposing sanctions on the shipment of arms to and various economic sanctions against such régimes. Moreover, the acquisition by such régimes of conventional arms of any sort and the development of nuclear facilities not subject to international safeguards present increasingly dangerous obstacles and challenges to a world community faced with the need to disarm, as would their acquisition of nuclear weapons. / (2)

Alternative 2:

12. Since the end of the Second World War, unresolved conflicts of national interests, uncertainty, rivalry and distrust among States, particularly among major Powers, combined with other obstacles to détente and disarmament / and an unprecedented technological revolution in weaponry have resulted in a massive arms race. The arms race, particularly in its nuclear aspect, runs counter to efforts to achieve further relaxation of international tension, to establish international relations based on peaceful coexistence and trust between all States, and to develop broad international co-operation and understanding. The arms race impedes the realization of the purposes and is incompatible with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations especially respect for sovereignty, refraining from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or the political independence of any State, peaceful settlement of disputes and non-intervention and non-interference in the internal affairs of States. It also adversely affects the rights of peoples freely to determine their systems of social and economic development, and hinders the struggle for self-determination and the elimination of colonial rule, racial or foreign domination or occupation. / Indeed, the massive accumulation of armaments and the acquisition of conventional and nuclear armaments technology by racist régimes present a challenging and increasingly dangerous obstacle to a world community faced with the urgent need to disarm. / It is important to prevent the acquisition of arms and arms technology by racist régimes through strict adherence by all States to the terms of the Security Council resolutions imposing sanctions on the shipment of arms to and various economic sanctions against such régimes. Moreover, the acquisition by such régimes of conventional arms of any sort and the development of nuclear facilities not subject to international safeguards or the acquisition by them of nuclear weapons present increasingly dangerous obstacles and challenges to a world community faced with the need to disarm. / (2) / It is important to prevent the acquisition of arms and arms technology by racist régimes through strict adherence by all States to the terms of the Security Council resolutions imposing sanctions on the shipment of arms to and various economic sanctions against such régimes. Moreover, the acquisition by such régimes of conventional arms of any sort and the development of nuclear facilities not subject to international safeguards present increasingly dangerous obstacles and challenges to a world community faced with the need to disarm, as would their acquisition of nuclear weapons. / (2)

Alternative 3:

12. Since the end of the Second World War, unresolved conflicts of national interests, uncertainty and distrust among States, /combined with rivalry among major Powers and activities against détente and disarmament and the interests of military industrial complexes/ and an unprecedented technological revolution in weaponry have resulted in a massive arms race. The arms race, particularly in its nuclear aspect, runs counter to efforts to achieve further relaxation of international tension, to establish international relations based on peaceful coexistence and trust between all States, and to develop broad international co-operation and understanding. The arms race impedes the realization of the purposes and is incompatible with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations especially respect for sovereignty, refraining from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or the political independence of any State, peaceful settlement of disputes and non-intervention and non-interference in the internal affairs of States. It also adversely affects the rights of peoples freely to determine their systems of social and economic development, and hinders the struggle for self-determination and the elimination of colonial rule, racial or foreign domination or occupation. /Indeed, the massive accumulation of armaments and the acquisition of conventional and nuclear armaments technology by racist régimes present a challenging and increasingly dangerous obstacle to a world community faced with the urgent need to disarm./ /It is important to prevent the acquisition of arms and arms technology by racist régimes through strict adherence by all States to the terms of the Security Council resolutions imposing sanctions on the shipment of arms to and various economic sanctions against such régimes. Moreover, the acquisition by such régimes of conventional arms of any sort and the development of nuclear facilities not subject to international safeguards or the acquisition by them of nuclear weapons present increasingly dangerous obstacles and challenges to a world community faced with the need to disarm./ /It is important to prevent the acquisition of arms and arms technology by racist régimes through strict adherence by all States to the terms of the Security Council resolutions imposing sanctions on the shipment of arms to and various economic sanctions against such régimes. Moreover, the acquisition by such régimes of conventional arms of any sort and the development of nuclear facilities not subject to international safeguards present increasingly dangerous obstacles and challenges to a world community faced with the need to disarm, as would their acquisition of nuclear weapons./ (2)

Alternative 4:

12. Since the end of the Second World War, /the acceleration of the arms race, particularly the nuclear arms race,/ runs counter to efforts to achieve further relaxation of international tension, to establish international relations based on peaceful coexistence and trust between all States, and to develop broad international co-operation and understanding. The arms race impedes the realization of the purposes and is incompatible with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations especially respect for sovereignty, refraining from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or the political independence of any State, peaceful settlement of disputes and non-intervention and non-interference in the internal affairs of States. It also adversely affects the rights of peoples freely to determine their systems of social and economic development, and hinders the struggle for self-determination and the elimination of

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colonial rule, racial or foreign domination or occupation. /Indeed, the massive accumulation of armaments and the acquisition of conventional and nuclear armaments technology by racist régimes present a challenging and increasingly dangerous obstacle to a world community faced with the urgent need to disarm./ /It is important to prevent the acquisition of arms and arms technology by racist régimes through strict adherence by all States to the terms of the Security Council resolutions imposing sanctions on the shipment of arms to and various economic sanctions against such régimes. Moreover, the acquisition by such régimes of conventional arms of any sort and the development of nuclear facilities not subject to international safeguards or the acquisition by them of nuclear weapons present increasingly dangerous obstacles and challenges to a world community faced with the need to disarm./ /It is important to prevent the acquisition of arms and arms technology by racist régimes through strict adherence by all States to the terms of the Security Council resolutions imposing sanctions on the shipment of arms to and various economic sanctions against such régimes. Moreover, the acquisition by such régimes of conventional arms of any sort and the development of nuclear facilities not subject to international safeguards present increasingly dangerous obstacles and challenges to a world community faced with the need to disarm, as would their acquisition of nuclear weapons./ (2)

Alternative 5:

12. Since the end of the Second World War, unresolved conflicts of national interests, uncertainty, /distrust among States, rivalry on a global scale, antagonisms among major Powers and other obstacles to détente and disarmament/ and an unprecedented technological revolution in weaponry have resulted in a massive arms race. The arms race, particularly in its nuclear aspect, runs counter to efforts to achieve further relaxation of international tension, to establish international relations based on peaceful coexistence and trust between all States, and to develop broad international co-operation and understanding. The arms race impedes the realization of the purposes and is incompatible with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations especially respect for sovereignty, refraining from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or the political independence of any State, peaceful settlement of disputes and non-intervention and non-interference in the internal affairs of States. It also adversely affects the rights of peoples freely to determine their systems of social and economic development, and hinders the struggle for self-determination and the elimination of colonial rule, racial or foreign domination or occupation. /Indeed, the massive accumulation of armaments and the acquisition of conventional and nuclear armaments technology by racist régimes present a challenging and increasingly dangerous obstacle to a world community faced with the urgent need to disarm./ /It is important to prevent the acquisition of arms and arms technology by racist régimes through strict adherence by all States to the terms of the Security Council resolutions imposing sanctions on the shipment of arms to and various economic sanctions against such régimes. Moreover, the acquisition by such régimes of conventional arms of any sort and the development of nuclear facilities not subject to international safeguards or the acquisition by them of nuclear weapons present increasingly dangerous obstacles and challenges to a world community faced with the need to disarm./ /It is important to prevent the acquisition of arms and arms technology by racist régimes through strict adherence by all States to the terms of

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the Security Council resolutions imposing sanctions on the shipment of arms to and various economic sanctions against such régimes. Moreover, the acquisition by such régimes of conventional arms of any sort and the development of nuclear facilities not subject to international safeguards present increasingly dangerous obstacles and challenges to a world community faced with the need to disarm, as would their acquisition of nuclear weapons. (2)

13. Enduring international peace and security cannot be built on the accumulation of weaponry by military alliances nor be sustained by a precarious balance of deterrence or doctrines of strategic superiority. Genuine and lasting peace can only be created through the effective implementation of the security system provided for in the Charter of the United Nations and the speedy and substantial reduction of arms and armed forces, by international agreement and mutual example leading ultimately to general and complete disarmament under effective international control. At the same time, the causes of the arms race and threats to peace must be reduced and to this end effective action should be taken to eliminate tensions and settle disputes by peaceful means. (3)

14. Since the process of disarmament affects the vital security interests of all States, they must all be actively concerned with and contribute to the measures of disarmament and arms limitations, which have an essential part to play in maintaining and strengthening international security. Therefore the role and responsibility of the United Nations in the sphere of disarmament, in accordance with its Charter, must be strengthened. (4)

15. It is essential that not only Governments but also the peoples of the world recognize and understand the dangers in the present situation. In order that an international conscience may develop and that world public opinion may exercise a positive influence, the United Nations should increase the dissemination of information on the armaments race and disarmament with the full co-operation of Member States. (5)

16. In a world of finite resources there is a close relationship between expenditure on armaments and economic and social development. Military expenditures are reaching ever higher levels, the highest percentage of which can be attributed to the nuclear-weapon States and most of their allies with prospects of further expansion and the danger of further increases in the expenditures of other countries. The hundreds of billions of dollars spent annually on the manufacture or improvement of weapons are in sombre and dramatic contrast to the want and poverty in which two thirds of the world's population live. This colossal waste of resources is even more serious in that it diverts to military purposes not only material, but also technical and human resources which are urgently needed for development in all countries, particularly in the developing countries. Thus, the economic and social consequences of the arms race are so detrimental that its continuation is obviously incompatible with the implementation of the new international economic order, based on justice, equity and co-operation. Consequently, resources released as a result of the implementation of disarmament measures should be used in a manner which will help to promote the well-being of all peoples and to improve the economic conditions of the developing countries. (6)

17. Disarmament has thus become an imperative and most urgent task facing the international community. No real progress has been made so far in the crucial field of the reduction of armaments. However, certain positive changes in international relations in some areas of the world provide some encouragement. Agreements have been reached that have been important in limiting certain weapons or eliminating them altogether, as in the case of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, and excluding particular areas from the arms race. The fact remains that these agreements relate only to measures of limited restraint while the arms race continues. These partial measures have done little to bring the world closer to the goal of general and complete disarmament. For more than a decade there have been no negotiations leading to a treaty on general and complete disarmament. The pressing need now is to translate into practical terms the provisions of this Final Document and to proceed along the road of binding and effective international agreements in the field of disarmament. (7)

18. Removing the threat of a world war - a nuclear war - is the most acute and urgent task of the present day. Mankind is confronted with a choice: we must halt the arms race and proceed to disarmament or face annihilation. (8)

B. /Goals and priorities/

19. The ultimate objective of the efforts of States in the disarmament process is general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

The principal goals of disarmament are to ensure the survival of mankind and to eliminate the danger of war, in particular nuclear war, to ensure that war is no longer an instrument for settling international disputes and that the use and the threat of force are eliminated from international life, as provided for in the Charter of the United Nations.

Progress towards this objective requires the conclusion and implementation of agreements on the cessation of the arms race and on genuine measures of disarmament taking into account the need of States to protect their security. (1)

20. Among such measures, effective measures of nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war have the highest priority. To this end, it is imperative to remove the threat of nuclear weapons, to halt and reverse the nuclear arms race until the total elimination of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems has been achieved, and to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

At the same time, other measures designed to prevent the outbreak of nuclear war and to lessen the danger of the threat or use of nuclear weapons should be taken. (2)

21. Along with these, agreements or other effective measures should be adopted to prohibit or prevent the development, production or use of other weapons of mass destruction. In this context, an agreement on elimination of all chemical weapons should be concluded as a matter of high priority. (3)

22. Together with negotiations on nuclear disarmament measures, negotiations should be carried out on the balanced reduction of armed forces and of conventional armaments, based on the principle of undiminished security of the parties with a view to promoting or enhancing stability at a lower military level, taking into account the need of all States to protect their security. These negotiations should be conducted with particular emphasis on armed forces and conventional weapons of nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant countries. There should also be negotiations on the limitation of international transfer of conventional weapons, based, in particular, on the same principle, /and taking into account the need of recipient States to protect their security and that of peoples under colonial or foreign domination to exercise their right to self-determination and independence/ and taking into account the right to self-determination and independence of peoples under colonial or foreign domination and the obligations of States to respect that right, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, as well as the need of recipient States to protect their security. (4)

23. Further international action should be taken to prohibit or restrict for humanitarian reasons the use of specific conventional weapons, including those which may be excessively injurious, cause unnecessary suffering or have indiscriminate effects. (5)

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24. Collateral measures both in the nuclear and conventional fields, together with other measures specifically designed to build confidence, should be undertaken in order to contribute to the creation of favourable conditions for the adoption of additional disarmament measures and to further relaxation of international tension. (6)

C. /Principles/

25. Negotiations and measures in the field of disarmament shall be guided by the fundamental principles set forth below.

26. All States Members of the United Nations reaffirm their full commitment to the purposes of the Charter of the United Nations and their obligation strictly to observe its principles as well as other relevant and generally accepted principles of international law relating to the maintenance of international peace and security.

They stress the special importance of refraining from the threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or against peoples under colonial or foreign domination seeking to exercise their right to self-determination and to achieve independence; non-intervention and non-interference in the internal affairs of other States; the inviolability of international frontiers; and the peaceful settlement of disputes, having regard to the inherent right of States to individual and collective self-defence in accordance with the Charter. (1)

27. In accordance with the Charter, the United Nations has a central role and responsibility in the sphere of disarmament. In order effectively to discharge this role and facilitate and encourage all measures in this field, the United Nations should be kept appropriately informed of all steps in this field, whether unilateral, bilateral, regional or multilateral, without prejudice to the progress of negotiations. (2)

28. All the peoples of the world have a vital interest in the success of disarmament negotiations. Consequently, all States have the duty to contribute to efforts in the field of disarmament. All States have the right to participate in disarmament negotiations. They have the right to participate on an equal footing in those multilateral disarmament negotiations which have a direct bearing on their national security. While disarmament is the responsibility of all States, the nuclear-weapon States have the primary responsibility for nuclear disarmament, and, together with other militarily significant States for halting and reversing the arms race. It is therefore important to secure their active participation. (3)

29. The adoption of disarmament measures should take place in such an equitable and balanced manner as to ensure the right of each State to security and that no individual State or group of States may obtain advantages over others at any stage. At each stage the objective should be undiminished security at the lowest possible level of armaments and military forces. (4)

30. An acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations for nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States should be strictly observed. (5)

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31. Disarmament and arms limitation agreements should provide for adequate measures of verification satisfactory to all parties concerned in order to create the necessary confidence and ensure that they are being observed by all parties. The form and modalities of the verification to be provided for in any specific agreement depend upon and should be determined by the purposes, scope and nature of the agreement. Agreements should provide for the participation of parties directly or through the United Nations system in the verification process. Where appropriate, a combination of several methods of verification as well as other compliance procedures should be employed. (6)

Alternative 1:

32. The use or threat of use of force including nuclear weapons /contrary to the Charter of the United Nations/ /against the sovereignty and territorial integrity of any State/ is indefensible /under any circumstances./ /The renunciation of the use or threat of force is of great importance to ensure more favourable conditions for halting the arms race and it should become a norm of international life./ /Any State using nuclear and thermonuclear weapons is to be considered as violating the Charter of the United Nations, as acting contrary to the laws of humanity, and as committing a crime against mankind and civilization./ /The use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States which have renounced the acquisition /and production/ and use of such weapons /and do not have them in their territory/ is indefensible under any circumstances. /To that end the nuclear-weapon States must give legally binding assurances to such non-nuclear-weapon States./ /Special agreements to this end may also be concluded between appropriate States./ (7)

Alternative 2:

32. /States should adhere to their solemn undertaking in the United Nations Charter to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State or from any acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace against any territory./ (7)

Alternative 3:

32. /The use of nuclear weapons by any State, except in self-defence against a nuclear attack, is to be considered a violation of the United Nations Charter, as contrary to the laws of humanity and a crime against mankind and civilization. The use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States not parties to the nuclear security arrangements of some nuclear Powers is indefensible under any circumstances; they should be given legally binding assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons./ (7)

Alternative 1:

33. /Taking into account the distinction to be made between zones where nuclear weapons are an element of the general equilibrium and zones where its introduction would constitute a dramatic factor of imbalance/ /The creation /where appropriate/

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of nuclear-weapon-free zones constitutes one of the most effective disarmament measures that can and should be initiated by the non-nuclear-weapon States. The nuclear-weapon States should undertake wherever possible legally binding obligations to respect the statutes of nuclear-weapon-free zones, to refrain from contributing in any way to the performance in the territories forming part of the zone of acts which involve a violation of such statutes and to refrain from using or threatening to use nuclear weapons against the States included in the zone provided that such zones are genuinely free of nuclear weapons, that relevant agreements contain no loop-holes and fully correspond to the generally recognized norms of international law. The establishment of zones of peace in various regions of the world can also contribute to the strengthening of security and promotion of friendly relations among States within such zones and international peace and security as a whole. (8)

Alternative 2:

33. The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones genuinely free of nuclear weapons on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned, and respect for such zones, constitutes an important disarmament measure. The process of establishing such zones in different parts of the world should be encouraged with the ultimate objective of achieving a world entirely free of nuclear weapons. In the process of establishing such zones, the characteristics of each region should be taken into account. (8)

Alternative 3:

33. The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned, full compliance with those arrangements, thus ensuring that they are genuinely free from nuclear weapons, and respect for such zones by nuclear-weapon States as spelled out in the Programme of Action, constitutes an important disarmament measure. The process of establishing such zones in different parts of the world should be encouraged with the ultimate objective of achieving a world entirely free of nuclear weapons. In the process of establishing such zones, the characteristics of each region should be taken into account. (8)

34. Disarmament, relaxation of international tension, respect for the right to self-determination and national independence, the peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the strengthening of international peace and security are directly related to each other. Progress in any of these spheres has a beneficial effect on all of them; in turn, failure in one sphere has negative effects on others. (9)

35. There is also a close relationship between disarmament and development. Progress in the former would help greatly to the realization of the latter. Therefore resources released as a result of the implementation of disarmament measures should be devoted to economic and social development of all nations and contribute to the bridging of the economic gap between developed and developing countries. (10)

Alternative 1:

36. Measures of disarmament shall not be construed in such a way as to hamper should be consistent with the inalienable right of all States without discrimination to develop, transfer, acquire or use without any discrimination or hindrance, nuclear technology, equipment or materials for peaceful purposes and to determine their peaceful nuclear programmes in accordance with their national priorities, needs and interests. Such measures must not hinder the strengthening of international co-operation in that field. In order to ensure that the peaceful application of nuclear energy does not lead to further proliferation of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices access to such technology, equipment and material and its application for peaceful purposes should be subject to universal, standardized and non-discriminatory international safeguards agreed upon by supplier and recipient States appropriate national and international measures, including in particular the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards system to cover all relevant nuclear activities of non-nuclear-weapon States applied through the International Atomic Energy Agency on a non-discriminatory basis and without jeopardizing the respective fuel cycle policies of various countries or international co-operation, agreements and contracts for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy which should be fulfilled in good faith in accordance with their terms and provisions. (11)

Alternative 2:

36. Measures of disarmament must be consistent with the inalienable right of all States, without discrimination, to develop or acquire the necessary nuclear technology, equipment, or materials for the peaceful use of nuclear energy, bearing in mind the need to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. In that regard, effective measures can and should be taken at the national level and through international agreements to minimize the danger of the proliferation of nuclear weapons without jeopardizing the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. The effect of the widespread application of such measures should be to facilitate the strengthening of peaceful nuclear co-operation between States, in particular access to nuclear supplies, services, and technology for peaceful purposes. Such international co-operation should be conducted under agreed and appropriate international safeguards applied through the IAEA on a non-discriminatory basis. (11)

Alternative 3:

36. Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is a matter of universal concern. Measures of disarmament must be consistent with the inalienable right of all States, without discrimination, to develop, acquire and use nuclear technology, equipment and materials for the peaceful use of nuclear energy and to determine their peaceful nuclear programmes in accordance with their national priorities, needs and interests, bearing in mind the need to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. International co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be conducted under agreed and appropriate international safeguards applied on a non-discriminatory basis. (11)

Alternative 4:

36. Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is a matter of universal concern. Measures of disarmament must be consistent with the inalienable right of all States, without discrimination, to develop, acquire and use nuclear technology, equipment and materials for the peaceful use of nuclear energy and to determine their peaceful nuclear programmes in accordance with their national priorities, needs and interests. International co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be conducted under agreed and appropriate international safeguards applied through the IAEA on a non-discriminatory basis in order to prevent effectively the proliferation of nuclear weapons. (11)

Alternative 1:

37. /Significant progress in nuclear disarmament would be facilitated by parallel political and international legal guarantees to strengthen the security of States./ (12)

Alternative 2:

37. /Political and international legal guarantees to strengthen the security of States would be conducive to significant progress in nuclear disarmament./ (12)

Alternative 3:

37. /Disarmament negotiations would be facilitated by parallel political and international legal guarantees to strengthen the security of States./ (12)
(This alternative text was proposed with the suggestion that it be included as the last sentence of paragraph 34 (9)).

38. Negotiations on partial measures of disarmament should be conducted concurrently with negotiations on more comprehensive measures and should be followed by negotiations leading to a treaty on general and complete disarmament under effective international control. (13)

39. Qualitative and quantitative disarmament measures are both important for halting the arms race. Efforts to that end must include negotiations on the limitation and cessation of the qualitative improvement of armaments, especially weapons of mass destruction and the development of new means of warfare so that ultimately scientific and technological achievements may be used solely for peaceful purposes. (14)

Alternative 1:

40. /In order to help create confidence among all States /all States parties to disarmament agreements /and to agreements with disarmament implications/ should fully comply with the provisions contained therein/ /all States should /accede/ /give further serious consideration to acceding/ to relevant existing international agreements /which are non-discriminatory and in which they have negotiated with the

/...

active participation of all States/ aimed at limiting the arms race and achieving disarmament./ /In addition, every effort should be made to /facilitate/ /achieve/ the widest possible adherence to existing disarmament agreements/ /which have been approved by consensus by the United Nations General Assembly./ (15)

Alternative 2:

40. /In order to create confidence among States, all States parties to agreements dealing with disarmament should fully comply with the provisions contained therein./ /It is necessary to strengthen the international treaties and agreements in force which are designed to limit the arms race and to ensure their universality and the participation in them of all States without exception./ (15)

Alternative 3:

40. /Disarmament agreements that are universally acceptable help create confidence among States. In order to create such confidence all parties to disarmament agreements should fully comply with the provisions contained therein. Confidence may also be strengthened through concrete steps to remove obstacles to wider acceptance of such agreements. (15)

Alternative 4:

40. /Disarmament agreements that are universally accepted help create confidence among States. Confidence is also strengthened when disarmament agreements relating to a particular region or a particular type of weapon attract the adherence of all States whose participation is essential to their effectiveness. In order to create confidence among States all parties to agreements dealing with disarmament should fully comply with the provisions contained therein./ (15)

Alternative 5:

40. /Disarmament agreements help create confidence among States. All parties to agreements dealing with disarmament should fully comply with the provisions contained therein. The widest possible, universal participation in such agreements, with due regard to the sovereign rights of States, will promote the effectiveness of these agreements. Further disarmament negotiations should aim at the conclusion of agreements enjoying the widest possible acceptance. /Confidence is also greatly strengthened when disarmament agreements attract the adherence of all those States whose participation is essential to their effectiveness./ /Confidence is also greatly strengthened when disarmament agreements attract the adherence of all States, thus making agreements more effective./ (15)

41. /The maintenance of foreign military bases and the presence of foreign military troops on the territory of a State /without its consent/ /and in colonial and non-self-governing territories/ represent/s/ /a permanent threat/ /an impediment/ to the establishment of genuine /international peace and security/ /and effective national and regional security and therefore to the strengthening of international peace and security./ /In the process of general disarmament, it is appropriate to

/...

consider measures that could provide for the dismantling or conversion to peaceful use of military bases and facilities wherever they might be located. (16)

42. In order to create favourable conditions for success in the disarmament process, all States should strictly abide by the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, refrain from actions which might adversely affect efforts in the field of disarmament, and display a constructive approach to negotiations and the political will to reach agreements. There are certain negotiations on disarmament under way at different levels, the early and successful completion of which could contribute to limiting the arms race. Unilateral measures of arms limitation or reduction could also contribute to the attainment of that goal. (17)

43. Since prompt measures should be taken in order to halt and reverse the arms race, Member States hereby declare that they will respect the above-stated objectives and principles and make every effort faithfully to carry out the Programme of Action set forth in section III below.

III. PROGRAMME OF ACTION

A. /Objectives/General and complete disarmament/

44. Progress towards the goal of general and complete disarmament can be achieved through the implementation of a programme of action on disarmament, in accordance with the goals and principles established in the Declaration of Disarmament. The present Programme of Action contains priorities and measures in the field of disarmament that States should undertake as a matter of urgency with a view to halting and reversing the arms race and to giving the necessary impetus to efforts designed to achieve genuine disarmament leading to general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

B. /Priorities/

45. The present Programme of Action enumerates the specific measures of disarmament which should be implemented over the next few years, as well as other measures and studies to prepare the way for future negotiations and for progress toward general and complete disarmament.

46. Priorities in disarmament negotiations shall be: nuclear weapons; other weapons of mass destruction, including chemical weapons; conventional weapons, including any which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects; and reduction of armed forces.

46. Proposed alternative

/In disarmament negotiations, equal importance should be attached to the reduction of conventional armaments and that of nuclear armaments, and the two should proceed in conjunction. Disarmament should cover:/

47. Nothing should preclude States from conducting negotiations on all priority items concurrently.

48. /For the purposes of implementing these priorities the following measures aiming at ending completely any further quantitative and qualitative build-up of arms and armed forces of States with a large military potential should be adopted within a specified limited period:

- Cessation of the production of all types of nuclear weapons;
- Cessation of the production of, and prohibition of, all other types of weapons of mass destruction;
- Cessation of the development of new types of conventional armaments of great destructive capability;

/...

- Renunciation by the permanent members of the Security Council, and by countries which have military agreements with them of the expansion of their armies and the build-up of their conventional armaments.

A start should be made, for example, with the cessation of the production of nuclear weapons.

C. Immediate and short-term measures to halt and reverse the arms race

1. Nuclear disarmament

49. Nuclear weapons pose the greatest danger to mankind and to the survival of civilization. It is essential to halt and reverse the nuclear arms race in all its aspects in order to avert the danger of war involving nuclear weapons. The ultimate goal in this context is the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

50. In the task of achieving the goals of nuclear disarmament, all the nuclear-weapon States, in particular those among them which possess the most important nuclear arsenals, bear a special responsibility.

51. The process of nuclear disarmament should be carried out in such a way, and requires measures to ensure that the security of all States is guaranteed at progressively lower levels of nuclear armaments taking into account the relative qualitative and quantitative importance of the existing arsenals of the nuclear-weapon States and other States concerned.

52. The achievement of nuclear disarmament will require urgent negotiation of agreement(s) at appropriate stages and with adequate measures of verification satisfactory to the States concerned for:

- cessation of the qualitative improvement and development of nuclear-weapon systems;
- cessation of the production of all types of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, and the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes;
- comprehensive time-bound programme of comprehensive phased programme of progressive and balanced reduction of stockpiles of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, leading to their ultimate and complete elimination. at the earliest possible time.

53. Consideration can be given in the course of the negotiations to mutual and agreed limitation or prohibition, without prejudice to the security of any State, of any types of nuclear armaments.

54. The process of nuclear disarmament described above should be expedited by the urgent and vigorous pursuit to a successful conclusion of ongoing negotiations and the urgent initiation of further negotiations among the nuclear-weapon States.

/...

(a) /CTB/

55. The cessation of nuclear-weapon testing by all States within the framework of an effective nuclear disarmament process would be in the interest of mankind. It would make a significant contribution to the aim of ending the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and the development of new types of such weapons and of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. In this context the negotiations now in progress on a "treaty prohibiting nuclear-weapon tests, and a protocol covering nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes which would be an integral part of the treaty," should be concluded urgently and the result submitted for full consideration by the multilateral negotiating body with a view to the submission of a draft treaty to the General Assembly at the earliest possible date.

56. All efforts should be made by the negotiating parties to achieve an agreement which, following General Assembly endorsement, could attract the widest possible adherence.

57. /Pending the conclusion of this treaty there should be a moratorium on the testing of nuclear weapons./

(b) /Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT)/

58. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America should conclude at the earliest possible date the agreement they have been pursuing for several years in the second series of the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT II). They are invited to transmit in good time the text of the agreement to the General Assembly. It should be followed promptly by further strategic arms limitation negotiations between the two parties leading to agreed significant reductions of and qualitative limitations on strategic arms. It should constitute an important step in the direction of nuclear disarmament and ultimately of establishment of a world free of such weapons.

* * *

59. Significant progress in nuclear disarmament would be facilitated both by parallel political or international legal measures to strengthen the security of States and by progress in the limitation and reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments of the nuclear-weapon States and other States in the regions concerned.

60. Real progress in the field of nuclear disarmament could create an atmosphere conducive to progress in conventional disarmament world-wide.

(c) /Non-use of nuclear weapons and prevention of the outbreak of nuclear war/

61. The most effective guarantee against the danger of nuclear war and the use of nuclear weapons is nuclear disarmament and the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

62. Pending the achievement of this goal negotiations for which should be vigorously pursued, and bearing in mind the devastating results which nuclear war would have on belligerents and non-belligerents alike, the nuclear-weapon States have special responsibilities to undertake measures aimed at preventing the outbreak of nuclear war, and of /the use of force in international relations including/ the use of nuclear weapons.

63. In this context, the nuclear weapon States are called upon:

Alternative 1

(a) /to assure mankind at large that its continued survival will not be endangered in any way by the use of nuclear weapons;/

Alternative 2

(a) /to assure mankind at large that its continued survival in a life-sustaining environment will not be imperilled in any way by the use of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction;/

Alternative 3

(a) /not to endanger the survival of mankind by the use of nuclear weapons;/

(b) /to recognize that the use of such weapons will be a crime against humanity and should therefore be outlawed;/

(c) /to take /further/ steps to assure the non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. In this context the General Assembly

/...

notes the declarations made by the nuclear-weapon States and urges them to pursue vigorously a binding arrangement to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons and urges all the nuclear-weapon States to conclude relevant agreements with appropriate non-nuclear-weapon States.

64. Alternative 1

All States should actively participate in efforts to bring about an international situation favouring the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons.

64. Alternative 2

All States should actively consider participate in the conclusion of an international convention on the non-use of force in international relations including the non-use of nuclear weapons. In the meantime requests all States, particularly the nuclear-weapon States, to submit to the General Assembly at its thirty-third session proposals concerning the non-use of nuclear weapons, avoidance of nuclear war and related matters, in order to facilitate an international convention.

65. They should maintain and wherever necessary improve their existing organizational and technical arrangements for guarding against the accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons under their control. They should also, where they have not yet done so, conclude agreements concerning measures to diminish and avert the danger of nuclear war.

(d) Nuclear-weapon-free zones

66. The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned, constitutes an important disarmament measure.

67. The process of establishing such zones in different parts of the world should be encouraged with the ultimate objective of achieving a world entirely free of nuclear weapons. In the process of establishing such zones, the characteristics of each region should be taken into account. The States participating in such zones should undertake to comply fully with all the objectives, purposes and principles of the agreements or arrangements establishing the zones, thus ensuring that they are fully and genuinely free from weapons.

68. With respect to such zones, the nuclear-weapon States in turn are urged to give undertakings, in terms to be negotiated with the competent authority of each zone, in particular:

(a) to respect strictly the status of the nuclear-weapon-free zone;

(b) to refrain from the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against the States of the zone.

69. The effectiveness of nuclear-weapon-free zones could be enhanced by the dismantling of all military bases of nuclear-weapon States in the zone concerned and by not subjecting any State in the zone to acts of aggression.

70. In the light of existing conditions, and without prejudices to other measures which may be considered in other regions, the following measures are especially desirable:

(a) Adoption by the States concerned of all relevant measures to ensure the full application of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco);

(b) Signature and ratification of the Additional Protocols of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) by the States entitled to become parties to those instruments which have not yet done so;

(c) In Africa, where the Organization of African Unity has affirmed a decision for the denuclearization of the region, the Security Council shall take appropriate effective steps whenever necessary to prevent the frustration of this objective;

(d) The serious consideration of the practical and urgent steps required for the implementation of the proposal for a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East where all parties directly concerned have expressed their support for the concept and where the implications the threat of nuclear-weapon proliferation are is would be acute. Pending the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, States of the region should solemnly declare that they will refrain on a reciprocal basis from producing, acquiring, or in any other way, possessing nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive devices, and from permitting the stationing of nuclear weapons on their territory by any third party and agree to place all their nuclear activities under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards. The Security Council should consider preventive measures to ensure that the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East should not be frustrated by any State in the region.

(e) All States and parties in the region of Parties to the nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia should take consider taking steps to implement the objective of keeping their region free of nuclear weapons. In the meantime, no action should be taken by them which would retard the establishment of the nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region. All States and parties in the region Parties to the nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region should accept the application of the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards over their nuclear facilities on a non-discriminatory basis. The United Nations should continue to encourage measures to establish the could keep the establishment of the nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region under review.

(f) The States belonging to the Balkans should be encouraged to convert it into an area of good neighbourliness, without nuclear weapons.

/...

(e) Zones of Peace

71. The establishment of zones of peace in various regions of the world, under appropriate conditions, to be clearly defined and determined freely by all States in the zone concerned, taking into account the characteristics of the zone and the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and in conformity with international law, can contribute to strengthening the security of States within such zones and to international peace and security as a whole.

72. The creation of zones of peace should be encouraged, inter alia, in:

(a) South-East Asia where States in the region have expressed interest in the establishment of such a zone, in conformity with their views;

(b) Indian Ocean in conformity with taking into account the relevant General Assembly resolutions; and the need to ensure the maintenance of peace and security in the region.

(c) Mediterranean.

(f) Non-proliferation

73. It is imperative as an integral part of the effort to halt and reverse the arms race, to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The goal of nuclear non-proliferation is on the one hand to prevent the emergence of any additional nuclear-weapon States beside the existing five nuclear-weapon States, and on the other progressively to reduce and eventually eliminate nuclear weapons altogether. This involves obligations and responsibilities on the part of both nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States, the former undertaking to stop the nuclear-arms race and to achieve nuclear disarmament by urgent application of measures to stop the development and further production of nuclear weapons and to achieve nuclear disarmament through the reduction and elimination of existing stockpiles, to halt the build-up of nuclear arsenals with the objective of eliminating the stockpiles of nuclear weapons and all States undertaking to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.

74. Therefore, the nuclear-weapon States and the non-nuclear-weapon States should take jointly further steps to develop an international consensus on ways and means, on a universal and non-discriminatory basis, to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. These may include:

75. Proposed alternative 1

(i) - Acceptance by all States of the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on all peaceful nuclear activities;

- Evolution of an agreed and standardized system of international safeguards to be applied through the International Atomic Energy Agency on a universal and non-discriminatory basis.

75. Proposed alternative 2

Ensuring that those States which have not yet adhered to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons should, at a minimum, place all nuclear facilities under agreed and appropriate international safeguards applied through the International Atomic Energy Agency.

In this connexion, note is taken of the work of the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation which should be pursued strictly in accordance with the objectives set out in the joint communiqué of its organizing Conference.

(ii) Adherence to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons after it has been renegotiated and made equitable in terms of responsibilities and obligations assumed by nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States. Total renegotiation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons so that it is made equitable and non-discriminatory in terms of responsibilities and obligations assumed by nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States, thus facilitating universal adherence. In this context, the urgent application by nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear

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Weapons/ of measures envisaged in article VI of the Treaty, /under appropriate safeguards/ /strengthening the security of non-nuclear-weapon States, in particular, providing them with credible and effective security assurances, and ensuring universality and non-discrimination in the régime of non-proliferation/, will further facilitate universal adherence.

(iii) Adherence to the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the Additional Protocols, as appropriate, and the creation of other nuclear-weapon-free zones /wherever feasible./ /under conditions set out in the relevant paragraphs of the section on nuclear-weapon-free zones./

(iv) /Other measures to prevent the immediate danger of development and acquisition of nuclear weapons by States which are reportedly developing such weapons./

(v) /Implementation by the nuclear-weapon States of their obligation with respect to nuclear disarmament and strengthening of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States./

(vi) Agreements should be reached on adequate standards for the physical protection of nuclear materials./

76. Non-proliferation measures should /enable/ /enable and not hinder/ /not hinder/ the exercise of the inalienable right of all States to apply and develop their programmes for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy for economic and social development in conformity with their priorities, interests and needs and to have access to /and be free to/ acquire technology, equipment and materials for peaceful uses of nuclear energy, taking into account the particular needs of the developing countries, /under effective International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards./

77. /Nothing should be done to prejudice the faithful implementation of international agreements and contracts for the transfer and development of nuclear equipment, material and technology in accordance with their terms and provisions./

78. International co-operation for the promotion of the transfer and utilization of nuclear technology for economic and social development, especially in the developing countries should be strengthened. Such co-operation should be under agreed and appropriate international safeguards applied through the International Atomic Energy Agency on a /universal and/ non-discriminatory basis in order to prevent effectively the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

79. /All States, in particular the nuclear supplier countries, should adhere strictly to the principles contained in resolution 32/50 of the General Assembly regarding international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear technology. In accordance with the principles of this resolution an international programme should be adopted for the promotion of transfer and utilization of nuclear technology for economic and social development in the developing countries./

80. Elimination of the restrictive and discriminatory features of policies in the supply of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes.^{*}

(A delegation proposed that the whole section be deleted.)

2. Other weapons of mass destruction

81. International action is urgently required to rule out, once and for all, the emergence and deployment of neutron weapons. As a result of the discussions on that subject it can be stated with full confidence that:

- Neutron weapons are particularly inhuman means of mass destruction of people;
- Neutron weapons will inevitably lower the threshold of a nuclear war and consequently increase the probability of such a war;
- The introduction of neutron weapons by one group of States will inevitably lead to similar action on the part of another group of countries, and this will open up a new trend in the nuclear arms race, as happened in the 1940s with atomic weapons and in the 1950s with thermonuclear weapons;
- The emergence of any one type of neutron weapon could merely mark the start of this race: the first type will inevitably be followed by other types, with even greater destructive capability, designed to attain objectives broader than those currently conceived, including objectives which go beyond the confines of a single continent;
- In the interests of the security of the peoples and in the light of the above-mentioned facts, consideration of the draft convention on the prohibition of the production, stockpiling, deployment and use of nuclear neutron weapons should be accorded high priority and, at its thirty-third session, the General Assembly should sum up the results of the work accomplished. / (1)

82. All States should adhere to the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare. (2)

83. All States which have not yet done so should consider adhering to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction. (3)

84. States should also consider the possibility of adhering to multilateral agreements concluded so far in the disarmament field which are mentioned below in this section. (4)

* Location to be determined.

85. The complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and their destruction represent one of the most urgent measures of disarmament. Consequently, conclusion of a convention to this end, on which negotiations have been going on for several years, is one of the most urgent tasks of multilateral negotiations. After its conclusion, all States should contribute to ensuring the broadest possible application of the convention through its early signature and ratification. (5)

86. A convention should be concluded prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons. (6)

87. In order to help prevent a qualitative arms race and so that scientific and technological achievements may ultimately be used solely for peaceful purposes, effective measures should be taken to avoid the danger and prevent the emergence of new types of weapons of mass destruction based on new scientific achievements and principles. Efforts should be appropriately pursued aiming at the prohibition of such new types and new systems of weapons of mass destruction. Specific agreements could be concluded on particular types of new weapons of mass destruction which may be identified. This priority question should be kept under continuing review. (7)

88. The CCD should keep under review the need for a further prohibition of military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques in order to eliminate the dangers to mankind from such use. (8)

89. In order to promote the peaceful use of and to avoid an arms race on the seabed and the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof, the CCD is requested -- in consultation with the States parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and the Subsoil Thereof, and taking into account the proposals made during the 1977 Review Conference and any relevant technological developments -- to proceed promptly with the consideration of further measures in the field of disarmament for the prevention of an arms race in that environment. (9)

90. In order to prevent an arms race in outer space, further measures should be taken and appropriate international negotiations be held in accordance with the spirit of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies. (10)

3. Conventional weapons

91. Together with negotiations on nuclear disarmament measures, the limitation and gradual reduction of armed forces and conventional weapons should be resolutely pursued within the framework of progress towards general and complete disarmament. States with the largest military arsenals have a special responsibility in pursuing the process of conventional armaments reductions. (1)

92. In particular the achievement of a more stable situation in Europe at a lower level of military potential on the basis of approximate equality and parity, as well as on the basis of undiminished security of all States with full respect for security interests and independence of States outside military alliances, by agreement on appropriate mutual reductions and limitations would contribute to the strengthening of security in Europe and constitute a significant step towards enhancing international peace and security. Current efforts to this end should be continued most energetically. (2)

93. Agreements or other measures should be resolutely pursued on a bilateral, regional and multilateral basis with the aim of strengthening peace and security at a lower level of forces, by the limitation and reduction of armed forces and of conventional weapons, taking into account the need of States to protect their security, bearing in mind the inherent right of self-defence embodied in the Charter of the United Nations and without prejudice to the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples in accordance with the Charter, and the need to ensure balance at each stage and undiminished security of all States. Such measures might include: (3)

94. Bilateral, regional and multilateral consultations and conferences where appropriate conditions exist with the participation of all the countries concerned for the consideration of different aspects of conventional disarmament; such as the initiative envisaged in the Declaration of Ayacucho subscribed in 1974 by eight Latin American countries and the Declaration of Bucharest adopted by the States members of the Warsaw Treaty in 1976; (4)

95. Consultations should be carried out on the limitation of international transfer of conventional weapons, based, in particular, on the principle of undiminished security of the parties with a view to promoting or enhancing stability at a lower military level, taking into account the need of all States to protect their security. (5)

96. Negotiations on cessation of the development and thus of production and deployment of new types of conventional armaments with a high destructive capability. (6)

97. For the sake of strengthening their national defence, safeguarding national independence and security, all countries have the right to acquire the necessary conventional armaments on an equitable basis. The super-Powers must not be allowed to use the export of conventional armaments to subject other nations to interference and control, much less to incite conflicts and wars among nations. (7)

/Particularly inhumane weapons/

98. The 1979 United Nations Conference on Prohibitions or Restrictions of Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which may be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects should seek agreement, in the light of humanitarian and military considerations, on the prohibition or restriction of use of certain conventional weapons including those which may cause unnecessary suffering or which may have indiscriminate effects. The conference should consider specific categories of such weapons, including those which were the subject-matter of previously conducted discussions. (1)

99. All States are called upon to contribute towards carrying out this task. (2)

100. The result of the Conference should be considered by all States and especially producer States, in regard to the question of the transfer of such weapons to other States. (3)

4. /Reduction of military budgets and armed forces/

101. Freezing and gradual reduction, in absolute figures or in terms of percentage points, of military budgets of States on an agreed /and verifiable/ basis, particularly those of nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant States would be a measure that can contribute to the /suffocation/ /curbing/ of arms race/s/. (1)

102. Therefore the General Assembly at its thirty-third session should consider what concrete steps could be taken to facilitate the reduction of military budgets including those of permanent members of the Security Council as well as those other militarily significant States. /bearing in mind reports of groups of experts on this question./ (2)

101/102. Proposed alternative

/Limiting and progressively reducing military budgets, including budgets for research and development of new strategic nuclear-weapons systems, on an agreed basis incorporating full openness of reporting and a fully effective means of authentication, particularly by nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant States would be one of the most effective means of curbing the arms race./

Paragraphs 103-104, proposed alternatives for section

103. /The General Assembly should establish, at its thirty-third session, a committee in which the two major nuclear-weapon States and other States engaged in substantial military expenditure would participate, with a view to the committee's submitting to the General Assembly, no later than at its thirty-fifth session, a report containing a data-presentation system which would allow a minimum of uniformity in the measurement of military budgets./ (3)

/...

103. Proposed alternative

The General Assembly at its thirty-third session should consider what concrete steps could be taken to facilitate the reduction of military budgets including those of the permanent members of the Security Council as well as of any other State with comparable military expenditures, bearing in mind the successive reports of the groups of experts on this question. (3)

104. The two major nuclear-weapon States should formulate a joint declaration (or similar separate declarations) in which they would undertake, as soon as the General Assembly had approved the report proposed in the preceding paragraph, to reduce by 10 per cent their military expenditure and to devote a considerable part of the savings to the promotion of the economic and social development of the developing countries. (4)

104. Proposed alternative

The General Assembly requests the permanent members of the Security Council to undertake to reduce their military expenditures. The savings A substantial part of the savings realized should be paid to the United Nations and used solely for development assistance to the developing countries. (4)

Paragraphs 105-108, proposed alternatives for section

105. The Secretary-General should organize a pilot test of a system for the reporting of military expenditures by States, drawing on the recommendations on a standardized reporting instrument by the intergovernmental Group of Budgetary Experts with the participation of States representing different economic military budgeting and accounting systems. (5)

106. The Secretary-General should appoint an ad hoc panel of budgetary experts, under the aegis of the United Nations, to give guidance to States supplying the required data, to analyse the results of the pilot test, to refine further the system and to develop recommendations for larger-scale application of the reporting instrument. (6)

107. The Secretary-General should submit a progress report to the General Assembly at its thirty-fourth session. (7)

108. The General Assembly should at its thirty-fourth session consider establishing a committee with the participation of major military States to consider the recommendations of the ad hoc panel. (8)

Proposed alternative for section

109. The General Assembly should, in the light of the reports by the groups of experts on the reduction of military budgets, at its thirty-third session consider what concrete steps could be taken to promote an increased openness between

/...

States with regard to their military expenditures as a means of building confidence and facilitating agreed reductions of armed forces./

Proposed alternatives for section

110. /To facilitate a solution to this question, States with a large economic and military potential, including all the permanent members of the Security Council, should agree on specific reductions in their own military budgets not in terms of percentage points but in absolute figures. Such agreement might cover, for instance, a period of three years, beginning with the budget for the next financial year.

111. At the same time, agreement could be reached on specific amounts which each State that reduced its military budget would allocate for increased aid to developing countries. In that event it would be desirable to set up machinery within the framework of the United Nations for the apportionment of such funds among the States receiving aid./

Proposed alternative for section

112. /The reduction of armed forces of States to levels necessary for the maintenance of internal order and fulfilment of obligations of States with regard to the safeguarding of international peace shall take place within the context of general and complete disarmament./ (9)

Proposed addition to section

113. /Before the realization of general and complete disarmament, all States have the right to maintain and build up the military strength necessary for their national defence, and the two Powers which possess the biggest arsenals should drastically reduce the nuclear and conventional armaments that exceed their defence needs. When major progress has really been made in the reduction of the nuclear and conventional armaments of the above two Powers, the other nuclear countries and militarily significant countries should also carry out disarmament, including the reduction of armed forces, at an equitable and reasonable proportion./ (10)

D. Implementation of disarmament agreements

114. In order to facilitate the conclusion and effective implementation of disarmament agreements and to create confidence, States should accept appropriate provisions for verification in such agreements. (1)

115. In the context of international disarmament negotiations, the problem of verification should be further examined and adequate methods and procedures in this field be considered. (2)

Proposed alternative

115. All aspects of the problem of verification should be examined to ensure that these verification measures are non-discriminatory, do not constitute undue interference in the internal affairs of States and do not unnecessarily impede their economic and social development programmes. For this purpose, more efficient methods and procedures in this field be considered. (2)

116. The Secretary-General is requested to transmit the working paper on verification contained in document A/AC.187/109 to Governments, to ascertain views of Member States on the subject and to submit replies of Member States together with a systematic presentation in a report to the thirty-fourth General Assembly. (3)

117. Methods of monitoring and verifying disarmament agreements and measures to strengthen international confidence and security could be strengthened by the use of observation of the earth by artificial satellite technology. Such satellite observation technology should therefore be part of the disarmament efforts undertaken by the international community. To this end, the establishment of an international satellite monitoring agency should be taken into consideration. (4)

118. The Secretary-General is requested to seek the views of Member States on this subject before 31 March 1979 and in a second phase to establish a committee of qualified governmental experts to study the functions, statute, structure and resources of the agency and to report to the General Assembly at its thirty-fourth session. (5)

E. Other measures to strengthen international security and to build confidence

119. In order to facilitate the process of disarmament, it is necessary to take measures and pursue policies to strengthen international peace and security and to build confidence among States. Commitment to confidence-building measures could significantly contribute to preparing for further progress in disarmament. For this purpose, the following measures should be undertaken: (1)

120. Solemn reaffirmation by States, on a regional or bilateral basis, where appropriate of their obligation, as embodied in the Charter of the United Nations strictly to observe the principles of non-use of force or threat of force in any

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form against the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of States which would contribute to the creation of a climate of confidence among States; (2)

121. Early conclusion of a treaty on the non-use of force in international relations; (3)

122. For the purposes of halting the process, which can lead to dangerous consequences, including the destabilization of the existing strategic situation, it is necessary to reach agreement on the non-stationing of nuclear weapons in the territories of States in which there are none at present. In practice, this means that no nuclear weapons should be stationed in the future, either in the form of deployed combat nuclear systems or in the form of stockpiles of nuclear warheads, bombs, shells and mines, in the territories of States in which there are no nuclear weapons at present. (4)

123. Non-nuclear-weapon States should make declarations to the effect that they will not allow the stationing of nuclear weapons in their territories.

124. The nuclear-weapon States could take a major positive step by assuming the obligation not to station nuclear weapons in countries in which there are none at present. Such an obligation should be universal in character, that is, it should be applicable to any non-nuclear State in whose territory there are no nuclear weapons, regardless of whether any particular nuclear State is or is not an ally of that State. (6)

125. The form of such an obligation could be determined through an exchange of views among nuclear-weapon States. (5)

126. In order to promote a climate of international confidence conducive to disarmament, the General Assembly calls for further and intensified efforts in the organs of the United Nations in which action is being taken or studies are in progress on peaceful settlement of disputes and peace-keeping. The General Assembly will give further consideration to this matter at forthcoming sessions with a view to supplementing existing activities as necessary. (5)

126. Proposed alternative

In order to promote a climate of international confidence conducive to disarmament, the General Assembly calls for further and intensified efforts in the organs of the United Nations in which action is being taken or studies are in progress with a goal of drafting a world treaty on the non-use of force in international relations as well as on peaceful settlement of disputes and peace-keeping. The General Assembly will give further consideration to this matter at forthcoming sessions. (5)

127. The establishment of a United Nations Peace-keeping Reserve to be made up of national contingents trained in United Nations peace-keeping methods and earmarked by their Governments for United Nations duty. This Reserve would be drawn upon by the Secretary-General whenever the Security Council decided to establish a United Nations force to maintain international peace and security. (6)

128. Prohibition of the establishment of new foreign military bases and stationing of troops in foreign territories; (7)

129. Withdrawal of foreign troops and dismantling of foreign military bases; (8)

Proposed alternatives

129. Dismantling of military bases in foreign territories and the withdrawal of foreign troops from such territories, bearing in mind the goals and principles principles and objectives of the United Nations Charter. (8)

129. The dismantling of military bases in foreign territories and the withdrawal of foreign troops from such territories should be pursued at an appropriate stage of general and complete disarmament, bearing in mind Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. (8)

130. The dissolution of military blocs; (9)

131. Not to extend the existing military alliances by admitting new members. (10)

132. Submission by States of reports information to the United Nations on their military budgets using the method shortly to be finalized through a pilot study by the Secretary-General for the standardized reporting of such budgets as a step towards verified and balanced reductions in military expenditures. (11)

133. Arrangements could be made, on a regional or bilateral basis, and in accordance with the characteristics of each region, providing for prior notification of major military manoeuvres and for exchanges of observers to military manoeuvres and other kind of exchanges, on a reciprocal basis, of military personnel by invitation. (12)

134. Arrangements could also be considered with a view to prior notification of major military movements and to refraining from the conduct of military manoeuvres above on agreed level. (13)

135. Confidence-building and stabilizing measures in various regions, including notification of manoeuvres, invitations of observers to manoeuvres and United Nations machinery to promote such measures, should be encouraged. (14)

136. An undertaking not to make shows of strength or concentrate armed forces near the frontiers of other States. (15)

137. The prevention of attacks which take place by accident, miscalculation or communications failure by taking steps to improve communications between Governments, particularly in areas of tension, by the establishment of "hot lines" and other methods of reducing the risk of conflict. (16)

138. Publish detailed information about their armed forces, and the total value of their arms production and of their transfers of arms to other countries; (17)

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139. States should assess the possible implications of their military research and development for existing agreements as well as for further efforts in the field of disarmament. (18)

140. Budget requests for major weapons and weapon systems should be accompanied by an evaluation of their impact on arms limitation and disarmament efforts. (19)

141. The Secretary-General shall periodically submit reports to the General Assembly on the economic and social consequences of the arms race and its extremely harmful effects on international peace and security. (20)

F. Disarmament and development

142. In view of the relationship between expenditure on armaments and economic and social development and the necessity to release real resources now being used for military purposes to economic and social development in the world, particularly for the benefit of the developing countries, the Secretary-General should, with the assistance of a group of qualified governmental experts appointed by him, initiate an expert study on the relationship between disarmament and development. The Secretary-General should submit an interim report on the subject to the General Assembly at its thirty-fourth session and submit the final results to the Assembly at its thirty-sixth session for subsequent action. at its second special session devoted to disarmament.* (1 and 2)

143. The expert study should have the terms of reference contained in the report of the Ad Hoc Group on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development appointed by the Secretary-General in accordance with General Assembly resolution 32/88 A of 12 December 1977. It should investigate the three main areas listed in the report, bearing in mind the United Nations studies previously carried out. The study should be made in the context of how disarmament can contribute to the establishment of the new international economic order. The study should be forward-looking and policy-oriented and place special emphasis on both the desirability of a reallocation, following disarmament measures, of resources now being used for military purposes to economic and social development, particularly for the benefit of the developing countries and the substantive feasibility of such a reallocation. A principal aim should be to produce results that could effectively guide the formulation of practical measures to reallocate those resources at the local, national, regional and international levels. (3)

144. It is appropriate to undertake immediate efforts to achieve a practical solution to the problems raised by the flagrant disproportion existing between the resources allocated to armaments expenditures and resources devoted to development aid.

In this respect, the Secretary-General is requested to report to the thirty-third General Assembly on different proposals made at the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, in particular, the establishment of an International Disarmament Fund for Development and the opening, on a provisional basis, pending

* If the decision is taken to hold such a session.

the establishment of such a fund, of an ad hoc account in the United Nations Development Programme, and the different proposals for using the savings from the reduction of military budgets which could be allocated for development assistance to the developing countries.

On the basis of that report, the thirty-third General Assembly should request the Secretary-General to prepare, with the assistance of a group of qualified governmental experts, a study on the feasibility of the establishment of the International Disarmament Fund for Development as well as on its objectives, its organization, the modalities of its operations and the nature of its resources. (4 and 5)

145. Special attention should be paid to the development of a programme aimed to allocate a substantial part of the resources released by the reduction of military budgets, to reward those nations which reduce their military expenditures to a level lower than a determined percentage of their public expenditures or their national product, regardless of their degree of development and as an incentive to promote disarmament. (6)

146. The military expenditure of the super-Powers amounts to 60 per cent of that of the whole world, and they should take the lead to reduce their military expenditure. (7)

G. Studies, information, education and training

1. Studies

147. Taking further steps in the field of disarmament and other measures aimed at promoting international peace and security would be facilitated by carrying out studies by the Secretary-General in this field with appropriate assistance from governmental or consultant experts. (1)

148. The Secretary-General shall, with the assistance of consultant experts, appointed by him, continue the study of the interrelationship between disarmament and international security and submit it to the thirty-fourth session of the General Assembly, as requested in resolution A/RES/32/154. (2)

149. The thirty-third and subsequent sessions of the General Assembly should determine the specific guidelines for carrying out studies, taking into account the proposals already submitted as well as other proposals which can be introduced later in this field. In doing so, the General Assembly would take into consideration a report on these matters prepared by the Secretary-General. (3)

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2. Information

150. In order to mobilize world public opinion on behalf of disarmament, the specific measures set forth below, designed to increase the dissemination of information about the armaments race and the efforts to halt and reverse it, should be adopted: (1)

151. Governmental and non-governmental information organs and those of the United Nations and its specialized agencies should give priority to the preparation and distribution of printed and audio-visual material relating to the danger represented by the armaments race as well as to the disarmament efforts and negotiations on specific disarmament measures. (2)

152. In particular, publicity should be given to the final documents of the special session. (3)

The General Assembly proclaims a week starting 6 August as Disarmament Week.

152. Proposed alternative

Each State is recommended to hold annually a day or a week devoted to fostering the objective of disarmament on/or beginning with 6 August /or any other day or week, if it is /suitable/ to that State. (3)

153. To encourage study and research on disarmament, the United Nations Centre for Disarmament should intensify its activities in the presentation of information concerning the armaments race and disarmament. Also, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), is urged to intensify its activities aimed at facilitating research and publication on disarmament, related to its fields of competence, especially in developing countries, and should disseminate the results of such research. (4)

154. Throughout this process of disseminating information about the developments in the disarmament field of all countries, there should be increased participation by non-governmental organizations concerned with the matter, through closer liaison between them and the United Nations. (5)

155. Member States should be encouraged to ensure a better flow of information with regard to the various aspects of disarmament to avoid dissemination of false and tendentious information concerning armaments and to concentrate on the danger of escalation of the armaments race and on the need for general and complete disarmament under effective international control. (6)

3. Education

156. With a view to contributing to a greater understanding and awareness of the problems created by the armaments race and of the need for disarmament, Governments and governmental and non-governmental international organizations are urged to take steps to develop programmes of education for disarmament and peace studies at all levels. (1)

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157. The General Assembly welcomes the initiative of UNESCO in planning to hold a world congress on disarmament education and in this connexion, urges UNESCO to step up its programme aimed at the development of disarmament education as a distinct field of study through the preparation, inter alia, of teachers' guides, textbooks, readers and audio-visual materials. Member States should take all possible measures to encourage the incorporation of such materials in the curricula for their educational institutes. (2)

4. Training

158. In order to promote expertise in disarmament in more Member States, particularly in the developing countries, the General Assembly decides to establish a programme of fellowships on disarmament. The Secretary-General, taking into account the proposal submitted to the special session, should prepare guidelines for the programme. He should also submit the financial requirements of 20 fellowships for inclusion in the regular budget of the United Nations bearing in mind the savings that can be made within the existing budgetary appropriations.

H. Comprehensive programme for disarmament

159. Implementation of these priorities should lead to general and complete disarmament under effective international control, which remains the ultimate goal of all efforts exerted in the field of disarmament. Negotiations on general and complete disarmament shall be conducted concurrently with negotiations on partial measures of disarmament. With this purpose in mind, the following measures shall be taken as a matter of urgency:

(a) Elaboration of a comprehensive programme of disarmament measures which would lead to the attainment of general and complete disarmament;

Proposed alternative for (a)

A comprehensive programme of disarmament measures may include general and complete disarmament as its goal, but it is more important to formulate practical measures for genuine disarmament, particularly for the reduction of the nuclear and conventional armaments of the two Powers which possess the greatest amount of armaments.

(b) Establishment of a special committee of the United Nations for the elaboration of the comprehensive programme of disarmament measures to be submitted to the General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session in 1980 at the latest.

Addition proposed for (b)

The special committee should be established by a decision of all countries with equal rights; the composition of the committee must fully represent the interests of all countries and must be widely representative. (1, 2 and 3)

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160. The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, as soon as it has undergone the reforms envisaged in the guidelines comprising section IV of this Final Document, will undertake the preparation of a comprehensive programme of disarmament encompassing all measures thought to be advisable in order to ensure that the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control becomes a reality in a world in which international peace and security prevail and in which the new international economic order is strengthened and consolidated. The comprehensive programme should contain appropriate procedures for facilitating the co-ordination of all disarmament negotiations, regardless of where and in what form they are conducted, and for ensuring that the General Assembly is kept fully informed of the progress of the negotiations so that it can properly perform its functions, including an appraisal of the situation when appropriate and, in particular, a continuing review of the implementation of the programme. The said programme should be completed by 1 March 1981 at the latest and should immediately thereupon be submitted, as a draft, to the Secretary-General of the United Nations so that he may transmit it to Member States and to the General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament. (4)

161. A second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament will open at the end of May 1981, its main objective being to consider and adopt the comprehensive programme of disarmament prepared in accordance with the provisions of the preceding paragraph. (5)

162. The process towards general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control should be accompanied by the establishment of reliable procedures for the peaceful settlement of disputes and in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations effective arrangements for the maintenance of peace and security, including renewed efforts to supplement by means of appropriate guidelines the arrangements concerning the United Nations peace-keeping operations. Studies and/or negotiations should be undertaken with a view to recruiting a permanent United Nations police force (Article 43 of the Charter) and establishing an international organ to supervise the application of disarmament agreements in force. (6)

162. Addition proposed to paragraph 160

In this context, the work of the Special Committee on the Charter of the United Nations and on the Strengthening of the Role of the Organization and the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations assumes greater significance. (6)

162. Amendment to 162nd paragraph

Delete the words: "United Nations police force". (6)

163. General and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control shall permit States to have at their disposal only those non-nuclear forces, armaments, facilities and establishments as are agreed to be necessary to maintain internal order and protect the personal security of citizens and in order that States shall support and provide agreed manpower for a United Nations police force. (7)

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I. Guidelines for implementation

164. All States, in particular the nuclear-weapon States, are called upon to contribute to the implementation of the Programme of Action;

165. Specific measures of the Programme of Action shall be implemented by individual States or groups of States which may conduct, for this purpose, bilateral or multilateral negotiations and shall inform the United Nations of the results thereof;

166. These measures shall be implemented in accordance with the above-mentioned priorities, bearing in mind the necessity to conduct, whenever possible, parallel negotiations on several measures with a view to reaching agreement on each of them as soon as possible;

167. Implementation should be in an agreed sequence, by stages, with each measure and stage carried out with specified time-limits, the entire process being completed not later than the end of the next decade;

168. Implementation of disarmament measures should be facilitated by the speeding up of the process of resolving outstanding problems and disputes which threaten international peace and security. This should include application, where appropriate, of the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.

169. The present Programme of Action has a twofold purpose. First of all, it enumerates a series of specific disarmament measures which have been selected because there is a consensus on the need and advisability of making every possible effort to implement them within a period of not more than three years, it being felt that realistically and objectively, there is a reasonable likelihood that such efforts will succeed. Secondly, the Programme of Action seeks to establish suitable procedures for monitoring compliance with the commitment thus made and for conducting serious negotiations on the preparation of a comprehensive programme of disarmament. In the light of the foregoing, the States participating in the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament undertake to do everything in their power, in good faith, to ensure the implementation, during the period from June 1978 to May 1981, of the measures set forth in the following Three-year Disarmament Plan:

170. The agenda for the thirty-third, thirty-fourth and thirty-fifth regular sessions of the General Assembly should include an item permitting the Assembly to review the manner in which the Three-year Disarmament Plan is being carried out and to make any appropriate recommendations resulting from that review.

171. A second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament should be convened in 1982.

172. A preparatory committee for the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament should be established by the General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session.

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173. Towards this end a world disarmament conference shall be convened in the year ... A preparatory committee for the world disarmament conference, composed of nuclear-weapon States members of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and other States on the basis of the principles of equitable, political and geographical representation, should be established by the General Assembly at its thirty-third session.

174. All States undertake to work towards the fulfilment of this programme and to respect agreed measures relating to it. The General Assembly should examine its implementation, as appropriate, taking account of the recommendations on disarmament machinery made later in the final document.7

IV. MACHINERY

175. While disarmament, particularly in the nuclear field, has become a necessity for the survival of mankind and for the elimination of the danger of nuclear war, little progress has been made since the end of the Second World War. In addition to the need to exercise political will, the international machinery should be utilized more effectively and also improved to enable implementation of the Programme of Action and help the United Nations to fulfil its role in the field of disarmament.

In spite of the best efforts of the international community, adequate results have not been produced with the existing machinery. There is, therefore, an urgent need to revitalize existing disarmament machinery and to create new forums for disarmament deliberations and negotiations with a better representative character.

For maximum effectiveness, two kinds of bodies are required in the field of disarmament negotiations - deliberative and negotiating. All Member States should be represented on the former, whereas the latter, for the sake of convenience, should have a relatively small membership. (1)

176. The United Nations in accordance with the Charter has a central role and primary responsibility in the sphere of disarmament. Accordingly, it should play a more active role in this field, and in order to discharge its functions effectively, the United Nations should facilitate and encourage all disarmament measures - unilateral, bilateral, regional or multilateral - and be kept duly informed through the General Assembly, or any other appropriate United Nations channel reaching all Members of the Organization, of all disarmament efforts outside its aegis without prejudice to the progress of negotiations. (2)

177. The General Assembly has been and should remain the main deliberative organ of the United Nations in the field of disarmament and should make every effort to facilitate the implementation of disarmament measures.

An item entitled "Review of the implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth special session" shall be included in the provisional agenda of the thirty-third and subsequent sessions of the General Assembly. (3)

178. Disarmament multilateral conventions should be subjected to the normal procedures applicable in the law of treaties. In particular, they should be open to amendment when submitted to the General Assembly. (4)

179. The First Committee of the General Assembly should deal in the future only with questions of disarmament and related international security questions.

In order to enable all Member States of the United Nations to participate on the footing of equality in disarmament deliberations, the First Committee of the General Assembly, sitting as a disarmament commission, should deal in the future only with questions of disarmament and related questions. (5)

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180. /The General Assembly establishes, as successor to the Commission originally established by resolution 502 (VI) a Disarmament Commission composed of all Members of the United Nations.

The General Assembly decides that:

(a) The Disarmament Commission shall be a deliberative body subordinate to the General Assembly, the functions of which shall be to consider and make recommendations in the field of disarmament and to follow up the relevant decisions and recommendations of the Special Session devoted to Disarmament. The Disarmament Commission could also elaborate elements to be recommended through the General Assembly for consideration in the negotiation of a comprehensive programme for disarmament by the negotiating body;

(b) The Disarmament Commission shall function under the rules of procedure relating to the committees of the General Assembly with such modifications as the Commission may deem necessary and shall make every effort to ensure that, in so far as possible, decisions on substantive issues be adopted by consensus.

The Disarmament Commission shall report annually to the General Assembly. It will submit for the consideration by the thirty-third session of the General Assembly a report on organizational matters. In 1979, the Disarmament Commission will meet for a period not exceeding four weeks, the dates to be decided at the thirty-third session of the General Assembly.

The Secretary-General is requested to furnish such experts, staff and services as are necessary for the effective accomplishment of the Commission's functions. / (6)

181. /A second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament should be held in _____./ (7)

182. /Within the framework of its primary function to promote the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security with the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources, the Security Council should review the implementation of its responsibilities in the field of the regulation of armaments in accordance with Article 26 of the Charter of the United Nations.

Furthermore, the Security Council may consider the desirability of establishing under Article 29 of the Charter, subsidiary organs for specific disarmament purposes beginning with a committee, divided into regional sub-committees, to control international transfers of conventional weapons. / (8)

Alternative 1:

183. /The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament should be replaced by a new negotiating body attached to the deliberative organ of the United Nations General Assembly, sitting as a disarmament commission.

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The new body, entitled "Disarmament Committee", should consist of the 30 to 40 members, among them States having a particular interest in disarmament questions and representing in a balanced way all the regions of the world, including in particular the members of the Security Council.

The mandate of the "Disarmament Committee", whose decisions would be taken by consensus, would be, in particular, to negotiate disarmament agreements stemming from the recommendations of the Disarmament Commission, to which it would report, and to co-ordinate the carrying out of regional actions.

States which were not members of the committee would be allowed to participate in its deliberations as observers. (9)

Alternative 2:

183. The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament should continue to be the principal multilateral negotiating body in the field of disarmament under the auspices of and reporting to the United Nations. Its practice of taking decisions on the basis of consensus should be continued. In order to enhance its effectiveness and representative character the following improvements should be undertaken:

(i) The existing link between the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and the United Nations should be retained strengthened. To this end:

(a) Consideration should be given to Arrangements should be made for possible limited increase in the membership of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament through nominations to be made by the President of the General Assembly after appropriate consultations. The limited size of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and its representative character should be maintained.

(b) Arrangements should be made for interested States not members of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to become observers at the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and as such to All Member States of the United Nations should have the right to submit directly to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament proposals or working documents on measures of disarmament that are the subject of negotiations in the Conference and to participate in its proceedings as well as in the appropriate working bodies when the subject-matter of such proposals or working documents is examined.

Arrangements should be made by the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament by which a State which is not a member of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, may be invited, upon its request, to participate in activities of the Conference when its particular concerns are under discussion.

- (c) /Other arrangements should be made for interested States not members of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to participate in the work of the Conference /, including arrangements for a system of limited rotation on a flexible regional basis, taking into account the need to ensure adequate continuity within the Conference./
- (d) The /Secretary-General/ /Special Representative of the Secretary-General/ should be assigned an enhanced role in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, including the authority to bring relevant matters to the attention of that body; /also, an enhanced role in the activities of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament should be assigned to the Centre for Disarmament./
- (e) /The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament should submit progress reports to the General Assembly more frequently./ /In addition to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament's annual report to the General Assembly, occasional progress reports should be prepared for the information of States not members of the Conference./
- (ii) /States concerned should take appropriate steps/ /Necessary conditions should be created/ so that all nuclear-weapon States /and other militarily significant States/ participate in the work of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.
- (iii) /The present system of co-chairmanship should be /retained/ /replaced by a system of monthly rotation between all /non-nuclear-weapon States/ members of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament/ /a bureau of four members, rotating on a monthly or sessional basis, consisting of one chairman and three vice-chairmen chosen in such a manner as to reflect the composition of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament/ /a chairman appointed by the Secretary-General in consultation with the members of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament/ /a chairman elected on a yearly basis by the members of the Conference./
- (iv) /A standing sub-committee of the whole should be established./ /The establishment of ad hoc working groups whenever appropriate, to facilitate the negotiations, as well as the holding of informal meetings with the participation of experts whenever necessary, are recommendable methods for the further work of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament./
- (v) The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament should adopt its own rules of procedure.
- (vi) /The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament should continue to negotiate concrete measures of disarmament on the basis of the recommendations of the General Assembly and proposals submitted by the members of the Conference and other members of the United Nations. /The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, once it has undergone the

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reforms envisaged in this section, should undertake the preparation continue discussions and development of a comprehensive programme of disarmament. The said programme should be completed by 1 March 1981 at the latest and should immediately thereupon be submitted, as a draft to the Secretary-General of the United Nations so that he may transmit it to Member States and to the General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament.

- (vii) States members of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament should endeavour to maintain their delegations at such a level that may ensure the most effective co-operation in the performance of the functions assigned to the Conference.
- (viii) There should be improved opportunities for the public to follow the work of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. The plenary meetings of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament should be made public unless otherwise decided. (9)

Alternative 3:

183. The General Assembly reaffirms the continuing requirement for a single multilateral negotiating forum of limited size and taking decisions on disarmament questions on the basis of consensus: and to this end:

- (i) endorses the agreement which has been reached on the composition of a Disarmament Negotiating Committee comprising: list of Member States;
- (ii) welcomes the decision taken by the above-mentioned States that the Disarmament Negotiating Committee should:
 - (a) take its decisions by consensus
 - (b) adopt its own rules of procedure which shall be its only rules of procedure
 - (c) request the Secretary-General of the United Nations to appoint following consultations with the Committee, an Executive Secretary for the Committee as his personal special representative whose functions shall be to organize the business and time-tables of the Committee, and to assist and advise the current Chairman
 - (d) provide for a system of rotation, among all the members of the Committee, of the chairmanship of its meetings
 - (e) adopt its own agenda taking note of recommendations made to it by the General Assembly and by the Executive Secretary
 - (f) review prior to the second special session on disarmament its composition

- (g) submit a report to the General Assembly annually, or more frequently as necessary, and provide copies of its formal and other appropriate documents to all the Member States of the United Nations
 - (h) make arrangements to invite interested States, not members of the Committee, to submit to the Committee written proposals or working documents on measures of disarmament which are the subject of negotiation in the Committee and to participate, where appropriate, in the plenary sessions of the Committee as well as in the proceedings of appropriate working bodies when the subject-matter of such proposals or working documents is examined
 - (i) invite States not members of the Committee, upon their request, to express views in the Committee when the particular concerns of those States are under discussion.
- (iii) welcomes the intention of the Member States of the CCD to disband that Committee upon the formulation of the Disarmament Negotiating Committee./ (9)

Alternative 4:

183. The General Assembly reaffirms the continuing requirement for a single multilateral negotiating forum of limited size and taking decisions on disarmament questions on the basis of consensus. To this end, the General Assembly, taking note of the consultations which have taken place among the Member States,

- (i) Endorses the establishment of a Disarmament Negotiating Committee comprising: /list of Member States/.
- (ii) Recognizes that the Disarmament Negotiating Committee should:
 - (a) take its decisions by consensus
 - (b) adopt its own rules of procedure which shall be its only rules of procedure
 - (c) request the Secretary-General of the United Nations to:
 - appoint, following consultations with the Committee, an Executive Secretary for the Committee as his personal special representative whose functions shall be to assist the Committee in organizing its work and time-tables and to assist and advise the current Chairman;
 - furnish such staff and facilities as the Committee may consider necessary for the effective accomplishment of its task
 - (d) provide for a system of rotation of the Chairmanship, among all the members of the Committee, on a monthly basis

/...

- (e) adopt its own agenda, taking note, inter alia, of recommendations by the General Assembly
 - (f) make arrangements for a periodic review of its composition
 - (g) submit a report to the General Assembly annually, or more frequently as necessary, and provide copies of its formal and other appropriate documents to all the Member States of the United Nations
 - (h) make arrangements to invite interested States, not members of the Committee, to submit to the Committee written proposals or working documents on measures of disarmament which are the subject of negotiation in the Committee and to participate, where appropriate, in the plenary sessions of the Committee, as well as in the proceedings of appropriate working bodies when the subject-matter of such proposals or working documents is examined
 - (i) invite States not members of the Committee, upon their request, to express views in the Committee when the particular concerns of those States are under discussion.
- (iii) Welcomes the intention of the member States of the CCD to disband that Committee upon the formulation of the Disarmament Negotiating Committee. / (9)

183. Alternative text to replace paragraphs (h) and (i), above.

/(h) invite States not members of the Committee, upon their request:

- (1) to submit to the Committee written proposals or working documents on measures of disarmament which are the subject of negotiation in the Committee and to participate, on an equal footing, in the plenary sessions of the Committee as well as in the proceedings of appropriate working bodies when the subject-matter of such proposals or working documents is examined;
- (2) to express views in the Committee when the particular concerns of those States are under discussion. / (9)

184. Bilateral and regional disarmament negotiations may also play an important role and could facilitate negotiations of multilateral agreements in the field of disarmament. (10)

185. /At the appropriate time, a world disarmament conference could be convened with universal participation and with adequate preparation. / /The deliberative machinery of the United Nations should be reinforced through the institutionalization of a world disarmament conference on terms acceptable to all Member States. /

/In order to provide for an effective forum intended to achieve the solution of the disarmament problem, the General Assembly recommends the convening of a world disarmament conference with universal participation in ...

/...

The World Disarmament Conference should consider questions of disarmament in their entirety including ways and methods of achieving general and complete disarmament and partial measures in this field.

The World Disarmament Conference should be organized in such a manner that specific problems will be considered in the first instance by States whose interests are primarily affected. It could give instructions to its special working bodies designed to conduct actual negotiations.

The World Disarmament Conference should be duly prepared. Taking into account the positive contribution made to this end by the Ad Hoc Committee on the World Disarmament Conference, a Preparatory Committee for the World Disarmament Conference is established, composed of nuclear-weapon States, members of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and a number of other States on the basis of the principle of balanced political and just geographical representation. The Preparatory Committee will draw up the agenda for the World Disarmament Conference and its work programme. It will submit a progress report to the General Assembly at its thirty-third session. (11)

186. In order to enable the United Nations to continue to fulfil its role in the field of disarmament and to carry out the additional tasks assigned to it by this special session, the United Nations Centre for Disarmament should be adequately strengthened and its research and information functions accordingly extended.

The Centre should also take account fully of the possibilities offered by United Nations specialized agencies and other institutions and programmes within the United Nations system with regard to studies and information on disarmament. The Centre should also increase contacts with non-governmental organizations and research institutions in view of the valuable role they play in the field of disarmament. This role could be encouraged also in other ways that may be considered as appropriate.

The Secretary-General is requested to set up an advisory board of eminent persons, selected on the basis of their personal expertise and taking into account the principle of equitable geographical representation, to advise him on various aspects of studies to be made under the auspices of the United Nations in the field of disarmament and arms limitation, including a programme of such studies. (12)

187. The Secretary-General is requested to appoint an intergovernmental group of experts to prepare a report on the question of the establishment of an International Institute for Research on Disarmament. This institute would be responsible to the United Nations which would nominate its governing council and would provide its financing, but it would have complete autonomy at the scientific level. (13)

188. With the advancement towards the ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament and in the light of the experience gained in the deliberative and negotiating bodies, the General Assembly of the United Nations should consider the proposal for establishing at the appropriate time under its auspices a world disarmament institution with the aim of having over-all competence in the field of disarmament. (14)

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189. The possibility of establishing an international disarmament organization as the operational framework for the implementation of agreements in the field of disarmament and the limitation of arms should be considered. The Secretary-General is therefore requested to seek the views of Member States with respect to the desirability of establishing an international disarmament organization and the possible functions and structure of such an organization and to submit these views and an analysis thereof to the General Assembly at its thirty-fourth session. (15)

Annex

Proposals relating to the draft Final Document
(Sections I, II and IV)

China: amendments to section I (Introduction) of
the draft Final Document

1. Third paragraph, fifth line. Replace "yet the accumulation of nuclear and conventional weapons today constitutes" by "Yet the build-up and accumulation of nuclear and conventional weapons by the super-Powers today constitute".
2. Fourth paragraph, second line. Replace "their conviction that the question of general and complete disarmament is the most important one facing the world of today" by "their conviction that the safeguarding of international peace against a new world war is an important task facing the world of today".
3. Seventh paragraph, second line. Delete "what is at stake is in the final analysis, the very survival of humanity".

In the sixth line, after the wording "the immediate goal must be that of," add the phrase "demanding first the disarmament of the two Powers which possess the largest arsenals".

4. Eighth paragraph, eighth line. After the wording "passing through all the necessary stages" add the words "of genuine disarmament".
5. Ninth (final) paragraph, second line. The phrase "and especially of those possessing nuclear weapons," should be amended to read "and especially the sincerity of those major Powers possessing large quantities of nuclear weapons,".

In the fourth line, the phrase "through the existence and effective functioning of an appropriate international mechanism or machinery" should be amended to read "through the existence and effective functioning of an appropriate international mechanism or machinery which is truly free of super-Power control and which really reflects the reasonable demands of all countries."

China: amendments to section II (Declaration) of the
draft Final Document

I. Subsection A (Review and appraisal)

- (a) Replace the wording from the beginning of paragraph 1 up to and including the word "yet" (line 7) by the following: "The super-Powers are energetically expanding their arms, including nuclear and conventional armaments, and are stepping up their aggression and expansion. As a result, the danger of war keeps rising, posing a grave threat to international peace and security".

/...

(b) Delete the sentence "The increase in weapons, especially nuclear weapons, far from helping to strengthen international security, on the contrary now weakens it."

(c) In the eleventh line, next sentence, replace the words: "The vast stockpiles and tremendous build-up of arms and armed forces and the competition" by: "The vast stockpiles and tremendous build-up of arms and armed forces of the two major nuclear Powers and their competition".

(d) In the fifteenth line, delete the words: "hinders the process of détente".

(e) In subsection A, paragraph 2, the first sentence should read as follows: "Since the end of the Second World War, the rivalry between the super-Powers on a global scale, combined with an unprecedented technological revolution in weaponry, has resulted in a massive and self-perpetuating arms race."

(f) In subsection A, paragraph 3, the second sentence should read as follows: "To safeguard international peace, it is essential to implement effectively the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter, to oppose the attempt of any country to seek and establish any form of hegemony or foreign domination in any part of the world, and to demand that the super-Powers take the lead in a speedy and massive reduction of armaments and armed forces."

(g) In subsection A, paragraph 6, the second sentence should be amended to read as follows: "Military expenditures are reaching ever higher levels, with the super-Powers accounting for 60 per cent of the total expenditures of all the countries in the world."

Also in paragraph 6, eighth line, the fourth sentence which reads: "This colossal waste of resources ..." should be replaced by "What is even more serious is that the super-Powers not only depend on the exploitation of their own people for their military build-up, but also divert to this purpose technical and human resources plundered by them and urgently needed by the developing countries."

The last sentence of paragraph 6 should be amended to read: "Consequently, resources released as a result of the super-Powers taking the lead in implementing disarmament measures should be returned to the developing countries to help promote the well-being of all peoples."

(h) In subsection A, paragraph 7, the fourth and fifth sentences should be deleted and replaced by: "Certain agreements have been reached, while the arms race continues."

(i) In subsection A, paragraph 8, the first sentence within brackets should be retained and the second sentence within brackets be replaced by "The people of the world is confronted with the important task of heightening their vigilance, including the struggle for the realization of genuine disarmament, striving to postpone a world war and safeguarding world peace." (As an alternative, this sentence may be inserted as a second sentence in subsection A, paragraph 5, after the words "... and understand the dangers in the present situation", and then delete para. 8.)

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II. Subsection B (Goals and priorities)

(a) In subsection B, paragraph 1, second line, after the words "... international control", add the following sentence: "To this end, the root cause of modern wars must be eliminated", and then delete the entire second paragraph in this section.

(b) In subsection B, paragraph 2, the entire second sentence should be deleted and replaced by the following: "To this end, it is equally imperative to give same priority to the reduction of the conventional armaments of the two Powers which possess the largest arsenals."

In order to promote disarmament and reduce the danger of nuclear war, these two Powers must first of all:

(1) Declare that they will at no time and in no circumstances resort to the threat or use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear countries and nuclear-free zones;

(2) Withdraw all their armed forces stationed abroad and undertake not to dispatch armed forces of any description to other countries, dismantle all their military bases and paramilitary bases on foreign soil and undertake not to seek any new ones;

(3) Stop their nuclear and conventional arms race and set out to destroy by stages their nuclear weapons and drastically reduce their conventional weapons;

(4) Undertake not to station massive forces or stage military exercises near the borders of other countries, and undertake not to launch military attacks, including surprise attacks, against other countries on any pretext;

(5) Undertake not to export weapons to other countries for the purpose of bringing them under control or for fomenting wars or abetting threats of war.

When major progress has been made in the destruction of the super-Powers' nuclear weapons and in the reduction of their conventional arms, the other nuclear countries should join them in destroying all nuclear weapons."

(c) In subsection B, paragraph 3 (5 or 4) the phrase "with particular emphasis on armed forces and conventional weapons of nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant countries" should be replaced by: "with particular emphasis on the armed forces and conventional weapons of the major nuclear-weapon States".

(d) In subsection B, paragraph 6, fourth line, delete the word "further". Also delete the last sentence in brackets reading: "These measures should include the conclusion of the treaty on the non-use of force in international relations."

III. Subsection C (Principles)

(a) In subsection C, paragraph 1, replace the entire text by the following: "All States Members of the United Nations reaffirm their commitment to and strict observance of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and, more important, the Five Principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. They should undertake not to seek and establish hegemony or any form of domination in any region or any part of the world."

(b) In subsection C, paragraph 3, the fourth sentence should read as follows: "While disarmament is the responsibility of all States, the major nuclear-weapon States have the primary responsibility for nuclear disarmament, and as they also possess huge conventional armaments, they bear the main responsibility for halting and reversing the conventional arms race as well." And then delete the last sentence which reads: "It is therefore important to secure their active participation."

(c) In subsection C, paragraph 7, second line, delete the sentence in brackets, which reads "The renunciation of the use or threat of force is of great importance to ensure ... and it should become a norm of international life."

(d) In subsection C, paragraph 10, second line, after the sentence "Progress in the former would contribute greatly to the realization of the latter" add a new sentence, which reads: "Accordingly, the major nuclear Powers with the largest military expenditures should be required to take the lead in reducing these expenditures."

(e) In subsection C, paragraph 15, delete the whole paragraph.

China: amendments to section IV (Machinery) of the
draft Final Document

1. At the beginning of the first paragraph of section IV /Machinery/, on page 44, add the following:

"The machinery for disarmament must ensure the realization of the reasonable propositions and just demands of all countries on disarmament and should be truly free from super-Power control and influence. It is especially necessary to guard against the super-Powers' attempt to use the machinery for disarmament as a means to delay disarmament and cover up their arms expansion."

2. On page 45, paragraph 2, add the following:

"The questions of disarmament and of international peace and security, which concern the interests of all countries, should be considered by an international deliberative organ with the participation of all countries on an

/...

equal footing under the auspices of the United Nations. A negotiating body for disarmament will be set up by this international deliberative organ through consultations, and it should be responsible and accountable to the international deliberative organ. The negotiating body should be composed on a fair and equitable basis, so that it can be fully representative. The specific items and procedures for disarmament negotiations should also be determined by the aforesaid international deliberative organ. The question of first reducing the nuclear and conventional armaments of the super-Powers should be given priority for deliberation and consideration."

3. On page 46, delete the whole of paragraph 8 and replace it by the following:

"Dissolve the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. After the establishment of the international deliberative organ for disarmament, a new negotiating body for disarmament, which is fully representative should be set up."

4. On page 48, delete the whole of paragraph 10.

Viet Nam: amendment to section I Introduction
of the draft Final Document

The fourth and fifth sentences of paragraph 1 should read as follows:

"Yet the accumulation of weapons, particularly nuclear weapons, for the purpose of aggression constitutes much more a threat than a protection for the future of mankind. The time has therefore come to put an end to this situation, to abandon the use of force in international relations and to seek security in disarmament and in the struggle for peace, freedom and national independence of all peoples, that is to say, through a gradual but effective process beginning with a reduction in the present level of armaments."
