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Ad Hoc Committee of the
Tenth Special Session

FINAL REPORT OF WORKING GROUP B (PROGRAMME OF ACTION)
TO THE AD HOC COMMITTEE OF THE TENTH SPECIAL SESSION
OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

A.

1. Working Group B of the Ad Hoc Committee of the Tenth Special Session was established as a result of the decision of the Ad Hoc Committee taken in pursuance of the relevant recommendation of its Bureau at its second meeting on 1 June 1978 (A/S-10/AC.1/PV.2).
2. At the same meeting, the Ad Hoc Committee unanimously elected H.E. Ambassador H. Jaroszek (Poland) as Chairman of Working Group B and assigned to the Working Group the consideration of the Draft Programme of Action (Report of the Preparatory Committee for the Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament, Volume I. Supplement No. 1, A/S-10/1, pp. 25-44).
3. Between 2 June, when it discussed procedural and organizational matters and 22 June when it adopted its Final Report to the Ad Hoc Committee, Working Group B held eight meetings.
4. The second and third meetings of the Working Group were devoted to a general exchange of views on the Draft Programme of Action.
5. At its fourth meeting on 6 June 1978, the Working Group established two open-ended Drafting Groups. Drafting Group I, under the co-ordination of H.E. Ambassador O. Adeniji (Nigeria), was assigned to consider parts of the Draft Programme of Action dealing with questions related to nuclear disarmament. Drafting Group II, under the co-ordination of H.E. Ambassador G. Hamilton (Sweden), was assigned to consider the remaining parts of the Draft Programme of Action, dealing with questions related to other weapons of mass destruction, conventional weapons and other matters.
6. During the period covered by this report, Drafting Group I held three formal meetings and Drafting Group II held five formal meetings which were devoted to the organization of their work, to submission of new proposals and to the

review of the progress of the Group's work. The substantive work of negotiating and drafting parts of the Programme of Action assigned to them was carried out mainly in informal consultations within the Drafting Groups.

7. On 9 June, at its fifth meeting and on 15 June, at its sixth meeting, Working Group B considered the information given to it by the co-ordinators of the Drafting Groups and considered its progress reports to the Ad Hoc Committee.

8. At its seventh meeting on 21 June, Working Group B considered the final report of the co-ordinators of the Drafting Groups and the draft texts submitted by them (WG.B/DG.1/CRP.6 and WG.B/DG.2/CRP.5).

9. In both Groups, considerable work has been accomplished with a view to arriving at a general agreement on the Draft Programme of Action. Progress has been achieved on a number of issues which remained unsolved by the Preparatory Committee. Although it has not proved possible to work out a text free from brackets and ripe for an immediate adoption by consensus, a significant number of brackets have been eliminated. At the same time, some new formulations have been added to the text.

On several issues, significant differences of opinion continue to exist.

10. It is pertinent to note that during the negotiating process, important disarmament proposals have been introduced, based both on the statements made in the general debate and in the form of documents submitted in the Ad Hoc Committee. They have been reflected in the deliberations of the Working Group and of the Drafting Groups and constitute a valuable contribution to the work of the special session.

11. Working Group B and its Drafting Groups had before them the relevant documents of the tenth special session and of the Ad Hoc Committee as well as the Conference Room Papers submitted in the Drafting Groups (WG.B/DG.1/CRP.1-6 and WG.B/DG.2/CRP.1-5).

B.

12. The Working Group submits below to the Ad Hoc Committee for its consideration, the Draft Programme of Action which was assigned to it. The relevant sections reflect the consensus reached on a significant number of questions. However, on a number of other questions, negotiations remained inconclusive and therefore the corresponding wording is in square brackets.

III. PROGRAMME OF ACTION

A. /Objectives/General and complete disarmament/

Progress towards the goal of general and complete disarmament can be achieved through the implementation of a programme of action on disarmament, in accordance with the goals and principles established in the Declaration of Disarmament. The present Programme of Action contains priorities and measures in the field of disarmament that States should undertake as a matter of urgency with a view to halting and reversing the arms race and to giving the necessary impetus to efforts designed to achieve genuine disarmament leading to general and complete disarmament under effective international control

B. /Priorities/

The present Programme of Action enumerates the specific measures of disarmament which should be implemented over the next few years, as well as other measures and studies to prepare the way for future negotiations and for progress toward general and complete disarmament.

Priorities in disarmament negotiations shall be: nuclear weapons; other weapons of mass destruction, including chemical weapons; conventional weapons, including any which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects; and reduction of armed forces.

Nothing should preclude States from conducting negotiations on all priority items concurrently.

Proposed alternative for paragraph 2

/In disarmament negotiations, equal importance should be attached to the reduction of conventional armaments and that of nuclear armaments, and the two should proceed in conjunction. Disarmament should cover:/

/For the purposes of implementing these priorities the following measures aiming at ending completely any further quantitative and qualitative build-up of arms and armed forces of States with a large military potential should be adopted within a specified limited period:

- Cessation of the production of all types of nuclear weapons;
- Cessation of the production of, and prohibition of, all other types of weapons of mass destruction;
- Cessation of the development of new types of conventional armaments of great destructive capability;

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- Renunciation by the permanent members of the Security Council, and by countries which have military agreements with them of the expansion of their armies and the build-up of their conventional armaments.

A start should be made, for example, with the cessation of the production of nuclear weapons.

C. Immediate and short-term measures to halt and reverse the arms race

1. Nuclear disarmament

Nuclear weapons pose the greatest danger to mankind and to the survival of civilization. It is essential to halt and reverse the nuclear arms race in all its aspects in order to avert the danger of war involving nuclear weapons. The ultimate goal in this context is the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

All the nuclear-weapon States in particular in the initial stage, the two leading nuclear-weapon States in particular those among them which possess the most important military potential have a special role and responsibility for the realization of this goal bear a special responsibility for the realization of this goal.

Proposed alternative formulation

When major progress has been made in the destruction of the nuclear arsenals of the two major nuclear Powers, and in the reduction of their conventional armaments, the other nuclear countries should join them in destroying all nuclear weapons.

The process of nuclear disarmament should be carried out in such a way, and requires measures to ensure that the security of all States is guaranteed at progressively lower levels of nuclear armaments taking into account the relative qualitative and quantitative importance of the existing arsenals of the nuclear-weapon States and their allies.

Alternative 1

The achievement of nuclear disarmament will require urgent negotiation of agreement(s) at appropriate stages and with adequate measures of verification satisfactory to the States concerned for:

Alternative 2

The achievement of the urgent task of nuclear disarmament will require negotiation of agreement(s) at appropriate stages and with adequate measures of verification satisfactory to the States concerned for:

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- /limitations on and ultimately/ /cessation of the qualitative improvement of existing types and/ cessation of development of new types and new systems of nuclear weapons;
- cessation of the production of all types of nuclear weapons and their /delivery vehicles/ /means of delivery/, /including the/ /and the/ production of fissionable material for weapons purposes;
- //comprehensive/ time-bound programme of/ progressive and balanced reduction of stockpiles of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, leading to their ultimate and complete elimination.

Alternative 1

/In the course of negotiations other questions could be considered bearing in mind that there is no such type of armaments that could not be limited or prohibited on a mutual and agreed basis without prejudicing the security of any State./

Alternative 2

/No type of nuclear armament is excluded from the purview of these negotiations./

/The process of nuclear disarmament described above should be expedited by the urgent and vigorous pursuit to a successful conclusion of ongoing negotiations between the nuclear-weapon States./

Alternative

/The two leading nuclear Powers should:

(a) As a first step, declare:

(i) A moratorium on the development, production and deployment of new types of nuclear weapons;

(ii) A halt to the build-up of their stockpiles of nuclear weapons;

(b) Reach an early agreement for mutual, balanced and significant reduction of their stockpiles of nuclear weapons and a freeze in the qualitative improvement of such weapons and their delivery systems./

(a) /CTB/

The cessation of nuclear-weapon testing by all States /as an integral part of the process of nuclear disarmament/ /within the framework of an effective nuclear disarmament process/ would be in the interest of mankind. It would make a significant

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contribution to the aim of ending the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and the development of new types of such weapons and of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. /To this end/ /In this context/ the negotiations now in progress on a "treaty prohibiting nuclear-weapon tests, and a protocol covering nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes which would be an integral part of the treaty," should be concluded urgently and the result submitted for full consideration by /.../ /the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament/ with a view to the submission of a draft treaty to the General Assembly at the earliest possible date.

/All efforts should be made /by the negotiating parties/ to achieve an agreement which, following General Assembly endorsement, /could/ /would/ attract the widest possible adherence./

/Pending the conclusion of this treaty there should be a moratorium on the testing of nuclear weapons./

(A delegation proposed that the whole section be deleted.)

(b) /Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT)/

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America should conclude at the earliest possible date the agreement they have been pursuing for several years in the second series of the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT II). /They are invited to transmit in good time the text of the agreement to the General Assembly./ It should be followed /promptly/ by further strategic arms limitation negotiations between the two parties leading to agreed significant reductions of and qualitative limitations on strategic arms /at an early date./ /It would be/ /This agreement should constitute/ an important step in the direction of nuclear disarmament and ultimately of establishment of a world free of such weapons./

Proposed alternative for paragraph 1

/The Soviet Union and the United States must be called upon to reach an agreement on the drastic reduction of their strategic arms in the strategic arms limitation talks. This agreement should include massive quantitative reduction and significant qualitative limitation./

/Agreement by the two major nuclear Powers to prohibit the flight-testing of new strategic delivery vehicles could serve as one means to curb the qualitative dimension of the strategic arms race to the extent that compliance with such prohibitions can be verified by national technical means./

(c) * -

Significant progress in nuclear disarmament /will require parallel/ /in certain regions would be facilitated by/ progress /in the consolidation of the political

* Former sect. (c) is included under C.1.

guarantees for the security of States and/ in the limitation and reduction of the armed forces and conventional weapons of the nuclear-weapon States and /their allies/ /other concerned States/ /their allies and other States/.

Real progress in the field of nuclear disarmament could create an atmosphere conducive to progress in conventional disarmament world wide.

(d) /Non-use of nuclear weapons and prevention of the outbreak of nuclear war/

Alternative 1 for the whole section

/The most effective guarantee against the danger of nuclear war and the use of nuclear weapons is nuclear disarmament and the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

While noting with satisfaction varying declarations made by nuclear-weapon States relating to the circumstances in which they would not use nuclear weapons, the nuclear-weapon States are requested:

(a) to assure mankind at large that its continued survival in a life-sustaining environment will not be imperiled in any way by the use of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction;

(b) to recognize that the use of such weapons will be a crime against humanity and should therefore be outlawed;

(c) to co-operate with non-nuclear-weapon States in the formulation of an international convention on non-use of nuclear weapons and on avoidance of nuclear war.

The attainment of the above objectives should be entrusted to the appropriate negotiating body that may be established./

Alternative 2 for the whole section

/The most effective guarantee against the use of nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear war is the prohibition of the use and complete elimination of nuclear weapons from the arsenals of States.

To achieve that goal all States, particularly the nuclear-weapon States have special responsibilities to undertake measures specifically aimed at preventing the risk of the outbreak of war and on negotiations about total prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons.

In the meantime nuclear-weapon States should undertake that they will never threat or use the nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States which have renounced the acquisition of such weapons, which have not such weapons on their

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territories and which are not parties to military alliances with a nuclear-weapon State. Such undertakings should be incorporated in a Security Council resolution, thus giving them binding force in international law./

Alternative 3 for the whole section

/The most effective guarantee against the danger of nuclear war and the use of nuclear weapons is nuclear disarmament and the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

To achieve that goal all States, particularly the nuclear-weapon States, have a special responsibility to undertake measures specifically aimed at preventing the risk of the outbreak of war and of the use of nuclear weapons. These measures should culminate in an international agreement to prohibit the use of nuclear weapons as part of /a disarmament agreement/ /measures/ banning, inter alia, the development, production and stockpiling of nuclear weapons, and other measures to enhance international security as a whole and to prevent the use of force in international relations.

The declarations made by some of the nuclear-weapon States that they will not be the first to use nuclear weapons or that they will never use nuclear weapons except against aggression by another nuclear-weapon State should be followed by early undertakings by all nuclear-weapon States that they will not be the first to use nuclear weapons. The problems relating to the level of conventional forces considered relevant in this context should be speedily resolved.

The nuclear-weapon States are called upon to undertake binding guarantees that they will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States./

Alternative 4 for the whole section

/The most effective guarantee against the danger of nuclear war and the use of nuclear weapons is nuclear disarmament and the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

This should be vigorously pursued and should culminate in a disarmament agreement banning, inter alia, the development, production, stockpiling and use of nuclear weapons which should be adhered to by all States.

All States should ensure strict implementation of the principle that States must refrain from any use of force, whether by nuclear or non-nuclear weapons, against the territorial integrity or political independence of any other States or in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations.

So long as nuclear weapons exist and bearing in mind the potentially devastating results of nuclear war to belligerents and non-belligerents alike, the

nuclear-weapon States have special responsibilities to undertake measures specifically aimed at preventing the risk of the outbreak of such a war.

The General Assembly notes the undertaking given by nuclear-weapon States that they will never use nuclear weapons against any State except in self-defence under the most extreme circumstances.

The nuclear-weapon States should take part in firm, far-reaching and permanent assurances that they will never use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States which have bindingly renounced such weapons, taking due account of the security situations of both nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States.

They should maintain and wherever necessary improve their existing organizational and technical arrangements for guarding against the accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons under their control. They should also, where they have not yet done so, conclude agreements concerning measures to diminish and avert the danger of nuclear war. /

Alternative 5 for the whole section

/The declarations of nuclear-weapon States to the effect that they will not use nuclear weapons against those States which renounce the production and acquisition of nuclear weapons and have no nuclear weapons in their territory are of considerable importance for ensuring the security of such non-nuclear States. All nuclear States must make similar declarations. Special bilateral agreements between nuclear and appropriate non-nuclear States must be concluded to that effect.

It is important to ensure the non-use of force in international relations and the permanent prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. Speedy conclusion of the treaty to this effect would effectively prevent the use of nuclear as well as conventional weapons.

Together with the measures for the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament all possible measures specially aimed at preventing the danger of an outbreak of nuclear war should be taken and for this purpose:

All States should act in such a way as to avert situations which could cause a dangerous aggravation of relations between them and avoid military confrontations which could lead to a nuclear war, making full use to that end of the possibilities of the Security Council in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations;

The nuclear-weapon States, in view of their special responsibility as permanent members of the Security Council, should always exercise restraint in their mutual relations, show a willingness to negotiate and settle differences by peaceful means and do all in their power to prevent conflicts and situations which could exacerbate international tension;

Those nuclear-weapon States which have not yet done so should conclude agreements with other nuclear-weapon States concerning measures to diminish and avert the danger of nuclear war and to prevent the accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons, and those nuclear-weapon States which have concluded such agreements with each other should improve and develop such measures./

Proposed new paragraph

/The danger of nuclear war comes from the two major nuclear Powers, which bear a special responsibility for the prevention of nuclear war. Therefore, first of all, they are required to undertake not to use nuclear weapons against the non-nuclear countries and nuclear-free zones, to reduce drastically their nuclear armaments by stages and ultimately to destroy their nuclear weapons completely./

(e) Nuclear-weapon-free zones

The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned, constitutes an important disarmament measure, /and as such contributes to the security of the members of such zones, to the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and to the goal of general and complete disarmament/, /provided that such zones are genuinely free from nuclear weapons, that relevant agreements contain no loop-holes and fully correspond to the generally recognized norms of international law/.

The process of establishing such zones in different parts of the world should be encouraged with the ultimate objective of achieving a world entirely free of nuclear weapons. /In this process/ /In the process of establishing such zones, /the characteristics of each region should be taken into account.

With respect to nuclear-weapon-free zones, the nuclear-weapon States are called upon to /consider giving/ /give/ undertakings, in terms to be negotiated with the competent authority of each zone, in particular:

(a) to respect strictly the status of military denuclearization of the zone /and to refrain from introducing /basing/ nuclear weapons in such zone/

(b) to refrain from the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against the States of the zone.

/The States participating in nuclear-weapon-free zones should in turn undertake to ensure that the zones are fully and genuinely free from nuclear weapons./

The effectiveness of nuclear-weapon-free zones could be enhanced by the dismantling of all military bases of nuclear-weapon States in the zone concerned and by not subjecting any State in the zone to acts of aggression.

In the light of existing conditions, the following measures are especially desirable:

(a) Adoption by the States concerned of all relevant measures to ensure the full application of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco);

(b) Signature and ratification of the Additional Protocols of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) by the States entitled to become parties to those instruments which have not yet done so;

(c) In Africa, where the Organization of African Unity has affirmed a decision for the denuclearization of the region, the Security Council shall take appropriate effective steps whenever necessary to prevent the frustration of this objective;

(d) The serious consideration of the practical and urgent steps required for the implementation of the proposal for a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East where all parties directly concerned have expressed their support for the concept and where the implications the threat of nuclear-weapon proliferation are is would be acute;

Pending the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, States of the region should solemnly declare that they will refrain on a reciprocal basis from producing, acquiring, or in any other way, possessing nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive devices, and from permitting the stationing of nuclear weapons on their territory by any third party and agree to place all their nuclear activities under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards.

The Security Council should consider preventive measures to ensure that the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East should not be frustrated by any State in the region.

(e) All States and parties in the region of Parties to the nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia should take consider taking steps to implement the objective of keeping their region free of nuclear weapons. In the meantime, no action should be taken by them which would retard the establishment of the nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region. All States and parties in the region Parties to the nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region should accept the application of the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards over their nuclear facilities on a non-discriminatory basis. The United Nations should continue to encourage measures to establish the could keep the establishment of the nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region under review.

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/(f) The States belonging to the Balkans should be encouraged to convert it into an area of good neighbourliness, without nuclear weapons.

/The creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones should be promoted by more active regional co-operation in the development of peaceful nuclear energy through facilitating the establishment of regional fuel cycle centres, under the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards, with their attendant economic and physical security benefits / for extracting uranium, fabricating nuclear fuel, reprocessing plutonium, and handling nuclear wastes.

(f) Zones of peace

Alternative 1

/The establishment of zones of peace in various regions of the world, under appropriate conditions to be clearly defined and determined freely by the States in the zone concerned, and in co-operation with other States concerned taking into account the characteristics of the zone and the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and in conformity with international law can contribute to strengthening the security of States within such zones and to international peace and security as a whole.

Alternative 2

The establishment of zones of peace in various regions of the world by a group of States or by an individual State can also significantly contribute to international peace and security.

/It would be of great importance to establish a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean that would be free from great-Power rivalry and of great-Power military presence as well as the presence of nuclear weapons. The great Powers in this context are urged to agree at an early date to reduce the nuclear-arms race in the region with a view to eliminating altogether the military presence and rivalry from the region.

Alternative 1 /While the General Assembly takes note of the consultations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, these two Powers and other major maritime users are called upon to work towards the elimination of foreign military presence and rivalry from the Indian Ocean.

Alternative 2 /Negotiations which have been initiated between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, based on a staged approach with a view not to increase their current military presence and to move on promptly to negotiations on reductions, should continue and lead to early and positive results. This would be a significant contribution to enhancing stability in the Indian Ocean.

(A delegation proposed that Alternative 2 be deleted.)

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- Alternative 1 /The littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean at their forthcoming meeting should consider measures for the implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace./
- Alternative 2 /In this connexion Member States note the proposal to hold a conference on the Indian Ocean with a view to considering such a zone of peace./
- Alternative 1 /The concept of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace also includes the necessity for mutual restraint on the part of the littoral and hinterland States./
- Alternative 2 /The littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean, at their forthcoming meeting, should, inter alia, reach agreement on measures such as a commitment to settle outstanding disputes by peaceful means, the renunciation of nuclear weapons and the maintenance of a reasonable military balance among themselves, in order to promote conditions of security within the Indian Ocean region./

/Consultations regarding all aspects of the zonal concept should take place with the participation of all States concerned with a view to the early convening of a conference on the Indian Ocean to establish such a zone, the status of which /should/ /could/ be respected by all States particularly by nuclear-weapon States and major maritime users./

/The creation of zones of peace in other areas in conformity with the principle outlined in paragraph ... is desirable, particularly in the area(s) of /South-East Asia/ /and the Mediterranean/ where States in the region have expressed interest in the establishment of such zones./

/The nuclear-weapon States should enter into negotiations with a view to reaching agreement on the withdrawal of ships carrying nuclear weapons from certain areas of the world's oceans and on other possible measures to limit the nuclear-arms race in those areas./

(g) /Non-proliferation/

It is imperative as an integral part of the effort to halt and reverse the arms race, to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The goal of nuclear non-proliferation is on the one hand to prevent the emergence of any additional nuclear-weapon States beside the existing five nuclear-weapon States, and on the other progressively to reduce and eventually eliminate nuclear weapons altogether. This involves obligations and responsibilities on the part of both nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States, the former undertaking to stop the nuclear-arms race and to achieve nuclear disarmament by urgent application of measures /to stop the development and further production of nuclear weapons and to achieve nuclear disarmament through the reduction and elimination of existing stockpiles/,

/...

/to halt the build-up of nuclear arsenals with the objective of eliminating the stockpiles of nuclear weapons/ and all States undertaking to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.

Therefore, the nuclear-weapon States and the non-nuclear-weapon States should take jointly further steps to develop an international consensus on ways and means, on a universal and non-discriminatory basis, to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. /These may include:

Alternative 1

(i) - Acceptance by /all/ states of the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards /on all /peaceful/ nuclear activities/;

- Evolution of an agreed and standardized system of international safeguards to be applied through the International Atomic Energy Agency /on a universal and non-discriminatory basis./

Alternative 2

/Ensuring that those States which have not yet adhered to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons should, at a minimum, place all nuclear facilities under agreed and appropriate international safeguards applied through the International Atomic Energy Agency./

In this connexion, note is taken of the work of the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation which should be pursued strictly in accordance with the objectives set out in the joint communiqué of its organizing Conference.*

/Elimination of the restrictive and discriminatory features of policies in the supply of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes./*

(ii) Adherence to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons /after it has been renegotiated and made equitable in terms of responsibilities and obligations assumed by nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States/. /Total renegotiation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons so that it is made equitable and non-discriminatory in terms of responsibilities and obligations assumed by nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States, thus facilitating universal adherence./ In this context, the urgent application by nuclear-weapon States /parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons/ of measures envisaged in article VI of the Treaty, /under appropriate safeguards/ /strengthening the security of non-nuclear-weapon States, in particular, providing them with credible and effective security assurances, and ensuring universality and non-discrimination in the régime of non-proliferation/, will further facilitate universal adherence.

* Location to be determined.

(iii) Adherence to the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the Additional Protocols, as appropriate, and the creation of other nuclear-weapon-free zones /wherever feasible./

(iv) /Other measures to prevent the immediate danger of development and acquisition of nuclear weapons by States which are reportedly developing such weapons./

(v) /Implementation by the nuclear-weapon States of their obligation with respect to nuclear disarmament and strengthening of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States./

(vi) Agreements should be reached on adequate standards for the physical protection of nuclear materials./

Non-proliferation measures should /enable/ /enable and not hinder/ /not hinder/ the exercise of the inalienable right of all States to apply and develop their programmes for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy for economic and social development in conformity with their priorities, interests and needs and to have access to /and be free to/ acquire technology, equipment and materials for peaceful uses of nuclear energy, taking into account the particular needs of the developing countries, /under effective International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards./

/Nothing should be done to prejudice the faithful implementation of international agreements and contracts for the transfer and development of nuclear equipment, material and technology in accordance with their terms and provisions./

International co-operation for the promotion of the transfer and utilization of nuclear technology for economic and social development, especially in the developing countries should be strengthened. Such co-operation should be under agreed and appropriate international safeguards applied through the International Atomic Energy Agency on a /universal and/ non-discriminatory basis in order to prevent effectively the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

/All States, in particular the nuclear supplier countries, should adhere strictly to the principles contained in resolution 32/50 of the General Assembly regarding international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear technology. In accordance with the principles of this resolution an international programme should be adopted for the promotion of transfer and utilization of nuclear technology for economic and social development in the developing countries./

(A delegation proposed that the whole section be deleted.)

2. Other weapons of mass destruction

1. International action is urgently required to rule out, once and for all, the emergence and deployment of neutron weapons. As a result of the discussions on that subject it can be stated with full confidence that:

- Neutron weapons are particularly inhuman means of mass destruction of people;
- Neutron weapons will inevitably lower the threshold of a nuclear war and consequently increase the probability of such a war;
- The introduction of neutron weapons by one group of States will inevitably lead to similar action on the part of another group of countries, and this will open up a new trend in the nuclear arms race, as happened in the 1940s with atomic weapons and in the 1950s with thermonuclear weapons;
- The emergence of any one type of neutron weapon could merely mark the start of this race: the first type will inevitably be followed by other types, with even greater destructive capability, designed to attain objectives broader than those currently conceived, including objectives which go beyond the confines of a single continent;
- In the interests of the security of the peoples and in the light of the above-mentioned facts, consideration of the draft convention on the prohibition of the production, stockpiling, deployment and use of nuclear neutron weapons should be accorded high priority and, at its thirty-third session, the General Assembly should sum up the results of the work accomplished.

2. All States should adhere to the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare.

3. All States which have not yet done so should consider adhering to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction.

4. States should also consider the possibility of adhering to multilateral agreements concluded so far in the disarmament field which are mentioned below in this section.

5. The complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and their destruction represent one of the most

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urgent measures of disarmament. Consequently, conclusion of a convention to this end, on which negotiations have been going on for several years, is one of the most urgent tasks of multilateral negotiations. After its conclusion, all States should contribute to ensuring the broadest possible application of the convention through its early signature and ratification.

6. A convention should be concluded prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons.

7. In order to help prevent a qualitative arms race and so that scientific and technological achievements may ultimately be used solely for peaceful purposes, effective measures should be taken to prevent the development of new types of weapons of mass destruction based on new scientific principles. Negotiations should be pursued aimed at working out an agreement on the prohibition of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction. Specific agreements could be concluded on particular types of weapons of mass destruction which may be identified. This question should be kept under continuing review.

8. The CCD should keep under review the need for a further prohibition of military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques in order to eliminate the dangers to mankind from such use.

9. In order to promote the peaceful use of and to avoid an arms race on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof, multilateral negotiations should start to consider further measures in this field.

10. In order to prevent an arms race in outer space, further measures should be taken and appropriate international negotiations be held in accordance with the spirit of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies.

3. Conventional weapons

1. Together with negotiations on nuclear disarmament measures, the limitation and gradual reduction of armed forces and conventional weapons should be resolutely pursued within the framework of progress towards general and complete disarmament. Nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant States have a special responsibility in pursuing the above negotiations.

Alternative to last sentence of paragraph 1

Those States with the largest military arsenals must initiate the process of conventional armaments reductions.

2. In particular the achievement of a more stable situation in Europe at a lower level of military potential on the basis of approximate equality and parity, as well as on the basis of undiminished security of all States, by agreement on mutual reductions and limitations of armed forces and conventional weapons would contribute to the strengthening of security in Europe and constitute a significant

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step towards enhancing international peace and security in the world as a whole. Current efforts to this end should be continued most energetically.

Alternative to paragraph 2

In particular the strengthening of security in Europe at a lower level of military potential by agreements on mutual limitation and reduction of armaments and armed forces would achieve a more stable military relationship there and constitute a significant step towards the attainment of general and complete disarmament. Current efforts to this end should be continued most energetically.

3. Agreements or other measures should be resolutely pursued in other regions of the world as well as appropriate on a bilateral, regional and multilateral basis with the aim of strengthening peace and security at a lower level of forces, by the limitation and reduction of armed forces and of conventional weapons, taking into account the need of States to protect their security, bearing in mind the inherent right of self-defence embodied in the Charter of the United Nations and without prejudice to the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples in accordance with the Charter, and the need to ensure balance at each stage and undiminished security of all States. Such measures might include:

4. Bilateral, regional and multilateral consultations and conferences where appropriate conditions exist with the participation of all the countries concerned for the consideration of different aspects of conventional disarmament; such as the initiative envisaged in the Declaration of Ayacucho subscribed in 1974 by eight Latin American countries and the Declaration of Bucharest adopted by the States members of the Warsaw Treaty in 1976;

5. Consultations among major arms producer and supplier countries, in particular the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, and between them and recipient States, on measures, on a voluntary or agreed basis of restraint on the international transfer of conventional weapons bearing in mind that no State should be placed at a disadvantage as a result of such transfers and having regard to differing levels of indigenous production capabilities of different countries, taking the production of such weapons into account, and with due regard to the security of recipient States.

6. Negotiations on cessation of the development and thus of production and deployment of new types of conventional armaments with a high destructive capability.

7. For the sake of strengthening their national defence, safeguarding national independence and security, all countries have the right to acquire the necessary conventional armaments on an equitable basis. The super-Powers must not be allowed to use the export of conventional armaments to subject other nations to interference and control, much less to incite conflicts and wars among nations.

/Particularly inhumane weapons/

1. The 1979 United Nations Conference on Prohibitions or Restrictions of Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which may be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects should seek agreement, in the light of humanitarian and military considerations, on the prohibition or restriction of use of certain conventional weapons including those which may cause unnecessary suffering or which may have indiscriminate effects. The conference should consider specific categories of such weapons, including those which were the subject-matter of previously conducted discussions.
2. All States are called upon to contribute towards carrying out this task.
3. /All producing States should refrain from transferring to other States those weapons which the conference will enumerate as excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects./

4. /Reduction of military budgets and armed forces/

1. Freezing and gradual reduction, in absolute figures or in terms of percentage points, of military budgets of States on an agreed /and verifiable/ basis, particularly those of nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant States would be a measure that can contribute to the /suffocation/ /curbing/ of arms race/s/.
2. Therefore the General Assembly at its thirty-third session should consider what concrete steps could be taken to facilitate the reduction of military budgets including those of permanent members of the Security Council as well as those other militarily significant States. /bearing in mind reports of groups of experts on this question./

Alternative to paragraphs 1 and 2

/Limiting and progressively reducing military budgets, including budgets for research and development of new strategic nuclear-weapons systems, on an agreed basis incorporating full openness of reporting and a fully effective means of authentication, particularly by nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant States would be one of the most effective means of curbing the arms race./

Paragraphs 3-4, alternatives for section

3. /The General Assembly should establish, at its thirty-third session, a committee in which the two major nuclear-weapon States and other States engaged in substantial military expenditure would participate, with a view to the committee's submitting to the General Assembly, no later than at its

thirty-fifth session, a report containing a data-presentation system which would allow a minimum of uniformity in the measurement of military budgets./

Alternative to paragraph 3

/The General Assembly at its thirty-third session should consider what concrete steps could be taken to facilitate the reduction of military budgets including those of the permanent members of the Security Council as well as of any other State with comparable military expenditures, bearing in mind the successive reports of the groups of experts on this question./

4. /The two major nuclear-weapon States should formulate a joint declaration (or similar separate declarations) in which they would undertake, as soon as the General Assembly had approved the report proposed in the preceding paragraph, to reduce by 10 per cent their military expenditure and to devote a considerable part of the savings to the promotion of the economic and social development of the developing countries./

Alternative to paragraph 4

/The General Assembly requests the permanent members of the Security Council to undertake to reduce their military expenditures. /The savings/ /A substantial part of the savings/ realized should be paid to the United Nations and used /solely/ for development assistance to the developing countries./

Paragraphs 5-8, alternative text for section

5. /The Secretary-General should organize a pilot test of a system for the reporting of military expenditures by States, drawing on the recommendations on a standardized reporting instrument by the intergovernmental Group of Budgetary Experts with the participation of States representing different /economic/ /military budgeting and accounting/ systems;./

6. /The Secretary-General should appoint an ad hoc panel of budgetary experts, under the aegis of the United Nations, to give guidance to States supplying the required data, to analyse the results of the pilot test, to refine further the system and to develop recommendations for larger-scale application of the reporting instrument;./

7. /The Secretary-General should submit a progress report to the General Assembly at its thirty-fourth session;./

8. /The General Assembly should at its thirty-fourth session consider establishing a committee with the participation of major military States to consider the recommendations of the ad hoc panel./

Alternative text for section

The General Assembly should, in the light of the reports by the groups of experts on the reduction of military budgets, at its thirty-third session consider what concrete steps could be taken to promote an increased openness between States with regard to their military expenditures as a means of building confidence and facilitating agreed reductions of armed forces.

Alternative text for section

To facilitate a solution to this question, States with a large economic and military potential, including all the permanent members of the Security Council, should agree on specific reductions in their own military budgets not in terms of percentage points but in absolute figures. Such agreement might cover, for instance, a period of three years, beginning with the budget for the next financial year.

At the same time, agreement could be reached on specific amounts which each State that reduced its military budget would allocate for increased aid to developing countries. In that event it would be desirable to set up machinery within the framework of the United Nations for the apportionment of such funds among the States receiving aid.

Alternative text for section

9. The reduction of armed forces of States to levels necessary for the maintenance of internal order and fulfilment of obligations of States with regard to the safeguarding of international peace shall take place within the context of general and complete disarmament.

Addition to section

10. Before the realization of general and complete disarmament, all States have the right to maintain and build up the military strength necessary for their national defence, and the two Powers which possess the biggest arsenals should drastically reduce the nuclear and conventional armaments that exceed their defence needs. When major progress has really been made in the reduction of the nuclear and conventional armaments of the above two Powers, the other nuclear countries and militarily significant countries should also carry out disarmament, including the reduction of armed forces, at an equitable and reasonable proportion.

D. Implementation of disarmament agreements

1. In order to facilitate the conclusion and effective implementation of disarmament agreements, States should accept, as appropriate, provisions for

verification as provided for in existing disarmament agreements or agreements yet to be concluded adequate to create confidence.

2. In the context of international disarmament negotiations, the problem of verification should be further examined and adequate methods and procedures in this field be considered.

Alternative to paragraph 2

All aspects of the problem of verification should be examined to ensure that these verification measures are non-discriminatory, do not constitute undue interference in the internal affairs of States and do not unnecessarily impede their economic and social development programmes. For this purpose, more efficient methods and procedures in this field be considered.

3. The Secretary-General is requested to transmit the working paper on verification contained in document A/AC.187/109 to Governments, to ascertain views of Member States on the subject and to submit replies of Member States together with a systematic presentation in a report to the thirty-fourth General Assembly.

4. The is requested to take up this matter as a separate item and to report on its discussions to the thirty-fourth General Assembly.

5. Methods of monitoring and verifying disarmament agreements and measures to strengthen international confidence and security could be strengthened by the use of observation of the earth by artificial satellite technology. Such satellite observation technology should therefore be part of the disarmament efforts undertaken by the international community.

To this end, the establishment of an international satellite monitoring agency should be taken into consideration.

6. The Secretary-General is requested to seek the views of Member States on this subject before 31 March 1979 and in a second phase to establish a committee of qualified governmental experts to study the functions, statute, structure and resources of the agency and to report to the General Assembly at its thirty-fourth session.

E. Other measures to strengthen international security and to build confidence/

1. In order to facilitate the process of disarmament, it is necessary to take measures and pursue policies to strengthen international peace and security and to build confidence among States. Commitment to confidence-building measures could

significantly contribute to preparing for further progress in disarmament. For this purpose, the following measures should be undertaken:

2. Solemn reaffirmation by States, on a regional or bilateral basis, where appropriate of their obligation, as embodied in the Charter of the United Nations strictly to observe the principles of non-use of force or threat of force in any form against the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of States which would contribute to the creation of a climate of confidence among States;

3. Early conclusion of a treaty on the non-use of force in international relations;

4. For the purposes of halting the process, which can lead to dangerous consequences, including the destabilization of the existing strategic situation, it is necessary to reach agreement on the non-stationing of nuclear weapons in the territories of States in which there are none at present. In practice, this means that no nuclear weapons should be stationed in the future, either in the form of deployed combat nuclear systems or in the form of stockpiles of nuclear warheads, bombs, shells and mines, in the territories of States in which there are no nuclear weapons at present.

Non-nuclear-weapon States should make declarations to the effect that they will not allow the stationing of nuclear weapons in their territories.

The nuclear-weapon States could take a major positive step by assuming the obligation not to station nuclear weapons in countries in which there are none at present. Such an obligation should be universal in character, that is, it should be applicable to any non-nuclear State in whose territory there are no nuclear weapons, regardless of whether any particular nuclear State is or is not an ally of that State.

The form of such an obligation could be determined through an exchange of views among nuclear-weapon States.

5. In order to promote a climate of international confidence conducive to disarmament, the General Assembly calls for further and intensified efforts in the organs of the United Nations in which action is being taken or studies are in progress on peaceful settlement of disputes and peace-keeping. The General Assembly will give further consideration to this matter at forthcoming sessions with a view to supplementing existing activities as necessary.

Alternative to paragraph 5

In order to promote a climate of international confidence conducive to disarmament, the General Assembly calls for further and intensified efforts in the organs of the United Nations in which action is being taken or studies are in progress with a goal of drafting a world treaty on the non-use of force in international relations as well as on peaceful settlement of disputes and peace-keeping. The General Assembly will give further consideration to this matter at forthcoming sessions.

6. The establishment of a United Nations Peace-keeping Reserve to be made up of national contingents trained in United Nations peace-keeping methods and earmarked by their Governments for United Nations duty. This Reserve would be drawn upon by the Secretary-General whenever the Security Council decided to establish a United Nations force to maintain international peace and security.

7. Prohibition of the establishment of new foreign military bases and stationing of troops in foreign territories;

8. Withdrawal of foreign troops and dismantling of foreign military bases;

Alternatives to paragraph 8

Dismantling of military bases in foreign territories and the withdrawal of foreign troops from such territories, bearing in mind the goals and principles principles and objectives of the United Nations Charter.

The dismantling of military bases in foreign territories and the withdrawal of foreign troops from such territories should be pursued at an appropriate stage of general and complete disarmament, bearing in mind Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.

9. The dissolution of military blocs;

10. Not to extend the existing military alliances by admitting new members.

11. Submission by States of reports information to the United Nations on their military budgets using the method shortly to be finalized through a pilot study by the Secretary-General for the standardized reporting of such budgets as a step towards verified and balanced reductions in military expenditure.

12. Arrangements could be made, on a regional or bilateral basis, and in accordance with the characteristics of each region, providing for prior notification of major military manoeuvres and for exchanges of observers to military manoeuvres and other kind of exchanges, on a reciprocal basis, of military personnel by invitation.

13. Arrangements could also be considered with a view to prior notification of major military movements and to refraining from the conduct of military manoeuvres above an agreed level.

/...

14. Confidence-building and stabilizing measures in various regions, including notification of manoeuvres, invitations of observers to manoeuvres and United Nations machinery to promote such measures, should be encouraged.
15. An undertaking not to make shows of strength or concentrate armed forces near the frontiers of other States.
16. The prevention of attacks which take place by accident, miscalculation or communications failure by taking steps to improve communications between Governments, particularly in areas of tension, by the establishment of "hot lines" and other methods of reducing the risk of conflict.
17. Publish detailed information about their armed forces, and the total value of their arms production and of their transfers of arms to other countries;
18. States should assess the possible implications of their military research and development for existing agreements as well as for further efforts in the field of disarmament.
19. Budget requests for major weapons and weapon systems should be accompanied by an evaluation of their impact on arms limitation and disarmament efforts.
20. The Secretary-General shall periodically submit reports to the General Assembly on the economic and social consequences of the arms race and its extremely harmful effects on international peace and security.

F. Disarmament and development

1. In view of the relationship between expenditure on armaments and economic and social development and the necessity to release real resources now being used for military purposes to economic and social development in the world, particularly for the benefit of the developing countries.
2. The Secretary-General should, with the assistance of a group of qualified governmental experts appointed by him, initiate an expert study on the relationship between disarmament and development. The Secretary-General should submit an interim report on the subject to the General Assembly at its thirty-fourth session and submit the final results to the Assembly at its thirty-sixth session for subsequent action. at its second special session devoted to disarmament.*
3. The expert study should have the terms of reference contained in the report of the Ad Hoc Group on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development appointed

* If the decision is taken to hold such a session.

by the Secretary-General in accordance with General Assembly resolution 32/88 A of 12 December 1977. It should investigate the three main areas listed in the report, bearing in mind the United Nations studies previously carried out. The study should be made in the context of how disarmament can contribute to the establishment of the new international economic order. The study should be forward-looking and policy-oriented and place special emphasis on both the desirability of a reallocation, following disarmament measures, of resources now being used for military purposes to economic and social development, particularly for the benefit of the developing countries and the substantive feasibility of such a reallocation. A principal aim should be to produce results that could effectively guide the formulation of practical measures to reallocate those resources at the local, national, regional and international levels.

4. Immediate efforts should be made to achieve a practical solution to the problems raised by the flagrant disproportion existing between the resources allocated to armaments expenditures and resources devoted to development aid.

In this respect, the establishment of an "International Disarmament Fund for Development" should be envisaged.

A group of qualified governmental experts should be convened and should report to the thirty-fourth session of the General Assembly on the questions linked to the establishment of the International Disarmament Fund for Development with a view to specifying its objectives, its organization, the modalities of its operations and the nature of its resources, bearing in mind the different proposals made in this respect to the tenth special session of the General Assembly.

5. Pending the establishment of the International Disarmament Fund for Development, an ad hoc account in the United Nations Development Programme should be opened on a provisional basis.

6. Special attention should be paid to the development of a programme aimed to allocate a substantial part of the resources released by the reduction of military budgets, to reward those nations which reduce their military expenditures to a level lower than a determined percentage of their public expenditures or their national product, regardless of their degree of development and as an incentive to promote disarmament.

7. The military expenditure of the super-Powers amounts to 60 per cent of that of the whole world, and they should take the lead to reduce their military expenditure.

G. Studies, information, education and training

1. Studies

1. Taking further steps in the field of disarmament and other measures aimed at promoting international peace and security would be facilitated by carrying out studies by the Secretary-General in this field with appropriate assistance from governmental or consultant experts.

2. The Secretary-General shall, with the assistance of consultant experts, appointed by him, continue the study of the interrelationship between disarmament and international security and submit it to the thirty-fourth session of the General Assembly, as requested in resolution A/RES/32/154.

3. The thirty-third and subsequent sessions of the General Assembly should determine the specific guidelines for carrying out studies, taking into account the proposals already submitted as well as other proposals which can be introduced later in this field. In doing so, the General Assembly would take into consideration recommendations on priorities and institutional allocations, to be prepared by the Secretary-General.

4. Among the suggestions put forward (by individual States or groups of States) to the special session for consideration were the following:

ways of limiting and reducing the build-up of conventional weapons with the aim of promoting peace and security, regionally and throughout the world, taking into account all relevant aspects, including the international transfer of conventional weapons bearing in mind that no State should be placed at a disadvantage as a result of such transfer and having regard to differing levels of indigenous production capability.

regional aspects of disarmament, including means of promoting disarmament on a regional basis as well as further measures designed to increase confidence and stability.

the possible contribution of technical arrangements to confidence building amongst States.

all aspects of verification and control of arms limitation and disarmament measures.

arms control and disarmament implications of the relationship between threat perception, security outlook and defence capabilities in various regions of the world.

the possibility of establishing a system of targets and incentives to promote and encourage progress in arms control and disarmament and, in particular, the possibility of voluntary ceilings on national defence expenditures.

/- the establishment of a world disarmament institution with the aim of having over-all competence in the field of disarmament.//

2. /Information/

1. In order to mobilize world public opinion on behalf of disarmament, the specific measures set forth below, designed to increase the dissemination of information about the armaments race and the efforts to halt and reverse it, should be adopted:
2. Governmental and non-governmental information organs and those of the United Nations and its specialized agencies should give priority to the preparation and distribution of printed and audio-visual material relating to the danger represented by the armaments race as well as to the disarmament efforts and negotiations on specific disarmament measures.

In particular, publicity should be given to the final documents of the special session.

3. /The General Assembly proclaims a week starting 6 August as Disarmament Week./

Alternative to paragraph 3

/Each State is recommended to hold annually a day or a week devoted to fostering the objective of disarmament on/or beginning with 6 August /or any other day or week, if it is /suitable/ to that State./

4. To encourage study and research on disarmament, the United Nations Centre for Disarmament should intensify its activities in the presentation of information concerning the armaments race and disarmament. Also, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), is urged to intensify its activities aimed at facilitating research and publication on disarmament, related to its fields of competence, especially in developing countries, and should disseminate the results of such research.
5. Throughout this process of disseminating information about the developments in the disarmament field of all countries, there should be increased participation by non-governmental organizations concerned with the matter, through closer liaison between them and the United Nations.
6. Member States should be encouraged to ensure a better flow of information with regard to the various aspects of disarmament to avoid dissemination of false and tendentious information concerning armaments and to concentrate on the danger of escalation of the armaments race and on the need for general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

3. Education

1. With a view to contributing to a greater understanding and awareness of the problems created by the armaments race and of the need for disarmament, Governments and governmental and non-governmental international organizations are urged to take steps to develop programmes of education for disarmament and peace studies at all levels.

2. The General Assembly welcomes the initiative of UNESCO in planning to hold a world congress on disarmament education and in this connexion, urges UNESCO to step up its programme aimed at the development of disarmament education as a distinct field of study through the preparation, inter alia, of teachers guides, textbooks, readers and audio-visual materials. Member States should take all possible measures to encourage the incorporation of such materials in the curricula for their educational institutes.

4. Training

In order to promote expertise in disarmament in more Member States, particularly in the developing countries, the General Assembly decides to establish a programme of fellowships on disarmament. The Secretary-General, taking into account the proposal submitted to the special session, should prepare guidelines for the programme. He should also submit the financial requirements for inclusion in the regular budget of the United Nations for the year 1979.

H. Comprehensive programme for disarmament

1. Implementation of these priorities should lead to general and complete disarmament under effective international control, which remains the ultimate goal of all efforts exerted in the field of disarmament. Negotiations on general and complete disarmament shall be conducted concurrently with negotiations on partial measures of disarmament. With this purpose in mind, the following measures shall be taken as a matter of urgency:

2. (a) Elaboration of a comprehensive programme of disarmament measures which would lead to the attainment of general and complete disarmament;

Alternative proposed for second paragraph

A comprehensive programme of disarmament measures may include general and complete disarmament as its goal, but it is more important to formulate practical measures for genuine disarmament, particularly for the reduction of the nuclear and conventional armaments of the two Powers which possess the greatest amount of armaments.

3. (b) Establishment of a special committee of the United Nations for the elaboration of the comprehensive programme of disarmament measures to be submitted to the General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session in 1980 at the latest.

/...

Additions proposed for the third paragraph

(b) ... The special committee should be established by a decision of all countries with equal rights; the composition of the committee must fully represent the interests of all countries and must be widely representative.

4. The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, as soon as it has undergone the reforms envisaged in the guidelines comprising section IV of this Final Document, will undertake the preparation of a comprehensive programme of disarmament encompassing all measures thought to be advisable in order to ensure that the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control becomes a reality in a world in which international peace and security prevail and in which the new international economic order is strengthened and consolidated. The comprehensive programme should contain appropriate procedures for facilitating the co-ordination of all disarmament negotiations, regardless of where and in what form they are conducted, and for ensuring that the General Assembly is kept fully informed of the progress of the negotiations so that it can properly perform its functions, including an appraisal of the situation when appropriate and, in particular, a continuing review of the implementation of the programme. The said programme should be completed by 1 March 1981 at the latest and should immediately thereupon be submitted, as a draft, to the Secretary-General of the United Nations so that he may transmit it to Member States and to the General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament.

5. A second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament will open at the end of May 1981, its main objective being to consider and adopt the comprehensive programme of disarmament prepared in accordance with the provisions of the preceding paragraph.

6. The process towards general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control should be accompanied by the establishment of reliable procedures for the peaceful settlement of disputes and in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations effective arrangements for the maintenance of peace and security, including renewed efforts to supplement by means of appropriate guidelines the arrangements concerning the United Nations peace-keeping operations. Studies and/or negotiations should be undertaken with a view to recruiting a permanent United Nations police force (Article 43 of the Charter) and establishing an international organ to supervise the application of disarmament agreements in force.

Addition proposed to paragraph 6

In this context, the work of the Special Committee on the Charter of the United Nations and on the Strengthening of the Role of the Organization and the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations assumes greater significance.

Amendment to sixth paragraph

Delete the words: "United Nations police force".

/...

7. General and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control shall permit States to have at their disposal only those non-nuclear forces, armaments, facilities and establishments as are agreed to be necessary to maintain internal order and protect the personal security of citizens and in order that States shall support and provide agreed manpower for a United Nations police force.]

I. Guidelines for implementation

[All States, in particular the nuclear-weapon States, are called upon to contribute to the implementation of the Programme of Action;

Specific measures of the Programme of Action shall be implemented by individual States or groups of States which may conduct, for this purpose, bilateral or multilateral negotiations and shall inform the United Nations of the results thereof;

These measures shall be implemented in accordance with the above-mentioned priorities, bearing in mind the necessity to conduct, whenever possible, parallel negotiations on several measures with a view to reaching agreement on each of them as soon as possible;

Implementation should be in an agreed sequence, by stages, with each measure and stage carried out with specified time-limits, the entire process being completed not later than the end of the next decade;

Implementation of disarmament measures should be facilitated by the speeding up of the process of resolving outstanding problems and disputes which threaten international peace and security. This should include application, where appropriate, of the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.

The present Programme of Action has a twofold purpose. First of all, it enumerates a series of specific disarmament measures which have been selected because there is a consensus on the need and advisability of making every possible effort to implement them within a period of not more than three years, it being felt that realistically and objectively, there is a reasonable likelihood that such efforts will succeed. Secondly, the Programme of Action seeks to establish suitable procedures for monitoring compliance with the commitment thus made and for conducting serious negotiations on the preparation of a comprehensive programme of disarmament. In the light of the foregoing, the States participating in the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament undertake to do everything in their power, in good faith, to ensure the implementation, during the period from June 1978 to May 1981, of the measures set forth in the following Three-year Disarmament Plan:

The agenda for the thirty-third, thirty-fourth and thirty-fifth regular sessions of the General Assembly should include an item permitting the Assembly to review the manner in which the Three-year Disarmament Plan is being carried out and to make any appropriate recommendations resulting from that review.

/...

A second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament should be convened in 1982.

A preparatory committee for the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament should be established by the General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session.

Towards this end a world disarmament conference shall be convened in the year ... A preparatory committee for the world disarmament conference, composed of nuclear-weapon States members of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and other States on the basis of the principles of equitable, political and geographical representation, should be established by the General Assembly at its thirty-third session.

All States undertake to work towards the fulfilment of this programme and to respect agreed measures relating to it. The General Assembly should examine its implementation, as appropriate, taking account of the recommendations on disarmament machinery made later in the final document./
