

Meeting of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects

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Agenda item 7

General exchange of views

Working paper on the Position of the Russian Federation under Agenda Item 7: "General Exchange of Views"

Submitted by the Russian Federation*

1. The Russian Federation reaffirms its commitment to the obligations under the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) and advocates the full implementation of all its provisions. We are convinced that it is the best suited forum that strikes the balance between humanitarian concerns and legitimate national security interests through consensus decisions. The CCW regime has shown in practice its real ability to respond to humanitarian threats, as well as its high adaptivity to changing conditions of warfare.
2. Therefore we consider that resolution of issues related to the use of conventional weapons lies exclusively in the plane of good-faith implementation of the existing provisions of the CCW and its protocols, as well as of the widespread use of political and diplomatic means of conflict resolution.
3. The strengthening of CCW and its five Protocols is directly dependent on its universalization. We urge the States that have not done it so far to also accede to the CCW as well as to its Protocols.
4. The Russian Federation comprehensively promotes the implementation of the Convention. We are strictly committed to the existing compliance mechanism for the Convention and its Protocols, in particular the decision to enhance its implementation adopted by the 2011 Review Conference and confirmed by the 2021 Review Conference. Russia submits timely its annual reports on compliance with both the Convention and its Amended Protocol II (AP-2) and Protocol V (P-5). We actively participate in all annual events under the CCW and its Protocols.
5. We strictly observe Protocol I to the CCW on non-detectable fragments. We are convinced of the need for all UN Member States to join it.
6. We emphasize the firm observance by the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation of AP-2, which establishes an effective mechanism against the improper use of landmines, which are for many States a legitimate and necessary means of ensuring national security, as well as of P-5 concerning explosive remnants of war. The Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, as well as the Ministry of Civil Defense, Emergencies and Disaster Relief of the Russian Federation make a significant contribution to the implementation of the provisions of the CCW and its protocols, including in terms of mine clearance and clearance of any explosive objects both on our territory and abroad (for example, in Laos). We reaffirm our willingness to share experience and practices accumulated from humanitarian demining as well as to enhancement of cooperation with all interested countries in this field.

* The present document is being issued without formal editing.



7. We reaffirm our commitment to our obligations deriving from Protocol III (P-3) to CCW on incendiary weapons. We consider calls to revise the provisions of Protocol III to be counterproductive. We see no reason in allocating separate space to the discussion on P-3 within the CCW. It is important to focus on more relevant issues, first and foremost, on faithful and better implementation of the Protocol.

8. We confirm our reserved attitude to the possible resumption of independent expert work on Mines Other Than Anti-Personnel Mines (MOTAPM) within the CCW. Such mines are a legitimate means of defense and any attempts to qualify their use as “special humanitarian threat” have nothing to do with reality. We believe that potential humanitarian risks associated with these mines should be addressed through the already existing IHL, in particular AP-2. We do not see the need to exchange best practices of the application of rules under AP-2 in relation to MOTAPM.

9. We are convinced that calls to consider the issue of the use of explosive ordnance in densely populated areas within CCW to be inadequate as their use is already sufficiently regulated by the norms of IHL and is not within the scope of the Convention. Meanwhile we consider the issue of improvised explosive devices to remain relevant. We support further consideration of this topic within AP-2.

10. We confirm our willingness to further discuss the issue of lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS) within the optimal platform for that – CCW Group of Governmental Experts (GGE), basing on discussion mandate and the principle of consensus. We assume that the existing international law, including IHL, is fully applicable to LAWS and does not need to be adapted to the specifics of these weapon systems.

11. We welcome the adoption at the Sixth Review Conference of financial rules designed to ensure the long-term and sustainable functioning of the Convention. We proceed from the fact that any expenditures from the budget of the CCW can be carried out exclusively with the approval of the States Parties to the CCW. We note with satisfaction and gratitude the work of the Implementation Support Unit.

12. The Russian Federation confirms its commitment to a constructive, results-oriented dialogue with all interested parties.
