Statement delivered by Ambassador Ichiro OGASAWARA, Permanent Representative of the Delegation of Japan to the Conference on Disarmament
2023 Group of Governmental Experts on Emerging Technologies in the Area of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems: 6 – 10 March
Agenda item 5, Topic 6: Risk mitigation and confidence-building measures

Thank you, Mr. Chairperson,

This delegation agrees with you that there has been a great amount of convergence on this issue, as you can see in the past consensus documents. And also, some similarities can be seen in each proposal submitted last year.

For Japan one important to be addressed on this topic is how we could properly fulfill national responsibilities while maximizing the benefit of AI technology. In this regard, it is important to correctly understand the characteristics of AI technology and implement necessary controls in the process of promoting advanced autonomy, in other words, to take measures to reduce and avoid the risk of unintended and inappropriate behavior of AI technology, including in relation to AI bias. In order to maintain and improve the accuracy of AI decisions, it is necessary to continue the process of collecting, analyzing, scrutinizing, testing and learning from vast amounts of data. Furthermore, those who use AI technologies and those who direct such use need to be educated and trained to ensure that they can responsibly utilize AI technologies.

For more details, please refer to the description of risk assessment and mitigation measures in Article 1 paragraph 2(c) and Article 6 of the 'Draft Articles on AWS', our joint proposal distributed by US.

In accordance with past language, Article 1 paragraph 2(c) stipulates the risks to be identified and assessed include unintended engagements, loss of system control, proliferation and acquisition of technology by terrorist groups, etc., in addition to civilian harm. On that basis, the following risk mitigation measures that can be incorporated throughout the life cycle of the weapon system are suggested: (a) controlling and limiting the types of targets with which the system can engage; (b) controlling and limiting the duration, geographic scope, and scale of weapon system operation through self-destruction, self-deactivation, and self-neutralization mechanisms; (c) reducing artificial intelligence bias and operator automation bias; (d) strengthening controls and improving decision-making on matters related to the use of force, including timing and accuracy.

We understand that these points are similar to those mentioned in the 'Roadmap toward a New Protocol on AWS' proposal and other related proposals.

As well as loss of system control, unintended engagements such as engagements against civilians and civilian objects, and the occurrence of engagements that have no operational military rationale, have consequences that are not desired by responsible military forces. In incorporating technologies such as AI and automation into military applications, there is a need to improve technologies to avoid unintended and harmful consequences, as well as technologies to help unit commanders achieve their intended operational objectives. It is important to share good practices on risk

mitigation measures, while respecting the national security considerations of each country. This is also meaningful from a confidence-building perspective.

Thank you, Mr. Chairperson.