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IED Clearance Methodologies

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
IED Disposal Equipment
Intelligence and Exploitation
IED Networks and System
Electronic Counter Measures
Clearance Methodologies
Developing Technologies
Counter IED Strategies
IED technology Development
Protection
Mitigation of Threat

Factors Affecting the Methodology?

- The threat environment. Benign or non-benign? Developing or static?
- Competency of the responding unit/organisation. (military, police, gendarmerie, NGO, civil defence, commercial…)
- Conflict type (enduring, legacy/forgotten, short term, asymmetric/insurgency etc.).
- Force protection and tactical technical procedures (TTPs).
- Intelligence and/or exploitation/counter IED procedures.
- Culture.
- Government policy/politics.
- Cost/economy.

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Objectives of IED Clearance?

- Protect human life.
- Protect property/infrastructure.
- Return the situation back to normal (civil, political and economic disruption).
- Protection of forensic evidence (protection, prevention, prosecution).

Threat and Appropriate Response



Non-permissive



Permissive

Military vs Humanitarian

- Obstacle clearance.
- Route clearance/assurance.
- Support to operations.
- Incidence response and/or on call.
- Forensics, WIS, WTI, WIT.
- Support to civil police and/or MACA.
- High threat search.
- Counter terrorism.
- Bilateral oversees training and advice (Op MONOGRAM).
- Non-permissive environments.
- During conflict.

- Land release to communities and host nation.
- Risk education to vulnerable groups and beneficiaries.
- Slow process with quality assurance and control.
- 100% clearance to return land.
- Assistance to victims and survivors.
- Support to APMBC and Ottawa Convention.
- Importance of “neutrality”.
- Permissive environments.
- Post conflict, humanitarian support to early recovery or development activities.

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Important Considerations

- IED Disposal/clearance standard operating procedures/guidelines.
- Training competencies of EOD units.
- Host nation laws and accreditation.
- Ability to “refer up” and recognise when the threat changes – “they don’t know, what they don’t know”.
- Understanding the threat, the device technology and the tactics involved and analysing it as one tool to defeat the “IED system”.

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Questions?

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