

**AD HOC GROUP OF THE STATES PARTIES
TO THE CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION
OF THE DEVELOPMENT, PRODUCTION AND
STOCKPILING OF BACTERIOLOGICAL
(BIOLOGICAL) AND TOXIN WEAPONS
AND ON THEIR DESTRUCTION**

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From the very start of negotiations of the Ad Hoc Group of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, established in 1994 by the Special Conference of the States Parties to the Convention, the Government of the Republic of Cuba has participated in the work of the Group in a responsible, informed and active manner, as it believes that the successful performance of the Group's mandate, namely, the preparation of a protocol to strengthen the Convention, will represent an important step towards the goal of the total and permanent eradication of weapons of mass destruction from the face of the Earth and of strengthened international cooperation on the peaceful use of advancements in science and technology.

In this context, we believe that the only way to prevent the use of biological weapons is to exclude any possibility that any micro-organism or organism be employed with a view to causing death, diseases or disabilities in human beings, animals and plants. This can only be achieved by taking specific and effective steps to guarantee the full implementation of article 1 of the Convention.

Cuba presents a good example of the need to strengthen the effectiveness of the Convention and to improve its implementation. Having been actual victims of acts of aggression using biological agents, which have harmed human beings and caused damage to practically all the major crops and livestock sectors of our country, we have resolved to participate in a determined and active manner in the current negotiations and to table specific proposals designed to give effect to the Protocol, particularly its articles II, III, V and VII.

Cuba's actions are not prompted by theoretical considerations, but by well-documented and incontrovertible evidence, some of which we believe we should share with our fellow States parties to the Convention participating in the work of the Ad Hoc Group. The following elements have been taken verbatim from the submissions by the people of Cuba in its actions against the Government of the United States for human damages and against the Government of the United States for economic damages, filed with the People's Provincial Court of the City of Havana on 31 May 1999 and 3 January 2000 respectively.

The Government of the Republic of Cuba will continue to play an active, positive and constructive role in the work of the Ad Hoc Group, as it remains convinced of the need to achieve an efficient, comprehensive, non-discriminatory and legally binding international instrument to strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention and to give its States parties real assurances of peace, security and social and economic development.

Action brought by the people of Cuba against the Government of the United States of America for economic damages caused to Cuba

“Twenty-first: From 1962 until the present day, the Government of the United States of America has used recourse to biological aggression as one of the principal weapons in its dirty war against Cuba, resulting in substantial damage to the Cuban economy and, far more serious, to the health and life of its citizens. At the economic level, this biological war has primarily been targeted against the Cuban agricultural and livestock sector, with the aim of sabotaging the population’s sources of food, undermining revenue from the export of agricultural products and causing substantial losses through lost production and expenses incurred in combating the introduced infestations and diseases.

“A document entitled ‘Project Cuba’, dated 18 January 1962, sets forth the aims and the 32 original tasks of what subsequently became known as Operation Mongoose. For task 21, it states that, on 15 February 1962, the CIA would submit a plan to disrupt the harvest of food crops in Cuba. The following two sections of the declassified text of this document, which might be expected to clarify the method to be used in pursuit of this objective, appear to be censored: clearly their content was so repugnant that even the officials responsible for declassifying the document saw fit to keep that part of it secret.

“In the light of this disclosure, it is hardly coincidental that, also in 1962, there were simultaneous outbreaks of Newcastle disease in poultry flocks in the provinces of Pinar del Río, La Habana, Matanzas and Oriente. Subsequent research established that the emergence of this disease was the result of sabotage carried out in a laboratory of the National Institute of Agrarian Reform on a vaccine against avian flu, and the distribution and application of this sabotaged vaccine caused the death of more than 1 million birds across the country. The economic impact, from the loss of production and the clean-up costs, amounted to 3.36 million pesos at current values. This was the first recorded case of the use by the CIA of biological aggression against the economy of Cuba.

“In 1971, the first outbreak of African swine fever was recorded in the municipality of Boyeros, in the former province of La Habana, from which it spread throughout the province and to certain areas in the province of Pinar del Río. The cause of this serious disease

affecting pigs was the introduction into Cuba from Fort Gulick, an American military base in the Panama Canal Zone, of a highly pathogenic virus brought in by a CIA agent, as was unequivocally established and subsequently confirmed in international press reports, after the agent himself had publicly admitted to the deed. To prevent the disease spreading, some 500,000 pigs had to be destroyed, which entailed the loss of millions of pesos to the Cuban economy through the loss of the animals themselves, the slaughtering costs, the costs of conducting the campaign, the payment of compensation to private farmers, and the impact on the quality of the national herd and on its future development. It is impossible to quantify the impact in terms of food security for the population caused by the decimation of the national pig herd.

“In January 1980, the presence of this disease was detected and confirmed in all the municipalities adjacent to or near the territory occupied by the United States naval base in Guantánamo Bay. On this occasion, 297,037 pigs had to be slaughtered. As before, the economic impact from the loss of animals, payment of compensation to private farmers, costs of the campaign and foreign trade losses was substantial. Still more serious, however, was the effect on the future development of the national pig herd, as an important and strategic sector in the country’s food security.

“In September 1973, the presence of sugar-cane rust, one of the most aggressive diseases affecting sugar cane, was detected in some sugar-cane-growing areas of Holguín province. The blight, which soon spread throughout the country, had a particularly severe effect on the Barbados 4362 variety, which, at that time, was the main variety grown in Cuban plantations. The sudden and extremely virulent outbreak of this disease, its almost instantaneous spread and the lack of any correspondence between the distribution of the centres of the disease and the prevailing patterns of air currents indicated, from the very outset, that this infestation was not attributable to natural causes. The emergence and spread of sugar-cane rust necessitated the immediate destruction of 34 per cent of the national sugar-cane crop and its replacement by other varieties with greater resistance to the disease but inferior in terms of their agro-industrial properties. Over the following years, sugar-cane rust had serious effects on the economy. The 1980-1981 harvest alone lost almost a million

tons of sugar.

“Tobacco blue mould was detected in November 1979, in the province of Villa Clara. This disease had already been reported in Cuba in 1957, when it was connected with the use by our farmers of shade cloth imported from the United States, where the disease was fairly widespread. Subsequent appropriate action eliminated the sources of the disease and no further instances were reported. The way in which the disease was propagated and the almost simultaneous appearance of its sources scattered over a wide area suggested that the fungus could have been disseminated deliberately from the air.

“The economic impact of the blue mould plague was so massive in the 1979 tobacco season that, by conservative estimates, losses amounted to almost 350 million dollars for that year alone, as a result of export losses and the impact on local consumption, which had to be met to a large extent through imports - the first time in its history that Cuba had ever had to resort to such a step. Exceptional and very costly measures had to be taken to eradicate the disease, involving the import of phytosanitary supplies to combat and prevent the reappearance of the plague, and the payment of subsidies and compensation to producers. The country's economy was affected not only by the multi-million dollar loss of export revenues, but also by the defection of traditional buyers to other producers in competition with Cuba, necessitating special promotion campaigns, which entailed further costs.

“The most sinister act of biological warfare perpetrated by the Government of the United States against the people of Cuba was the introduction of the haemorrhagic dengue epidemic to Cuba in 1981, which caused the death of 158 people, including 101 children. The virus stocks subsequently isolated were genetically remote from those which at that same time had been moving across other Caribbean countries, but were, on the other hand, related to laboratory virus stocks which had been exclusively developed in North American centres. At the same time, the three sources which had been identified as primary sources, and which had no epidemiological connection with one another, were situated within a few kilometres of two of the three air corridors across the island. Later it was also established that a vaccination exercise had been conducted against the disease at the Guantánamo naval base earlier that year, and that, throughout the course of the epidemic in Cuba, there was not one single case of

dengue at the base. On the basis of all these considerations, it was possible at that time categorically to establish that the introduction of the type 2 dengue virus to Cuba in 1981 was not a natural phenomenon. This was later confirmed by the confession of one of the ringleaders of the terrorist organization Omega 7, who had been working for the CIA.

“Through their immediate, vigorous and comprehensive response to the rapid propagation of the disease, which resulted in 344,203 reported cases, the Cuban authorities were able completely to eradicate the epidemic in a period of four and a half months. The campaign against dengue cost Cuba a total of some 103.2 million dollars, at prices current at that time.

“That same year saw an outbreak in Cuba of haemorrhagic conjunctivitis, caused by the pathogen enterovirus 70, which, according to the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO), had never before been attested in the hemisphere. We should also note the outbreak of dysentery at the same time in the province of Guantánamo, site of the United States naval base, which led to the death of 18 children and was caused by the shigella bacteria, which had never previously been reported in the country.

“Also in 1981, on 4 August, the viral disease known as bovine nodular pseudodermatosis was detected in the province of Villa Clara. In the matter of some 21 days, the disease had spread through nine provinces. This disease, endemic in Africa, had never before been attested in Cuba. Its etiological agent had been isolated in Italy and in the United States, but the authorities of those countries had omitted to officially inform the international health authorities of their action. By this time, work was under way on the virus in the Plum Island Animal Disease Centre, situated in the United States. The battle against this disease cost Cuba a great deal of money. Given the clinical properties of the disease, strict quarantine measures had to be taken, the beef herd had to be immobilized and milk production eliminated in the 2,895 detected sources, which had a total of 226,181 diseased animals. All these measures caused substantial economic losses and seriously affected the supply of milk and its consumption by the Cuban people. The effects of this disease continue to cause considerable losses to the economy.

“We should also note that, at this time, Cuba had made significant advances in cattle

genetics, and was steadily changing the structure of the national beef herd in favour of breeds with superior meat and milk production properties. Massive investments had been made in infrastructure and equipment. There had been a steady increase in the production of milk, an essential food item for the general population and, in particular, for children, the sick and the elderly.

“Another suspicious cattle disease - ulcerative mammalitis - was detected on 4 April 1989 in the province of Granma, from which it rapidly spread to adjacent areas. Similar outbreaks were also recorded, however, in the distant provinces of La Habana and Pinar del Río, showing a completely abnormal pattern of propagation. This disease has a high morbidity rate - 80 per cent - and causes a 25 per cent reduction in milk production. The sick animals need special treatment, involving isolation and intensive disinfection and quarantine measures. Since the emergence of this disease, which has still not been totally eradicated, some 400 sources have been identified. Added to the losses in milk production are the costs of medication, disinfection and other essential treatment measures and actions.

“In the 1990s, Cuba’s trade and other relations with the countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union - its main partners in those areas - collapsed and the country’s agricultural and livestock sector now faced an unprecedented challenge. On the one hand, the income which had traditionally been available to Cuba to maintain its agricultural and livestock production both for export and for domestic consumption was substantially reduced and, on the other, the demand for domestic production had been increased by the restrictions on its food imports resulting from new measures taken by the United States Congress and Administration.

“In these difficult circumstances, the agricultural and livestock sector became one of the chief targets of United States aggression, in particular, the biological warfare waged against Cuba with an intensity and on a scale hitherto unknown by any country in the world. A major effort was made in Cuba to develop what was known as the National Food Programme, which was designed to achieve, within a reasonable period, food self-sufficiency in the main food-producing regions. This programme assigned particular importance to the production of bananas and plantains, and large plantations were established for the crop in

different areas of the country.

“In October 1990, the plantain disease black Sigatoka was detected in the province of Camagüey. This disease had never before been reported in Cuba and there was a suspicious coincidence between its appearance and the work under way in the country at that time to expand and optimize the production of bananas and plantains. The initial centres of infection were situated very close to the Maya international air corridor. To date, the introduction of this infestation to Cuba has caused expenses and losses amounting to more than 100 million dollars. Between 1990 and 1995 the country’s total area under banana clones of the AAB group was reduced by 77 per cent. In addition to the severe adverse impact on production and supply, the losses in economic production and the cost of medication used to combat the disease, damage was also caused to the campaign to develop and expand production of a basic component of the Cuban diet.

“Citrus production is one of the economic activities in the agricultural sector which has been extensively developed during the Cuban Revolution. Over the 1980s, annual production reached approximately 1 million tons and exports surpassed half a million tons, with the prospects of still further expansion. In the difficult economic situation facing the country in the early 1990s, citrus production should have played a prominent role as a source of export revenue and in meeting the food needs of the Cuban population.

“In December 1992, the presence of the black plant louse, the most efficient vector of the disease known as citrus tristeza, was detected in plantations in Calmanara municipality, where the enclave containing the American naval base is situated. This insect had not previously been reported in the country. One year later, citrus leafminer was reported in La Habana province and, four months after this, the leafminer blight had spread through the country from Pinar del Río as far as Camagüey. This insect had not previously been reported in America. The connection between these suspicious diseases and the importance of the citrus crop and its development for the Cuban economy hardly needs commenting on. Between them, the two infestations caused multi-million expenses and losses to Cuba, as well as a substantial drop in potential income and foreign currency earnings from citrus exports.

“Rabbit viral disease, also exotic in Cuba, was diagnosed in 1993 in Havana, from

where it rapidly spread to other areas. The only previous instance of this disease on the American continent had been reported in Mexico in 1989. The appearance of these new breeding grounds did not correspond to any normal propagation pattern. Among the economic losses due to the epidemic which could be quantified was the death or destruction of 122,135 animals. It is much more difficult to quantify the damage caused by the setback to the rabbit breeding programme and the loss of a supplementary and alternative source of animal protein in the local diet.

“In February 1995, the coffee borer worm, considered the worst of the coffee pests, was detected in Granma and Santiago de Cuba provinces. The coffee borer is exotic in our country and there is no plausible explanation for its natural appearance in the island. On the contrary, there is ample evidence indicating that it was intentionally introduced and showing how this was done. The infestation is considered to have caused losses in excess of 80 per cent of production. It also caused a serious deterioration in the quality of the bean, with a significant adverse effect on its market prices. All in all, this meant that the economic costs and losses due to this infestation were very considerable.

“The bee disease varroasis was diagnosed in April 1996 in three private-sector apiaries in the municipality of Limonar, Matanzas province. From here it swiftly spread to other regions of the country. A study revealed that the only natural way in which this disease could have entered the country was through the provinces of Pinar del Rio or Guantánamo. Its propagation actually moved from west to east, however, while, with the predominance of east winds, natural propagation would have followed the opposite direction. Many of the identified breeding grounds are isolated from all previous breeding grounds. The import of products to control the disease, the decline in the output of honey and other bee products, losses from the death of bees and expenditure on quarantine measures have all had a severe economic impact on the sector.

“In 1996, the presence was also diagnosed in Zaza reservoir, in the province of Sancti Spiritus, of the ulcerative disease of trout, which had spread to other species of commercial value, such as tilapia. There has still been no definitive evaluation of the economic impact of this disease on the aquaculture sector, which is of considerable

importance for the country's food production and which it has made a considerable effort to develop as an alternative source of food, in view of the general problems facing Cuba, like all countries, in developing its marine fishing industry.

“On 21 October 1996, a crop-dusting aircraft of the SR2 model, registration N3093M of the Civil Aircraft Registry of the United States of America, operated by the State Department of that country in its programme against drug production in Colombia, was observed spraying a substance over Cuban territory along the Girón international air corridor, in Matanzas province. The incident was the subject of a protest note from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. On 18 December 1996, two months later, the first signs were detected in that province of the presence of a Thrips plague affecting potato crops. In January 1997, breeding grounds of the same insect were detected in other municipalities of Matanzas and in the province of La Habana. On 14 February 1997, the Central Quarantine Laboratory confirmed that the insect examined was the *Thrips palmi karny*, previously exotic to Cuban territory.

“Following an analysis of those facts and the findings of subsequent research, it was established that the primary breeding grounds of the insect were located close to the Girón air corridor and that, on the basis of the insect population observed in December and the reproduction rate of the species, the beginning of the infestation could be dated to 21 December, namely, the date on which the United States plane had been observed. Given that the vector is attested in Haiti, Dominican Republic and Jamaica, it may be presumed that its natural occurrence in the territory of Cuba would have occurred in the eastern area of the country, closest to those countries. Its appearance more than 600 kilometres away from that region was, at the very least, unusual and suspicious. In this case there is sound evidence indicating, with a high degree of certainty, that Cuba yet again has been the target of biological aggression.

“Since its appearance in Cuba, *Thrips palmi* has struck 17 crops in the contaminated areas, including potato, beans, peppers, cucumbers and pumpkins. To date, production losses measure some 3 million quintals, and total economic expenditure and losses amount to tens of millions of dollars.

“In September 1997, in the municipality of Nueva Paz, La Habana province, the

presence of the rice mite was detected. This infestation, which has affected 12 of the country's 14 provinces, is of Asiatic origin and is not found in any other spot in the American continent. The area where it appeared is adjacent to the main national highway and is therefore particularly vulnerable to deliberate introduction. Once again, the emergence of an infestation of this kind coincided with a priority agricultural programme, in this instance, the development of rice production with a view to reducing Cuba's dependence on imports and, eventually, achieving self-sufficiency in this cereal, which forms an essential part of the Cuban diet. The presence of the plague was largely responsible for a fall of about 50 per cent in the 1998 harvest by comparison with that of 1997. Overall, the introduction of the rice mite has caused considerable losses to the Cuban economy.

"As can be seen, one thing that all these acts of aggression have in common is that they occurred at the same time as major national efforts to promote specific production activities. The resulting losses relate not only to the direct destruction or damaging of crops or livestock, but also to the effect of this destruction and damage on the development plans which have been launched in each of the sectors targeted by the aggression.

"Practically all the crops and basic livestock production sectors of the country have suffered over the years from the effects of these plagues, which have never before been attested in Cuba and which had been kept out of the country by the strict phytosanitary control policies systematically applied by the Cuban authorities. In many cases, there is documented evidence of the participation of agents acting with deliberate intent. Some of these cases have been explicitly confirmed by the culprits themselves, who perpetrated the acts of biological aggression. In many other cases, there is sufficient evidence to establish with almost total certainty that the introduction of these infestations was deliberate and formed part of the biological warfare campaign waged against our country by the Government of the United States.

"The economic losses caused by the resulting diseases are enormous. Significant damage has been caused to agricultural and livestock production in such sectors - virtually all of them important and some of essential significance - as sugar cane, tobacco, rice, citrus fruit and plantains. In some cases, the effects have endured for a number of years and have caused

a substantial decline in deliveries of food to the population and in the revenues flowing into the country from the export of such crops as sugar, tobacco, citrus fruit and others.

“This biological war is, without any doubt, one of the most perfidious barbaric and criminal manifestations of the aggressive policy of the United States against the people of Cuba.”

**Action brought the People of Cuba against the Government of the
United States of America for human damages caused to Cuba**

“Seventh: Throughout these years of the Revolution, the aggressive actions by the Government of the United States of America have had a significant impact on the health of our people. This criminal policy has been pursued with a view to undermining and obstructing the impressive gains made by the Cuban social policy. For this purpose, the United States has employed, among other tactics, biological aggression, which has cost precious human lives, including those of children and pregnant women.

“In May 1981, reports began to emerge in the Municipality of Boyeros, in the Cuban capital, of people suffering from fevers, retro-orbital, abdominal and muscular pain, rashes, severe headaches and asthenia, frequently accompanied by multiple bleeding with varying degrees of severity. A few days later, there were outbreaks of similar cases in the provinces of Cienfuegos, Holguín and Villa Clara, which then spread equally rapidly throughout the rest of the country.

“Initial studies demonstrated that the first cases had appeared simultaneously in three spots in the island, separated by more than 300 kilometres. There could be no epidemiological explanation to account for these occurrences as a natural infection.

“Laboratory studies confirmed that the etiological agent was the dengue type 2 virus. The unexpected manner in which the virus had appeared, with no epidemic activity of dengue-2 attested either in the Americas or in any of the countries with which Cuba had contacts involving the exchange of significant numbers of people, as well as its simultaneous appearance in different parts of the country, are factors substantiating the studies carried out by Cuban scientists of recognized standing, with the cooperation of foreign scientists specializing in the detection and control of biological aggression.

“Subsequent exhaustive research and studies pointed to the fact that the epidemic had been deliberately introduced into the territory of Cuba by agents working for the United States Government. North American specialists in biological warfare had been the only ones to obtain a variety of the *Aedes aegypti* mosquito, closely associated with the transmission of the dengue type 2 virus, as stated by Colonel Philip Russell at the fourteenth international

congress on the Pacific Ocean, held in 1979, a mere two years before the outbreak of the vicious epidemic in Cuba.

“It should be noted that, in 1975, when on a visit to Cuba, the American scientist Charles Henry Calisher investigated and found evidence of the existence of antibodies to dengue in the Cuban population and the lack, among Cuban people of at least 45 years of age, of antibodies to the dengue type 2 virus.

“At his trial in 1984 in the United States, Eduardo Arocena, ringleader of the terrorist organization Omega 7, publicly confessed to having introduced germs into Cuba and admitted that haemorrhagic dengue fever had been introduced into the island via groups of family relatives of Cuban origin, based in the United States.

“In order to determine whether or not this confession by the head of the notorious Omega 7 terrorist organization is true, regarding the groups used to introduce the haemorrhagic dengue epidemic into Cuba, we have provided below an exhaustive explanation and description of who these groups are, who organized them and in whose service they were operating.

“In addition, the United States army had reported the existence of a vaccine which gave protection against dengue type 2 and which had been administered to the population of the Guantánamo naval base, ensuring that there was not a single recorded case of dengue type 2 infection within the military base, while the epidemic raged across the entire territory of the rest of the island.

“During the ninety-first session of the United States Congress, a hearing was held on 18-20 November and 2, 9, 18 and 19 December 1969 to analyse alleged plans regarding the use of biological weapons against Cuba.

“The following dialogue took place:

Mr. Fraser: ‘It has been said that the United States was prepared to use biological agents with regard to the invasion of Cuba. Can you tell us whether that is true?’

Mr. Pickering: ‘I have no knowledge of that.’

Mr. Fraser: ‘Has anyone here any information on that question?’

(No response.)

Mr. Pickering: 'I have seen the discussion of the subject in the press.'

Mr. McCarthy: 'I would say the Senate Foreign Relations Committee is familiar with the incidents alluded to and there are people in the Government who know what the record is, present and past. I know the information is available in your records.'¹

"The use of insects to transmit diseases has been carefully studied at Fort Detrick. A journalist reported that the insect inventory at Fort Detrick in 1959 included mosquitoes infected with yellow fever, malaria and dengue; fleas infected with plague; ticks with tularaemia, relapsing fever and Colorado fever; and houseflies infected with cholera, anthrax and dysentery.

"According to data released by the United States army some 20 years ago, in July 1958 the Centre for Bacteriological Weapons of the United States Ground Forces conducted experiments with yellow-fever-carrying *Aedes aegypti* mosquitoes. The experiments were carried out in a testing ground in the state of Florida. The swarm of mosquitoes - not infected, of course - numbering some 600,000 insects, was dispersed over the testing ground from a plane. The results of the research showed that, in one day, the mosquitoes covered distances of 1.6-3.2 kilometres and bit many people, demonstrating that the *Aedes aegypti* had great potential as a long-distance carrier of yellow fever.

"On 29 October 1980, a press dispatch from Washington reported that:

'The US Government seriously considered using yellow-fever mosquitoes against the Soviet Union in 1956.

'Declassified military documents released today state that the US army considered using *Aedes aegypti* mosquitoes to spread yellow fever inside the USSR.

'At Fort Detrick, Maryland, experiments are being carried out with millions of yellow-fever mosquitoes. These laboratories can produce half a million mosquitoes every month and work on a new plant designed by the Army, with a capacity for

¹* *Translator's note.* The English texts of this and subsequent quotations from the press are as provided by the Cuban authorities.

130 million mosquitoes a month, is about to begin.

‘The declassified documents assert that the possible aggression against the USSR is based on the Soviet Union’s inability to implement a programme of massive immunization against such a mosquito attack.’

Here we are talking about a great Power, located at a great distance from the United States and covering an immense territory, with which the United States was not at war. Nonetheless, it was toying with the idea of silent biological sabotage.

“An article published on 1 September 1981 in the *Miami Herald*, a newspaper which cannot be suspected of friendly feelings towards Cuba, may help shed light on what took place in Cuba:

‘*Washington*. The pompous statement by Fidel Castro that the “harmful plagues” that are destroying crops and animals in Cuba and the dengue fever epidemic that has brought about the death of over 100 people in the island are the doings of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) do not seem inconceivable to the authors of a new book that shall be put out this autumn.

‘William W. Turner, former agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigations, and journalist Warren Hinckle state that the United States used biological warfare against Cuba during the Nixon administration.

‘The authors argue that the CIA has committed the United States to a secret, undeclared and illegal war against Cuba for more than 20 years. The so-called Cuban Project is the largest and least known operated by the CIA outside the legal limits of its statutes, they say.

‘The history of the Cuban Project is the history of an important US war not declared by Congress, not acknowledge by Washington, and not reported in the press.’

“Prior to that article, a cabled report from Washington by the press agency United Press International (UPI) on 9 January 1977, stated the following:

‘*Newsday*, a Long Island (New York) newspaper said that, at least with the tacit support of the CIA, agents related to anti-Castro terrorists introduced the African swine fever virus in Cuba in 1971.

‘Six weeks later, an outbreak of the disease forced Cuban sanitary authorities to sacrifice 500,000 pigs in order to avoid an animal epidemic of national proportions.

‘An unidentified source of the CIA revealed to *Newsday* that at the beginning of 1971 he was given a container with virus at Fort Gulick, a US Army base situated in the Panama Canal zone also used by the CIA, and that the container had been taken on a fishing boat by underground agents in Cuba.

‘It was the first time the disease appeared in the Western Hemisphere.

‘It is known, through their own admission, that when the African swine fever broke out in Cuba, the CIA and the US Army were experimenting with poisons, deadly toxins, products to destroy crops and other techniques of bacteriological warfare.’

“There is a mountain of evidence, background information and facts that cannot be ignored.

“One indisputable fact is that, in just a few weeks, the haemorrhagic dengue epidemic in Cuba - where it had never occurred before - had struck a total of 344,203 people, more than had ever been affected in any other country in the world. On a single day, 6 July 1981, a record 11,400 new cases were recorded.”

“A total of 116,143 cases were hospitalized: about 24,000 of these were suffering from haemorrhaging and 10,224 from some degree of dengue-induced shock.

“In all, 158 died as a result of the epidemic, including 101 children.

“The entire country and all its resources were mobilized in an endeavour to combat the epidemic. An intense effort to control the vector was mounted simultaneously in all the country’s towns and settlements, using all possible means, including products and equipment urgently brought in from wherever possible, including the United States. A request was made to the United States, through the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) and finally, in August 1981, permission was granted for the sale of an important larvicide. Chemicals and equipment were brought in, often by plane and sometimes from places as far afield as Japan, from whose factories Cuba was able to obtain thousands of backpack sprayers. Malathion had to be brought from Europe, by plane, at a shipping cost of 5,000 dollars per ton - in other

words, three and a half times the cost of the product itself.

“In addition to the existing hospital network, dozens of boarding schools were converted into hospitals to ensure that all the new patients, more and more of whom were being reported every day, could each, without exception, be isolated. At the same time, intensive care units were installed and equipped in all the country’s children’s hospitals.

“As a result the last case of dengue infection was reported on 10 October 1981.

“Had it not been for this immense effort, tens of thousands of people, the vast majority of them children, would have died. An epidemic which, in the forecast of many experts, would have taken years to eradicate, was defeated in a little over four months.”
