Meeting of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction

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Item 8 and 12 of the provisional agenda
Informal presentation of requests for extension of deadlines submitted under Article 5 and of the analysis of these requests
Consideration of requests submitted under Article 5

Request for an extension of the deadline for completing the destruction of anti-personnel mines in accordance with article 5 of the convention

Executive Summary

Submitted by Somalia

1. Somalia acceded to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction (hereinafter "the Convention") on 16 April 2012. The Convention entered into force for Somalia on 1 October 2012. Somalia submitted its first Article 5 extension request in September 2021. The request was granted by the Nineteenth Meeting of the States Parties (19MSP) in November 2021, establishing a new deadline of 1 October 2027.

2. On 21 February 2026, Somalia informed the Committee on Article 5 Implementation that submission of the present request would be delayed from 31 March 2026 to 31 May 2026 due to the need for additional stakeholder consultations and consolidation of updated operational data.

3. This document constitutes the Federal Government of Somalia's (FGS) second Article 5 extension request. It highlights achievements made during the first extension period up to 31 December 2025, describes the current situation as of early 2026, and presents a realistic work plan for the requested extension period[1].

4. The history of armed conflict in Somalia dates back to the Ethiopian-Somali wars of 1964 and 1977– 1978. Repeated conflict across Somalia's Federal Member States has resulted in contamination with anti-personnel mines (AP mines), victim-operated improvised explosive devices (VOIEDs), and other explosive remnants of war (ERW). AP mine contamination is concentrated along Somalia's border regions with Ethiopia and around former military installations[2]. Improvised anti-personnel mines continue to pose a growing threat to civilians, livelihoods and civilian infrastructure. At the time of Somalia's previous request (08 September 2021), the remaining implementation challenge for all types of explosive ordnance (EO) was estimated at 161,806,388 square metres.

[1] 2021 extension request, page 6. Somalia's first extension was granted by the Nineteenth Meeting of the States Parties in November 2021.
[2] See 2021 extension request, page 17.

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5. During the extension period (1 January 2021 to 31 December 2025), Somalia released 113,196,517 square metres of explosive ordnance-contaminated land through the clearance of Confirmed Hazardous Areas (CHAs), cancellation and reduction of Suspected Hazardous Areas (SHAs), Battle Area Clearance (BAC), and Spot Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) tasks (see Table 6 in the extension request). Of this total, 10,370,496 square metres constituted areas contaminated by AP mines in which a total of 132 anti-personnel mines were identified and destroyed. A detailed annual breakdown by methodology is provided in Table 5 in the extension request.

6. Somalia Explosive Management Authority (SEMA) offices continued to operate across all Federal Member States with sustained capacity building support from United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS), HALO Trust, the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), and Information Management and Mine Action Programmes (iMMAP). Since 2012, more than two million beneficiaries have been reached through explosive ordnance risk education (EORE) activities, including 24,835 in 2025 alone. Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) completed non-technical survey (NTS) across Puntland State in February 2023 before withdrawing due to funding constraints.

7. Information generated through NPA's NTS was incorporated into Somalia's national information-management system and contributed to the current contamination baseline for Puntland. As of 31 December 2025, Puntland records 24 CHAs covering 2,562,444 square metres and 176 SHAs covering 4,833,052 square metres. These areas form part of Somalia's remaining challenge and will inform future prioritisation, survey and land-release activities.

8. The HALO Trust continued NTS in Galmudug and in newly accessible areas.

9. These achievements were made despite a severe funding gap. Somalia's 2022–2027 Work Plan estimated a total requirement of 23 million United States dollars (USD), of which approximately USD 12.8 million (55.6%) was mobilised for direct humanitarian mine action during the extension period[3].This funding supported survey, clearance, risk education, and national capacity development. Nevertheless, funding shortfalls led to the withdrawal of NPA in April 2023, the cessation of Mines Advisory Group (MAG) operations, and the suspension of UNMAS direct field clearance in 2025. Furthermore, the Mine Action Parliamentary Bill remains pending ratification as of 2026 which, if passed, would provide a funding stream for the SEMA.

10. The following circumstances impeded Somalia's progress during the first extension period and remain largely present as of early 2026:

(a) **SEMA not formally recognised:** No parliamentary approval since 2013, no national budget since 2015; salaries and operations funded entirely by donors.

(b) **Insecurity and access:** Al-Shabaab controls several districts; inter-clan conflict restricts team deployment to seven minefields in Galmudug alone.

(c) **Funding shortage:** Despite additional funding mobilised during the extension period, only approximately USD 12.8 million (55.6%) of the estimated USD 23 million required for humanitarian mine action was secured. Funding shortfalls resulted in reduced operational capacity, the withdrawal of NPA in 2023, and the cessation of UNMAS humanitarian field clearance operations in 2025.

(d) **No updated National Strategy:** The 2018–2020 strategy has expired; a replacement awaits ministerial approval as of early 2026.

(e) **Improvised Explosive Device (IED) prioritisation:** VOIEDs — recognised as improvised AP mines under the Convention— cause thousands of civilian casualties annually, diverting donor funding and security resources from humanitarian mine action.

[3] Total confirmed funding of USD 22,322,974.90 less the UNMAS–Ukroboronservice(UOS)/Demineco Human Services (DHS) Contract (USD 7,326,420), funded through the United Nations Support Office in Somalia budget, and the iMMAP agreement (approximately USD 2,200,000), which extends through 2029, yields approximately USD 12,796,554.90 in direct humanitarian mine action funding. See Table 9 in the extension request.

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11. Somalia distinguishes between humanitarian mine action conducted in fulfilment of Article 5 obligations and broader counter-IED operations, which remain outside the scope of Article 5 implementation. This request addresses VOIED contamination in accordance with Action 20 of the Siem Reap-Angkor Action Plan 2025–2029.

12. Between January 2021 and December 2025, IEDs caused 3,795 civilian casualties in Somalia (2,624 injuries and 1,171 deaths) — an average of just over two per day. Over the same period, 152 confirmed victim-operated improvised explosive devices (VOIEDs) were recorded[4].During the same reporting period, a total of 302 mine/ERW casualties were recorded in Somalia.

13. Children account for the majority of casualties over this period. In 2024, a total of 53 AP mine/ERW casualties were recorded, with children accounting for 89% (47 of 53)[5].Minefields along the Ethiopian–Somalia border deny access to agricultural land, grazing routes (70% of the population depends on livestock), cross-border trade routes, and essential services. Climate-related flooding and drought continuously shift contamination, exposing previously safe areas to new populations.

14. As of 31 December 2025, Somalia had identified 535 mined areas measuring 126,949,715 square metres including: 248 CHAs covering 112,989,656 square metres and 287 SHAs covering 13,960,059 square metres.

15. These figures include anti-personnel mines, anti-vehicle mines, ERW, and explosive hazards of mixed or uncertain composition. The Northeastern State of Somalia (formerly SSC-Khaatumo) accounts for the largest concentration of recorded contamination, primarily mixed battle area contamination requiring further survey and classification. Contamination estimates have fluctuated during the extension period because the AP mine challenge is embedded within larger, complex battle areas[6]. Nevertheless, data consolidation, re-surveys, and the mapping of newly accessible areas have been incorporated into the national Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database.

16. Somalia requests a five-year extension of its Article 5 deadline, from 1 October 2027 to 1 October 2032. Somalia does not anticipate full completion of all Article 5 obligations within the requested extension period due to access, security, and funding conditions. Somalia will use the period of the extension to toward progressive reduction of anti-personnel mine contamination, establishing greater clarity on the remaining Article 5 challenge, while also strengthening the institutional and operational foundations. The five-year timeframe is the most realistic and operationally credible option: a shorter period would not allow sufficient time for nationwide survey consolidation, institutional strengthening, or securing predictable multi-year funding, while a longer period is considered inappropriate given the high degree of uncertainty in the operating environment. The requested extension therefore seeks to ensure continued compliance with the Convention while implementing a realistic, phased, and conditions-based work plan[7].

17. The work plan adopts an adaptive and scenario-based implementation framework reflecting operational realities, security constraints, and funding uncertainty:

(a) Phase 1 (June 2026 – 1 October 2027): Preparatory phase: maintain ongoing survey, clearance, and EORE operations; strengthen IMSMA consolidation; finalise SEMA legislation; and develop a resource mobilisation strategy.

(b) Phase 2 (1 Oct 2027 – 1 Oct 2032): Implementation phase under Scenario A (full funding), Scenario B (current funding trajectory), or Scenario C (reduced funding): expand survey and clearance in accessible areas, continue EORE and police EOD response capacity, and strengthen residual risk management.

18. The estimated total cost of implementing the work plan during the requested extension period is approximately USD 30 million. As of August 2026, The HALO Trust had secured

[4] UNMAS IED database, 2021–2025.
[5] UNMAS IM.
[6] 2021 extension request, page 9, Table 1.
[7] Consequently, the strategy has been pivoted toward continued compliance, ensuring sustained progress and international oversight while maintaining realistic milestones.

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approximately USD 3.6 million and iMMAP approximately USD 2.2 million (EUR 2 million) in Netherlands-funded support covering 2025– 2029. However, current funding levels remain insufficient to maintain the operational capacity required to address Somalia's remaining contamination and achieve its Article 5 obligations. Continued implementation of the work plan will therefore depend on sustained international support and successful resource mobilisation. Somalia plans to work with iMMAP during 2027 to strengthen its resource mobilisation capacity and support the development of the Resource Mobilisation Strategy. A specific date for completion and approval of the Strategy has not yet been established. Somalia will continue actively engaging traditional and non-traditional donors to seek predictable, multi-year funding. Subject to parliamentary approval of the Mine Action Bill, Somalia will also advocate for increased national budget allocations to mine action and will continue to present annual funding requirements to the Mine Action Support Group and other relevant donor coordination mechanisms.

19. The Federal Government of Somalia emphasises that the requested extension reflects operational necessity, not diminished commitment. Implementation will be evidence-based, prioritised, and aligned with conditions on the ground[8].

[8] Somalia maintains that Somaliland remains part of Somalia *de jure* and under the jurisdiction of the FGS for the purpose of the Convention but is not included in operational plans within this request. HALO Trust maintains separate mine action operations in Somaliland under distinct donor arrangements. The FGS remains open to dialogue and will report any developments in its annual Article 7 transparency reports.

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