Meeting of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction

Date ...

English only

Twenty-Second Meeting
Geneva, 1-5 December 2025
Item 9 of the provisional agenda
Consideration of the general status and operation of the Convention

Siem Reap Angkor - Action Status of Implementation*

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* The present document is being issued without formal editing.

Annex I

Siem Reap Angkor - Action Status of Implementation

Action	*Indicator*	*2025*	*2026*	*2027*	*2028*	*2029*
Best Practices in Implementation						
Action #1[1]	1		66%[2]			
	2		59%[3]			
Action #2	1		60%[4]			
Action #3	1		63%[5]			
	2		46%[6]			
Action #4	1		66%[7]			
Action #5	1		59%[8]			
	2		55%[9]			
	3		33%[10]			
	4		TBD			
Action #6	1		34%[11]			
Action #7	1		10%[12]			
	2		4%[13]			
Action #8	1		71%[14]			
	2		69%[15]			
Action #9	1		54%[16]			
Action #10	1		88.5%			
	2		12%[17]			
			[Final data after 22MSP]			
Universalisation						
Action #11	1		1[18]			
	2		2[19]			
	3		1[20]			
	4		9[21]			
			[Final data after 22MSP]			

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Action	*Indicator*	*2025*	*2026*	*2027*	*2028*	*2029*
Action #12		1	9[22]			
		2	TBD [Final data after 22MSP]			
Stockpile destruction and retention of anti-personnel mines						
Action #13		1	0			
		2	0%			
Action #14		1	0%[23]			
		2	0%[24]			
		3	50%[25]			
Action #15		1	0			
		2	0			
Action #16		1	34%[26]			
		2	33%[27]			
		3	0.03%[28]			
Survey and Clearance of mined areas						
Action #17		1	63%[29]			
		2	57%[30]			
Action #18		1	60%[31]			
		2	51%[32]			
		3	54%[33]			
Action #19		1	19[34]			
		2	20[35]			
Action #20		1	9[36]			
		2	8[37]			
Action #21		1	51%[38]			
		2	1[39]			
Action #22		1	63%[40]			
		2	71%[41]			
		3	63%[42]			

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Action	*Indicator*	*2025*	*2026*	*2027*	*2028*	*2029*
Action #23		1	60%[43]			
		2	60%[44]			
		3	29%[45]			
Action #24		1	0			
		2	0%			
Action #25		1	60%[46]			
		2	49%[47]			
Mine Risk Education and Reduction						
Action #26		1	51%[48]			
		2	57%[49]			
Action #27		1	49%[50]			
Action #28		1	51%[51]			
Action #29		1	69%[52]			
Victim Assistance[53]						
Action 30		1	69%[54]			
		2	54%[55]			
		3	44%[56]			
		4	69%[57]			
Action 31		1	62%[58]			
		2	64%[59]			
Action 32		1	64%[60]			
		2	54%[61]			
Action 33		1	56%[62]			
		2	59%[63]			
Action 34		1	54%[64]			
		2	36%[65]			
Action 35		1	67%[66]			
		2	54%[67]			
		3	26%[68]			

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Action	*Indicator*	*2025*	*2026*	*2027*	*2028*	*2029*
Action 36		1	64%[69]			
		2	33%[70]			
Action 37		1	49%[71]			
		2	44%[72]			
		3	26%[73]			
Action 38		1	44%[74]			
		2	26%[75]			
Action 39		1	38%[76]			
		2	44%[77]			
International Cooperation and Assistance						
Action #40		1	57%[78]			
		2	36%[79]			
		3	0			
		4	55%[80]			
Action #41		1	64%[81]			
		2	48%[82]			
		3	50%[83]			
Action #42		1	63%[84]			
		2	49%[85]			
Action #43		1	18[86]			
		2	12[87]			
		3	11[88]			
		4	2[89]			
		5	7[90]			
		6	3[91]			
Action #44		1	2[92]			
Action #45		1	21[93]			
		2	19[94]			

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Action	*Indicator*	*2025*	*2026*	*2027*	*2028*	*2029*
Measures to ensure compliance						
Action #46		1	3[95]			
		2	100%[96]			
Action #47		1	63%[97]			
Action #48		1	72%[98]			

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Annex II

Universalization

Table 1
States not Party positions vis-à-vis the Convention

State not Party	*Position vis-à-vis the Convention*
Armenia	"Armenia supports the Convention and is ready to take measures consistent with the provisions of the treaty but, to assume legally binding obligations, Armenia expects clearly observed readiness to reciprocate on the part of its regional neighbours. Therefore, Armenia's full participation in the Convention is contingent upon a similar level of political commitment by other parties in the region to adhere to the treaty and comply with its regime." (Signing Conference of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention, 4 December 1997)
Azerbaijan	"Azerbaijan is not a state party to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention for the obvious reasons arising from our assessment that the military posture of neighbouring Armenia does not allow us to become a full-fledged party to the Convention. One more issue relating to this Convention is that it does not address the responsibility for mine clearance of contaminated territories. In our view, this responsibility should rest with the state which deployed the mines, especially if it deployed them on the territory of another state." (Twenty-First Meeting of the States Parties, 2023).
	Azerbaijan supports the philosophy, purpose objective of the Convention and continues to make certain contributions to the implementation of the Convention's objectives. Azerbaijan has also consistently voted in favour of the resolution on the implementation of the Convention at the United Nations General Assembly. Azerbaijan will consider joining the Convention in the context of complete demining of conflict affected territories and full restoration of the regional security. (…) Azerbaijan is committed to work towards a world free of anti-personnel mines and stand ready to support the international efforts contributing to this important goal (Intersessional Meetings, 22 June 2022).
Bahrain	No official information submitted.
China	The Government of China accepts the principles of the Convention and abides by its humanitarian aspects. China is not a party to the Convention but it has not ceased cooperating and ensuring exchanges with States Parties. (…) China supports the efforts of the international community to resolve the humanitarian problems caused by landmines. (…) In 1996, China established a moratorium on the import of landmines not conforming to CCW amended protocol II. (…) China also trains demining personnel. (17MSP, 2018).
Cuba	"Cuba shares the legitimate humanitarian concerns associated with the indiscriminate and irresponsible use of mines. (..) It is not possible for Cuba to renounce the use of mines for the preservation of its sovereignty and territorial integrity, corresponding to the right of legitimate defence, recognised in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations." (Explanation of vote, UNGA resolution on the implementation of the Convention, 2016).
Egypt	"Fully aware of the relevant humanitarian considerations, Egypt imposed a moratorium since the 1980s on the production and export of antipersonnel landmines, long before the conclusion of any conventions in this field including the Ottawa Convention which fell short of addressing many key elements associated with the threat of landmines. The possession, production, and stockpiling of conventional weapons

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State not Party	*Position vis-à-vis the Convention*
	are legitimate sovereign rights that rests entirely in the hands of each State according to its national security requirements. The transfers of conventional weapons remain also perfectly legitimate provided that the recipient is duly authorized by the Government of the importing State and that there are no limitations imposed by the Security Council." (Thematic debate on conventional weapons, UNGA First Committee, resolution on the implementation of the Convention, 2018). "Egypt acknowledges the humanitarian considerations which the Ottawa Convention attempted to embody and had actually imposed, based on the same considerations, a moratorium on its landmine production and export since the 1980s. However, Egypt views this convention as lacking balance between the humanitarian considerations related to anti-personnel mines and their legitimate military use for border protection. Most importantly, the convention fails to acknowledge the legal responsibility of States for demining anti-personnel mines they themselves have laid, in particular in territories of other States, making it almost impossible for affected States to meet alone the Convention's demining requirements. This is particularly true in the case of Egypt which still has millions of anti-personnel mines on its territories, planted by Second World War powers, requiring vast demining resources (…) The mentioned weaknesses are only complemented by the weak international cooperation system of the Convention which remains limited in its effect and much dependent on the will of donor States. The mentioned weaknesses of the Convention have kept the largest world producers and some of the world's most heavily affected States outside its regime, making the potential for its universality questionable and reminding us all of the value of concluding arms-control and disarmament agreements in the context of United Nations and not outside its framework." (Explanations of vote, UNGA First Committee resolution on the implementation of the Convention, 2010 and 2012).
Georgia	Georgia "has never produced anti-personnel mines and doesn't retain the option to produce them. In 1996, the President of Georgia declared a moratorium on producing, importing and using anti-personnel mines. Due to existing circumstances, it is not reasonable to join the Convention (…) The main reasons for not acceding to the Convention are the occupied territories and unstable environment surrounding them. (…) This situation will prevent Georgia from the fulfilment of Convention obligations." (Information sent to the ISU, 15 October 2009).
India	"India believes that the availability of militarily effective alternative technologies that can perform cost-effectively, the legitimate defensive role of anti-personnel landmines will considerably facilitate the goal of the complete elimination of anti-personnel mines. India is a party to the Amended Protocol–II of the CCW which takes into account the legitimate defense requirements of States especially those with long and difficult borders like India. (…) India is observing a moratorium on the export and transfer of anti-personnel landmines. (…) India remains committed to increased international cooperation and assistance for mine clearance as well as rehabilitation of mine victims and has been contributing to this end through technical assistance and expertise." (Twentieth Meeting of the States Parties, 2022)
Iran	"Anti-personnel mines have been used irresponsibly during the civil wars in certain regions of the world and consequently have claimed a great number of innocent lives, particularly among women and children. We welcome every effort to stop this trend. However, the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention focuses mainly on humanitarian concerns and does not adequately take into account the legitimate military requirements of many countries, particularly those with long land borders, for the responsible and limited use of mines to defend their territories. Because of the difficulties related to monitoring extensive sensitive areas by established and permanent guarding posts or effective warning systems, unfortunately, anti-personnel mines continue to be the effective means for those countries to ensure the

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State not Party	*Position vis-à-vis the Convention*
	minimum-security requirements of their borders. While these defensive devices should be used under strictly established rules to protect civilians, more national and international efforts should also be made to explore new alternatives to such mines." (Explanation of vote, UNGA resolution on the implementation of the Convention, 2024)
Israel	"Israel has undertaken additional concrete measures aimed at reducing the potential adverse consequences that may be associated with the use of anti-personnel landmines, and, in 1994, Israel unilaterally declared a moratorium on any export, sales or transfers of any type of anti-personnel mines. Since its initiation, the moratorium has been consistently extended for additional three-year periods and is currently in force until July 2026. (…) Some of Israel's borders are protected, inter alia, by minefields, which aim to prevent incursions into Israel by armed forces, other militants or terrorists. The overall instability in the Middle East, requires Israel to be vigilant and prepared for hostile infiltrations to its territory. (…) Consequently, Israel continues to view landmines, including anti-personnel mines, as an essential defensive tool that is effective in deterring and preventing infiltration into its territory and threats to its security." (Twenty-First Meeting of the States Parties, 2023)
Kazakhstan	"Kazakhstan completely supports the humane orientation of the Convention (…) There are a lot of objective reasons for which Kazakhstan is not ready to liquidate anti-personnel mines: 1) Kazakhstan has a big border with the neighbouring countries which should be covered and protected by armed forces, including by the use of anti-personnel mines in frontier areas of the country at the certain cases of conditions, 2) Full destruction or non-use of anti-personnel mines is unacceptable in the absence of alternative systems to defend the overland borders of the country (…) At the same time, in 1997, a moratorium on export of anti-personnel mines, including their re-export and transit, entered into force in Kazakhstan." (International Seminar "Confidence Building Measures and Regional Cooperation through Mine Action", Almaty, 25-27 March 2007)
Korea, DPR of	No official information submitted.
Korea, Republic of	"Although the Republic of Korea has not yet acceded to the Convention due to its unique security situation on the Korean Peninsula, the Republic of Korea fully shares the humanitarian objectives of the Convention and remains concerned about the humanitarian impact of the indiscriminate use of anti-personnel mines. The Republic of Korea has made efforts to mitigate the suffering caused by anti-personnel mines. The Republic of Korea has been on a steady path of anti-personnel mine clearance where possible. In 2024, we voluntarily removed 167 anti-personnel mines in adherence to the International Mine Action Standards. We are also exercising strict control over anti-personnel mines and have maintained an indefinite extension of the moratorium on their export since 1997. In a similar vein, the Republic of Korea has not installed any mines for several years. For existing mines, we are undertaking all possible precautionary measures to protect civilians from the risks and effects of mines by including fencing, signs, warnings and monitoring. In this regard, the Republic of Korea has enacted the Law on Mine Response Activities Including Mine Clearance in 2024. Under this new law, the Ministry of National Defense (MND) will devise a basic mine action plan every five years and establish a Mine Response Activity Committee to deliberate on matters related to mine action activities." (Intersessional Meetings, 20 June 2025). "The Republic of Korea supports the objectives and purposes of the Convention and remains particularly concerned about the humanitarian impacts of the indiscriminate use of anti-personnel mines. However, due to the unique security situation on the Korean Peninsula, the Republic of Korea is not currently a Party to the Convention. The primary reason for the Republic of Korea not acceding to the Convention is that the Republic of Korea takes into account not only humanitarian aspects but also security concerns in addressing the landmine issue.

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State not Party	*Position vis-à-vis the Convention*
	As a part of its contribution to support global efforts to mitigate the humanitarian sufferings caused by anti-personnel mines, the Republic of Korea has been maintaining a moratorium on the export of anti-personnel mines since 1995, and it declared the indefinite extension of the moratorium at the 52nd UN General Assembly in 1997. (Response from the Republic of Korea to questions posed by the 22MSP President, 12 June 2025).
Kyrgyzstan	"Along with speaking in favour of a complete landmine ban, our country advocates step-by-step advance to this goal. (…) Kyrgyzstan has never produced or exported landmines. All supplies that we have were left after the collapse of the Soviet Union. (…) Today the problem of mine clearance cannot be considered because of demarcation and delimitation of neighbouring countries' borders. Our border issues with some neighbouring countries remain unsettled." (First Review Conference, 2004).
Lao PDR	Lao PDR remains committed to the global disarmament agenda as we have consistently demonstrated this dedication through our active advocacy efforts to raise awareness within the UXO/ Mine Action sector. At both global and regional levels, the Lao PDR has maintained record of supporting all relevant UXO/Mine resolutions and actively participating in Convention-related initiatives. (…) In this connection, the Deputy-Minister has stated that the Lao PDR will submit the national voluntary report to the Convention. So, this year we will fulfill our commitment and submit the report before the Meeting of States Parties. (Intersessional Meetings, 20 June 2025).
	As a small country with limited resources and capacity to fulfill all international obligations, Lao PDR has prioritized the implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions due to the ongoing threat of cluster munition contamination that continues to harm and kill our people. Although Lao PDR still faces resource constraints and limited capacity to fully accede to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention, the country conducts clearance operations that include all forms of explosive remnants of war, including mines. (...) Despite not being a party to the Convention, Lao PDR has consistently supported its humanitarian spirit and engaged in international and regional efforts to promote it. The country has also demonstrated its commitment to the Convention by attending the Fourth Review Conference held in Oslo in 2019 at the highest level, with the Deputy Minister declaring our intention to submit a national voluntary report in 2020. However, the global pandemic has slowed down the process, causing delays. (…) our Department of International Organisations, on behalf of the national secretariat for the new national committee, will lead the internal consultation and submit the 2nd National Voluntary Report to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention by next year. Despite facing resource constraints and limited capacity, Lao PDR has prioritized and maximized our national capacity to focus on implementing the Convention on Cluster Munitions aligned with our national socio-economic development. As a result, we have not yet fully acceded to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention. However, we are confident that with consistent support and assistance from the international community, we will be able to accede to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention in the near future. (…) I would like to emphasize our strong political will and commitment to take important steps and enhance the understanding of relevant stakeholders to increase efforts to implement certain clauses of the humanitarian spirit of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention alongside the Convention on Cluster Munitions. (Intersessional Meetings, 21 June 2023).
Lebanon	The Government of Lebanon has adopted a national mine action policy to deal with landmines and explosive remnants of war which affirms its aspiration "to become a State Party to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction." The Minister of Defence, head of the national mine action authority, for the first time, sent a letter to the Minister of Foreign Affairs in 2019 stating that the Ministry of Defence has no objection to sign the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention. The Lebanese Army is committed to humanitarian mine action and therefore thrives to clear all contaminated areas, and does

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State not Party	*Position vis-à-vis the Convention*
	not use, stockpile, produce and transfer anti-personnel mines. (…) The Lebanon Mine Action Centre (LMAC) recognises the 2025 objective of a mine free world and works in a spirit of compliance with the Convention and with the IMAS. (Fourth Review Conference, 2019).
Libya	"The interim Government is not in a position to ratify the Convention for the time being. However, Libya shares the international community's humanitarian concerns with regards to anti-personnel landmines because of their tragic impact on human lives and the environment, which impedes development, particularly since Libya has suffered from mines and war remnants since the Second World War. However, the Convention does not address the damage inflicted on States by the remnants of war and explosives resulting from occupation, or whose territories were the theatre of fighting between foreign countries. The Convention also does not establish a mechanism to assist affected countries suffering from mines placed by colonial States, or commit colonial States to removing, at their own expense, the mines they placed on the territories of other States." (Explanation of vote, UNGA First Committee resolution on the implementation of the Convention, 2015).
Marshall Islands	On 12 March 2025, the Marshall Islands ratified to the Convention. The Convention entered into force for the Marshall Islands on 1 September 2025.
Micronesia, Federated States of	"The Government of the FSM has indicated its full support to the concept of universalization and full implementation of the Convention (…) The FSM considers itself as a mine-free State. Regardless, the aspiration of the Government of the FSM to accede to the Convention remains intact. (…) The Government of the FSM is very close to fulfilling its internal legal requirements in order to accede to the Convention. Presently there is a draft resolution before the Congress of the FSM seeking approval to accede to the Convention. It is expected that Congress will take favourable action on the resolution in the upcoming January 2009 regular session." (Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Convention, 2 June 2008).
Mongolia	"The Government's policy has laid the groundwork for accession via a step-by-step approach that involved amending legislation to allow release of the amount of stockpile, starting the destruction of stockpile and securing funding for stockpile destruction (…) Mongolia has a stockpile of 206,317 anti-personnel mines and it will destroy 380 mines in 2011. Let me underline that Mongolia seeks to accede to the Convention in the near future. Therefore cooperation, assistance and support through both bilateral channels and international organisations are appreciated for accelerating the process of Mongolia's accession to the Convention." (10MSP, 2010) "Mongolia continues to pursue a step-by-step (or phased) policy towards accession to the Convention due to a range of security and economic concerns." (Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Convention, 20 June 2011)
Morocco	Morocco fully supports the fundamental principles of the Convention. The commitment of Morocco for the elimination of anti-personnel mines is confirmed by its vote in favour of the various draft resolutions relative to the implementation of the Convention presented to the UN General Assembly. Morocco is committed to the universalization of the Convention, while recalling that to this end all conditions must be met, namely the resolution of the artificial regional conflict around the Moroccan Sahara. Morocco is fully aware of the necessity to reinforce the Convention and to this end regularly submits a voluntary transparency report in accordance with Article 7. In accordance with Article 3 of the Convention, mines in storage only serve for instruction, in particular introduction and training on demining. For this purpose, the mines of the Defence Line are catalogued and monitored according to pre-established laying plans held by military engineering units. These mines were laid before the entry into force of the Convention and will be eliminated as soon as the artificial regional conflict

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State not Party	*Position vis-à-vis the Convention*
	imposed to Morocco is resolved. (…) Morocco's accession to the Convention is temporarily postponed for one reason only, linked to the definitive resolution of the artificial regional dispute over the Moroccan Sahara. (Intersessional Meetings, 21 June 2023)
Myanmar	Myanmar recognizes the importance of the Anti-personnel Mine Ban Convention in putting an end to the suffering and human casualties caused by anti-personnel mines, in saving lives and in returning hope and human dignity. We also believe that universalization of the Convention is vital in reducing humanitarian harms. "The Myanmar Government has been very active in the mine action sector and has expanded the space for humanitarian mine action operators active in the country." (…) Commitments and efforts in line with the spirit of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention include: a) participating as an observer in meetings of the State Parties since 2003 with an aim to increase our understanding of the convention and its works, b) hosting a workshop in March 2019 with key ministries and the Presidency of the Convention to strengthen the knowledge and the implication of the various articles of the convention in a Myanmar context, c) hosting an international workshop to discuss how Myanmar can establish a National Mine Action Authority to lead and manage a humanitarian mine action programme, d) undertaking various exchange visits to other mine affected states to familiarise various ministries on the process of becoming a signatory, the conventions obligations and how to organise humanitarian mine action in general and e) working closely with the ASEAN Regional Mine Action Centre (ARMAC), with the country's first annual financial contribution to the Centre since 2018-2019 financial year and enhancing technical cooperation in mine action." (Fourth Review Conference, 2019).
Nepal	Though Nepal has not yet become a state party to the Convention, we are fulfilling most of the obligations of the Treaty. (…) Nepal does not produce landmines. Nepal has constituted a high-level taskforce to study and evaluate the opportunities and liabilities of the treaty and it will submit a report in near future. In the taskforce, there are representative from different ministries. We have, for the first time, allocated budget for mine action program through Nepal Peace Trust Fund (NPTF) where there are funds from donors and Government of Nepal as well. (Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Convention, June 2010).
Pakistan	Pakistan supports the humanitarian objectives of this Convention and is guided by humanitarianism and respect for International Humanitarian Law and protection of civilian life. (…) Pakistan supports the balanced approach of the CCW Amended Protocol-II on anti-personnel landmines, which addresses the humanitarian concerns while also taking into account the legitimate security requirements of states and the military utility of landmines. (…) While our security needs necessitate the use of anti-personnel landmines, this is done in accordance with international norms, safety parameters and humanitarian considerations. The use of landmines is exclusively by the military for defence purposes. Furthermore, Pakistan continues to scrupulously adhere to a policy of ban on all exports of mines and ensures that the private sector is not allowed to manufacture or to trade in landmines. (…) Pakistan has produced only detectable anti-personnel mines since January 1, 1997. Pakistan has itself been a victim of the use of landmines, including as improvised explosive devices, by terrorists and non-state actors. Notwithstanding their use by terrorists, Pakistan's security forces do not use mines for the maintenance of internal order and law enforcement or in counter-terrorism operations. Pakistan is supportive of an international legal instrument banning the transfer of anti-personnel landmines. Such an instrument will help in preventing the acquisition of landmines by non-state actors and terrorists as a majority of civilian causalities result from the use of landmines by such actors. We believe that the objective of the total elimination of anti-personnel mines can be promoted, inter alia, by making available non-lethal and cost-effective alternative technologies. (Twenty-First Meeting of the States Parties, 2023)

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State not Party	*Position vis-à-vis the Convention*
Russian Federation	Russia does not exclude its possible accession to the Convention in the future and in the meantime continues to work to address a number of technical, organisational and financial issues related to implementation of the Convention. Russia also is undertaking effective measures to minimise the mine threat. (….) Russia has ceased production of the most dangerous blast-type anti-personnel mines. (UNGA First Committee, Thematic debate on conventional weapons, 20 October 2017)
Saudi Arabia	"Saudi Arabia has always supported the Convention (…) Saudi Arabia observes and respects the spirit of this Convention. It has never used anti-personnel mines, nor has produced them. Such mines have never been transferred to or from the Kingdom to any destination, be it governmental or otherwise. Saudi law forbids all authorities other than the armed forces from stockpiling mines." (First Review Conference, 2004)
Singapore	"As in the past years, Singapore supports and will continue to support all initiatives against the indiscriminate use of anti-personnel landmines, especially when they are directed at innocent and defenceless civilians. With this in mind, Singapore declared a two-year moratorium in May 1996 on the export of anti-personnel landmines without self-neutralising mechanisms. In February 1998, Singapore expanded the moratorium to include all manner of anti-personnel landmines, not just those without self-neutralising mechanisms, and extended the moratorium indefinitely. We also support the work of the Convention by regularly attending the Meetings of the States Parties to the Convention. (…) At the same time, like several other countries, Singapore firmly believes that the legitimate security concerns and the right to self-defence of any State cannot be disregarded. A blanket ban on all types of anti-personnel landmines and cluster munitions may therefore be counter-productive." (Explanation of vote, UNGA resolution on the implementation of the Convention, 2016 and 2018)
Syrian Arab Republic	The occupation and illegal foreign presence in some Syrian areas, and the use of mines and improvised explosive devices by armed terrorist groups in those areas, constitute obstacles to accessing and clearing all areas contaminated with mines. In the occupied Syrian Golan, mines planted by the Israeli occupation continue to pose real risks to life the and the homes of Syrian citizens and around their fields and villages which are a source of their livelihoods. In conclusion, fulfilling the humanitarian objectives of the Ottawa Convention requires respect for the basic pillars on which it was founded, most notably respect for national ownership of mine clearance operations, strengthening international assistance and cooperation, and providing financial and technical resources away from political conditionality. Syria renews its demand for the immediate and unconditional lifting of Western unilateral coercive measures and for support for its efforts to cleanse its entire territory of the evils of mines, terrorism and foreign occupation. (Twentieth Meeting of the States Parties, 2022)
Tonga	Tonga acceded to the Convention on 25 June 2025. The Convention entered into force for Tonga on 1 December 2025.
United Arab Emirates	"We have a stockpile of anti-personnel mines. We do not produce anti-personnel mines. We do not transfer antipersonnel mines to any party or any other country. We believe that the question of acceding to the Convention still needs further study and consultations before taking any decision." (Information sent by the Permanent Mission of the United Arab Emirates in Geneva to the ISU, 25 September 2009)
United States of America	In April 2021, the Biden-Harris Administration began a comprehensive interagency review of U.S. anti-personnel landmine policy. Following the conclusion of this review, President Biden decided to announce a new U.S. anti-personnel landmine policy. Under the new U.S. anti-personnel landmine policy, the United States will align its activities outside of the context of the Korean Peninsula with key provisions of the Ottawa Convention. This means the United States will: i) Not develop, produce, or acquire APL; ii) Not export or transfer anti-personnel landmines, except when necessary for activities related to mine destruction or removal, and for the purpose of destruction; iii)

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State not Party	*Position vis-à-vis the Convention*
	Not use anti-personnel landmines outside the Korean Peninsula; iv) Not assist, encourage, or induce anyone, outside the context of the Korean Peninsula, to engage in activity that would be prohibited by the Ottawa Convention; and v) Undertake to destroy anti-personnel landmines stockpiles not required for the defence of the Korean Peninsula. Additionally, the United States will undertake diligent efforts to pursue materiel and operational solutions that would be compliant with and ultimately allow the United States to accede to the Ottawa Convention, while ensuring our ability to respond to contingencies and meet our alliance commitments. The new policy reflects President Biden's belief in the need to reduce the use of landmines worldwide and complements longstanding U.S. leadership in the clearance of landmines and explosive remnants of war. (Intersessional Meetings, 21 June 2022)
Uzbekistan	No official information submitted
Viet Nam	"Since the end of the war, explosive remnants of war have killed 40,000 people in Viet Nam and maimed many more. That is why Viet Nam profoundly understands and supports the humanitarian aspects of the Ottawa Convention, as well as strongly opposes the indiscriminate use of mines against civilians. At the same time, Viet Nam reiterates the legitimate right of states to self-defence and that, even with the invaluable assistance from the international community and partners, at the current speed and with current resources, it would take us a hundred year to clear all contaminated areas." (Fifth Review Conference, 2024)
	"Viet Nam acknowledges the humanitarian objective of international efforts to address the indiscriminate use of landmines, including through the Convention on Cluster Munitions and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destructions. We are also grateful for the invaluable assistance and support from international partners in mine action in Viet Nam." (79th UNGA, First Committee, 24 October 2024)

Table 2
Participation of States not party in the work of the Convention

	State not party	*Voted in favour of 2024 UNGA resolution on the implementation of the Convention [To be completed]*	*2024 voluntary Article 7 report*	*Participation in meetings of the Convention*		*Latest participation in an MSP/Review Conference*	*Moratorium in place*
				2025 IM	*5RC*		
1	Armenia	√		√	√	5RC (2024)	
2	Azerbaijan			√	√	5RC (2024)	
3	Bahrain	√				2RC (2009)	
4	China	√				18MSP (2020)	
5	Cuba					2RC (2009)	
6	Egypt					4RC (2019)	√[99]

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	State not party	*Voted in favour of 2024 UNGA resolution on the implementation of the Convention* *[To be completed]*	*2024 voluntary Article 7 report*	*Participation in meetings of the Convention* *2025 IM*	*5RC*	*Latest participation in an MSP/Review Conference*	*Moratorium in place*
7	Georgia	√			√	5RC (2024)	√[100]
8	India			√		21MSP (2023)	√[101]
9	Iran						
10	Israel					21MSP (2023)	√[102]
11	Kazakhstan	√				16MSP (2017)	√[103]
12	Korea, DPR of						
13	Korea, Republic of			√		21MSP (2023)	√[104]
14	Kyrgyzstan	√				7MSP (2006)	
15	Lao PDR	√		√	√	5RC (2024)	
16	Lebanon	√			√	5RC (2024)	
17	Libya	√				21MSP (2023)	
18	Micronesia, Federated States of	√		√		11MSP (2011)	
19	Mongolia	√				11MSP (2011)	
20	Morocco	√	√	√	√	5RC (2024)	√[105]
21	Myanmar	√		√		21MSP (2023)	
22	Nepal					10MSP (2010)	
23	Pakistan					21MSP (2023)	
24	Russian Federation					10MSP (2010)	
25	Saudi Arabia			√		4RC (2019)	
26	Singapore	√			√	5RC (2024)	√[106]
27	Syria					21MSP (2023)	
28	United Arab Emirates	√			√	5RC (2024)	
29	United States of America				√	5RC (2024)	√[107]
30	Uzbekistan						
31	Viet Nam				√	5RC (2024)	
	Total (31)	**15**	**1**	**9**	**10**		**9**

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Annex III

Article 4 and Article 3 - Stockpile destruction and retention of anti-personnel mines

Table 1
Status of implementation

State Party	*Total number of anti-personnel mines destroyed*	*Total number of anti-personnel mines destroyed since the Fifth Review Conference*	*Total number of anti-personnel mines remaining to be destroyed*	*Article 4 projected completion date*
Greece	1,306,820	73,591	261,347	Not communicated[108]
Ukraine	3,438,948	0	3,364,433[109]	Not communicated[110]
Total	**4,746,768**	**73,591**	**3,625,780**	

Table 2
Anti-personnel mines reported retained by 58 States Parties for purposes permitted by Article 3 of the Convention

State Party	*2018 and/or earlier*	*2019*	*2020*	*2021*	*2022*	*2023*	*2024*	*2025*	*Current and planned use of retained stockpiled anti-personnel mines*
Bangladesh				12050	12050	12050	12050	12050	The amount of landmines we are in possession of, is the minimum number that is absolutely required to train our armed forces personnels for developing expertise in mine action. The disposal of mines is in progress by an authorised board and that the total quantity will reduce soon.
Belarus		4505	4505		4492	4489	4489		
Belgium		2066	2044	2021	967	958	934	911	Education and training of Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) specialists and deminers with live ammunition and training militaries in "Mine Risk Education". The use of M35Bg mines takes place during different sessions of courses organised by the Belgian Armed Forces. At this stage, no live mines (from the stock retained under Article 3) were used for research and development studies. Some of the Belgian studies are using data collected from live minefields abroad.
Bhutan					146	66		66	
Bosnia and Herzegovina		834	834	834		817	817	803	Over the course of 2024 a total of 14 antipersonnel mines were destroyed by the Federal administration of civil protection. The purpose of retained mines is for training mine detection dogs, demining organisations have their training polygons and the BH Mine Action Centre has two polygons for accreditation training. When a demining organisation has no need any

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State Party	*2018 and/or earlier*	*2019*	*2020*	*2021*	*2022*	*2023*	*2024*	*2025*	*Current and planned use of retained stockpiled anti-personnel mines*
									more for retained mines, the Federal administration of civil protection is obliged to destroy them. At the moment Bosnia and Herzegovina needs this is number of retained mines to train and accredit the mine detection dogs that they can be in good shape to discover the mines on sites. The alternatives to using live anti-personnel mines cannot be used because mine detection dogs have to smell explosive to be able to find mines sites. Bosnia and Herzegovina will continue to report about number of retained mines and ensure that every surplus will be destroyed.
Bulgaria		3318		3485		3445	3304	3416	
Burundi	4 (2017)			4					
Cameroon	1885 (2009)						1885		
Canada[111]		1878	1649	1540	1491	1475	1475	1475	Canada retains live anti-personnel mines to study the effect of blast on equipment, to train soldiers on procedures to defuse live anti-personnel mines and to demonstrate the effect of landmines. For example, live mines help determine whether suits, boots and shields will adequately protect personnel who clear mines. The live mines are used by the Defence department's research establishment located at Suffield, Alberta and by various military training establishments across Canada. The Department of National Defence represents the only source of anti-personnel mines, which can be used by Canadian industry to test equipment. As of December 2022, Canada has 1475 AP mines in its inventory. A variety of anti-personnel mines are necessary for training soldiers in mine detection and clearance. Counter-mine procedures and equipment developed by Canada's research establishment must also be tested on different types of mines members of the Canadian Armed Forces or other organizations might encounter during demining operations. The Department of National Defence retains a maximum of 2000. This number is to ensure we have a sufficient number of mines for training and for valid testing in the area of mine detection and clearance. Canada will continue to conduct trials, testing and evaluation as new technologies are developed. There will be a continuing requirement for provision of real mine targets and simulated minefields for research and development of detection technologies.
Cape Verde	120 (2009)								
Congo Brazzaville	322 (2009)								

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State Party	*2018 and/or earlier*	*2019*	*2020*	*2021*	*2022*	*2023*	*2024*	*2025*	*Current and planned use of retained stockpiled anti-personnel mines*
Cote d'Ivoire	290 (2014)							290	
Croatia		4973	4851	3858	3766	3747	3636	3564	In year 2025, the amount of anti-personnel landmines that will be used (and consequently destroyed) will be based on the needs for testing of demining machines. Croatian Armed Forces will use only "inert" anti-personnel mines for training purposes.
Cyprus		435	435	435	410	380	357		
Czech Republic		2180	2155	2155	2138	2102	1740	761	Objectives: The Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) specialists are trained to detect and to destroy anti-personnel mines. Activity/project: The regular special courses to train and/or educate current and new EOD personnel.
Denmark		1748	1736	1730	1702		1602	1547	Tripwires and tripwire devices have been removed from Danish Claymore Mines and subsequently replaced by electric detonators, whereby the mines can only be activated on command. The instruction manual also clearly states that the claymore mine is a command-initiated defence weapon. The Danish stock of APM is intended for demonstration, training and development purposes. These include: Demonstration of the effect of an APM. Training of engineer units on how to clear APM. Training of Conventional Munitions Disposal personnel. Training of NGO mine clearance teams. Testing of mine detection and disposal equipment. New anti-personnel mines are only acquired in order to replenish stocks in order to continue training for the above-mentioned purposes. Anti-personnel mines are not used for the purpose of training in mine laying.
Djibouti	2996 (2005)								
Ecuador		90	90	90	90			30	Ecuador foresees the annual use of 30 anti-personnel mines to be destroyed in training activities, as well as their possible use in research in training activities, and research tasks. During the year 2024, the destruction of 30 antipersonnel mines was carried out due to the development of two Basic Demining Courses. Two Basic Demining Courses were held.
Eritrea	101[112] (2014)								

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State Party	*2018 and/or earlier*	*2019*	*2020*	*2021*	*2022*	*2023*	*2024*	*2025*	*Current and planned use of retained stockpiled anti-personnel mines*
Finland	16192 (2018)		15982	15851	15771	15665	15591	15509	
France		3941	1842	1841	1771	1770	1777	1774	Objective 1: implementation of new techniques for the remote neutralization of ammunition by the intervention group of the national gendarmerie and objective 2: decrease of stockpiled anti-personnel mines retained by France. Over the period 2017-2023 more than 2,000 anti-personnel mines were destroyed as part of the stock reduction of this type of ammunition. The purpose of these destructions was to eliminate aging mines raising safety issues related to their storage. A stock reduction has taken place for certain types due to their very low rate of use in relation to the number of mines stored.
Gambia	100[113] (2013)								
Germany		583	583	543	279	271	113	81	For demining research and testing purposes Germany retains stocks of Directional Fragmentation Mines MON50 / MON100 / MON200 which are operated in the command-detonated mode only. All Tripwires and tripwire devices have been removed from these Mines. These are not anti-personnel mines, as defined in Article 2 of the 1997 Anti-Personnel-Mine Ban Convention and therefore not prohibited under the Convention.
Greece		5599	5585	5570	5547	5527	5507	5497	Anti-personnel mines have been retained under Article 3 for training soldiers in mine detection and clearance and canine detection.
Guyana	0			80					
Honduras	815 (2007)								
Indonesia		2148	2050				2050[114]		
Iraq		20	Unclear	Unclear	20	20	20	20	Iraq has recently intensified its efforts to implement Article 3 in a responsible and transparent manner. Key government bodies, particularly the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Interior, have held coordination meetings with national mine action authorities to ensure compliance with the Convention while building national capacity for mine clearance operations. One of the most significant outcomes of these meetings was the agreement to replace live explosive devices with inert (non-live) models in training programs for demining and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) teams. This shift marks a major step forward in terms of safety, compliance, and technical advancement. The decision to use inert models aims to achieve several key objectives: (a) Legal

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State Party	*2018 and/or earlier*	*2019*	*2020*	*2021*	*2022*	*2023*	*2024*	*2025*	*Current and planned use of retained stockpiled anti-personnel mines*
									Compliance: Ensuring all training activities are consistent with Article 3 of the Convention, which restricts the use of live mines to very limited and specific purposes, (b) Capacity Building: Enhancing the skills of Iraqi deminers through realistic, yet safe, training environments, (c) Risk Reduction: Minimizing the dangers associated with handling live explosives during training exercises, (d) Technological Advancement: Introducing advanced training tools and scenarios that simulate real-world conditions without the associated risks. Government representatives affirmed their full support for this approach and expressed readiness to provide the necessary logistical and technical resources to implement the use of inert models across all relevant training facilities. Furthermore, Directorate of mine Action (DMA) has called upon the international community to support Iraq's ongoing efforts, through technical assistance, provision of modern training aids, and capacity development for demining personnel. This initiative reflects Iraq's dedication to creating a mine-free environment, protecting civilian lives, and reinforcing its role as a responsible party to international humanitarian agreements. in the near future will announce Iraq's compliance with Article 3.
Ireland		55	54	53	51	49		41	The Irish Defence Forces is the only entity authorised to retain mines for permitted purposes. The Irish Defence Forces use live anti-personnel mines in the development and validation of mine render safe procedures and in training personnel in these procedures. Render safe procedures normally involve the destruction of the mine. Live mines are also used as part of the testing and validation of mechanical mine clearance equipment and in the training of personnel in the use of such equipment. Minimum metal content mines are used, as required, in the calibration and testing of mine detection equipment.
Italy		617	617	563	563	563			
Japan		898	803	719	663	617	573	547	During the reporting period, Japan used anti-personnel mines for education and training. In 2025, Japan plans to use anti-personnel mines for education and training in mine detection and mine clearance. In terms of efforts to annually review the number of mines to ensure that they do not exceed the minimum number absolutely necessary, the Chief of Staff of Ground Self Defense Force (GSDF) and Commissioner of Acquisition, Technology & Logistics Agency (ATLA) reports to the Ministry of Defense the amounts of mines used and stored on a quarterly basis according to relevant internal regulations. Japan has been making

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State Party	*2018 and/or earlier*	*2019*	*2020*	*2021*	*2022*	*2023*	*2024*	*2025*	*Current and planned use of retained stockpiled anti-personnel mines*
									efforts to replace the use of live mines by using simulated mines in some of training.
Jordan		100	100	100	100	100	100	100	
Kenya	3000 (2008)								
Mali	600 (2005)						600	600	
Mauritania		728	728	728	658	658	658	628	Mines are retained solely for training demining staff to detection, demining and mines destruction techniques.
Mozambique[115]		900		No info	No info	No info	No info		
Namibia	1634 (2010)								
Netherlands		889	868	270	270	204	204	170	
Oman	2000 (2017)	No info	No info	2000				1970	
Peru		2015	2015	1705	1330	956	482	482	As of December 2023, 482 mines are available for anti-personnel for training and training. These mines will be destroyed by 2025.
Romania		2395	2249	2020		1836	1836		
Rwanda	65 (2008)								
Senegal[116]		50		50	50	50	50	50	Mines retained for training purposes have been collected during demining operations or extracted from rebel stocks before their destruction. These mines are available at the Military Engineers Training Centre in Bargny. The number of mines retained for permitted purposes has not changed because the needs expressed by the entities retaining these mines (Armed Forces and operators) have not changed. This means that for Senegal, the reported number of mines is the number absolutely necessary to reach the objectives related to the training and instruction of army and demining organisations personnel.
Serbia[117]		3134	No info	No info	3134	3134	No info	No info	For training demining personnel, training of mine detection dogs, testing demining machines and studying the effect of the blast of various types of anti-personnel mines on demining equipment and testing of the protection equipment.
Slovenia		272	256	249	229	229	219	199	
South Africa[118]	576 (2014)			483					

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State Party	*2018 and/or earlier*	*2019*	*2020*	*2021*	*2022*	*2023*	*2024*	*2025*	*Current and planned use of retained stockpiled anti-personnel mines*
Spain		1349	1357	1121	976	976	923	923	Antipersonnel mines are retained by Spain under Article 3 for experimentation in demining techniques. These techniques of demining, in addition to being aimed at national personnel, are made available to experts from other countries, through the humanitarian demining courses taught every year at the International Centre for Demining.
Sri Lanka		21153		16718	14489	9825	7339	6121	The Sri Lanka armed forces authorized to retain anti-personnel mines for permitted purposes: the Sri Lanka Army, Sri Lanka navy and Sri Lank Air force. It retains anti-personnel mines for training mine detection dogs, testing demining machines and studying the effect of the blast of various types of anti-personnel mines on demining equipment. During the course of 2024, authorized institutions used 2,304 anti-personnel mines for permitted purposes.
Sweden		6009	6009	5964	5948	5173	5161	5041	
Tanzania, United Rep. of[119]	1780 (2009)								
Togo	436 (2004)								
Tunisia		4405	4375		4341	4320		4282	
Türkiye		9259	6552	6439	6357	5728	5719	5719	As of the end of 2024, Türkiye retained a total of 5.719 anti-personnel mines for permitted purposes such as certification/accreditation of mechanical demining machines, mine clearance equipment and mine detection dogs, and training of newly appointed military demining units.
Uganda	1764 (2012)					1660	1660		
Venezuela	4874 (2012)								
Yemen [120]	3760 (2017)	No info	No info on numbers		No info on numbers	No info on numbers	N/A	No info	
Zambia		907			907	907			Mines continue to be retained for training by the Defence Forces who are actively engaged in various peacekeeping operations worldwide. Mines are used to prepare troops proceeding on UN peace-keeping missions, to familiarise Staff College Students in minefield layout and densities and to prepare combat engineers in mine warfare. Activities include: mine identification, detection techniques, disposal techniques, minefield layout, minefield marking, detection techniques, and handheld disposal techniques.

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State Party	*2018 and/or earlier*	*2019*	*2020*	*2021*	*2022*	*2023*	*2024*	*2025*	*Current and planned use of retained stockpiled anti-personnel mines*
Zimbabwe		450	450	450	450	450	450	450	The Republic of Zimbabwe authorized the Zimbabwe School of Military Engineering (ZSME) to keep the antipersonnel mines listed on Table 1 for training purposes. ZIMAC engaged authorities to review the numbers retained in accordance with Action #16 of the Siem Reap Action Plan (SRAAP) in the year 2024 and the quantities remain the same.

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Annex IV

Article 5 - Survey and Clearance of Mined Areas

Table 1
Progress reported in Implementation

State Party	*Number of areas released*	*Cancelled area (square metres)*	*Reduced area (square metres)*	*Cleared area (square metres)*	*Total area released (square metres)*	*Number of anti-personnel mines destroyed*	*Number of other explosive items destroyed*
Afghanistan		39,113,454		10,044,926	49,158,380		
Angola		140,430	2,381,063	3,026,610	5,548,103	5,680	5,652
Argentina							
Bosnia & Herzegovina	6[121]	12,025,270	3,252,991	171,891	15,450,152	1,003	582
Burkina Faso							
Cambodia	859					4,849	6,094
Chad							95
Colombia		75,044	112	1,398,340	1,473,496	193	148
Croatia			9,213,471	42,505,648	51,719,119	1,395	1,029
Cyprus							
Democratic Republic of Congo	9	6,235		158,411			
Ecuador	4[122]	5,814		4,190	10,004	367	
Eritrea							
Ethiopia		917,887,550	10,675,579	1,828,847	930,391,976	145	6,073
Guinea-Bissau	14						277
Iraq	177	128,418,445	11,847,983	9,368,175	149,634,603	13,674	6,817
Mali							
Mauritania			42,104	15,574	57,678		
Niger							
Nigeria							
Oman							
State of Palestine							
Peru	14			22,625	22,625	746	
Senegal							

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State Party	*Number of areas released*	*Cancelled area (square metres)*	*Reduced area (square metres)*	*Cleared area (square metres)*	*Total area released (square metres)*	*Number of anti-personnel mines destroyed*	*Number of other explosive items destroyed*
Serbia							
Somalia		62,927,702		4,253,324	67,181,026	4	2,324
South Sudan	7	189,441		557,219	746,660	150	141
Sri Lanka	164	53,735	999,264	4,999,908	6,052,907	1,407	1,360
Sudan	10				3,402,120		
Tajikistan	25	640,691	643,212	415,853	1,699,756	2,777	120
Thailand	32	143,286	4,766,726	310,023	5,220,035	17,600	244
Türkiye	14	5,027,433	35,546	680,864	5,743,843	363	6
Ukraine	302	7,013,092	4,256,877	17,095,009	28,364,978	31,020	302,929
Yemen	95		748,124	21,837,115	22,585,239	793	106,208
Zimbabwe	19[123]		2,440,198	1,947,974	4,388,172	31,672	19

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Table 2

Remaining challenge reported by States Parties

State Party	*Article 5 Mine Clearance Deadline*	*Number of areas known to contain anti-personnel mines*	*Number of areas suspected to contain anti-personnel mines*	*Total number of areas*	*Amount of area known to contain anti-personnel mines (square metres)*	*Amount of area suspected to contain anti-personnel mines (square metres)*	*Total amount of area (square metres)*
Afghanistan	1 February 2025	1,219	40	1,259	89,554,421	13,066,524	102,620,945
Angola	31 December 2025	886	79	965	54,877,743	2,191,193	57,068,936
Argentina	31 December 2025						
Bosnia & Herzegovina	31 December 2025			8,673	164,519,054	658,076,220	822,595,274
Burkina Faso[124]							
Cambodia	31 December 2025		3,917	3,917		424,238,236	424,238,236
Chad	1 January 2030	71	48	119	55,936,780	21,678,562	77,615,342
Colombia	31 December 2025	214	281	495	1,708,820	1,350,052	3,058,872
Croatia	1 March 2026				43,133,281	6,201,721	49,335,002
Cyprus	1 July 2028						
Democratic Republic of the Congo	31 December 2025			35			340,201
Ecuador	31 December 2025		22	22		9,964	9,964
Eritrea	31 December 2027						
Ethiopia	31 December 2025			147			125,177,647
Guinea-Bissau	31 December 2027		47	47			1,974,656
Iraq	1 February 2028	4,722	562	5,284	1,388,658,119	242,554,146	1,631,212,265
Mali							
Mauritania	31 December 2026			22			22,312,046
Niger	31 December 2029						
Nigeria	31 December 2025						
Oman	1 February 2025						
State of Palestine	1 June 2028						
Peru	31 December 2029			46			279,388
Senegal	1 March 2026	62	13	75	1,174,012	107,945	1,281,957
Serbia	31 December 2026		1	1			268,100
Somalia	1 October 2027	230	232	462	110,718,172	12,183,090	122,901,262

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State Party	*Article 5 Mine Clearance Deadline*	*Number of areas known to contain anti-personnel mines*	*Number of areas suspected to contain anti-personnel mines*	*Total number of areas*	*Amount of area known to contain anti-personnel mines (square metres)*	*Amount of area suspected to contain anti-personnel mines (square metres)*	*Total amount of area (square metres)*
South Sudan	9 July 2026	71	43	114	2,662,879	2,280,682	4,943,561
Sri Lanka	1 June 2028	634	206	840	17,646,604	5,548,484	23,195,088
Sudan	1 April 2027	66	42	108	9,963,089	3,369,164	13,332,253
Tajikistan	31 December 2025	109	2	111	6,132,708	621,000	6,753,708
Thailand	31 December 2026	64	8	72	9,587,588	7,453,974	17,041,562
Türkiye	31 December 2025	2,000	1,656	3,656	93,189,617	126,713,843	219,903,460
Ukraine	1 December 2033		207	207		105,877	105,877
Yemen	1 March 2028	109	38	147	5,901,683	2,073,319	7,975,002
Zimbabwe	31 December 2025			60			11,999,499

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Table 3
Milestones for 2025 reported by States Parties

States Parties	*Number of Areas to be addressed*	*Total area to be addressed (in square metres unless otherwise indicated)*
Afghanistan		
Angola	113	4,426,227
Argentina		
Bosnia & Herzegovina		75,000,000
Burkina Faso[125]		
Cambodia		130,345,769
Chad[126]		
Colombia		1,643,571
Croatia		49,335,002
Cyprus		
Democratic Republic of Congo[127]		
Ecuador		9,964
Eritrea		
Ethiopia[128]		
Guinea-Bissau[129]		
Iraq		75,052,315
Mali		
Mauritania		4,097,318
Niger		
Nigeria[130]		
Oman		
Peru	18	
Senegal		
Serbia	1	268,100
Somalia[131]		
South Sudan	19	1,360,000
Sri Lanka	196	5,889,880

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States Parties	*Number of Areas to be addressed*	*Total area to be addressed (in square metres unless otherwise indicated)*
State of Palestine		
Sudan	45	7,573,173
Tajikistan	20	650,055
Thailand	42	7,359,455
Türkiye		6,200,000
Ukraine		204.7[132]
Yemen[133]		
Zimbabwe		3,870,000

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Annex V

Article 6 - Victim Assistance

Table 1
Overview of latest information on national implementation support mechanism and casualty data provided by the States Parties with mine victims in areas under their jurisdiction or control

State Party	*National government entity coordinating victim assistance efforts*	*National action plans on victim assistance/ disabilities*	*Database on mine casualties, survivors/ persons with disabilities*	*Mine victims*[134]
Afghanistan	State Ministry for Martyrs and Disabled Affairs (SMOMDA, also known as MMD)	National Disability Strategy (2020-2030)	MMD disability database	More than 36,000
Albania	Albanian Mine and Munitions Coordination Office (AMMCO)	National Action Plan for Persons with Disability 2021-2025		1,003
Algeria	National Council of Persons with Disabilities	Victim Assistance is integrated into relevant health, disability and social development plans.	Database on mine victims, including on indirect mine victims	7,255
Angola	National Mine Action Agency (known as ANAM)	Victim Assistance Plan (annual)	ANAM Database	9,441
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Victim Assistance Coordination Body at the Bosnia-Herzegovina Mine Action Centre (BHMAC)	Victim Assistance Action Plan (2019- 2025)	BHMAC Mine Victims Database	1,863
Burundi	Ministry of Public Security and Disasters Management (MOPSDM) & Humanitarian Action against Landmines and unexploded ordnance	National Action Plan for Assistance of Mines/ERW Victims and other Persons with Disabilities		Approx. 6,000
Cambodia	Mine Action and Victim Assistance Authority (CMAA)	National Disability Strategic Plan (2019-2024) & Victim Assistance Action Plan (annual)	National Centralised Database under the CMAA	65,086
Chad	National Mine Action Commission (HCND)	National Victim Assistance Action Plan (2018-2022)	HCND Database	2,894
Chile	National Demining Commission (CNAD) through its Executive Secretariat			738

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State Party	*National government entity coordinating victim assistance efforts*	*National action plans on victim assistance/ disabilities*	*Database on mine casualties, survivors/ persons with disabilities*	*Mine victims*[134]
Colombia	Mine Action Authority & Ministry of Health and Social Protection (MOHSP)	Action Plan of the Technical Secretary for Disabilities (annual)	Anti-personnel Mine Survivors Information Service (SISMAP)	12,500
Croatia	Mine Action Centre at the Civil Protection Directorate within the Ministry of the Interior (MOI)	Victim Assistance has been integrated into relevant national plans	Database on Mine Victims	610
Democratic Republic of Congo	Ministry of Humanitarian and Social Affairs (MOHSA) & National Mine Action Centre (CCLAM)			3,198[135]
El Salvador	The Institute for Administration of Veterans and Ex-Combatants Benefits (INABVE)	Victim Assistance is integrated into INABVE's operation plans	A national database on persons with disabilities, including mine survivors	5,129
Eritrea				Approx. 5,750
Ethiopia	Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (MOLSA)	National Disability Action Plan (2012-2021)[136]	National Database on Persons with Disabilities	16,616
Guinea-Bissau	National Mine Action Coordination Centre on Anti-Personnel Mines (CAAMI)	National Strategy for the Inclusion of Persons with Disabilities (ENPICD)		Approx. 1,500
Iraq	Directorate of Mine Action (DMA) & Commission for Persons with Disability Care and those with Special Needs	National Victim Assistance and Disability Action Plan (2019-2021)	Mine Victims Database at the DMA	34,249
Jordan	High Council on Affairs of Persons with Disabilities (HCD) & National Demining and Rehabilitation Authority (NCDR)	Victim Assistance has been integrated into several disability related plans and policies	National Database on Mine Victims at the NCDR	1,025
Mali	Permanent Secretariat on Small Arms and Light Weapons			351[137]
Mauritania	National Humanitarian Demining Programme for Development (PNDHD)		PNDHD Casualty Database	643
Mozambique	Ministry of Gender, Child and Social Affairs (MOGCSA)	National Action Plan for People with Disabilities including Mine Victims		Approx. 10,000

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State Party	*National government entity coordinating victim assistance efforts*	*National action plans on victim assistance/ disabilities*	*Database on mine casualties, survivors/ persons with disabilities*	*Mine victims*[134]
Nicaragua	National Council for the Promotion and Enforcement of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (the National Council)	2022–2026 National Human Development Plan	Ministry of Health Database & Todos Con Voz Database	1,276
Niger	National Commission for the Collection and Control of Illicit Weapons (CNCCAI)			More than 500
Nigeria	National Humanitarian Mine Action Committee (NHMAC) and the National Council for Persons with Disabilities (NCPWD)			Approx. 16,000
Palestine (the State of)	Palestinian Mine Action Centre (PMAC)			450[138]
Peru	Peruvian Centre for Action against Anti-personnel Mines (CONTRAMINAS) & National Council for the Integration of Persons with Disabilities (CONADIS)	National Accessibility Plan 2018-2024	National Registry of Persons with Disabilities	348
Senegal	National Centre for Mine Action (CNAMS)	National Action Plan for Victim Assistance (PANAV)[139]	Mine Victims Casualty Database at the CNAMS	870
Serbia	Ministry of Labour, Employment, Veteran and Social Policy (MLEVSA)	Strategy for Improvement of Position of Persons with Disabilities for period 2020-2024	Database on Civilian Victims of War at the MLEVSA	721
Somalia	Somalia Explosive Management Authority (SEMA)	National Action Plan for Assistance to Survivors of Mines and Explosive Remnants of War (2020 – 2025)	Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database	Approx. 1,300
South Sudan	Ministry of Gender, Child and Social Work (MOGCSW) & National Mine Action Authority (NMAA)	National Disability/Victim Assistance Action Plan (2020-2025)	Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database	More than 5,300
Sri Lanka	National Mine Action Centre (MAC)	National Action Plan on Equalisation of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and National Mental Health Strategy	Mine Victims Database at the MAC and Injury Surveillance System at the MOH	1,972

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State Party	*National government entity coordinating victim assistance efforts*	*National action plans on victim assistance/ disabilities*	*Database on mine casualties, survivors/ persons with disabilities*	*Mine victims*[134]
Sudan	National Mine Action Centre (NMAC) & National Council of Persons with Disabilities (NCPWD)	National Disability Strategy 2020-2030 & National Victim Assistance Strategy	Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database	2,639
Tajikistan	Tajikistan Mine Action Centre (TMAC)	Victim assistance has been integrated into disability related plans	TMAC IMSMA Database	890
Thailand	Department of Empowerment of Persons with Disabilities (DEP) at the Ministry of Social Development, Human Security and Public Health (MOSDHSPH) and Thailand Mine Action Centre (TMAC)	Victim Assistance has been integrated into several disability related plans and strategies	National Disability Database	667
Türkiye	Ministry of Family, Labour and Social Services (MOFLSS) and Turkish Mine Action Centre (TURMAC)	2023–2025 Disability Rights National Action Plan and 2030 Accessible Vision Document	Ministry of Family and Social Services (MOFSS) database	4,166
Uganda	Ministry of Gender, Labour and Social Development (MOGLSD)	National Comprehensive Action Plan on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (2020-2025)		Approx. 2,500
Ukraine	National Mine Action Authority Secretariat (NMAAS)	Victim Assistance Action Plan 2025-2027	NMAAS Casualty Database	1,221
Yemen	Mine Executive Action Centre (YEMAC)		YEMAC IMSMA Database	10086
Zimbabwe	Department of Disability Affairs (DODA) at the Ministry of Public Service, Labour and Social Welfare (MOPLSW)	2021-2025 Action Plan of the National Policy on Disability	ZIMAC Casualty Database and DODA Disability Database	Approx. 1,692[140]

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Annex VI

Article 9 – Implementation Measures

A. 75 States Parties that have reported that they have adopted legislation in the context of Article 9 obligations

Afghanistan	Cyprus	Kiribati	St Kitts and Nevis
Albania	Czech Republic	Latvia	St Vincent & the Grenadines
Australia	DRC	Liechtenstein	Senegal
Austria	Djibouti	Luxembourg	Serbia
Belarus	El Salvador	Malaysia	Seychelles
Belgium	Eritrea	Mali	Sri Lanka
Belize	Fiji	Malta	South Africa
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Finland	Mauritania	Spain
Brazil	France	Mauritius	Sudan
Bulgaria	Germany	Monaco	Sweden
Burkina Faso	Guatemala	New Zealand	Switzerland
Burundi	Honduras	Nicaragua	Timor Leste
Cambodia	Hungary	Niger	Trinidad and Tobago
Canada	Iceland	Niue	Türkiye
Chad	Ireland	Norway	United Kingdom
Colombia	Italy	Oman	Yemen
Cook Islands	Japan	Panama	Zambia
Costa Rica	Jordan	Paraguay	Zimbabwe
Croatia	Kenya	Peru	

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B. 44 States Parties that have reported that they consider existing laws to be sufficient in the context of Article 9 obligations

Algeria	Ethiopia	Montenegro	Romania
Andorra	Greece	Mozambique	Samoa
Angola	Guinea Bissau	Namibia	Slovakia
Argentina	Guyana	Netherlands	Slovenia
Bhutan	Holy See	North Macedonia	State of Palestine
Cameroon	Indonesia	Papua New Guinea	Tajikistan
Central African Republic	Iraq	Philippines	Thailand
Chile	Kuwait	Poland	Tunisia
Côte d'Ivoire	Lesotho	Portugal	Ukraine
Denmark	Lithuania	Qatar	Tanzania
Estonia	Mexico	Republic of Moldova	Venezuela

C. 45 States Parties that have not yet reported having either adopted legislation in the context of Article 9 obligations or that they consider existing laws to be sufficient

Antigua and Barbuda	Dominican Republic	Madagascar	Somalia
Bahamas	Ecuador	Malawi	South Sudan
Bangladesh	Equatorial Guinea	Maldives	Suriname
Barbados	Eswatini	Nauru	Togo
Benin	Gabon	Nigeria	Turkmenistan
Bolivia	The Gambia	Palau	Tuvalu
Botswana	Ghana	Rwanda	Uganda
Brunei Darussalam	Grenada	St Lucia	Uruguay
Cape Verde	Guinea	San Marino	Vanuatu
Comoros	Haiti	Sao Tome and Principe	

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Congo	Jamaica	Sierra Leone
Dominica	Liberia	Solomon Islands

Notes

[1] Note: The percentages given for indicators under Actions #1 (indicator 1, 2) , #5 (indicator 1,2, 4), #40 (indicator 4), and #41 (indicator 1, 2, 3) are compiled from the total number of States Parties (44) that reported either Article 5 Mine Clearance or Victim Assistance obligations.

[2] Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, Croatia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Iraq, Jordan, Mauritania, Nicaragua, Peru, Senegal, Serbia, Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Türkiye, Ukraine, Yemen, Zimbabwe.

[3] Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Cambodia, Colombia, Croatia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Iraq, Jordan, Nicaragua, Peru, Senegal, Serbia, Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Türkiye, Ukraine, Yemen, Zimbabwe.

[4] 21 States Parties – Angola, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, Croatia, Ecuador, Iraq, Mauritania, Peru, Senegal, Serbia, Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Thailand, Türkiye, Ukraine, Yemen and Zimbabwe.

[5] 22 States Parties – Angola, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, Croatia, Ecuador, Iraq, Mauritania, Peru, Senegal, Serbia, Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Türkiye, Ukraine, Yemen and Zimbabwe.

[6] 16 States Parties – Angola, Cambodia, Colombia, Croatia, Ecuador, Peru, Senegal, Serbia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Türkiye, Ukraine, Yemen and Zimbabwe.

[7] 23 States Parties – Afghanistan, Angola, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, Ecuador, Guinea Bissau, Iraq, Mauritania, Peru, Senegal, Serbia, Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Türkiye, Ukraine, Yemen and Zimbabwe.

[8] Algeria, Angola, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Cambodia, Colombia, Croatia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Iraq, Jordan, Mauritania, Nicaragua, Peru, Senegal, Serbia, Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Türkiye, Ukraine, Yemen, Zimbabwe.

[9] Albania, Algeria, Angola, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Cambodia, Colombia, Croatia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Iraq, Mauritania, Peru, Senegal, Serbia, Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Türkiye, Ukraine, Yemen, Zimbabwe.

[10] Algeria, Angola, Colombia, El Salvador, Senegal, Serbia, South Sudan, Thailand, Türkiye, Yemen, Zimbabwe.

[11] 12 States Parties – Angola, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Cambodia, Colombia, Croatia, Ecuador, Iraq, Peru, Serbia, Somalia, South Sudan and Ukraine.

[12] 17 States Parties – Australia, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, Türkiye, the United Kingdom.

[13] 4 Staes Parties – Canda, Denmark, France, Germany, Japan and the Netherlands.

[14] 25 States Parties – Afghanistan, Angola, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, Croatia, Ecuador, Guinea Bissau, Iraq, Mali, Mauritania, Peru, Senegal, Serbia, Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Türkiye, Ukraine, Yemen and Zimbabwe.

[15] 24 States Parties – Afghanistan, Angola, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, Croatia, Ecuador, Guinea Bissau, Iraq, Mali, Mauritania, Peru, Senegal, Serbia, Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Türkiye, Yemen and Zimbabwe.

[16] 19 States Parties – Angola, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, Croatia, Ecuador, Iraq, Serbia, Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Türkiye, Ukraine, Yemen and Zimbabwe.

[17] 20 States Parties – Algeria, Australia, Austria, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Netherlands, Norway, Peru, Slovenia, Spain, Switzerland, Thailand, Türkiye and the United Kingdom.

[18] 1 State Party – Switzerland.

[19] Marshall Islands and Tonga.

[20] Morocco.

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[21] 9 States not party – Armenia, Azerbaijan, Federated States of Micronesia, India, Korea, Rep. of, Lao PDR, Morocco, Myanmar and Saudi Arabia registered to attend the 2025 Intersessional Meetings.

[22] Egypt, Georgia, India, Israel, Kazakhstan, Korea, Rep. of, Morocco, Singapore and the United States of America have reported having moratoria in place.

[23] At the 2024 Intersessional Meetings, Greece reported foreseeing that the transportation and destruction of the remaining stockpiled anti-personnel mines would be completed by the end of May 2025. At the 2025 Intersessional Meetings, Greece reported that the transportation and destruction process had to be paused at the beginning of 2025 but that it would resume in the coming weeks. At the 2025 Intersessional Meetings, Ukraine indicated that, under current circumstances, the development of a time-bound for completion of its Article 4 obligations was not feasible.

[24] Greece and Ukraine both reported on progress in implementation, however they indicating that no progress had been made.

[25] 1 State Party – Greece – reports on securing and accounting of stockpiled anti-personnel mines. Ukraine reports that if the warehouses and arsenals where anti-personnel mines are stored are located in the territories occupied by Russia, or if they have been subjected to air and missile strikes by the armed forces of the Russian Federation, then information about such mines can be obtained only after the territory has been liberated, cleared and carrying out relevant inspections.

[26] 20 of the 58 States Parties retaining anti-personnel mines: Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Japan, Mauritania, Netherlands, Oman, Slovenia, Sri Lanka, Sweden and Tunisia. (States that have reported a decrease in the number of mines retained).

[27] 19 of the 58 States Parties retaining anti-personnel mines: Bangladesh, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, France, Greece, Iraq, Ireland, Japan, Mauritania, Senegal, Spain, Sri Lanka, Türkiye and Zimbabwe.

[28] 2 of the 58 States Parties retaining anti-personnel mines – Iraq and Japan - reported currently using or making efforts to use alternatives to live anti-personnel mines for training and research purposes. 2 other States Parties – Senegal and Zimbabwe – reported exploring available alternatives to using live anti-personnel mines.

[29] 22 States Parties – Angola, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, Croatia, Ecuador, Iraq, Mauritania, Peru, Senegal, Serbia, Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Türkiye, Ukraine, Yemen and Zimbabwe.

[30] 20 States Parties – Angola, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Cambodia, Colombia, Croatia, Ecuador, Iraq, Mauritania, Peru, Senegal, Serbia, Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Türkiye, Yemen and Zimbabwe.

[31] 21 States Parties – Angola, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Cambodia, Colombia, Croatia, Ecuador, Iraq, Mauritania, Peru, Senegal, Serbia, Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Türkiye, Ukraine, Yemen and Zimbabwe.

[32] 18 States Parties – Angola, Cambodia, Colombia, Ecuador, Iraq, Peru, Senegal, Serbia, Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Türkiye, Ukraine, Yemen and Zimbabwe.

[33] 19 States Parties – Angola, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Cambodia, Colombia, Croatia, Ecuador, Iraq, Peru, Senegal, Serbia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Türkiye, Ukraine, Yemen and Zimbabwe.

[34] 19 States Parties – Angola, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Cambodia, Colombia, Croatia, Ecuador, Iraq, Peru, Senegal, Serbia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Türkiye, Ukraine, Yemen and Zimbabwe.

[35] 20 States Parties – Angola, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Cambodia, Colombia, Croatia, Ecuador, Iraq, Mauritania, Peru, Senegal, Serbia, Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Türkiye, Yemen and Zimbabwe.

[36] 9 States Parties – Afghanistan, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Chad, Colombia, Iraq, Mali, Somalia, Ukraine and Yemen.

[37] 8 States Parties – Afghanistan, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Colombia, Iraq, Mali, Somalia, Ukraine and Yemen.

[38] 18 States Parties – Angola, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Cambodia, Colombia, Croatia, Ecuador, Iraq, Peru, Senegal, Serbia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Thailand, Türkiye, Ukraine, Yemen and Zimbabwe.

[39] 1 State Party – Mali.

[40] 22 States Parties – Afghanistan, Angola, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Colombia, Croatia, Ecuador, Guinea Bissau, Iraq, Mali, Peru, Senegal, Serbia, Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Türkiye, Ukraine, Yemen and Zimbabwe.

[41] 25 States Parties – Afghanistan, Angola, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, Croatia, Ecuador, Guinea Bissau, Iraq, Mali, Mauritania, Peru, Senegal, Serbia, Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Türkiye, Ukraine, Yemen and Zimbabwe.

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[42] 22 States Parties – Afghanistan, Angola, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, Croatia, Ecuador, Iraq, Peru, Senegal, Serbia, Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Türkiye, Ukraine, Yemen and Zimbabwe.

[43] 6 States Parties – Angola, Cambodia, Colombia, Ethiopia, Türkiye and Zimbabwe.

[44] 6 States Parties – Angola, Cambodia, Colombia, Ethiopia, Türkiye and Zimbabwe.

[45] 4 States Parties – Angola, Cambodia, Colombia and Zimbabwe.

[46] 21 States Parties – Angola, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, Croatia, Ecuador, Iraq, Mauritania, Peru, Senegal, Serbia, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Türkiye, Ukraine, Yemen and Zimbabwe.

[47] 17 States Parties – Angola, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, Croatia, Ecuador, Iraq, Peru, Serbia, Somalia, Sudan, Thailand, Türkiye, Ukraine, Yemen and Zimbabwe.

[48] 18 States Parties – Angola, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Cambodia, Colombia, Croatia, Ecuador, Iraq, Peru, Senegal, Serbia, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Türkiye, Yemen and Zimbabwe.

[49] 20 States Parties – Angola, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Cambodia, Colombia, Croatia, Ecuador, Iraq, Mauritania, Peru, Senegal, Serbia, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Türkiye, Ukraine, Yemen and Zimbabwe.

[50] 17 States Parties – Angola, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Cambodia, Colombia, Iraq, Peru, Senegal, Serbia, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Türkiye, Ukraine, Yemen and Zimbabwe.

[51] 18 States Parties – Angola, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Cambodia, Colombia, Croatia, Ecuador, Iraq, Mauritania, Peru, Senegal, Serbia, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Thailand, Türkiye, Yemen and Zimbabwe.

[52] 17 States Parties – Angola, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, Croatia, Ecuador, Iraq, Peru, Serbia, Somalia, Sudan, Thailand, Türkiye, Ukraine, Yemen and Zimbabwe.

[53] Percentages are calculated based on the 39 States Parties with mine victims in areas under their jurisdiction or control; in 2025, 29 of these States Parties reported on victim assistance.

[54] 27 States Parties – Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Colombia, Croatia, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Iraq, Jordan, Mauritania, Nicaragua, Peru, Senegal, Serbia, Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Türkiye, Ukraine, Yemen and Zimbabwe.

[55] 21 States Parties – Afghanistan, Albania, Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Colombia, Croatia, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Iraq, Jordan, Nicaragua, Serbia, Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, Thailand, Türkiye, Yemen and Zimbabwe.

[56] 17 States Parties – Albania, Algeria, Angola, Colombia, Croatia, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Iraq, Nicaragua, Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tajikistan, Türkiye, Yemen and Zimbabwe.

[57] 27 States Parties – Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, Croatia, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Iraq, Jordan, Mali, Mauritania, Nicaragua, Senegal, Serbia, Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Türkiye, Yemen and Zimbabwe.

[58] 24 States Parties – Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Colombia, Croatia, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Iraq, Mali, Nicaragua, Senegal, Serbia, Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Türkiye, Ukraine, Yemen and Zimbabwe.

[59] 25 States Parties – Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Colombia, Croatia, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Iraq, Mauritania, Nicaragua, Peru, Senegal, Serbia, Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Türkiye, Yemen and Zimbabwe.

[60] 25 States Parties – Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, Croatia, El Salvador, Iraq, Jordan, Mauritania, Peru, Senegal, Serbia, Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Türkiye, Ukraine, Yemen and Zimbabwe.

[61] 21 States Parties – Afghanistan, Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Colombia, Croatia, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Iraq, Nicaragua, Peru, Senegal, Serbia, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Türkiye, Ukraine, Yemen and Zimbabwe.

[62] 22 States Parties – Albania, Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Colombia, Croatia, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Iraq, Jordan, Mali, Peru, Serbia, Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Türkiye, Ukraine, Yemen and Zimbabwe.

[63] 23 States Parties – Albania, Algeria, Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Colombia, Croatia, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Iraq, Jordan, Mali, Peru, Senegal, Serbia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, Thailand, Türkiye, Ukraine, Yemen and Zimbabwe.

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[64] 22 States Parties – Algeria, Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, Croatia, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Mali, Nicaragua, Senegal, Serbia, Somalia, South Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Türkiye, Ukraine, Yemen and Zimbabwe.

[65] 14 States Parties – Algeria, Angola, Colombia, Croatia, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Iraq, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Thailand, Türkiye, Yemen and Zimbabwe.

[66] 26 States Parties – Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, Croatia, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Iraq, Jordan, Mali, Nicaragua, Senegal, Serbia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Türkiye, Ukraine, Yemen and Zimbabwe.

[67] 21 States Parties – Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Colombia, Croatia, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Iraq, Mali, Mauritania, Nicaragua, Senegal, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, Thailand, Türkiye and Yemen.

[68] 10 States Parties – Angola, Colombia, Croatia, El Salvador, Mali, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, Türkiye and Zimbabwe.

[69] 25 States Parties – Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Colombia, Croatia, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Jordan, Mali, Mauritania, Nicaragua, Peru, Senegal, Serbia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Türkiye, Yemen and Zimbabwe.

[70] 13 States Parties – Algeria, Angola, Colombia, Croatia, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Senegal, South Sudan, Sudan, Thailand, Türkiye, Yemen and Zimbabwe.

[71] 19 States Parties – Algeria, Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Colombia, Croatia, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Jordan, Peru, Serbia, Sri Lanka, Somalia, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Türkiye, Yemen and Zimbabwe.

[72] 17 States Parties – Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Cambodia, Colombia, Croatia, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Jordan, Nicaragua, Senegal, Serbia, Somalia, South Sudan, Thailand, Türkiye and Zimbabwe.

[73] 10 States Parties – Afghanistan, Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Colombia, Croatia, Ethiopia, El Salvador, Türkiye and Zimbabwe.

[74] 17 States Parties – Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Colombia, Croatia, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Nicaragua, Peru, Senegal, Serbia, South Sudan, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Türkiye and Zimbabwe.

[75] 10 States Parties – Angola, Colombia, Croatia, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Nicaragua, Serbia, South Sudan, Türkiye and Zimbabwe.

[76] 15 States Parties – Albania, Algeria, Angola, Cambodia, Croatia, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Iraq, Jordan, Nicaragua, Serbia, South Sudan, Tajikistan, Türkiye, Zimbabwe.

[77] 17 States Parties – Albania, Algeria, Angola, Colombia, Croatia, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Iraq, Jordan, Peru, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Tajikistan, Türkiye, Yemen and Zimbabwe.

[78] 20 States Parties – Angola, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Cambodia, Colombia, Croatia, Ecuador, Iraq, Peru, Senegal, Serbia, Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Türkiye, Ukraine, Yemen and Zimbabwe.

[79] 14 States Parties - Algeria, Angola, Colombia, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Jordan, Mauritania, Senegal, Serbia, South Sudan, Thailand, Türkiye, Yemen, Zimbabwe.

[80] 24 States Parties – Algeria, Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Colombia, Croatia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Iraq, Jordan, Peru, Senegal, Serbia, Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Türkiye, Ukraine, Yemen, Zimbabwe.

[81] 23 States Parties – Angola, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Cambodia, Colombia, Croatia, Ecuador, Guinea Bissau, Iraq, Mali, Mauritania, Peru, Senegal, Serbia, Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Türkiye, Ukraine, Yemen and Zimbabwe.

[82] 19 States Parties – Angola, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Cambodia, Colombia, Croatia, Ecuador, Iraq, Peru, Serbia, Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Türkiye, Ukraine, Yemen and Zimbabwe.

[83] 22 States Parties – Angola, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, Croatia, Ecuador, Guinea Bissau, Iraq, Mauritania, Niger, Peru, Senegal, Serbia, Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tajikistan, Türkiye, Yemen and Zimbabwe.

[84] 22 States Parties – Angola, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, Croatia, Iraq, Mali, Mauritania, Peru, Senegal, Serbia, Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Türkiye, Ukraine, Yemen and Zimbabwe.

[85] 17 States Parties – Angola, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Cambodia, Colombia, Iraq, Peru, Senegal, Serbia, Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, Thailand, Türkiye, Ukraine, Yemen and Zimbabwe.

[86] 18 States Parties - Australia, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, Türkiye, United Kingdom.

[87] 12 States Parties - Australia, Belgium, Canada, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, and United Kingdom.

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[88] 11 States Parties - Australia, Belgium, Canada, Germany, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, and United Kingdom.
[89] 2 States Parties – Sweden and United Kingdom.
[90] 7 States Parties - Canada, Denmark, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, and Switzerland.
[91] 2 States Parties – Belgium, Italy and Norway.
[92] 2 State Party – Italy and Switzerland.
[93] 21 States Parties – Angola, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Brazil, Cambodia, Colombia, Croatia, Ecuador, Iraq, Peru, Senegal, Serbia, Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Türkiye, Ukraine, Yemen and Zimbabwe.
[94] 19 States Parties – Angola, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Cambodia, Colombia, Croatia, Ecuador, Peru, Senegal, Serbia, Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Türkiye, Ukraine, Yemen and Zimbabwe.
[95] Sudan, Ukraine and Yemen.
[96] 3 of the 3 States Parties with alleged and/or known non-compliance with Article 1 – Sudan, Ukraine, Yemen.
[97] 50 of the 76 States Parties that are implementing obligations under Article 4, 5 or that retain anti-personnel mines under Article 3 submitted Article 7 reports containing updated information on implementation – Afghanistan, Angola, Argentina, Bangladesh, Belgium, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Canada, Chad, Colombia, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Guinea-Bissau, Iraq, Ireland, Japan, Jordan, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Netherlands, Oman, Peru, Senegal, Serbia, Slovenia, Somalia, South Sudan, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Sweden, Tajikistan, Thailand, Tunisia, Türkiye, Ukraine, Yemen, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
[98] 119 of the 164 States Parties.
[99] Moratorium on landmine production and export since the 1980s.
[100] In 1996, the President of Georgia declared a moratorium on producing, importing, and using anti-personnel mines.
[101] India is observing a moratorium on the export and transfer of antipersonnel mines (2018).
[102] Israel has extended the moratorium on all exports, sales or other transfers of all anti-personnel landmines for an additional period of three years, until July 2023 (2022).
[103] In 1997, a moratorium on export of anti-personnel mines, including their re-export and transit, entered into force in Kazakhstan.
[104] The Government of the Republic of Korea is enforcing a moratorium on export of anti-personnel mines for an indefinite extension of time (2022).
[105] Morocco enforces a moratorium on the use of anti-personnel mines.
[106] Singapore declared a two-year moratorium in May 1996 on the export of anti-personnel landmines without self-neutralizing mechanisms. In February 1998, Singapore expanded the moratorium to include all manner of anti-personnel landmines, not just those without self-neutralizing mechanisms, and extended the moratorium indefinitely (2016).
[107] A June 21, 2022, White House Fact Sheet stated the United States would not develop, produce, or acquire APLs; export or transfer anti-personnel mines; use antipersonnel mines outside of the Korean Peninsula; or assist, encourage, or induce anyone to engage in any activity prohibited by the Convention. According to the fact sheet, the United States would also destroy all antipersonnel stockpiles not required for the defense of South Korea.
[108] At the 18-20 June 2024 Intersessional Meetings, Greece indicated that the sixth amendment to the contract between HDS and competent Department of the Hellenic Army General Staff foresees that the transportation and destruction of its remaining stockpiled antipersonnel mines will be completed by May 2025.
[109] Article 7 report submitted by Ukraine in 2025. Ukraine also indicated that if the warehouses and arsenals where anti-personnel mines were stored were located in the territories occupied by Russia, or if they had been subjected to air and missile strikes by the armed forces of the Russian Federation, then information about such mines could be obtained only after the territory has been liberated, cleared and carrying out relevant inspections.
[110] In its Article 7 reports submitted in 2023-2025, Ukraine indicated that its stockpiled anti-personnel mines would be destroyed in accordance with Article 4 commitments after the cessation of hostilities and the restoration of the territorial integrity of Ukraine within its internationally recognised borders.
[111] In 2018, Canada reported that 57 of the 1878 anti-personnel mines retained under Article 3 are without fuses.
[112] In its reports submitted in 2013 and 2014, Eritrea indicated that 71 of the 101 mines were inert.

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[113] In its report submitted in 2013, the Gambia indicated that it retains 100 anti-personnel mines under Article 3. While a report was submitted in 2020, it did not contain information on antipersonnel mines retained under Article 3.

[114] While Indonesia did not submit an Article 7 report in 2024, it provided an update on Article 3 mines at the 2023 Intersessional Meetings.

[115] In its report submitted in 2018, Mozambique indicated that 90 of the 1355 anti-personnel mines retained under Article 3 are inert without explosive and detonator. In its report submitted in 2022, Mozambique indicated that the Defense and Interior Ministries have a certain number of guarded mines that are intended, solely and exclusively, for the instruction of the Defence and Security Forces.

[116] In its report submitted in 2019, Senegal indicated that 13 of the 50 mines retained have been defused.

[117] In its report submitted in 2018, Serbia indicated that all fuses for 494 PMA-1 type and 540 PMA-3 type had been removed and destroyed. While Serbia submitted reports in 2020 and 2021, no updated information on anti-personnel mines retained under Article 3 was provided.

[118] In its report submitted in 2022, South Africa indicated that that as of 31 December 2020 it retained 483 anti-personnel mines under Article 3.

[119] In its report submitted in 2009, the United Republic of Tanzania indicated that it retains 1780 anti-personnel mines under Article 3, including 830 deactivated anti-personnel mines.

[120] In its Article 7 reports submitted in 2020 and 2021, Yemen indicated that before 2014 Yemen submitted information about quantity and types of anti-personnel mines for permitted purpose in accordance with Article 3 after that Yemen did not use any anti-personnel mines for training and research activities. Under the current operating procedures forced upon YEMAC by the current conflicts, at any given time there are a number of AP mines (and AP mines of an improvised nature) held at YEMC storage locations whilst awaiting destruction. This is caused by the lack of access to explosives or other means to destroy items in place and the need to conduct large scale demolitions once coordination with relative contacts and approval of access to explosives besides burning items such as thermite is allowed. The numbers and types vary and are kept only for so long as it takes to organize their destruction. The conflict created a complex environment and currently Yemen is not performing any plan of development of mine detection, detection techniques for further training of the use of mines retained under Article3. Yemen is commitment to give updates about all status and information on it is transparency report (Article 7). At this stage landmines especially Ap-mines and the Ap- improvised nature are also presented in Yemen in large numbers.

[121] Bosnia and Herzegovina reported that in 2024 it released a total of 6 Mine Suspected Areas, A mine suspected area has been defined by Bosnia and Herzegovina as: "An area made up of SHAs and CHAs which encompasses one or more impacted communities and due to economic, cultural or geographical and other reasons is selected as a logical unit…MSA represents an organizational task for a demining organization".

[122] Ecuador reported that in 2024 the 68th Engineer Battalion "COTOPAXI" addressed 4 mined areas containing the following 'objectives': PV-2_07,Obst_D-34, Obst_D-36, Obst_D-32, Obst_D-33, Obst_C-5, Obst_D-20, Obst_C-26, Obst_C- 23, Obst_D-22, Obst_D-25, Obst_D19, Obst_C-9.

[123] Zimbabwe reported that in 2024, it addressed 19 'sectors'. A sector can be defined as a subdivision of a mined area used for operational purposes.

[124] Burkina Faso in its request to extend its Article 5 deadline, submitted for consideration to the twenty-Second Meeting of the States Parties indicated that it had identified a total of 226 municipalities where incidents involving improvised AP mines have been recorded, or where their presence is suspected. These municipalities are primarily located across ten administrative regions: the Sahel, the East, the Centre-North, the North, the Boucle du Mouhoun, the Cascades, the Centre-West, the Centre-East, and the Hauts-Bassins.

[125] Burkina Faso in its request submitted to the 22MSP, indicated the following milestones for 2025; A national contamination assessment workshop scheduled; The development of a national Information Management (IM) system, including the use of Survey123 and ARCGIS, the procurement of IT equipment, and the establishment of internet connectivity across CNCA regional offices, with IM workshops to be held in 2025 and 2027, annual IM training sessions and refresher course conducted, as well as the establishment of a digital early warning system, Non-technical surveys (NTS) and the deployment of EOD teams.

[126] Chad projected to address the following areas: (a) between February 2025 and March 2029, 17 mined areas in the Borkou province; (b) between April 2025 and August 2029, 13 mined areas in the Ennedi province and; (c) between March 2025 and November 2029, 89 mined areas in the Tibesti region dependent on the security situation. Chad also reported that it would also address a number of areas affected by explosive remnants of war during the period of the extension.

[127] Democratic Republic of the Congo in its request to extend its 31 December 2025 deadline, submitted to the Twenty-Second Meeting of the States Parties included the following work plan, among others; land release of 35 hazardous areas through "an implementation plan taking into account priorities based on well-defined criteria"; survey in Dungu and clearance of identified and marked areas.

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[128] Ethiopia in its extension request submitted to the 22MSP projected to survey 147 mined areas spanning 125,177,647 square meters across Afar, Benishangul-Gumuz, Gambella, Oromia, Somali, and Tigray regions, conducting targeted surveys in Tigray and Afar, and performing emergency clearance tasks based on community requests and humanitarian needs.

[129] Guinea Bissau reported the following priorities: a) implementation of non-technical survey 2024-2026, b) implementation of marking and clearance activities in support of the non-technical survey 2024-2026, and c) implementation of marking and clearance activities according to identified needs and priorities 2026-2027.

[130] Nigeria in its request to extend its 31 December 2025 deadline, submitted for consideration to the twenty-Second Meeting of the States Parties, included the following work plan, among others: to start training humanitarian mine action teams to start operations in late 2025 or early 2026. Initial survey and clearance by these teams will take place in priority areas to 2027. Analysis of survey data from these teams will then inform survey and clearance activities from 2027 to 2029.

[131] Somalia in its 2021 extension request contained information on a two-phase work plan designed to be adaptable due to the security situation present in the country, including capacity building, information management, quality assurances, training, and integration of gender and diversity policies.

[132] Ukraine reported milestones in square kilometres.

[133] Yemen reported the following activities: continue of survey and clearance efforts, emergency response, the continuity of YBLS objectives, producing an annual revised work plan to meet its Article 5 obligations, enhancing and improving Information Management, supporting the coordination office – YMACC, and developing a National Mine Action Strategy.

[134] Note: The figures are based on the latest information made available by the respective States Parties, including Article 7 reports, official statements, and data provided directly to the Committee on Victim Assistance in 2025 or in recent years. In several cases, the information is incomplete due to challenges in data collection, and in some cases the identification of mine victims is still ongoing. Most figures refer only to mine survivors and fatalities, not to indirect victims (such as affected families and communities). In many cases, the data covers survivors of anti-personnel mines as well as other types of explosive ordnance and persons with disabilities. Accordingly, the figures remain subject to updates and adjustments.

[135] The Democratic Republic of the Congo stated, in its update provided at the Intersessional Meetings on 18 June 2025, that over 10,000 victims remain unregistered due to insufficient funding.

[136] In 2025 Ethiopia reported that work has been underway to draft a new National Disability Action Plan for the period of 2026-2035.

[137] This figure only includes casualties report for 2024.

[138] Identification of mine victims is yet to be completed – it is estimated that there are around 1,000 to 1,200 mine victims.

[139] Senegal reported that PANAV was initially developed for 2012-2014 and while aiming to develop a new action plan, Senegal continued to pursue achieving the objectives of the PANAV as they remain relevant.

[140] In its 2025 Transparency Report, Zimbabwe stated having an estimated number of 1692 mine/EO casualties and that as of December 2024, 314 mine/EO victims were registered.

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